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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home – so 
close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet they are the 
world of the individual person; the neighbourhood he lives in; the school or college he 
attends; the factory, farm or office where he works. Such are the places where every man, 
woman and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without 
discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning 
anywhere. Without concerned citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look 
in vain for progress in the larger world.” 
 
Eleanor Roosevelt, “In Our Hands”1  
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The practice of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C), also known as 
female circumcision, involves the partial or total removal of the external female 
genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons.2 
The practice is typically performed by traditional practitioners on girls between 
infancy and the age of 15. The practice of FGM/C has no documented health 
benefits and leads to serious health consequences. It is believed to be a 
requirement for marriage and necessary to control women’s sexuality.3 FGM/C 
is often an integral part of cultural heritage and a marker of ethnic identity. 
Although practiced among communities with various religious backgrounds, 
many practitioners believe that FGM/C is a religious obligation under Islam.4 
FGM/C occurs in a wide variety of cultural contexts, with significant 
                                                        
1 Speech delivered on the tenth anniversary of !the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1958). 
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, the first Chair of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, played a 
key role in the development of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.   
2 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 4; World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation, Fact Sheet No. 241, WHO, 
February 2014, available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015]. Chapter III, section 2 and 3 will elaborate further on the definition, 
terminology and classification of FGM/C.  
3 Chapter III, section 9 of this research will provide more information on the reasons and 
justifications for the practice FGM/C.  
4 However, no reference to the practice is to be found in the Quran. See Chapter III, section 9.3 of 
this research for more information about FGM/C and religion.  
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differences in terms of the extent of cutting, the setting in which the practice 
takes place and the rituals associated with it. The following account is given by 
a mother (named Kerthio), who testifies how FGM/C was performed on her 
four-year-old daughter in Senegal: 
 
“A clean straw mat would be laid out in the back courtyard, near where the cooking 
was done, and the tools readied: cloth, a bar of soap, and a razor blade or knife. The 
cutter’s assistant would then go and gather goat dung – it was believed that goat 
excrement had antiseptic qualities – and stir it into a large, metal tub of water, 
steeped with special leaves and perfume. She’d boil the liquid until the firewood 
underneath bloomed crimson with heat and the dung had fully dissolved, and then 
carry the steaming tub to the ground next to the mat, where Kerthio’s daughter 
waited. Sitting cross-legged at the child’s feet, the cutter would grip the razor blade 
in her hands. Too large for such a delicate job, the blade would be carefully broken 
in half. The assistant would grip the child’s arms, pinning them firmly to the 
ground, as the cutter lifted the young girl’s pagne, a traditional wraparound skirt, 
and spread open her legs. Sure to keep as much pressure as she could on the girl’s 
arms, the assistant would instruct Kerthio’s daughter to be brave. It will all be over 
with quickly, she might whisper. And it will all be worth it. Kerthio believed these 
words. Life was filled with hardships and suffering, especially for women. This was 
her daughter’s first opportunity to prove to herself, as well as to the community, 
that she was courageous, that she could endure the excruciating pain so many 
women like Kerthio knew so well themselves. Kerthio wondered if the assistant 
would turn aside her gaze as the cutter took the razor blade and, with a few quick 
cuts, remove the girl’s clitoris and labia. Kerthio might have imagined it, but she 
could sense her daughter’s screams slicing through the distant, heavy air, scattering 
the heat and the flies as she was lifted from the mat and placed into the milky dung 
water, which would quickly turn red with blood. The women would give the water 
time to clean the wound before lifting the trembling girl back onto the mat and 
pressing the area with the wet neem leaves they had collected.”5 
 
This account of Kerthio is one out of millions. According to United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF),6 an estimated 125 million girls and women have 
undergone the practice, and 30 million girls are at risk of undergoing FGM/C 
over the next decade if current trends persist.7 The practice is, according to 
UNICEF, concentrated in 27 countries8 in Africa and two countries in the 
Middle East (Yemen and Iraq). However, UNICEF has been criticized for failing 
to address countries in Asia,9 other countries in the Middle East,10 and Latin 
America11 where the practice is – according to small-scale local research – also 
                                                        
5 A. Molloy, However Long the Night: Molly Melching’s Journey to Help Millions of African Women and 
Girls Triumph, Harper Collins Publishers, 2013, p. 8-9.  
6 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 3.  
7 Ibid, p. 114; United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: What Might the 
Future Hold?, UNICEF, July 2014, p. 2.  
8 Including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and United Republic of 
Tanzania. 
9 Including Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Tajikistan and Thailand.  
10 Including Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Palestinian Territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
United Arab Emirates and Qatar.  
11 Including Colombia.  
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prevalent.12 The total number of girls and women who have undergone FGM/C 
worldwide is likely to be much higher than the figures of UNICEF show.13 The 
practice also became a concern in Europe,14 the United States, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand as a result of international migration from countries where 
FGM/C is prevalent.15 Chapter III will further explain what the practice of 
FGM/C entails. 
 
1.1 The practice of FGM/C within the scope of international and regional 
human rights law 
 
Initially, the practice of FGM/C was placed outside the scope of international 
and regional human rights law.16 The practice was widely viewed as a ‘private’ 
act and a ‘domestic’ matter, performed by private individuals (rather than State 
officials).17 In addition, the international community was of the opinion that the 
practice of FGM/C “formed a part of African customs and traditions” with 
which they “out of respect” did not want to interfere.18 This changed in the 
1990s with the global movement against Violence Against Women (VAW). First, 
the United Nations (UN) classified FGM/C as a form of VAW with the 
adoption of Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women 
(DEVAW).19 Although not legally binding, DEVAW strengthened the growing 
international consensus that FGM/C of any type is a human rights violation.20 
Second, with the adoption of General Recommendation No. 1921 on Violence 
Against Women in 1992, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAWCee) explicitly included VAW within the scope of 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)22 and thus falling under international human rights law.23  
                                                        
12 See Chapter III, section 6.2 of this research for more information about the prevalence of FGM/C 
in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.  
13 See Chapter III, section 6.4 of this research for a discussion on the FGM/C prevalence data.  
14 European Institute for Gender Equality, Female Genital Mutilation in the European Union and Croatia, 
EIGE Publications Office, 2013.  
15 See Chapter III, section 6.3 of this research for more information about the prevalence of FGM/C 
in ‘the West’.  
16 See Chapter IV, section 4 of this research for more information about the classification of FGM/C 
as a human rights violation.  
17 B. Shell-Duncan, From Health to Human Rights: Female Genital Cutting and the Politics of 
Intervention, American Anthropologist, Volume 110, No. 2, 2008, p. 227. 
18 A. Martinez and M.E. Stuart, Out of the Ivory Tower: Feminist Research for Social Change, Canadian 
Scholars’ Press, 2003, p. 125. 
19 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/48/104, 20 December 1993, Article 2(a): “Violence against women shall be understood to 
encompass, but not be limited to, the following: (a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence 
occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, 
dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices 
harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation.” 
20 E. Leye and M.J. Middelburg, Female Genital Mutilation in Europe from a Child Right’s Perspective, in: 
W. Vandenhole et al., Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies, Roudledge, 2015, p. 
298.  
21 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, 1992. 
22 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1249, p. 13. 
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In 1997, the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA) issued a Joint Statement on ‘Female Genital 
Mutilation.’24 In this Joint Statement they described the implications of the 
practice for public health and human rights. In 2008, a wider group of UN 
agencies25 reinforced the classification of FGM/C as a human rights violation in 
the Interagency Statement on ‘Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation.’26 They 
stated the following: 
 
“Female genital mutilation violates a series of well-established human rights 
principles, norms and standards, including the principles of equality and non-
discrimination on the basis of sex, the right to life when the procedure results in 
death, and the right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment as well as the rights identified below. As it interferes with 
healthy genital tissue in the absence of medical necessity and can lead to severe 
consequences for a woman’s physical and mental health, female genital mutilation 
is a violation of a person’s right to the highest attainable standard of health. Female 
genital mutilation has been recognized as discrimination based on sex because it is 
rooted in gender inequalities and power imbalances between men and women and 
inhibits women’s full and equal enjoyment of their human rights. It is a form of 
violence against girls and women, with physical and psychological consequences. 
Female genital mutilation deprives girls and women from making an independent 
decision about an intervention that has a lasting effect on their bodies and infringes 
on their autonomy and control over their lives.”27 
 
This quotation shows that numerous human rights are being violated with the 
practice of FGM/C. These human rights are enshrined in various human rights 
treaties that are legally binding upon States that have ratified them. Important 
human rights instruments at the UN level in relation to the practice of FGM/C 
are the CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).28 Since 
the practice of FGM/C is widespread in large parts of Africa, the human rights 
instruments of the African Union (AU) need to be taken into account as well. 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), also known as 
the “Banjul Charter,”29 the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in 
                                                        
23 Chapter IV, section 4 will further elaborate on the classification of FGM/C as a human rights 
violation from the 1950s to the 1990s.  
24 World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation: A Joint WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA Statement, 
WHO Library, 1997, p. 3. See Chapter IV, section 4.14 for more information about the Joint 
Statement on ‘Female Genital Mutilation.’  
25 Including World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and United Nations Development Fund for Women 
(UNIFEM). 
26 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008.  
27 Ibid, p. 9-10.  
28 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1577, p. 3. 
29 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 27 June 1981. 
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Africa (“Maputo Protocol”),30 the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child (ACRWC)31 and the African Youth Charter (AYC)32 are important in 
relation to the practice of FGM/C. These legally binding human rights 
instruments contain provisions under which FGM/C constitute a violation of 
human rights, and oblige States parties to take measures to prevent and 
eliminate the practice.33  
In addition to these legally binding human rights treaties – or hard law 
instruments – the practice of FGM/C has been specifically addressed in many 
other human rights documents, referred to as soft law instruments. Soft law 
documents are quasi-legal instruments that in principle do not have legally 
binding effect, such as Declarations,34  Programmes and Plans of Action,35 
General Recommendations (GR) and General Comments (GC) of Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies,36 and non-binding resolutions.37 Despite the non-binding 
                                                        
30 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa, 11 July 2003, 
31 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 11 July 1990. 
32 African Union, African Youth Charter, 2 July 2006. 
33 See Chapter IV, section 7.2 of this research for the obligations for States in relation to the 
elimination of FGM/C.  
34 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/48/104, 20 December 1993. 
35 United Nations General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23, 
12 July 1993; United Nations, Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World 
Conference on Women, 27 October 1995.  
36 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision, A/45/38 and Corrigendum, 1990; United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19: 
Violence Against Women, 1992; United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), 
A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. I, 1999; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General 
Comment No. 4: Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, CRC/GC/2003/4, 1 July 2003; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General 
Comment No. 5: General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
CRC/GC/2003/527, November 2003; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General 
Comment No. 7: Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood, CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, 20 September 
2006; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 13: The Right of the 
Child to Freedom from all Forms of Violence, CRC/C/GC/13, 18 April 2011; United Nations Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the United Nations Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, Joint general Recommendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women/General Comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on 
Harmful Practices, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, 14 November 2014. 
37 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 52/99 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting 
the Health of Women and Girls, A/52/637, 12 December 1997; United Nations General Assembly, 
Resolution 53/117 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and Girls, 
A/RES/53/117, 1 February 1999; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 54/133 on Traditional 
or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/54/133, 7 February 2000; 
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 56/128 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the 
Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/56/128, 30 January 2002; United Nations General Assembly, 
Resolution 58/156 on The Girl Child, A/RES/58/156, 26 February 2004; United Nations General 
Assembly, Resolution 60/141 on The Girl Child, A/RES/60/141, 11 January 2006; United Nations 
General Assembly, Resolution 62/140 on The Girl Child, A/RES/62/140, 19 February 2008; United 
Nations General Assembly, Resolution 66/140 on The Girl Child, A/RES/66/140, 27 March 2012; 
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination of 
Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013; United Nations General Assembly, 
Resolution 68/146 on The Girl Child, A/RES/68/146, 4 February 2014. 
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nature of these soft law documents, they are considered relevant and influential 
in the development of international and national human rights law and further 
action against the practice of FGM/C.38 Chapter IV will further elaborate on the 
human rights framework applicable in relation to the practice of FGM/C.  
 
1.2 Global goal to end FGM/C in one generation 
 
In the end, the ultimate goal of the human rights framework is to eliminate the 
practice of FGM/C worldwide. A global commitment to end the practice has 
been set for the first time in 2002 by the UN GA Special Session on Children: 
“To achieve these goals, we will implement the following strategies and actions: 
[…] End harmful traditional or customary practices, such as early and forced 
marriage and female genital mutilation, which violate the rights of children and 
women.”39 The primary objective of the UN was to abandon FGM/C by 2010.40 
This objective was later adjusted to 2015, but these objectives proved not to be 
realistic. In 2008, the UN has set a global goal to eliminate the practice of 
FGM/C within a generation (i.e. next 20 years).41  
The international 42  campaign against FGM/C has gained considerable 
momentum in recent years with three landmark events. In the first place, the 
launch of the ‘UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change’ [hereinafter “Joint Programme”]. 
Initiated in 2008, the Joint Programme became the main UN instrument to 
promote the acceleration of the elimination of FGM/C. 43  Working in 
partnership with national governments, civil society, religious leaders, 
communities and key stakeholders, the Joint Programme aims to support and 
                                                        
38 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 210-229. 
39 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution S-27/2 on A World Fit For Children, A/RES/S-27/2, 
11 October 2002, p. 15, para. 44.9.   
40 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Funding Proposal UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme, p. 16, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/fgm_proposal_donors.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
41 Ibid, p. 21; United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Abandonment of 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Funding Proposal UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme Phase II, January 2014, p. 2, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-
pdf/Funding%20Proposal%20for%20Phase%20II%20of%20the%20UNFPA-
UNICEF%20Joint%20Programme.PDF [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]; United Nations General 
Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination of Female Genital 
Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, p. 5, para. 19.  
42 At the European level, a landmark event was the adoption of the Council of Europe (CoE) 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence 
(“Istanbul Convention”) in May 2011, which entered into force in August 2014. This is the first 
European legally binding instrument specifically devoted to violence against women and domestic 
violence. It is also the first European legally binding instrument that included a provision on the 
practice of FGM/C: Council of Europe, Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against 
Women and Domestic Violence, 11 May 2011, Article 38.  
43 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation Report  
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, 2008-2012, 
Volume I, New York, September 2013, p. viii, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/FGM-report_11_14_2013_Vol-I.pdf [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
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accelerate efforts already being undertaken at the national and regional levels. 
The Joint Programmes focuses on protecting women and girls from FGM/C 
using a human rights-based and culturally sensitive approach. In 2014, a second 
phase of the Joint Programme was launched (January 2014 till December 
2017),44 expanding its work from 15 to 17 countries.45 The goal of phase II is to 
contribute to the global elimination of FGM/C in the next generation,46 more 
specifically to achieve “a 40% decrease in prevalence among girls aged 14 and 
younger in at least five countries, with at least one country declaring total 
elimination of the practice by the end of 2017.”47 
In the second place, the UN General Assembly (GA) adopted in December 
2012 a Resolution on ‘Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination of Female 
Genital Mutilation.’48 Introduced by African States and adopted by consensus, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called the UN Resolution “historic” and “an 
important step towards a world free from violence against women.”49 The 
Resolution emphasized that FGM/C is a human rights violation and called for 
stronger global efforts to end the practice. It urged States to “take all necessary 
measures, including enacting and enforcing legislation, to prohibit female 
genital mutilations and to protect women and girls from this form of violence, 
and to end impunity.”50 
In the third place, the CEDAWCee and the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRCee) adopted a Joint GR/GC on ‘harmful practices’ in November 
2014. In this document, both Committees further clarified the obligations of 
States parties to the CEDAW and CRC by providing “authoritative guidance on 
legislative, policy and other appropriate measures that must be taken to ensure 
full compliance with their obligations under the Conventions to eliminate 
harmful practices.”51  
                                                        
44 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Abandonment of Female 
Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Funding Proposal UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme 
Phase II, January 2014, p. 2, available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-
pdf/Funding%20Proposal%20for%20Phase%20II%20of%20the%20UNFPA-
UNICEF%20Joint%20Programme.PDF [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
45 Including Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Uganda, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. 
46 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Abandonment of Female 
Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Funding Proposal UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme 
Phase II, January 2014, p. 2, available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-
pdf/Funding%20Proposal%20for%20Phase%20II%20of%20the%20UNFPA-
UNICEF%20Joint%20Programme.PDF [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
47 United Nations Population Fund, Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/joint-programme-female-genital-mutilationcutting [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
48 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination 
of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013.  
49 United Nations News Centre, Ban Welcomes UN General Assembly Resolutions Eliminating Female 
Genital Mutilation, 21 December 2012, available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43839#.VfKMu2TtlHw [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015]. 
50 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination 
of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, para. 4.  
51 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint general Recommendation No. 31 of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women/General Comment No. 18 of the Committee on the 
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1.3 Practice of FGM/C remains widespread 
 
Some progress has been made in the past decade at both the international, 
regional and national level. According to the Interagency Statement on 
‘Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation,’ the following has been achieved:  
 
”Much effort has been made to counteract female genital mutilation, through 
research to generate further evidence on which to base interventions, through 
working with communities, through advocacy and by passing laws. Progress has 
been made at both international and local levels. More United Nations agencies are 
involved; human rights treaty monitoring bodies and international resolutions have 
condemned the practice; legal frameworks have improved in many countries; and 
political support for ending female genital mutilation is growing. Most significantly, 
in some countries the prevalence of female genital mutilation has declined, and an 
increasing number of women and men in practising communities are declaring 
their support for its abandonment.”52  
 
In spite of these positive signs, the overall progress has been slow. The 
prevalence of FGM/C has declined in a number of countries, including in the 
Central African Republic, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Egypt.53 However, in other 
countries (including in Sudan, Gambia, Chad and Tanzania) the FGM/C 
prevalence remained constant and in some countries (including in Guinea-
Bissau and Burkina Faso) an increase in prevalence rate can be observed.54 The 
decline in the worldwide FGM/C prevalence is not as substantial as was hoped 
for. In December 2013, the UN GA acknowledged in Resolution 68/146 on the 
Girl Child that the goal of ending FGM/C in the next generation “remains 
unfinished business.”55 In its most recent Resolution, the UN GA stated that 
they remained deeply concerned that, despite the increase in national, regional 
and international efforts and the focus on the elimination of FGM/C, “the 
practice continues to exist in all regions of the world.”56  
Bettina Shell-Duncan, a professor in anthropology at the University of 
Washington who has been studying the practice of FGM/C in many countries 
for years, said in March 2015: “There have been a multitude of different 
strategies, but one of the frustrating things for those working on this issue is 
that there has been surprisingly little success in large-scale abandonment of the 
practice. […] In most countries, there’s no decline in the prevalence of cutting, 
or only the slightest beginning of change among the youngest group of 
                                                        
Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, 14 November 2014, 
para. 2. 
52 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 3. 
53 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 95. 
54 Chapter III, section 6.1 of this research will provide more information on the statistics of UNICEF 
in relation to the prevalence of FGM/C.  
55 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 68/146 on The Girl Child, A/RES/68/146, 4 February 
2014, p. 5.  
56 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination 
of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013.  
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women.”57 The 2012 Report ‘Violating Children’s Rights: Harmful Practices 
based on Tradition, Culture, Religion or Superstition’ of the Council on 
Violence against Children also observed a “devastating failure of international 
and regional human rights mechanisms to provoke the necessary challenge, 
prohibition and elimination.”58  
 
2 THE COMPLIANCE QUESTION 
 
2.1 Gap between State’s commitments and behaviour 
 
International law is built on the foundation of State consent.59 As Henkin 
argued: “No treaty, old or new, whatever its character or subject, is binding on 
a State unless it has consented to it.”60 A State establishes its consent to be 
bound by a treaty by means of “ratification”, “acceptance”, “approval” and 
“accession.”61 With this act, States demonstrate their willingness to undertake 
the legal obligations under international law. The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties62 codified the principle of pacta sunt servanda and established 
that treaties must be respected: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”63  
A growing number of States where FGM/C is prevalent have signed and 
ratified international and regional human rights treaties. As a consequence, the 
human rights framework that is designed to eliminate FGM/C is applicable in 
these countries. States have an obligation under international law to comply 
with the human rights treaties they have ratified. The previous section showed 
that there is no significant overall decline in the worldwide prevalence of 
FGM/C. This raises the question to what extent (and why) States comply, or in 
the case of FGM/C, appear not to comply with the human rights framework. 
There seems to be a gap between State’s commitments to comply with the 
obligations and recommendations set forth in legally binding treaties and non-
binding soft law documents on the one hand and the behaviour of States on the 
other. Does that mean that the commitments of States in relation to the human 
rights framework are “empty promises”? The answer to this question is likely 
to be negative. Most probably, State’s commitments are more than just empty 
promises.  
                                                        
57 D. Bach, UW Expert Part of International Research Project on Female Genital Cutting, University of 
Washington, 13 March 2015, available at http://www.washington.edu/news/2015/03/13/uw-
expert-part-of-international-research-project-on-female-genital-cutting/ [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015].  
58 International NGO Council on Violence against Children, Violating Children’s Rights: Harmful 
Practices Based on Tradition, Culture, Religion or Superstition, October 2012, p. v, available at 
https://srsg.violenceagainstchildren.org/sites/default/files/documents/docs/InCo_Report_15Oct
.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
59 A.T. Guzman, Against Consent, Virginia Journal of International Law, Volume 52, 2011, p. 747. 
60 L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 28.  
61 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, Volume 1155, p. 331, Article 2(b).  
62 Senegal acceded to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1986.  
63 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, Volume 1155, p. 331, Article 26.  
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The question when and why States comply with international law has become 
of central interest among scholars from different disciplines. Guzman64 and 
Bradford65 explain that the question of compliance is one of the most central 
questions within the international legal academy: “the absence of an 
explanation for why States obey international law in some instances but not 
others threatens to undermine the very foundations of the discipline.”66 Other 
scholars argue that without an understanding of the connection between 
international law and the behaviour of States, an explanation for the function of 
the international legal system is missing.67 The ‘compliance question’ challenges 
the efficacy of international law and questions the authenticity of State’s legal 
commitments to protect and promote human rights.68  Hafner-Burton and 
Tsutsui stated the following: “What good are international human rights 
treaties if they do not improve the human rights situation on the ground?”69 In 
the end, the goal of the human rights framework is to translate human rights 
into a lasting reality.  
 
2.2 Theories explaining compliance with international law  
 
The literature on compliance with international law represents an example of 
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research undertaken at the boundaries 
of International Relations (IR) and International Law (IL).70 In general, IL and IR 
scholars sought to answer the question of compliance with the aim to gain a 
deeper understanding of the role of international law in shaping State 
behaviour. IL scholars started to study the compliance question from the 1960s 
onwards, but IR scholars were not interested in international law at that time 
and neglected for instance the adoption of the UDHR.71 They became interested 
in the importance of international law in general and the human rights 
framework in particular in the 1970s, because of changes in world politics and 
international law (i.e. the rise of the UN and other international and regional 
organizations) and the fact that human rights were prominently present in 
international politics.72 They were puzzled by the growth of international law 
and the human rights movement. The legal landscape changed significantly 
during these years: the expansion of international institutions and regimes, the 
                                                        
64 A.T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, California Law Review, Volume 
90, 2002, p. 1826. 
65 W.C. Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of War, SSRN, 6 June 2004, 
p. 6, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=555894 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.555894 [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015]. 
66 A.T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, California Law Review, Volume 
90, 2002, p. 1826. 
67 M. Burgstaller, Amenities and Pitfalls of a Reputational Theory of Compliance with International 
Law, Nordic Journal of International Law, Volume 76, 2007, p. 42.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid. 
70 H.M. Hensel, Sovereignty and the Global Community: the Quest for Order in the International System, 
Ashgate Publishing, 2004, p. 111.  
71 L. Hoder, Is there a Theory of International Legal Compliance?, Paper for the ECPR Graduate 
Conference 2010, Panel International Norms: Recent Developments in a Growing Debate, Dublin, 
Ireland, 31 august 2010, p. 2.    
72 H.H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, Nebraska Law Review, Volume 75, 1996, p. 191. 
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increase of non-State actors and the influence of international law in national 
legal systems.73 As a result of IR scholars’ rising curiosity in international law, 
they became sensitive to the issue of compliance and developed theories 
explaining compliance with international law.74 The issue of compliance became 
an area of research for IR scholars and IL scholars alike.  
Although IR and IL covered the same ‘territory’, the two disciplines evolved 
independently of one another and at first reached different conclusions about 
the functions and influence of international law. Abbot wrote the following 
about the estrangement between IL and IR: “With a few notable exceptions, 
scholars in these two fields have long proceeded on separate tracks. They have 
for the most part worked independently, published in different journals, 
attended different conferences, and cited each other’s work only to a very 
limited degree. Over time, scholars in each field have become unfamiliar with 
the other’s research agenda, making cooperation increasingly difficult.”75 The 
advantages made by each discipline in examining and theorizing compliance 
were ignored by the other discipline.76 Koh argued: “By the early 1980s, the 
schism between the two disciplines was nearly complete. International lawyers 
tended to find the glass half full […] while international relations theorists 
found the glass half empty.”77 The existing disagreements about the theories of 
compliance between IR scholars and IL scholars are still ingredients for a lively 
academic debate. The two disciplines provide different (though not 
uncomplimentary) answers to the question of compliance. 78  As Simmons 
argued: “The literature on international rule compliance is quite disparate in 
methods, theoretical orientation, and findings.”79 However, as Chapter II will 
show, research agendas in IL and IR have converged around the ‘compliance 
question’ in the past decade. The chasm between the two disciplines has 
narrowed as IL and IR theorists have begun to share insights, sometimes 
resulting in articles in co-authorship. In addition, new interdisciplinary theories 
have been developed providing an answer to the ‘compliance question’.  
                                                        
73 In states with a dualist system, international law is not directly applicable at the national level. It 
is required to translate international law into national legislation before the national courts can 
apply it. However, in states with a monist system, international law does not need to be translated 
into national law. The act of ratifying a treaty immediately incorporates the treaty into national law.  
74 Sonia Cardenas argued that human rights research has entered the mainstream of political science. 
She studied the number of articles in the political science top-ranked publications to answer the 
question how much human rights influenced political science scholarship. Before 1980, only 34 
articles were published on human rights, 36 articles in the 1980s, 60 articles in the 1990s and 459 
between 2000 and August 2008. Yet, she concluded that despite this dramatic growth in human 
rights scholarship, human rights research remains relatively marginal among major political science 
publications. See S. Cardenas, Mainstreaming Human Rights: Publishing Trends in Political Science, 
Political Science & Politics, Volume 42, 2009.     
75 K.W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 
Yale Journal of International Law, Volume 14, 1989, p. 337.  
76 O.A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Yale Law Journal, Volume 112, 
2002, p. 1942-1943.  
77 H.H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, Nebraska Law Review, Volume 75, 1996, p. 191-192.  
78 R.B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory: An Overview, in: J. Cameron et al., Improving Compliance with 
International Environmental Law, Earthscan, 1996, p. 3-4. 
79 B.A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs, American Political Science Review, Volume 94, No. 4, 2000, p. 819-835. 
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3 A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
Since the ‘compliance question’ touches upon the “foundations” of international 
(human rights) law in general in shaping the behaviour of States, a short history 
of the development of international human rights law will be provided below.  
 
3.1 The adoption of the United Nations Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 
 
After the devastation of World War II, the protection of human rights became 
one of the most pressing goals of the international community.80  In 1945, 
governments committed themselves to establishing the UN. Besides 
maintaining international peace and security, one of the central reasons for 
founding the UN is to promote and encourage universal respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.81 In the preamble of the Charter of the UN, 
the drafters reaffirmed their “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small.”82 To advance this goal, the UN established in 1946 the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). The UNCHR83 was 
charged with the task of drafting a document spelling out the meaning of these 
human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the UN Charter, which 
would later become known as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).84 
In 1948, with the adoption of the UDHR, for the first time in history an 
international document had come into being which defined the rights of every 
human being in detail. The preamble of the UDHR starts out with the words: 
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world.” The very name of the document and the preamble 
emphasizes that the UDHR was to set standards of rights for all people 
everywhere.85 The belief was that everyone, anywhere in the world, simply by 
virtue of his or her humanity (rather than having the rights contingently, on the 
basis of specific qualifications, such as citizenship or national laws), is entitled 
to human rights. 86  The adoption of the UDHR constituted a landmark 
achievement in human rights law, because it was the first international human 
rights document. The UDHR has been described as “the constitution of the 
                                                        
80 E.M. Hafner-Burton and K. Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty 
Promises, American Journal of Sociology, Volume 110, No. 5, 2005, p. 1373.  
81 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, Article 1 and Article 55(c).  
82 Ibid, preamble. 
83 The drafting committee of the UDHR consisted of: Eleanor Roosevelt (Chairperson – US), Peng-
chun Chang (Vice-chair - China), Charles Malik (Rapporteur - Lebanon), William Hodgson 
(Australia), Hernán Santa Cruz (Chile), René Cassin (France), Alexander E. Bogomolov (USSR), 
Charles Dukes (United Kingdom) and John P. Humphrey (Canada). 
84 United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948. 
85 M. Dziva et al., Examining the Significance and Controversy of Human Rights Education in 
Developing Countries, Journal of Human Ecology, Volume 45, No. 3, 2014, p. 198.  
86 A. Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Volume 32, No. 4, 2004, 
p. 315-316. 
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entire human rights movement” and the “single most cited human rights 
instrument.” 87  Nearly all human rights instruments and documents were 
inspired by, and include abundant references to, the UDHR.88 According to the 
UN, the UDHR “is generally agreed to be the foundation of international 
human rights law.”89 
 
3.2 International Bill of Human Rights 
 
The adoption of the UN Charter and the UDHR were the first steps at the 
international level to creating a human rights framework. 90  According to 
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, the adoption of the UN Charter and the UDHR 
“provided a window of opportunity for States, international organizations, and 
civil society actors and organizations to place human rights on the international 
legal agenda.” The UDHR was not a treaty in the formal sense, because it was 
not ratified by States, but enacted as a resolution by the GA. Since the UN 
Charter does not give power to the GA to make international law, the UDHR 
originally lacked any binding force under international law.91 However, as soon 
as the UDHR was enacted, attempts were made to further develop and translate 
the standards in the UDHR into an internationally legally binding human rights 
convention. Although the UDHR emphasizes universal respect and adherence 
to all human rights (and does not distinguish between on the one hand civil and 
political rights and on the other hand economic, social and cultural rights),92 
there was an intense debate in the early 1950s on the question whether the unity 
of the UDHR should be maintained or whether the UDHR should be split up 
into two separate treaties. This debate was rooted in an ideological conflict 
between the supporters of political rights and liberal democracy (e.g. the United 
States and its allies) versus the supporters of economic rights and socialism (e.g. 
the Soviet bloc). The socialist States insisted on the interdependence and 
indivisibility of all human rights and they advocated for one human rights 
covenant. However, in the end, Western States succeeded in preventing the 
creation of one human rights covenant. They demanded a division of the 
                                                        
87 H.J. Steiner et al., International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and Materials, 
Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 136. 
88 D. Shelton, The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, 2013, 
p. 1.  
89 United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
90 Before World War II, States limited their international obligations to declarations of intent and to 
a small number of treaties and conventions, for example the formal prohibition of the slave trade by 
the Treaty of Vienna (1815) and the General Act of Brussels. See also: E.M. Hafner-Burton and K. 
Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, American Journal of 
Sociology, Volume 110, No. 5, 2005, p. 1374.  
91 The GA is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN. All 193 UN 
Member States are represented in the GA, making it the only UN body with universal 
representation. For more information, see United Nations, Main Organs, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/index.html [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015].  
92 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 421(V) on Draft International Covenant on Human 
Rights and Measures of Implementation: Future Work of the Commission on Human Rights, A/1775, 4 
December 1950.  
 
 
Chapter I 
16 
UDHR into two different tracks: one treaty for the protection of civil and 
political rights and one treaty for the protection of economic, social and cultural 
rights.93 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)94 and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICSCR)95 
were adopted in 1966 and entered into force ten years later in 1976. Together 
with the UDHR, they form the International Bill of Human Rights, which now 
stands at the centre of the human rights regime.96  
 
3.3 Growing body of human rights law 
 
During the years following the signing of the ICCPR and the ICSCR, the body 
of human rights law grew rapidly. While before the adoption of the UDHR 
there were virtually no international human rights instruments, the post-World 
War II era has seen a proliferation of human rights declarations, conventions, 
protocols, treaties, charters and agreements. As Hathaway explains: “Over the 
last half-century, the number of treaties that address issues of human rights has 
grown from a handful to hundreds.” 97  This rapid growth resulted in a 
worldwide structure of international law designed for the protection and 
promotion of human rights.98 International human rights law became, in a 
relatively short period of time, an important branch of international law. 
Between 1965 and 2006, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),99 CEDAW, the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT),100 CRC, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), 101  the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 102  and the 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(ICED)103 were adopted. These seven human rights treaties, together with the 
ICCPR and the ICSCR are now generally regarded as the nine “core” UN 
                                                        
93 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 543(VI) on the Preparation of two Draft International 
Covenants on Human Rights, A/2119, 5 February 1952.  
94 United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 999, p. 171.  
95 United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 
December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 993, p. 3. 
96 H.J. Steiner et al., International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and Materials, 
Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 133. 
97 O.A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and 
Public Policy Working Papers, Yale Law School, Paper 273, 2003, p. 1.  
98 D. Shelton, The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, 2013, 
p. 1.  
99 United Nations General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 660, p. 195. 
100 United Nations General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85. 
101 United Nations General Assembly, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, A/RES/45/158, 18 December 1990.  
102 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/61/106, 24 January 2007. 
103 United Nations General Assembly, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, 20 December 2006.  
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human rights treaties.104 These “core” human rights treaties (listed below in 
table 1.1) are legally binding upon States that have ratified the treaty.  
 
Table 1.1 The nine “core” UN human rights treaties 
 
Treaty Adoption by GA 
Entry 
into force 
 
Number of 
ratifying 
States105 
 
 
ICERD 
 
1965 
 
1969 
 
177 
ICCPR 1966 1976 168 
ICESCR 1966 1976 164 
CEDAW 1979 1981 189 
CAT 1984 1987 158 
CRC 1989 1990 196 
ICRMW 1990 2003 48 
CRPD 2006 2008 159 
ICED 2006 2010 50 
 
In addition to these human rights treaties, various optional protocols106 have 
been adopted, further extending the obligations and rights guaranteed in the 
“core” human rights treaties. Each of the “core” human rights treaties has 
established a committee of independent experts, or a so-called Treaty 
Monitoring Body tasked with the competence to monitor the implementation of 
and compliance with the treaty provisions by its State Parties. An important 
part of their work consists of fact-finding, i.e. trying to get all relevant 
                                                        
104 The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights refers to ten “core” 
human rights instruments and includes the Optional Protocol to the CAT as the tenth “core” human 
rights treaty. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Core International Human 
Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
105 As of 1 October 2015, see United Nations, Treaty Collection, Chapter IV: Human Rights, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015]. 
106 Including the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OP-
ICESCR), the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR-
OP 1), the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (ICCPR-OP 2), the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (OP-CEDAW), the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(OP-CAT), the Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement 
of children in armed conflict (OP-CRC-AC), the Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (OP-CRC-SC), the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure 
(OP-CRC-IC) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(OP-CRPD). 
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information on a State’s compliance behaviour.107 Some Optional Protocols 
created additional institutional mechanisms for ensuring compliance, for 
example by providing individuals the means to submit complaints about the 
violation of their human rights against their governments. 
One of the goals of the UN was the universal ratification of the “core” 
human rights treaties. Therefore, the UN has put an effort to push States to sign 
and ratify these treaties.108 Nowadays, the vast majority of States have ratified 
nearly all “core” human rights treaties over a relatively short period of time. 
More precisely, as table 1.1 shows, seven of the “core” UN human rights treaties 
have been ratified by more than 150 States. These States thus consented to be 
bound by the norms and legal obligations to protect the fundamental rights of 
every human being through law. Some scholars therefore argue that the human 
rights framework became an “accepted fact of international life.”109 For many 
scholars and activists alike, this rapid growth of the international human rights 
framework and the high formal acceptance of these human rights instruments 
suggested “substantial progress towards universal recognition of human rights 
norms.”110 However, despite the growing body of human rights law and the 
increasing global legal commitments of States to protect human rights, the 
question remains what difference these human rights norms make in actual 
State practice.111  
 
4 TRANSLATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO PRACTICE 
 
4.1 Do human rights treaties improve respect for human rights on the ground? 
 
For a long time, international law scholars firmly believed that human rights 
treaties improved respect for human rights in practice. There was a widespread 
confidence that international law in general, and the human rights framework 
in particular, mattered and had the power to shape States’ behaviour and to 
improve human rights practices. Goodman and Jinks argued: “The normative 
appeal of international law is predicated upon the view that well-designed 
rules will — in general and on average — promote peace, stability and good 
governance.”112 International law was seen as a means to achieve human rights 
objectives. After all, a lot of diplomatic effort was put in negotiating human 
rights treaties and in encouraging States to ratify them. 113  But is the 
                                                        
107 W.J.M. Van Genugten et al., Loopholes, Risks and Ambivalences in International Lawmaking: 
The Case of a Framework Convention on Victims' Rights, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 
Volume 37, 2007, p. 137.  
108 O.A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and 
Public Policy Working Papers, Yale Law School, Paper 273, 2003, p. 1; H.J. Steiner et al., International 
Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 14-36.  
109 R.K.M. Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 162.  
110 L.C. Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It 
Make a Difference in Human Rights Behaviour?, Journal of Peace Research, Volume 36, 1999, p. 95. 
111 S. Baumbartner, Does Access to Justice Improve Countries’ Compliance With Human Rights 
Norms? – An Empirical Study, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 44, 2011, p. 442.     
112 R. Goodman and D. Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, European Journal of 
International Law, Volume 14, No. 1, 2003, p. 171.  
113 E.A. Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 69. 
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international human rights framework able to mitigate or eliminate the 
problems it is designed to address? 
 
4.2 No State has a perfect human rights record  
 
Unfortunately, the current state of affairs suggests that non-compliance with 
international law is very common, particularly in the area of human rights. 
Pillay (former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) said during an 
interview: “I would say that not a single State can claim to have a perfect 
human rights record. There are issues of concern in every country in the 
world.”114 Also the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights 
reveal that there is not one country in the world with a perfect or near-perfect 
human rights record.115 While the majority of States have ratified nearly all the 
“core” human rights treaties, human rights violations remain widespread. The 
aspirations of the UDHR of a world in which human rights are being respected 
everwhere have not been achieved.  
Today, news reaches us faster than ever before and much of it concerns 
human rights violations. Merry argued: “there are fissures between the global 
settings where human rights ideas are codified into documents and the local 
communities where the subjects of these rights live and work.”116 Posner is very 
sceptical and argues that human rights law has failed to accomplish its 
objectives.117 He claims that there is little evidence that human rights treaties 
have improved the wellbeing of people. In his book, The Twilight of Human 
Rights Law,118 he concludes that international human rights law has little real 
impact.119 To substantiate his claim, he wrote the following: 
 
“In much of the Islamic world, women lack equality, religious dissenters are 
persecuted and political freedoms are curtailed. The Chinese model of development, 
which combines political repression and economic liberalism, has attracted 
numerous admirers in the developing world. Political authoritarianism has gained 
ground in Russia, Turkey, Hungary and Venezuela. Backlashes against LGBT rights 
have taken place in countries as diverse as Russia and Nigeria. The traditional 
champions of human rights – Europe and the United States – have floundered. 
Europe has turned inward as it has struggled with a sovereign debt crisis, 
xenophobia towards its Muslim communities and disillusionment with Brussels. 
The United States, which used torture in the years after 9/11 and continues to kill 
civilians with drone strikes, has lost much of its moral authority. Even age-old 
scourges such as slavery continue to exist. A recent report estimates that nearly 30 
                                                        
114 United Nations News Center, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, 28 August 2014, 
available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers.asp?NewsID=110 [Last Accessed 1 
October  2015].  
115 S.P. Baumgartner, Does Access To Justice Improve Countries’ Compliance with Human Rights 
Norms? – An Empricial Study, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 44, 2011, p. 446.  
116 S.E. Merry, Human Rights & Gender Violence, Translating International Law into Local Justice, 
University of Chicago Press, 2006, p. 2-3.  
117 E.A. Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 7. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid, p. x.  
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million people are forced against their will to work. It wasn’t supposed to be like 
this.”120 
 
Similarly, Koskenniemi’s critical and often cited From Apology to Utopia 121 
portrays the international legal doctrine as contradictory and repetitive 
argumentative routine that is incapable of producing meaningful “legal” 
results.122  
 
4.3 Empirical evidence on human rights treaty compliance 
 
IL and IR theories alone do not tell us all about the ability of international law 
to generate real change at the national level. Shaffer and Ginsburg claimed: “the 
theoretical debate over whether international law matters is a stale one. What 
matters now is the study of the conditions under which international law is 
formed and has effects. International law is the product of specific forces and 
factors; it accomplishes its ends under particular conditions.”123 The question of 
compliance with international human rights law is not only fundamental from a 
theoretical, but also from an empirical perspective.124 Goodman and Jinks 
argued that, in the end, the question whether human rights treaties improve 
human rights conditions on the ground is empirical in character. They were 
among the first scholars that noted the importance of empirical work in human 
rights scholarship.125  
Empirical work on international law and compliance was rare until two 
decades ago. Before the 1990s, scholars did not empirically assess the 
compliance question. The following quotations from scholars illustrate this. 
Simmons argued for example: “Despite the recent interest in issues surrounding 
compliance, and more generally the effects of rules on international politics, the 
effort to link theory with evidence is still in its infancy.”126 Mitchell used similar 
wordings and argued: “empirical understanding of the impact of international 
law on behaviour, at least by political scientists, remains in its infancy.”127 
Hafner-Burton refers to this as “persistent gaps between rhetorical success and 
empirical reality.”128 Hoder argued: “the lack of empirical testing of these 
                                                        
120 E.A. Posner, The Case Against Human Rights, The Guardian, 4 December 2014, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights [Last Accessed 
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University Press, 2005. 
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theories makes this theoretically sophisticated interdisciplinary work very 
vague. There is a lack of systematic, multi-case comparative studies, which 
restrict the nature of claims and prescriptions that compliance theorists can 
present.”129 Baumgartner argued: “Not until recently, however, have scholars 
undertaken the task of considering in depth the way in which international 
human rights law affects actual State practice. The result has been a number of 
theories to explain the behaviour of States in the face of human rights 
obligations and international norms more generally. However, few of these 
theories have been tested empirically.”130 
This has changed in the past fifteen years.131 A new generation of empirical 
research emerged on how international human rights law works in different 
contexts. Kingsbury noted: “The much-needed empirical work on compliance is 
beginning to appear in increasing quantity, involving case studies, large-n 
series, and other methodologies.” 132  Pioneering scholars with different 
backgrounds (mostly political scientists and law professors) took an effort to 
move beyond the descriptive theoretical work in the field of compliance. They 
attempted to rigorously test the premise that international human rights law 
improves respect for human rights.133 Most of this empirical work seeks to 
directly address the question if international human rights law matters. They 
have used different empirical methods and statistical techniques to evaluate in 
the first place why States sign and ratify international human rights treaties and 
in the second place how those treaties influence State behaviour. Since 
international law’s normativity is aimed at changing the behaviour of States, 
scholars have tried to examine the effectiveness of international human rights 
law by studying whether a State’s human rights performance improved after 
treaty ratification. In other words: whether treaty ratification reduces human 
rights violations. Most (but not all) of the empirical studies on compliance with 
international human rights treaties are quantitative and “help refine theoretical 
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hypothesis and determine the conditions under which particular claims are 
valid or invalid.”134 
The findings of these empirical studies on compliance (and non-compliance) 
with international human rights law are surprising, striking and at times 
controversial. Although a few scholars are optimistic and have (limited) 
empirical evidence that – in certain circumstances – human rights treaties 
improve respect for human rights, 135  a growing body of empirical work 
suggests that international human rights law has limited effect on the behaviour 
of States. Contrary to what is expected, treaty ratification is according to these 
studies not associated with better domestic human rights practices. Contrary to 
what was expected, some of these studies136 show that treaty ratification might 
have negative effects on human rights practices and might in some instances 
even increase human rights violations. Hathaway, for instance, claims that 
ratification of human rights treaties is associated with worse, rather than better, 
human rights practices. She claims that States “use ratification as a symbolic 
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substitute for real improvements in their citizens’ lives.”137 Hathaway argues 
that ratifying human rights treaties can relieve pressure for change imposed by 
international actors, who may rely more heavily on positions than effects in 
evaluating countries’ records.138 As a consequence, this reduction in pressure 
may in turn lead a ratifying State to improve its human rights practices less 
than it might otherwise.139 According to Hathaway, ratifying States often appear 
less likely, rather than more likely, to conform to the requirements of the 
treaties than countries that do not ratify these treaties. It has, according to 
Hathaway, an opposite effect, because these States use treaty ratification as a 
shield to pursue more repressive behaviour.140  
With her groundbreaking research, she shook scholarly faith in the human 
rights regime, especially the beliefs and assumptions of IL scholars. In the 
following years, more empirical studies were conducted studying the 
‘compliance question’. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui found the same “disturbing 
trend”141 as Hathaway, and they argued that many States ratify human rights 
treaties without the will or capability to change their behaviour in accordance 
with the provisions of human rights treaties, mainly because of the “strong 
pressures to ratify international human rights treaties and the relatively low 
cost of ratification.”142 According to Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, the act of 
ratification puts a legitimate face on the State and gives States a cover to violate 
human rights.143 Similar to Hathaway, they argue that because of the weak 
institutional mechanisms to enforce and monitor compliance with human rights 
treaties, it offers States the opportunity to ratify human rights treaties as a 
matter of window dressing rather than a serious commitment to implement 
respect for human rights in practice.144 Both authors therefore conclude that 
treaty ratification is little more than a “paradox of empty promises”.145  
The majority of empirical studies focusing on the ‘compliance question’ did 
not find evidence that international human rights law has improved human 
rights practices on the ground. The negative research results in relation to 
human rights treaty compliance have drawn much attention and stirred up the 
academic debate about the impact of international human rights law.  The study 
of human rights treaty compliance has been a “tremendously productive area of 
research”146 over the past fifteen years. The empirical data now available to 
assess compliance is more extensive and informative than a few years ago and 
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one could say that the study of human rights treaty compliance has 
significantly advanced.147 Despite this progress made in the past years, the 
current empirical evidence on compliance and non-compliance with 
international human rights law is still rather thin and a long way from being 
settled, since controversies and lacunae still remain. Hathaway recognized that 
“we must not jump to conclusions about the worth of human rights treaties” 
based solely on her quantitative analysis. She writes that even if the results of 
her study are accurate, they do not preclude the possibility that human rights 
treaties have a favourable impact on human rights. She argues: “Although 
countries that ratify human rights treaties on the whole appear not to have 
better human rights practices than would otherwise be expected, treaties may 
have broader positive effects not captured by the analysis.”148   
Analysing human rights treaty compliance is not a simple thing,149 especially 
because human rights performance is not easily measurable. Part of the 
difficulty in the empirical study of the ‘compliance question’ has been 
methodological. Much disagreement exists on the appropriate methodological 
approaches and the most suitable (statistical) technique or model to be used. 
Kingsbury argued: “As those engaged in this work readily acknowledge, the 
methodological obstacles to this inquiry are severe.”150 Hafner-Burton and Ron 
argued that there is a wide gap between qualitative and quantitative 
researchers, mainly because of their methodologically induced differences: “it 
seems that opinions are shaped, at least in part, by the choice of research 
method. Those working in the more established case study tradition tend 
toward greater optimism, while those working in the newer quantitative genre 
are more sceptical.”151 Von Stein noted that it is obviously unsatisfactory if the 
answer to the question of compliance is that “it depends on the sample, or on 
the statistical technique being used.” 152  Currently, it seems that scholarly 
debates about the ‘compliance question’ focus more on method rather than 
substance.153 On the one hand, IL scholars accuse IR scholars that they became 
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too obsessed with methodological rigor. On the other hand, IL scholars often do 
not specify the assumptions underlying their analysis and that leads, according 
to IR scholars, to “methodological unsophistication.”154 IR scholars also accuse 
IL scholars that they do not take empirical work seriously: “They rarely do case 
studies to test the claims of descriptive inference or causality that underlie so 
much of their work.”155 
 
5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Taking into account the above, the state of the art in current research is clear. 
Theoretical explanations in relation to the ‘compliance question’ point in 
different directions and systematic empirical evidence on human rights treaty 
compliance is still rather limited and coloured by methodological difficulties. 
Simmons therefore concluded that we are still “a long way theoretically and 
empirically from an understanding of the conditions under which governments 
comply with international agreements.”156  
This research will dive into this current gap in existing literature. In the first 
place, this research will map the development of IL and IR theories explaining 
compliance and non-compliance with international (human rights) law from the 
1960s up to now. More specifically, the different factors that follow from these 
IL and IR theories that provide a possible answer to the ‘compliance question’ 
will be analyzed. In the second place, this research will empirically address the 
‘compliance question’ in relation to the practice of FGM/C by conducting a case 
study in Senegal.157 However, the empirical data achieves significance when 
viewed in relation to theoretical concerns.158 Peters explains for example that 
compliance research is both empirical research, as well as theory-based 
research.159 She refers to Shaffer and Ginsburg who have called this “emergent 
analytics”, which they define as “analytics that oscillate between empirical 
finding, real-world testing, and back again.” 160  In this way, theoretical 
engagement becomes part of “a dynamic, recurrent, interactive process with 
empirical assessment of international law in action.”161 As social theorist Merton 
wrote, “empirical research goes far beyond the passive role of verifying and 
testing theory: it does more than confirm or refute hypotheses. Research plays 
                                                        
Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 116-117; R. Goodman and D. Jinks, Measuring the Effects of 
Human Rights Treaties, European Journal of International Law, Volume 14, No. 1, 2003, p. 171-183.  
154 J. Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, Stanford Law 
Review, Volume 52, 2000, p. 984.  
155 S.D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 114-115.  
156 B.A. Simmons, Compliance With International Agreements, Annual Review of Political Science, 
Volume 1, No.1, 1998, p. 91. 
157 Section 7 of this chapter will provide more information on the methodology used in this research, 
as well as the selection criteria and the justifications why Senegal was selected as a case study. 
158 A. Peters, Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour, The European Journal of International Law, 
Volume 24, No. 2, 2013, p. 547.  
159 A. Peters, Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour, The European Journal of International Law, 
Volume 24, No. 2, 2013, p. 547.  
160 G. Shaffer and T. Ginsburg, Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, American Journal of 
International Law, Volume 106, No. 1, 2012, p. 1.  
161 Ibid.  
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an active role: It initiates, it reformulates, it deflects, and it clarifies theory.”162 
Therefore, the data gathered in the field will be connected with the theories 
developed by IL and IR scholars in Chapter VI.  
 
The central research question of this research is the following:  
 
Which factors explain compliance and/or non-compliance with the human 
rights framework in relation to the practice of Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting in Senegal?  
 
This central research question is sub-divided into the following five sub-
questions: 
 
1. Which factors follow from international law and international 
relations theories that explain compliance and non-compliance with 
international law in general and the human rights framework in 
particular?  
2. What does the practice of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting entail? 
3. Which human rights are being violated with the practice of Female 
Genital Mutilation/Cutting?  
4. What are the duties of States (and non-State actors) concerning Female 
Genital Mutilation/Cutting prescribed by the human rights framework?  
5. To what extent is Senegal in compliance with the human rights 
framework in relation to Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting, and 
which factors explain compliance and/or non-compliance with this 
framework? 
 
6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
The objective motivating this study is to contribute to the ‘body of knowledge’ 
concerning compliance with international human rights law, especially in 
relation to the practice of FGM/C, by employing an innovative research design. 
Although most scholars empirically studying the ‘compliance question’ have 
adopted a quantitative approach, and some scholars therefore claim that there 
is a trend towards the “quantification” of the study of international law,163 in 
this research the ‘compliance question’ was qualitatively addressed by 
conducting a case study in Senegal. Simmons argued that innovative research 
designs “will help to deepen our knowledge about what makes international 
law compliance especially problematic (or not).”164 That is exactly the objective 
of this research. As the previous sections have shown, the compliance literature 
has advanced considerably in recent years. Von Stein argues that we have “a 
better – though admittedly still incomplete – understanding” of the 
                                                        
162 R.K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press, 1968, p. 157. 
163 J. von Stein, International Law: Understanding Compliance and Enforcement, in: R. Denemark, 
International Studies Compendium, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 5. 
164 B.A. Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 13, 
No. 1, 2010, p. 45.  
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mechanisms that underlie compliance. 165  In addition, she explains that: 
“Scholars are taking seriously the proposition that States comply for reasons 
other than expectations of enforcement, which is leading to a richer 
understanding of how international law works.”166 
Drawing on theories of IL and IR and by conducting an extensive empirical 
study in Senegal, this study will enrich our understanding of how and the 
conditions under which, international law in general and the human rights 
framework in particular works. More specifically, this research explores when, 
where, and to what extent the human rights framework is complied with or 
violated in relation to the practice of FGM/C. The intention of this research is to 
narrow the gap between abstract theory, empirical research, and the world of 
practice. This research aims to contribute to both relevant bodies of theory, as 
well as to current practice in relation to FGM/C. This research will lead to a 
better understanding of the problems related to the ‘compliance question’ and 
how they can be addressed, since this study will provide valuable insights for 
promoting human rights compliance. 
The issue of generalization is important to both these aims. Because how can 
you generalize from a single case? This is a common concern in case study 
research.167 Senegal is selected as case study, but this country has not been 
chosen as a representative sample of all countries where FGM/C exists. 
However, the case study in Senegal can be viewed as a ‘critical case’,168 which 
can serve to falsify the assumed compliance with the human rights framework 
by IL scholars, while similarly calling into question the extent to which States – 
in this case Senegal – comply with the human rights framework. The outcome 
of the analysis and the insights that will be provided in this case study might be 
applicable for comparable countries (democratic States with a strong civil 
society) as well.  
The outcome of this research will be an incentive for the UN, the AU and 
States (especially Senegal) to have a closer look at their (ratified) human rights 
instruments and documents and their compliance strategies at the international, 
regional and national level. This study might contribute to improvement of 
existing approaches towards compliance with the human rights framework in 
relation to the elimination of the practice of FGM/C. 
This research does not only target academia (including IL scholars, IR 
scholars and social scientists), but also other actors (practitioners, government 
officials, international organizations, CSOs) who are involved in the day-to-day 
struggle of implementing human rights (in relation to the practice of FGM/C) 
at the national level. This research will also have practical relevance to the work 
of international organisations, especially to the UN and AU Treaty Monitoring 
Bodies. 
 
                                                        
165 J. von Stein, International Law: Understanding Compliance and Enforcement, in: R. Denemark, 
International Studies Compendium, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 5.  
166 Ibid.  
167 R.K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage Publications, 2013, p. 20. 
168 L.P. Ruddin, You Can Generalize Stupid! Social Scientists, Bent Flyvbjerg, and Case Study 
Methodology, Qualitative Inquiry, Volume 12, 2006, p. 803. 
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7 METHODOLOGY  
 
7.1 Combination of research methods 
 
Taking into account the socio-legal nature of this research, a combination of 
research methods is required. Traditional legal research methods revolving 
around the study and interpretation of primary legal resources (e.g. legislation, 
case law) and secondary legal resources (e.g. literature) are combined with 
research methods and techniques of social sciences. Desk research is combined 
with empirical research in Senegal. More specifically, a qualitative case study 
research strategy is used and the main methods of data collection are document 
analysis and semi-structured interviews. The methodology applied for the desk 
research and empirical research are explained more in detail in Chapter II 
(literature review), Chapter IV (legal analysis) and V (empirical study). Section 
7.4 below will explain why Senegal is selected as the case study country.    
 
7.2 Interdisciplinary research 
 
This research is interdisciplinary, since no single discipline has all the answers 
to the rather complex ‘compliance question’. Cardenas explained: “The study of 
compliance itself has been approached from virtually every social science 
discipline and the field of law.”169 The issue of compliance itself is already 
interdisciplinary and taking an interdisciplinary approach enables to fully 
grasp the conditions under which the human rights framework does (or does 
not) work in a particular context, specifically in relation to the practice of 
FGM/C. Interdisciplinary research involves several unrelated 170  academic 
source disciplines in a way that forces them to cross subject boundaries to create 
new knowledge and theory and solve a common research goal.171 The aim of 
interdisciplinary research is to create a common understanding of a complex 
issue or ‘real world’ problem 172 (in this case the ‘compliance question’ in 
relation to the practice of FGM/C) and to seek coherence between the 
knowledge produced by different disciplines.173  This research ultimately aims 
to bridge legal scholarship with other disciplines in order to provide a platform 
for generating new insights and to contribute to complex problem solving. By 
doing so, this research touches upon three disciplines, i.e. law (more specifically 
international human rights law), political science (more specifically the subfield 
international relations) and social science (more specifically the subfield 
                                                        
169 S. Cardenas, National Human Rights Institutions and State Compliance, in: R. Goodman and T. 
Pegram, Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights 
Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 30.  
170 By ‘unrelated’, Tress et al mean that they have contrasting research paradigms e.g. the 
differences between qualitative and quantitative approaches or between analytical and 
interpretative approaches that bring together different disciplines. 
171 G. Tress et al., Publishing Integrative Landscape Research: Analysis of Editorial Policies of Peer-
Reviewed Journals, Environmental Science & Policy, Volume 9, No. 5, August 2006, p. 466-475.  
172 J.T. Klein, Interdisciplinary Approaches in Social Science Research, in: W. Outwaite and S.P. 
Turner, The Sage Handbook of Social Science Methodology, Sage Publications, 2007, p. 37-38.  
173 J. Petts et al., Crossing Boundaries: Interdisciplinarity in the Context of Urban Environments, 
Geoforum, Volume 39, 2008, p. 596.  
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anthropology). However, the main approach in this research is legal and the 
other two disciplines are supplementary. This research draws ideas, insights, 
concepts, elements, terminology, theories and methods of these three 
disciplines and it integrates their insights.174  
 
7.3 Criteria for country selection 
 
When taking into account the problems described in section 2 of this chapter, 
the portents of the level of compliance with the human rights framework in 
relation to the practice of FGM/C are not very positive. For that reason, it was 
decided that a country should be selected for this case study where all 
ingredients are present to expect compliance with the human rights framework 
in relation to the practice of FGM/C. Four selection criteria are used to 
determine which country would be most interesting and best suited for this 
research. The selection criteria will be discussed in the four sub-sections below.  
 
7.3.1 Prevalence rate 
In the first place, the practice of FGM/C should be prevalent in the country 
selected for this case study. Nationally representative data on FGM/C 
prevalence are mainly available from two sources: Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS).175 The DHS 
defined prevalence of FGM/C as “the percentage of girls and women of 
reproductive age (15 to 49 years old) who have experienced any form of 
FGM/C.”176 The national prevalence of FGM/C has been measured using a 
standard survey method developed by the DHS of Macro International (now 
ICF International). DHS surveys collect data from nationally representative 
probability samples of households and from adult women and men in the 
sampled households in over 90 countries.177 A module of FGM/C questions is 
added to the DHS Women’s Questionnaire in several countries. Since 2000, 
UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) have used a similar 
module to collect information on FGM/C. Both DHS surveys and MICS surveys 
provide FGM/C prevalence data for 27 countries in Africa, as well as in Yemen 
and Iraq.178 Although there is growing evidence that FGM/C is also prevalent 
in other countries in the Middle East and Asia, no nationally representative data 
on FGM/C is available in these countries.179 Therefore, I am forced to choose 
one of the 29 countries for which there is data.  
                                                        
174 W. Newall, A Theory of Interdisciplinary Studies, Issues in Integrative Studies, Volume 19, 2001, p. 
1-25. 
175 Other nationally representative household surveys with questions on FGM/C include the Family 
Health Surveys, conducted by the Pan Arab Project for Family Health in Djibouti (2002) and Yemen 
(2003), the Ethiopian Welfare Monitoring Survey (2011) and the Zambia Sexual Behaviours Surveys 
(1998-2009).  
176 Unfortunately, reliable prevalence figures for girls aged 0-15 years do not exist, and neither are 
data available through the DHS and MICS for prevalence in Asian countries where FGM/C is 
practiced, see P.S.. Yoder and S. Khan, Number of Women Circumcised in Africa: The Production of a 
Total, DHS Working Papers, No. 39, USAID, Calverton, March 2008, p. 3. 
177 Ibid, p. 4.  
178 Ibid.   
179 See Chapter III, section 6.2 of this research.  
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The DHS and MICS surveys show that FGM/C prevalence rates vary 
significantly across these 29 countries. In order to clarify these differences, 
UNICEF developed groupings by FGM/C prevalence levels, which are 
presented in table 1.2.180  
 
Table 1.2 National FGM/C prevalence per country 
 
 Country 
High 
prevalence 
Somalia (98%), Guinea (96%), Djibouti (93%), 
Egypt  (91%), Eritrea (89%), Mali (89%), Sierra 
Leone (88%), Sudan (88%) 
Moderately 
high 
prevalence 
Gambia (76%), Burkina Faso (76%),  
Ethiopia (74%), Mauritania (69%), Liberia (66%) 
Moderately 
low prevalence 
Guinea-Bissau (50%), Chad  (44%), 
Cote d’Ivoire (38%), Kenya (27%), Nigeria (27%), 
Senegal (25%)181 
Low 
prevalence 
Central African Republic (24%), Yemen (23%), 
Tanzania (15%), Benin (13%) 
Very low 
prevalence 
Iraq (8%), Ghana (4%), Togo (4%), Niger (2%), 
Cameroon (1%), Uganda (1%) 
 
7.3.2 Treaty ratification 
In the second place, the human rights framework in relation to the practice of 
FGM/C should be applicable in the country selected for this case study. An 
important characteristic of international law is the “voluntary” nature of the 
legal obligation, since States cannot not bound by international law against their 
will. Only if States ratify a human rights treaty, they are bound by the legal 
provisions set forth in the treaty (unless the provision forms part of customary 
international law).182 Ratification is necessary for the treaty to come into force.183 
                                                        
180 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 27.  
181 Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie [Sénégal], et ICF International, Sénégal: 
Enquête Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue 2014), ANSD et ICF International, 2015, p. 
95-104.  
182 Customary international law refers to international obligations arising from established state 
practice, as opposed to obligations arising from formal written international conventions. Article 
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines “international custom” as one of the 
sources of international law and describes it as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law,” see 
United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, Article 38(1). It is generally 
agreed that customary international law can be established by the presence of two elements: state 
practice and opinio juris.  
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It establishes a State’s consent to be bound by the international agreement and 
leads to a legally binding obligation under international law. Therefore, the 
country selected for this case study should have ratified all the human rights 
treaties that are important in relation to the practice of FGM/C. More 
specifically, this means that the State should have ratified CEDAW and CRC at 
the UN level. If an African country is selected, the State should have ratified the 
ACHPR, ACRWC, AYC and the Maputo Protocol. Especially the ratification of 
the Maputo Protocol is essential, since this is the only legally binding human 
rights instrument applicable in Africa in which FGM/C is specifically 
mentioned.184 
In addition, the country selected for this case study should not have made 
any reservations to the human rights treaties mentioned above that are relevant 
in relation to the practice of FGM/C that attempt to limit or modify the scope of 
the ratifying States' obligations. As defined by the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, a reservation is “a unilateral statement, however phrased or 
named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or 
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect 
of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.”185  
States make reservations upon ratification of international treaties in which 
they declare under which conditions they consider themselves to be bound by a 
certain treaty. Article 19-21 of the Vienna Convention allows States to enter 
reservations and contains provisions on the procedure for entering reservations. 
Article 19 of the Vienna Convention provides for example that States may 
formulate a reservation unless the reservation is “incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the treaty.”186 A large number of reservations are made in 
relation to human rights treaties (as opposed to other areas of international law 
such as criminal, trade, investment, and environmental law). 187  Most 
reservations have been made to the CEDAW, since a number of Islamic 
countries require that the respective human rights treaty provisions be 
interpreted in light of Islamic law.188 However, when assessing the ‘compliance 
question’ in relation to human rights law, it is essential that the country selected 
for this case study accepted the human rights framework in relation to the 
practice of FGM/C as a whole.189  
                                                        
183 There is a difference between signing and ratifying a treaty. When signing a human rights treaty, 
a state declares that it has agreed upon the content of the treaty, and intends to work towards its 
implementation. However, this does not lead to a legally binding obligation under international law.  
184 See Chapter IV, section 7.2.1 of this research.  
185 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, Volume 1155, p. 331, Article 2 (1)(d). 
186 Ibid, Article 19 (c). 
187 L.R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, Virginia Law Review, Volume 91, 2005, p. 1641; D.W. Hill, Avoiding 
Obligation: Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 12, 2015, p. 
2.  
188 M.A. Freeman, Reservations to CEDAW: An Analysis for UNICEF, Discussion Paper, Gender, 
Rights and Civic Engagement Section, Division of Policy and Practice, New York, December 2009. 
Available at http://www.unicef.org/gender/files/Reservations_to_CEDAW-
an_Analysis_for_UNICEF.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
189 E. Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 49, No. 6, 2005, p. 951; E. Neumayer, Qualified Ratification: 
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7.3.3 Level of democracy  
In the third place, the country selected for this case study should have a high 
level of democracy. Various studies found that democratic States are less likely 
to commit human rights violations and are more likely to comply with human 
rights law and pointed in their studies190 to positive effects of democracy on 
human rights practices. Hathaway found empirical evidence suggesting that 
fully democratic States are more likely than other States to comply with the 
human rights treaties they have ratified and can be associated with a better 
human rights record.191 Neumayer has found the same pattern.192  
The ‘Democracy Index’ (DI) 193 is an index compiled by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, which measures the state of democracy in 167 countries. The 
index is based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories: electoral 
process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political 
participation, and political culture.194 In addition to a numeric score and a 
ranking, the index categorizes countries as one of four regime types: full 
democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes.195  
The ‘Freedom House Index’ (FHI)196 evaluates the state of freedom in 195 
countries and 15 territories. The index assesses the “real-world rights and 
                                                        
Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties, Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 36, 
No. 2, 2007, p. 397.  
190 B. Bueno de Mesquita et al., Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human 
Rights, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 49, No. 3, 2005, p. 439-458; C. Davenport, Multi-
Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry Into Why States Apply Negative 
Sanctions, American Journal of Political Science, Volume 39, No. 3, 1995, p. 683–713; C. Davenport, 
Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 43, No. 1, 1999, 
p. 92-116; C. Davenport and D.A. Armstrong II, Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A 
Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996, American Journal of Political Science, Volume 48, No. 3, 2004, p. 
538-554; C. Davenport, State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace, Cambridge University 
Press, 2007; B. Harff, Barbara, No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust: Assessing Risks of Genocide 
and Political Mass Murder Since 1955, American Political Science Review, Volume 97, No. 1, 2003, p. 
57-74; C. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Volume 35, 1991, p. 120-142; D.W. Hill and Z.M. Jones, An Empirical Evaluation of 
Explanations for State Repression, American Political Science Review, Volume 108, No. 3, 2014, p. 661-
687; J.M. McCormick and N.J. Mitchell, Human Rights Violations, Umbrella Concepts, and 
Empirical Analysis, World Politics, Volume 49, No. 4, 1997; S.C. Poe and C.N. Tate, Repression of 
Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, American Political Science Review, 
Volume 88, No. 4, 1994; S.C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity 
Revisited: A Global, Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976– 1993, International Studies 
Quarterly, Volume 43, No. 2, 1999, p. 291-313.  
191 O.A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Yale Law Journal, Volume 112, 
2002, p. 2020. 
192 E. Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 49, No. 6, 2005, p. 951. 
193 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2014, Democracy and its Discontents, 2014, 
available at http://www.sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24-
2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
194 Ibid, p. 1.  
195 For more information on the methodology, see The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 
2014, Democracy and its Discontents, 2014, p. 37-49, available at 
http://www.sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24-
2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
196 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2015, Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist, 2015, 
available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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freedoms enjoyed by individuals, rather than governments or government 
performance per se.”197 The index is based on 25 indicators, and the average of a 
country or territory’s political and civil liberties ratings determine whether it is 
free, partly free, or not free.198  
 
7.3.4 Strength of civil society  
In the fourth place, the country selected for this case study should have a strong 
civil society. Various studies found that compliance with human rights treaties 
is conditional on the strength of civil society. According to these scholars, a 
strong civil society in a country improves respect for human rights and has a 
positive impact on treaty compliance.199  
The ‘Civil Society Index’ (CSI)200 is an index developed by the World 
Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS), an alliance of civil society 
organizations with members in over 100 countries. CIVICUS adopted a 
functional definition of civil society as “the arena, outside of the family, the 
State and the market where people associate to advance common interests.”201  
The aim of CSI is to assess the state of civil society in countries around the 
world.  
 
7.4 Why Senegal is selected 
 
In total, 27 countries in Africa and two countries in the Middle East would be 
eligible as a case study country when the first selection criterion is taken into 
account. Preferably, a country in the ‘high prevalence’, ‘moderately high 
prevalence’ or ‘moderately low prevalence’ category will be selected.   
All 29 countries where FGM/C is prevalent have signed the CRC, and only 
two countries (Somalia and Sudan) have not signed the CEDAW.202 Of the 27 
African countries where FGM/C is prevalent, all countries have signed and 
ratified the ACHPR.203 In total, 24 of the 27 African countries where FGM/C is 
prevalent have ratified the ACRWC.204 The Central African Republic, Djibouti 
and Somalia have signed the ACRWC, but have not ratified it. Of the 27 African 
                                                        
197 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2015, Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist, 2015, p. 2,  
available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015].  
198 Ibid.  
199 E. Hafner-Burton and K. Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty 
Promises, American Journal of Sociology, Volume 110, No. 5, 2005, p. 1402; E. Neumayer, Do 
International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Volume 49, No. 6, 2005, p. 951. 
200 V. Keinrich and L. Fioramonti, CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society: Comparative 
Perspectives, Kumarian Press, 2007.  
201 Ibid, p. 378.  
202 As of 1 October 2015, see United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV: Human Rights, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015]. 
203 As of 1 October 2015, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ratification Table: 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, available at 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/ [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
204 As of 1 October 2015, African Union, ACRWC Ratifications Table, available at 
http://pages.au.int/acerwc/pages/acrwc-ratifications-table [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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countries where FGM/C is prevalent, 18 have ratified the AYC205 and 18 have 
ratified the Maputo Protocol.206  
The following 17 countries have ratified all human rights treaties that are 
important in relation to the practice of FGM/C: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Yemen. Table 1.3 below 
provides a detailed overview of the ratifications of human rights treaties per 
country where FGM/C is prevalent.  
 
                                                        
205 As of 1 October 2015, African Union, List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the 
African Youth Charter, available at http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/youth%20Charter.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015].  
206 As of 1 October 2015, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ratification Table: 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, available 
at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ratification/ [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015].  
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Table 1.3 Ratifications of human rights treaties 
 
 CEDAW CRC 
 
ACHPR 
 
 
ACRWC 
 
 
AYC 
 
 
Maputo 
Protocol 
 
 
Benin 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
Burkina Faso √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Cameroon √ √ √ √ √ √ 
CAR √ √ √    
Chad √ √ √ √ √  
Cote d’Ivoire √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Djibouti √ √ √  √ √ 
Egypt √ √ √ √   
Eritrea √ √ √ √   
Ethiopia  √ √ √ √   
Gambia √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Ghana  √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Guinea √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Guinea-Bissau √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Iraq √ √ N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Kenya √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Liberia √ √ √ √  √ 
Mali √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Mauritania √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Niger √ √ √ √ √  
Nigeria  √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Senegal √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Sierra Leone √ √ √ √   
Somalia  √ √    
Sudan  √ √ √   
Tanzania  √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Togo √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Uganda √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Yemen  √ √ N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Taking into account the third criterion, there is among the 29 countries where 
FGM/C is prevalent no “full democracy”207 according to the ‘Democracy Index’ 
of the Economist Intelligence Unit. Only two out of the 29 countries where 
FGM/C is prevalent are earmarked as a “flawed democracy,”208 namely Ghana 
and Senegal. Countries with a “hybrid regime” include Mali, Tanzania, Benin, 
Uganda, Kenya and Iraq.209 According to the ‘Freedom House Index’, there are 
three “free” countries out of the 29 where FGM/C is prevalent, namely Benin, 
Ghana and Senegal.210 Table 1.4 provides an overview of the overall scores of 
these countries in relation to the level of democracy.  
 
Table 1.4 Level of democracy per country 
 
Country 
Democracy 
Index 2014 
(out of 10) 
Freedom 
House Index 
2015  
(out of 7) 
Benin 5.65 2.0 
Ghana 6.33 1.5 
Iraq 4.23 6.0 
Kenya 5.13 4.0 
Mali 5.79 4.5 
Senegal 6.15 2.0 
Tanzania 5.77 3.0 
Uganda 5.22 5.5 
 
Taking into account the fourth criterion, the state of civil society of both Ghana 
and Senegal was assessed, since these two countries are the only “flawed 
democracies” where FGM/C is prevalent, according to the ‘Democracy Index’. 
Although Benin is according to the ‘Freedom House Index’ a “free” country, the 
State has not ratified the AYC and is therefore not selected. Ghana scores 
according to the CSI of CIVICUS on average 1.7 (structure 1.3, environment 1.5, 
values 2.0 and impact 2.0), while Senegal scores on average slightly less, namely 
1.68 (structure 1.5, environment 1.2, values 2.1 and impact 1.9). Nevertheless, 
Senegal was selected as the case study country, since the FGM/C prevalence 
                                                        
207 The only “full democracy” at the African continent is the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius. 
However, FGM/C is not prevalent in Mauritius.  
208 Other countries at the African continent with a “flawed democracy” are Botswana (DI: 7.87, FHI: 
3)), Cape Verde (DI: 7.81, FHI: 1), Lesotho (DI: 6.66, FHI: 2), Namibia (DI: 6.24, FHI: 2), South Africa 
(DI: 7.82, FHI: 2), Zambia (DI: 6.39, FHI: 3,5). However, FGM/C is not prevalent in these countries.  
209 Democracy Index 2014, Democracy and its Discontents, a Report from The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
p. 3-8, available at http://www.sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24-
2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
210 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2015, Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist, 2015, 
available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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rate is much higher in Senegal compared to Ghana (25%211 versus 4%). Senegal 
is a ‘moderately low prevalence’ country, while Ghana is a ‘very low prevalence’ 
country (see table 1.2). In Snegal, 25% of girls and women aged 15 to 49 have 
undergone FGM/C. Senegal has ratified all human rights treaties that are 
important in relation to the practice of FGM/C (see table 1.3). Senegal did not 
make any reservations to the treaties they have ratified, neither at the UN, nor 
at the AU level.212 Senegal is considered a “flawed democracy” and is also a 
country with a strong civil society. According to the ‘Civil Society Index’ of 
CIVICUS, Senegalese civil society has “a strong value base for taking action.” In 
addition, the CIVICUS country report of Senegal concluded that civil society in 
Senegal “has a noticeable impact on democracy and development.”213  
Senegal is also an interesting country to study, since the Civil Society 
Organization (CSO) Tostan is based in Senegal. Tostan is one of the first, and 
perhaps best-known CSO’s for their grassroots efforts in FGM/C abandonment. 
Established in 1991, Tostan, which means “breakthrough” in Wolof (one of the 
local languages in Senegal), has implemented its Community Empowerment 
Program (CEP) in thousands of communities in Senegal. Tostan’s three-year 
programme is designed to empower communities through education on human 
rights, leading to social change. Their mission is to empower African 
communities to bring about sustainable development and positive social 
transformation based on respect for human rights. 
 
8 TERMINOLOGY 
 
8.1 Compliance 
Before dealing with the question when and why States comply with the human 
rights framework, it is essential to define the concept of compliance and to 
distinguish it from implementation and effectiveness (or impact).214 There are 
many overlaps and links between these concepts, but they do have a different 
meaning and focus. For example, an international human rights treaty could on 
the one hand be perfectly implemented, but still be ineffective in attaining its 
objectives. On the other hand, compliance can also occur without implementing 
international law provisions.  
In this research, the concept of compliance is defined as “a state of conformity 
between an actor’s behaviour and a legal rule,”215 or what Risse and Sikkink call 
                                                        
211 Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie [Sénégal], et ICF International. Enquête 
Démographique et de Santé à Indicateurs Multiples au Sénégal (EDS-MICS) 2010-2011, ANSD et ICF 
International, 2012, p. 294-295.  
212 Senegal made only one declaration with the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the involvement of children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC). 
213 M. Mbaye, Engaging Together for Real Change, CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Country 
Report for Senegal, 2011, p. 65, available at http://civicus.org/downloads/CSI/Senegal.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015].  
214 W. Carlsnaes et al., Handbook of International Relations, Sage, 2012, p. 553.  
215 See also M. Faure et al., Environmental Enforcement Networks: Concepts, Implementation and 
Effectiveness: New Horizons in Environmental and Energy Law Series, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, p. 
74; K. Raustialia, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law, Volume 32, 2000, p. 391; K. Raustiala and A. Slaughter, 
International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in: W. Carlsnaes et al., Handbook of 
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“rule-consistent behaviour.”216 Thus, according to this definition, non-compliance 
or violation occurs when an actor’s behaviour is not in correspondence with a 
legal rule.217 Legal rules in this study include both legally binding rules or laws, 
and non-binding legal rules (see section 8.2 below). Actors include both States 
and non-State actors, depending on the subjects of the legal rule, or in other 
words: to whom the legal rules are addressed. In case of the human rights 
framework, Kent distinguished five stages of international and national 
compliance: (1) ratification of (or accession to) human rights treaties, the 
acceptance of norms that this entails, and the acceptance that treaty bodies 
monitor the implementation of human rights treaties; (2) procedural compliance, 
including submitting reports to the human rights treaty bodies and other 
requirements; (3) substantive compliance, including conforming to the human 
rights standards in the treaties and by implementing the human rights treaty 
bodies’ recommendations; (4) de jure compliance, including the implementation 
of international norms in national legislative provisions; and (5) de facto 
compliance, or compliance at the national level.218 This research will look at all 
five stages of compliance.   
 
Figure 1.1 Five stages of compliance  
 
 
 
While compliance entails an actual change in behaviour, implementation in this 
study refers to measures taken by States to put international norms into effect in 
its national laws (de jure compliance). Implementation is often an essential step 
towards (de facto) compliance.219  
In turn, effectiveness goes beyond implementation and compliance and is 
defined as the degree to which a legal rule achieves its objective and induces 
changes in behaviour that enhances the rule’s goal.220 Studies in relation to 
‘effectiveness’ or ‘impact’ evaluate whether the goals of (those who drafted) the 
                                                        
International Relations, Sage, 2012, p. 539; E.B. Weiss and H.K. Jacobson, Engaging Countries: 
Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, MIT Press, 2000, p. 4; O. Young, 
Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1979, p. 104; R.B. Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty 
Compliance, MIT Press, 1994, p. 30; W.C. Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance 
with the Laws of War, Arizona State Law Journal, Volume 37, 2005, p. 1243; S. Cardenas, Conflict and 
Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2007, p. 7.   
216 T. Risse and K. Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 10.  
217 C. Romano et al., The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication, Oxford University Press, 2014, 
p. 438. 
218 A. Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2011, p. 7.  
219 K. Raustiala and A. Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in: W. 
Carlsnaes et al., Handbook of International Relations, Sage, 2012, p. 539. 
220 Ibid. 
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legal rules are being fulfilled. Effective legal rules are rules that lead to 
observable, desired behavioural change. 221  Although the line between 
‘compliance’ and ‘effectiveness’ can blur, the main difference between the two 
concepts is the establishment of causal relationships. Law and compliance are 
conceptually linked, because “law explicitly aims to produce compliance with 
its rules: legal rules set the standard by which compliance is gauged.”222 
However, the concept of compliance does not necessarily entail a cause-effect 
relationship between the legal rule and behaviour (which is an instant different 
with effectiveness). 223 As Raustiala and Slaughter explained, compliance is 
“agnostic about causality.”224 Compliance draws no causal linkage between a 
legal rule and behaviour, but simply identifies conformity between the legal 
human rights framework and behaviour of a State.225 Therefore, measuring and 
explaining compliance is a different exercise from establishing a causal link 
between the legal rule and compliance. The observation that a given State is in 
compliance (or not in compliance) with the human rights framework does not 
mean that this State is in compliance with this framework as a result of 
ratification of human rights treaties and the existence of the human rights 
framework. It is very complex to determine whether a State is in compliance (or 
not) due to the human rights framework itself, or because of a range of other 
factors instead.226 In light of this, Cardenas argues rightly: “Even if compliance 
stems from factors other than legal norms, it still constitutes compliance, if for 
no other reason than the fact that outsiders will label it as such.”227 The aim of 
this study is to gain an understanding to what extent Senegal is in compliance 
(or not in compliance) with the human rights framework in relation to the 
practice of FGM/C, and which factors explain the level of compliance (or non-
compliance), but not necessarily to establish causal relationships. Consequently, 
this study does not explore why FGM/C continues to exist and how FGM/C 
can or should be ended. This study will neither assess the different 
approaches228 nor reach conclusions about which strategy may be most effective 
to eliminate FGM/C.229 
                                                        
221 K. Raustialia, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law, Volume 32, 2000, p. 394.  
222 K. Raustiala and A. Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in: W. 
Carlsnaes et al., Handbook of International Relations, Sage, 2012, p. 538. 
223 When speaking of effectiveness is to speak directly of causality: when claiming that a legal rule is 
effective, is to claim that it led to certain behaviours or outcomes, see K. Raustialia, Compliance & 
Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law, Volume 32, 2000, p. 398. 
224 Ibid.  
225 K. Raustialia, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law, Volume 32, 2000, p. 398; C. Romano et al., The Oxford Handbook of 
International Adjudication, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 438. 
226 O.A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Yale Law Journal, Volume 112, 
2002, p. 1989. 
227 S. Cardenas, Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, p. 32.  
228 Such as, among others, the alternative rite of passage approach, the social norm approach, the 
grandmothers project/approach, the alternative source of income approach, safe houses approach. 
229 This will however be the goal of the international research project launched in March 2015. This 
five-year project, funded by the U.K. Department for International Development and led by the 
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8.2 Human rights framework 
The sources of international law are enumerated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice.230 The three ‘primary’ sources of international 
law are: (a) international conventions; (b) international custom; and (c) general 
principles of law. Human rights treaties fall under category (a) of Article 38 
Statute ICJ. However, the ‘human rights framework’ consists not only of 
international human rights laws strictu sensu, but must be understood broadly 
and includes both hard law instruments (i.e. legally binding covenants, charters, 
treaties, protocols and conventions) and soft law documents (i.e. non-binding 
declarations, resolutions, general recommendations, consensus documents, 
guidelines, statements of intent, memoranda of understanding and 
principles).231 The ‘human rights framework on FGM/C’ indicates the set of 
international and regional human rights instruments and documents dedicated 
to FGM/C, including monitoring mechanisms and remedies. 
 
8.3 Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting 
International consensus has not been reached about the terminology used to 
refer to the practice. Opposing views dominated (and still dominate) debates on 
what terms should be used. Attention to language is vital to understand the 
political and ideological debates surrounding the practice.232 As Abusharaf 
argued: “Any meaningful discussion dealing with the question of female 
circumcision should heed the importance of terminology.”233  
The terminology to refer to the practice has undergone a number of 
important evolutions. In the early 1970s, when the practice first came to be 
known beyond the practicing communities and emerged as a topic of 
scholarship, it was commonly referred to as ‘female circumcision’. 
Anthropologists, ethnographers and sociologists initially used this term in their 
work, given that in some societies the rituals surrounding both male and female 
circumcision form a part of the process of initiation into adulthood.234 In 
addition, the term ‘female circumcision’ is often the English translation of the 
practice from local languages into English.235  
A shift of language occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s with increased 
feminist scholarship. These authors objected to the use of the term ‘female 
circumcision’, since it mistakenly suggests that the practice is analogous to male 
circumcision. This direct parallel would be wrong both from anatomical, 
                                                        
New York-based Population Council is led by a consortium comprising of Bettina Shell-Duncan, 
Gerry Mackie and several African organizations.  
230 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946. 
231 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 210-
229. 
232 R.M. Abusharaf, Female Circumcision: Multicultural Perspectives, Pennsylvania Studies in Human 
Rights, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, p 5.  
233 Ibid.  
234 United Nation Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 6. 
235 O. Bjälkander et al., Female Genital Mutilation in Sierra Leone: Forms, Reliability of Reported 
Status, and Accuracy of Related Demographic and Health Survey Questions, Obstetrics and 
Gynecology International, Volume 2013, Article ID 680926, 2013, p. 1.  
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religious and social viewpoints.236 They regarded FGM/C as an example of 
patriarchal oppression, deep-rooted gender inequality that assigns women an 
inferior position in society and a form of violence against women. They argued 
that the term ‘female circumcision’ obscured the severity of the practice, which 
is not equivalent to “the simple foreskin removal involved in male 
circumcision.”237  
To emphasize the different nature of the practice compared to male 
circumcision and to establish a clear linguistic distinction, feminists, women’s 
health advocates and human rights activists claimed that ‘female genital 
mutilation’ or ‘FGM’ would be the most appropriate term. This term gained 
growing support, since the word ‘mutilation’ emphasizes the gravity and 
physical damage of the practice. El Hadi argued: “It is a mutilation from the 
human rights and legal points of view because it is carried out with the 
intention of limiting and controlling women's sexuality and in perpetuating the 
subordination of women, denying them the full citizenship they deserve."238 In 
1990, the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health 
of Women and Children239 adopted the term ‘female genital mutilation’240 at a 
meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and in 1991, the WHO recommended that the 
UN adopt this term as well.241 The Technical Working Group of the WHO 
decided in 1995 that the adoption of ‘female genital mutilation’ or ‘FGM’ as a 
standard term was essential in terms of research, training, planning policies and 
formulating appropriate legislation.242 Since then, the practice has come to be 
widely known as ‘female genital mutilation’.  
A second shift of language occurred in the late 1990s, moving away from the 
term ‘female genital mutilation’ in favour of a more value neutral term that is 
sensitive to local beliefs, namely ‘female genital cutting’ or ‘FGC’. The 
preference for this term was partly due to dissatisfaction with the negative tone 
and association attached with ‘mutilation’. 243  It was thought that the 
term ’mutilation’ entails judgment, condemnation and insensitivity, especially 
towards girls and women who have undergone the procedure. In addition, 
some evidence showed that the use of the word ‘mutilation’ was alienating 
practicing communities and eventually hindering the process of social change 
for the elimination of the practice.244 However, opponents argue that the term 
                                                        
236 O. Bjälkander et al., Female Genital Mutilation in Sierra Leone: Forms, Reliability of Reported 
Status, and Accuracy of Related Demographic and Health Survey Questions, Obstetrics and 
Gynecology International, Volume 2013, Article ID 680926, 2013, p. 1.  
237 E. Eliah, REACHing for a Healthier Future’, UNFPA, Populi, Volume 23, No. 1, March 1996, p. 15. 
238 A.A. El Hadi, Female Genital Mutilation in Egypt, in: M. Turshen, African Women’s Health, Africa 
World Press, 2000, p. 146.  
239 See Chapter IV section 4.7 of this research for more information about the Inter-African 
Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children. 
240 United Nation Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 7. 
241 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 22. 
242 World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation: Report of a WHO Technical Working Group, 
Geneva, 17-19 July 1995, WHO/FRH/WHD/96.10, p. 4.  
243 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 22. 
244 Ibid. 
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FGC does not reflect the accurate extent of injury on the genitalia caused by the 
practice.  
Another development in the debate on the terminology of the practice is the 
use of the term ‘female genital surgery’ or ‘FGS’. Although not often used, this 
more neutral expression takes into account the increased ‘medicalisation’ of the 
practice.245  
From the 1950s till the 1990s, the UN used several terms to refer to the 
practice, including ‘ritual operations’,246 ‘ritual practices’ and ‘operations based 
on custom’. In the 1990s, the UN referred to the practice as ‘female 
circumcision’,247 but in later UN documents the practice is usually referred to as 
‘female genital mutilation’ or ‘female genital mutilation/cutting’. However, 
there is up to today no consensus between UN agencies about the terminology 
to refer to the practice. The WHO and UNFPA248 use the term ‘female genital 
mutilation’, while UNICEF uses the term ‘female genital mutilation/cutting’. 
According to the WHO, the use of the word ‘female genital mutilation’ 
reinforces “the fact that the practice is a violation of girls’ and women’s rights, 
and thereby helps to promote national and international advocacy for its 
abandonment.”249 UNFPA claims: “More than ever, we are at a time when the 
practice must be viewed from a human rights perspective and the term 
‘mutilation’ better describes the practice from this viewpoint both in terms of 
the process and the outcome.”250 However, UNICEF added the word ‘cutting’, 
because of “the importance of employing respectful terminology when working 
with practicing communities.”251 
In this research, the term ‘female genital mutilation/cutting’ or ‘FGM/C’ 
will be applied, emphasizing that the practice is a violation of human rights, but 
at the same time recognizing the importance of using less judgmental 
terminology. Other terminology may appear in quotations.  
 
                                                        
245 See also Chapter III, section 7.2.2 of this research.    
246 World Health Organization, Resolution 680 B II (XXVI) of the Economic and Social Council: Ritual 
Operations, Eighteenth and Twentieth Meetings, EB23.R75, 2 and 3 February 1959 available at 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/87417/1/EB23R75_eng.pdf?ua=1 [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
247 For example United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
General Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision, A/45/38, 1990; S. Detrick et al., The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the "Travaux Préparatoires", Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1992, p. 352.  
248 Since 2007 UNFPA has been using the term ‘Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting’, but revisited its 
position and formally adopted the term ‘Female Genital Mutilation’ in 2014. See also: United 
Nations Population Fund, Implementation of the International and Regional Human Rights Framework for 
the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation, UNFPA New York, November 2014, p. 12.  
249 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 22. 
250 United Nations Population Fund, Implementation of the International and Regional Human Rights 
Framework for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation, UNFPA, New York, November 2014, p. 12.  
251 United Nation Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 7. 
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9 STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK 
 
This research is structured in four parts, namely (I) theoretical framework; (II) 
human rights framework; (III) empirical analysis; and (IV) conclusions. Chapter 
II is a theoretical analysis of the different factors that explain compliance and 
non-compliance with international law in general and the human rights 
framework in particular. Both IL and IR theories will be examined and their 
explanations when and why States comply will be taken into account. Chapter 
III will provide more background information on the practice of FGM/C. It is 
necessary to explain in depth what the practice of FGM/C exactly entails, in 
order to be able to link the phenomenon to the different human rights that are 
being violated and the applicable human rights framework. Chapter IV is a 
legal analysis of the human rights (instruments and documents) that are being 
violated with the practice of FGM/C. In addition, this chapter will analyze the 
obligations and recommendations for States prescribed by the human rights 
framework in relation to elimination of FGM/C. In the empirical analysis of 
Chapter V, a case study in Senegal evaluates to what extent Senegal is in 
compliance with the human rights framework in relation to the practice of 
FGM/C. In addition, the factors that explain compliance and non-compliance 
with the human rights framework in relation to the practice of FGM/C in 
Senegal will be addressed. In Chapter VI, an answer to the central question of 
this research will be formulated.   
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CHAPTER II 
THEORIES OF STATE COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” 
 
Louis Henkin, 19791  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
When and why – or under what conditions – do States comply with 
international law? Since the 1950s, legal theorists and political scientists have 
had extensive debates on the importance of international law in shaping State 
behaviour. In the 1960s and 1970s, parallel with the development and growth of 
international human righs law and changes in world politics, International Law 
(IL) and International Relations (IR) scholars started to develop theories on the 
question why States comply with (or violate) international law. Both IL and IR 
scholars described in their theories whether international law “mattered”, and if 
so, how, and under what conditions. They provided accounts of why States (do 
not) comply with international law, resulting in (sometimes) competing theories, 
approaches and perspectives. This chapter will address, by means of a literature 
review, the factors that follow from IL and IR theories that explain compliance 
and non-compliance with international law in general and the human rights 
framework in particular.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. It starts with the research question 
(section 2) and methodology (section 3) applied for this literature review. 
Section 4 will discuss the traditional IL theories and section 5 will examine the 
traditional IR theories. An analysis of more recent theories of IL and IR can be 
found in section 6. Concluding observations are spelled out in section 7.  
 
2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The research question that will be addressed in this chapter is the following: 
“Which factors follow from international law and international relations theories that 
explain compliance and non-compliance with international law in general and the 
human rights framework in particular?”  
                                                        
1 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 47. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Literature review 
 
In order to provide an answer to this research question, a literature review was 
conducted. The aim of this literature review was not simply to summarize “all 
there is to know” about compliance with international law. This review neither 
intended to offer a comprehensive intellectual history of all the IL and IR 
theories nor to offer a comprehensive description of all theories present in both 
IL and IR scholarship. The overall aim of this literature review was to provide 
an overview of the factors that follow from IL and IR theories that explain 
compliance and non-compliance with international law in general and the 
human rights framework in particular.  
 
3.2 Literature search strategy 
 
The first step of this literature review was a thorough search of relevant 
literature. Relevant publications in relation to compliance with international 
law (including journal articles, book chapters, working papers, conference 
proceedings, informal publications and other published reports) were identified. 
The main guiding point while searching the literature was the research question. 
The following search terms were used during the search: ‘compliance’, ‘comply’, 
‘compl*’, ‘theory’, ‘theories’, ‘international law’, ‘international’, ‘IL’, 
‘international relations’, ‘IR’, ‘political science’, ‘human rights’, ‘rights’, ‘human 
rights framework’, ‘human rights law’, ‘international human rights law’, 
‘human rights norms’, ‘law’, ‘norms’, ‘research’, ‘studies’. To ensure that 
publications that use other words than ‘compliance’ were included, the terms 
‘implement*’, ‘enforcement’, ‘enforc*’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘effective*’, ‘impact’, 
‘domestic impact’ and ‘national impact’ were used as well. Combinations of 
these search terms were entered into several electronic scholarly literature 
databases, including Worldcat, Heinonline, Westlaw, Jstore, Web of Science, 
Lexis and Sage Journals Online. In addition, the citation index SSRN was 
searched. In order to be as comprehensive as possible, a search on the web was 
conducted, using search engines (such as Google Scholar) to search for 
literature. In addition, Bradford’s International Legal Compliance: An Annotated 
Bibliography2 was a useful resource during the literature search. Of those studies 
included in the analysis, retrieved studies were used to identify other relevant 
studies by taking into account articles, books and reports cited or discussed in 
other relevant studies. This so-called ‘snowballing effect’ was a helpful method.  
 
3.3 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
 
The second step of this literature review was to define the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. I was fully aware of the fact that the selection of publications 
                                                        
2 W.C. Bradford, International Legal Compliance: An Annotated Bibliography, North Carolina 
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, Volume 30, No. 2, 2004.  
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to be integrated in the review could have a considerable bearing on the factors 
to be found and the conclusions reached. Therefore, each publication that was 
selected for possible inclusion in this review was read carefully, to identify 
whether it meets the inclusion criteria, to ensure that it fits precisely within the 
field of research. The choice of publications to include and exclude was again 
guided by the research question.  
In the field of compliance, there exists a so-called “information overload” 
exist because of the many theories on compliance with international law. 
Therefore, criteria for eligibility and relevance were carefully drawn, being the 
following. The publication should explain compliance (and non-compliance) 
with international law in general and the human rights framework in 
particular. 3  The ‘compliance question’ should be differentiated from the 
question why States commit to international law in the first place. Even though 
the decision of a State to commit to international law (or not) is related to the 
question of compliance, the subject matter of discussion is different in many 
ways.4 Therefore, studies solely focusing on the question of commitment were 
excluded from this review. Theories from both IL and IR were included in the 
literature review. This literature review did not focus on a particular geographic 
area (European Union, United States, Asia, Africa, etc). The literature review 
included literature in the English language since the 1960s (because the first 
attempts to study compliance date from the 1960s). The literature search was 
conducted between October 2011 and September 2015.  
 
3.4 Selection of literature 
 
In the first place, the traditional “dominant strands” (or “leading schools”) of IL 
and IR compliance theory were included in this literature review. But what are 
the traditional “dominant strands” or “leading schools”? After careful analysis 
of relevant literature, I found that four IL theories and four IR theories are 
generally regarded as the “dominant strands” in IL and IR literature.5 The 
                                                        
3 A definition of ‘compliance’ can be found in Chapter I, section 8.1.   
4 M. Burgstaller, Amenities and Pitfalls of a Reputational Theory of Compliance with International 
Law, Nordic Journal of International Law, Volume 76, 2007, p. 43.  
5 Some authors divided the dominant strands a little bit differently. Guzman made, for example, a 
distinction between traditional legal theories (including the managerial model, legitimacy theory 
and transnational legal process) and international relations theories (including neorealists, liberal 
theory and institutionalist theory), see A.T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International 
Law, California Law Review, Volume 90, 2002, p. 1830-1840. Bradford made a distinction between 
realism, enforcement theory, rational choice, institutionalism, liberalism and normativism, see W.C. 
Bradford, W.C., In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of War, Arizona State 
Law Journal, Volume 37, 2005, p. 6. Abbott identified four IR theories, including realism, 
institutionalism, liberalism and constructivism, see K.W. Abbott, Toward a Richer Institutionalism 
for International Law and Policy, Journal of International Law & International Relations, Volume 8, 
2005, p. 12-16. Arend identified three IR theories, including structural realism, rationalist 
institutionalism and constructivism, see A.C. Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and 
International Politics, Virginia Journal of International Law, Volume 38, 1997/1998, p. 109-110; Hoder 
makes a distinction between the main theories of IL (including managerial theory, consent-based 
theory, theory of enforcement, legitimacy theory, transnational legal process theory and theories of 
rational choice) as well as the main theories of IR (including realism, liberalism, institutionalism and 
constructivism), see L. Hoder, Is there a Theory of International Legal Compliance?, Paper for the ECPR 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II 
50 
leading schools in IL theory are: (i) Henkin’s compliance theory; (ii) Chayes and 
Chayes’ managerial theory; (iii) Franck’s legitimacy theory; and (iv) Koh’s 
transnational legal process theory. These traditional IL theories are also referred 
to as the ‘traditional’, ‘optimist’ or the ‘conventional’ approach. The leading 
schools in IR theory are: (i) realism; (ii) institutionalism; (iii) liberalism; and (iv) 
constructivism. These eight “dominant strands” (see figure 2.1) within 
compliance theory were examined with the aim to identify the factors that these 
theories ascribe compliance or non-compliance with international law in 
general and the human rights framework in particular. 
 
Figure 2.1 Traditional International Law and International Relations compliance 
theories 
 
 
 
                                                        
Graduate Conference 2010, Panel International Norms: Recent Developments in a Growing Debate, 
Dublin, Ireland, 31 august 2010, p. 6.  
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In the second place, I decided to also include in this literature review more 
recent compliance theories by both IL and IR scholars. The following seven 
“theories” were included (see figure 2.2), that are accepted in the current IL and 
IR literature as alternatives to the “dominant strands”: (i) Guzman’s 
reputational theory; (ii) Downs, Rocke & Barsoom's enforcement theory; (iii) 
Goldsmith & Posner’s limit theory; (iv) Risse, Ropp & Sikkink’s spiral model; (v) 
Goodman & Jinks’ State socialization theory; (vi) Brunnée & Toope‘s 
interactional theory; and (vii) Moore’s signaling theory. 
 
Figure 2.2 More recent compliance theories 
 
 
 
 
 
The traditional “dominant strands” and new theories were analyzed with the 
aim to identify the factors that these theories use to explain compliance or non-
compliance with international law. In case these theories specifically addressed 
compliance with the human rights framework, it was taken into account. In 
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4 INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE 
 
4.1. Henkin’s compliance theory 
 
Louis Henkin was one of the pioneers of the international legal process school 
and he sought to explore the actual impact of international law on the 
behaviour of States.6 Henkin argued that States behave largely in compliance 
with international law. The international human rights regime is, according to 
Henkin, no exception. In 1968, he first published his famous book How Nations 
Behave.7 He asserted: “It is probably the case that almost all nations observe 
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations 
almost all of the time.”8 Koh described these oft-quoted words as the “sentence 
that launched a thousand articles.” 9  Henkin’s work set the standard and 
remained a touchstone for scholars working in the field of compliance.10 
Henkin’s ideas about the nature of international law have been at the heart of 
the discussion of IL and IR scholars. 
 
4.1.1 States comply with international law 
Henkin claimed that States are law-abiding and that the international system is 
orderly. He started with the assumption that States comply with international 
law, 11  despite the lack of an executive authority with power to enforce 
international law and the lack of effective sanctions against the violator.12 In 
fact, he argued, States act in the expectation that other States will comply with 
international law and treaty obligations. Based on that expectation, States 
maintain expensive national and international institutions and they put a lot of 
effort, energy and resources to conclude treaties, struggling over details, over a 
phrase or a word. Henkin’s argument is that States would refrain from doing 
that, if they were not convinced that international law matters.13 He argues that 
this is the case for the whole international legal framework: “If it were not so, 
the legal system would be a massive delusion.”14 He went so far as to argue that 
law might be even irrelevant, because States would act the same way in the 
absence of law.15 He claimed that the existing laws are a codification of existing 
                                                        
6 A. Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, European Journal of International Law, 
Volume 6, No. 1, 1995, p. 503.   
7 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979. 
8 Ibid, p. 47. 
9 H.H. Koh, Louis Henkin (1917-2010), Opinio Juris, 15 October 2010, available at 
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/10/15/louis-henkin-1917-2010/ [Last accessed 1 October 2015]. 
10 K. Raustriala and A. Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in: W. 
Carlsnaes et al., Handbook of International Relations, London, Sage Publications, 2012, p. 540. 
11 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1968, p. 49. 
12 Ibid, p. 45-49. 
13 L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 47. 
14 Ibid.  
15 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1968, p. 84-89. 
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mores, of how people and States (ought to) behave.16 Henkin found it easy to 
demonstrate that States generally comply with international law. He argued 
that States comply with international law for the same reasons that citizens 
comply with national laws: “Citizens who join in making law, generally 
approve the law they have made, and have incentives to maintain it. The citizen 
has some sense of citizenship (if not of morality), which militates to compliance 
and engenders habits of compliance. […] Violations are likely to be detected 
and violators are likely to be known; the victim is likely to react, the community 
likely to be offended and to join in an organized reaction.”17 Henkin argues that 
the international system acts in the same manner and that the international 
system has a culture of compliance.18 In his book How Nations Behave,19 Henkin 
identified a number of factors that influence compliance with international law 
positively and negatively. He divided these factors into two categories, namely 
foreign policy factors (or: “external inducements”) and domestic factors (or: 
“internal motivations”). However, he acknowledged that it is not easy to 
separate domestic and foreign policy factors: “A nation’s foreign policy is 
intimately related to national qualities and domestic factors such as those 
considered. It would not be easy to determine how much is due to national 
“character” and domestic influences, how much to foreign policy and the 
elements that contribute to it.”20 
 
4.1.2 Foreign policy factors 
Henkin argued that States comply with international law, because they have an 
interest to do so. States comply with international law, to keep the international 
system intact: “States have an interest in keeping the society running and 
keeping international relations orderly.”21 Henkin argued that States comply 
with international law, because they desire their relations with other countries 
to be orderly and friendly.22 States do not like to be accused or criticized by 
other States and violations between two States will negatively influence their 
relations. According to Henkin, considerations regarding “honour,” “prestige,” 
“leadership,” “influence,” “stability,” “reliability” and “reputation” often 
weighs in favour of international law compliance. States desire a reputation for 
principled behaviour, for propriety and respectability.23 Henkin further argued 
that the States that developed international law (e.g. Western European States) 
are more satisfied with the international legal framework and are more likely to 
comply with it: “Since law is generally a conservative force, it is more likely to 
be observed by those more content with their lot.”24 According to Henkin, 
                                                        
16 Henkin argues: “If there were no law against homicide, most individuals in contemporary 
societies would still refrain from murder.” See L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 
New York, Columbia University Press, 1968, p. 89.  
17 L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 48-49. 
18 Ibid, p. 49.  
19 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979. 
20 Ibid, p. 68.  
21 Ibid, p. 51. 
22 Ibid, p. 52. 
23 Ibid, p. 52. 
24 Ibid, p. 53.  
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Western-style democracies have tended to comply more with international law 
than others, since the Western European powers (and their colonial offspring) 
created international law in their image and their interest.25 Quite related to 
that, Henkin noted that compliance with international law is dependent on the 
attitude of States towards international law. Some States comply more with 
international law, because of their national “morality” and “character”.26 They 
are – according to Henkin – sensitive to stigma of violating international law. 
 
4.1.3 Domestic factors 
Henkin mentions psychological reasons as an internal force (e.g. domestic 
factor) that influences compliance positively. According to Henkin, the quality 
of law implies an obligation. Therefore, States comply with international law 
“from habit and imitation of others.” 27  In addition, States have moral 
commitments, reflecting the ideology, the values, the “style” of their society as 
well as some awareness of, and respect for, world opinion.28 Another domestic 
factor is the acceptance of the law into national life and institutions. Henkin 
argued that when international law is accepted, “national law will reflect it, the 
institutions and personnel of government will take account of it, and the life of 
the people will absorb it.”29 In other words: with acceptance of the law comes 
automatically compliance. In addition, national constitutions and institutions 
contribute to compliance with international law. In most States, international 
law is part of the national laws, without need for legislative or executive 
intervention. According to Henkin, treaties are law of the land and (if self-
executing) will be enforced by the courts on their own initiative. Institutions 
make compliance normal and routine. 30  Henkin also noted that political 
personalities (and their personal power and tenure) of politicians, lawyers, law 
officers (particularly the legal advisor to a foreign office), political officers and 
policy-makers, may be an important influence for compliance with 
international law and the degree of their commitment to international order.31 
Special commitment to a rule or agreement, makes it less likely that the State 
would breach it during that official’s term or while he or she continues in 
power. President Kennedy’s commitment to the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is 
given as an example. Henkin argued that the likelihood of compliance with 
important international agreements can purposefully be enhanced by requiring 
heads of State personally to commit their prestige to the agreement.32  
 
                                                        
25 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 63. 
26 Ibid, p. 61.  
27 Ibid, p. 60. 
28 L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Developments in 
International Law, Volume 18, 1995, p. 49. 
29 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 60. 
30 L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Developments in 
International Law, Volume 18, 1995, p. 49. 
31 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 64-66.  
32 Ibid, p. 65.  
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4.1.4 Factors explaining non-compliance 
Nevertheless, Henkin also acknowledged that there are “occasional” instances 
where States are not in compliance with international law. Henkin argued that 
sometimes a violation occurs not as a matter of State policy, but “by mistake, or 
by an unauthorized act of an institution or official of the State, or in a burst of 
national passion or other irrationality.”33 These violations are classified by 
Henkin as “irrational” instances of non-compliance with international law. 
Nevertheless, Henkin acknowledged that there are also “rational” exceptions of 
non-compliance with international law, for example when an international 
agreement that was once desirable has ceased to be satisfactory.34 Henkin also 
argued that States sometimes deliberately violate international law, because 
they expect that the short-term advantages of violation will outweigh its costs 
(especially its long-term costs): “There are cases when the cost of law 
observance seems too high, the cost of violation temptingly low.”35 Another 
reason why States deliberately not comply with international law is that 
“obligations are sometimes accepted without authentic commitment (as may be 
true for some States in respect of human rights).”36 Sometimes there is a tension 
between international treaties and the habits and traditions of State autonomy. 
Henkin argued that some States have the feeling that what they do to their 
citizens is not the business of other States or of international law. 
Considerations regarding honor, duty, leadership, power, forcefulness and 
prestige are, according to Henkin, also important. In addition, Henkin 
mentioned domestic influences for violation of international law: “There are 
domestic forces and impulses that might make a nation violate the law.”37 In the 
first place, Henkin claimed that, as there are psychological inducements to 
compliance with international law, there might also be countervailing 
psychological pressures to violate international law. The sovereignty of a State 
may give the State a sense of freedom and power to behave as it likes, 
regardless of the law.38 In the second place, pressure of influential parties (such 
as “opposition parties, impeding elections, a hostile press, pressure groups, 
organized and vocal segments of public opinion”) might be a force for violation 
of international law.39 In the third place, national institutions can also hinder 
State-compliance with international law. Henkin argued that international law 
is sometimes violated when the governmental machinery is inadequate, when 
administration is ineffective, when departments responsible for carrying out 
undertakings are remiss in doing so. In the fourth place, States might violate 
                                                        
33 L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Developments in 
International Law, Volume 18, 1995, p. 47. 
34 Ibid. 
35 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 69; and L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Developments in International Law, Volume 18, 1995, p. 47-48. 
36 L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Developments in 
International Law, Volume 18, 1995, p. 48. 
37 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 74. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid.  
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international law due to inadequate legal advice.40 In addition, Henkin referred 
to additional factors why international treaties are being violated. He explained 
that international norms are sometimes outdated “an old treaty, though still 
technically in effect, may be outmoded; treaties of long duration, also, may no 
longer be reasonable or fair.”41 Quite remarkably, Henkin also put another 
factor forward, being the lack of sufficient deterrence. He wrote that if the only 
response to violation of a treaty is termination of that specific clause or article, 
the State might not be likely to be deterred from violating that provision.42 
Henkin wrote more specific about human rights and compliance in his essay 
Inter-State Responsibility for Compliance with Human Rights Obligations43 and he 
argued: “It is time for States parties to multilateral human rights treaties to 
recognize and to act on their responsibility, and for all States to recognize their 
mutual responsibility for compliance with international human rights norms 
generally.” In his view, the extent that ordinary human beings in the world will 
enjoy human rights depends on maintaining what he called “a human rights 
culture” around the world, which depends in turn on the commitment and 
responsibility of governments, institutions, peoples, NGOs and individuals: “It 
depends on all of us.”44 
 
4.1.5 Concluding observations 
When describing and explaining all the factors that influence compliance with 
international law positively and/or negatively, Henkin used many examples of 
compliance with and violations of international law. Henkin mostly focused on 
compliance with international law in general and only briefly touched upon the 
question of compliance with the international human rights framework. His list 
of factors explaining compliance and non-compliance is very rich and his 
analysis offers a quite chaotic analysis of relevant factors. Raustriala and 
Slaughter argue that his list of factors is “too rich, however, to yield a clear 
theory of why and when States do and do not comply.”45 Overall, Henkin was 
of the opinion that critics solely focus on the rare cases of non-compliance, 
rather than the overwhelming cases of compliance. To conclude, Henkin offered 
a strong argument of compliance and claimed: “the fact is that law observance, 
not violation, is the common way of nations.”46   
 
4.2 Chayes & Chayes’ managerial theory 
 
The managerial theory of international legal compliance of Chayes & Chayes 
                                                        
40 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 76. 
41 Ibid, p. 76-77.  
42 Ibid, p. 77. 
43 L. Henkin, Inter-State Responsibility for Compliance with Human Rights Obligations, in: L.C. Cohrah et 
al., Men’s Inhumanity to Man, Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonia Cassese, Kluwer Law 
International, International Humanitarian Law Series, Volume 5, 2003, p. 383-397. 
44 Ibid, p. 397. 
45 K. Raustriala and A. Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’, in: W. 
Carlsnaes et al., Handbook of International Relations, London, Sage Publications, 2012, p. 540. 
46 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1968, p. 46. 
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has the same premise as Henkin, in particular the expectation that States have a 
“general propensity to comply with their international treaty obligations.”47 
Chayes & Chayes presented in their book The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreements 48  an alternative traditional legal process 
theory of compliance, namely the “managerial model.” This model rejects 
enforcement approaches to international law compliance where compliance is 
achieved through coercive mechanisms (such as economic or military sanctions). 
Chayes & Chayes are not in favour of coercive measures, because they argue 
that these measures are too costly, too political and often ineffective in changing 
behaviour.49 Instead, the managerial model is relying primarily on a cooperative, 
problem-solving approach.50 This model places the spotlight on the process of 
international dialogue. 51  Chayes & Chayes claim that the fundamental 
instrument for maintaining compliance with treaties is “an iterative process of 
discourse among the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider public.”52  
In order to support their claim, they identified three factors that contribute to 
compliance with international law, being: efficiency, interests and norms. They 
did not suggest that these three factors (separately or in combination) will lead 
to compliance in every case or even in any particular instance.53 However, they 
claimed that these three factors “lend plausibility to the assumption of a 
propensity to comply”54 and will lead to a better understanding of the problems 
of non-compliance and how they can be addressed.55 
 
4.2.1 Efficiency  
In the first place, Chayes & Chayes argued that compliance is efficient from an 
internal, decisional perspective. They explained that “decisions are not a free 
good”56 and that “governmental resources for policy analysis and decision 
                                                        
47 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 4.  
48 Ibid. Part of this book had previously been published: A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, On 
Compliance, International Organization, Volume 47, No. 2, 1993.  
49 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 2-3 and O.A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties 
Make a Difference? Yale Law Journal, Volume 112, 2002, p. 1935. Chayes and Chayes might have 
been inspired by M.B. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law, Bookbarn International, 
1993, p. 7. Akehurst noted: “Sanctions are not the main reason why the law is obeyed in any legal 
system. People do not refrain from committing murder because they are afraid of being punished, 
but because they have been brought up to regard murder as unthinkable; habit, conscience, 
morality, affection and tolerance play a far more important part than sanctions. Sanctions are 
effective only if the law-breaker is in a small minority; if he is not, sanctions are powerless to secure 
compliance with the law, as is shown by wide-spread violation of speed limits…” 
50 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 3.  
51 O.A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Yale Law Journal, Volume 112, 
2002, p. 1955. 
52 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 25.  
53 Ibid, p. 3-4.  
54 Ibid, p. 4.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.  
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making are costly and in short supply.”57 They argued that the continuous 
recalculation of costs and benefits is not necessary if circumstances have not 
changed since the original decision. Therefore, States that comply with 
international law save transaction costs, because compliance avoids the need to 
recalculate the costs and benefits of a decision.58 The adoption of a treaty 
establishes an authoritative rule system.59 Chayes & Chayes argued that the 
alternative to recalculation is to follow the established treaty rule.  
 
4.2.2 National interest 
In the second place, Chayes & Chayes noted that a treaty is a consensual 
instrument: “It has no force unless the State has agreed to it.”60 They argued 
that the process by which international agreements are formulated and 
concluded “is designed to ensure that the final result will present, to some 
degree, an accommodation of the interests of the negotiating States.” 61 
According to Chayes & Chayes, the international treaty-making process leaves 
enough room for accommodating divergent interests. They acknowledge that, 
from the point of view of the particular interests of any State, the outcome of the 
treaty-making process might fall short and States will probably not be able to 
achieve all of its objectives. They recognize the fact that a treaty is necessarily a 
compromise between States.62 Nevertheless, Chayes & Chayes argue that if the 
treaty or international agreement is well designed, compliance problems and 
enforcement issues are likely to be manageable. If non-compliance occurs, it is – 
according to Chayes & Chayes – no willful disobedience of States, but rather an 
unsuccessful negotiating process that did not incorporate a broad enough range 
of the States’ interests.63 Overall, they assumed that international treaties are 
consent-based instruments that serve the interest of the participating States.64 
 
4.2.3 Norms 
In the third place, Chayes & Chayes compare the acceptance of people to obey 
the national laws with the acceptance of States to obey international law. They 
argue: “the existence of legal obligation, for most actors in most situations, 
translates into a presumption of compliance, in the absence of strong 
countervailing circumstances.”65 Henkin used the same kind of argumentation 
in his theory. Chayes & Chayes refer to the principle of pacta sunt servanda66 
                                                        
57 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 4.  
58 Ibid, and A.T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, California Law Review, 
Volume 90, 2002, p. 1830.  
59 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 4. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, p. 4-5. 
62 Ibid, p. 7. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid, p. 4-5 and A.T. Guzman, ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’, California Law 
Review, Volume 90, 2002, p. 1830.  
65 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 8.  
66 Ibid, p. 128.  
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(treaties are to be obeyed), the fundamental norm of international law that the 
State is bound by its consent. According to Chayes & Chayes, if a State has 
formally assented to a provision contained in international law, the State has a 
legal obligation to obey this provision and is “presumptively a guide to 
action.”67 In other words, States comply with international law, because of their 
prior agreement to do so, even in the absence of a threat of reprisal.68 With the 
agreement, States created a normative obligation for themselves that they 
cannot ignore. However, Chayes & Chayes also acknowledge that the mere 
existence of international law does not ensure automatic compliance by State 
Parties that have assented to it. It is necessary that the norms of the treaty have 
to be understood and accepted in their application to concrete situations for 
States to have the power to induce obedience.69  
 
4.2.4 Factors explaining non-compliance 
Chayes & Chayes argued that the decision of a State whether or not to comply 
with a treaty is (in most cases)70 not the result of a calculation of costs and 
benefits. To their minds, States only infrequently violate international law 
wilfully: “such cases are the exception rather than the rule.”71 But if States do 
not violate international law premeditated and deliberately, why do States 
violate their international legal obligations? What explains this violating 
behavior of States? Chayes & Chayes identified three factors that in their view 
often lie at the root of non-compliance with international law: (1) ambiguity and 
indeterminacy of treaty language, (2) limitations on the capacity of parties to 
carry out their undertakings and (3) the temporal dimension of the social, 
economic, and political changes contemplated by regulatory treaties.  
 In the first place, Chayes & Chayes point out that the general language of 
treaty provisions very often do not provide determinate answers to specific 
questions. Drafters of international legal instruments often did not foresee 
many of the possible applications, neither their contextual settings. Therefore, 
language of international law is, according to Chayes & Chayes often “unable to 
capture meaning with precision.”72 This can produce a “zone of ambiguity 
within which it is difficult to say with precision what is permitted and what 
forbidden.”73 On the one hand, sometimes there are good reasons for choosing a 
more general formulation of the obligation (for example when the political 
                                                        
67 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 128.  
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69 Ibid, p. 112.  
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consensus may not support more precision; or to try to inform a process, rather 
than seeking to foresee in detail the circumstances in which the words will be 
brought to bear). On the other hand, detailed language of treaty provisions has 
its difficulties as well: “It invites the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
(to express one thing is to exclude the other).”74 Sometimes precision provides 
loopholes, requiring a process of continuous revision. Overall, in many 
instances, Chayes & Chayes explain that States take advantage of the 
indeterminacy of treaty language to justify a (too) broadly interpretation of 
treaty provisions. In that way, many States seek to discover the limits of their 
treaty obligations. Another related problem of ambiguity is that States comply 
with the letter of the obligation, but they leave “questions about the spirit for 
another day.”75 
 In the second place, Chayes & Chayes explain that, according to classical 
international law, treaties are agreements among States. Legal rights and 
obligations run between States and the object of the international agreement is 
to affect State behavior.76 However, in many instances, the real object of a treaty 
is not to affect State behavior, but for example to regulate the activities of 
individuals and private entities. A State is often in compliance when it has 
formally enacted implementing legislation and when the State established and 
enforced a domestic regime designed to ensure compliance. However, in many 
States (mostly developing countries), deficits in domestic regulatory capacity 
exist, what makes States (sometimes) unwillingly violate their international law 
obligations. In those countries, apart from political will, there is a lack of 
scientific, technical, bureaucratic, and financial resources to build effective 
domestic enforcement systems. Chayes & Chayes substantiated their claim with 
providing the example of the Montreal Protocol.77 Four years after the Protocol 
was signed, only half of the Member States had complied with the requirements 
of the treaty. However, the great majority of the violating States were 
developing countries that were simply unable to comply without technical 
assistance from the treaty organization.78 
 In the third place, Chayes & Chayes argue that regulatory treaties79 manage 
a major international problem area over time. However, significant changes in 
social or economic systems with the means of treaties, take time. A period of 
transition is always necessary: “Treaty drafters often recognize at the 
negotiating stage that there will be a considerable time lag after the treaty is 
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concluded before some or all of the parties can bring themselves into 
compliance.” 80  Therefore, modern treaties have provided for transitional 
arrangements. Chayes & Chayes emphasized that the problem of a time lag 
between undertaking and performance is even more prominent in the field of 
human rights: “Human rights norms, despite their almost universal acceptance, 
are slow to establish themselves in places where they may clash with local 
customs, culture, and systems of government.” 81  They contend that non-
compliance with human rights treaties is very common and that there is a big 
time lag between undertaking and performance.82 However, Chayes & Chayes 
argue that, although human rights treaties include ideals of the international 
system, it is a mistake to call human rights treaties “aspirational.” Instead, these 
treaties are – according to Chayes & Chayes – designed to initiate a process that 
over time (perhaps a long time) would bring behavior “into greater congruence 
with those ideals.”83  
 
4.2.5 Elements of management strategy  
Chayes & Chayes further provide a management strategy to persuade non-
complying States to act in accordance with international law. This strategy 
consists of three elements. The first and “almost universal element of 
management strategy”84 is to increase transparency regarding the requirements 
of the treaty regime and the Member State’s performance under it. 85 
Transparency influences strategic interaction among Member States of the 
treaty and will consequently lead to better compliance.86 The second element is 
to improve the dispute settlement system. Where ambiguity in treaty language 
creates compliance problems, the traditional remedy is the dispute settlement 
machinery: binding adjudication or informal meditative processes. According 
to Chayes & Chayes, it does not matter whether the dispute settlement 
procedure is legally required or the decision is legally binding, so long as the 
outcome is treated as authoritative. They explain that a good-working dispute 
settlement system has a preventive or anticipatory value.87 The third element is 
building capacity, because – as mentioned previously – the lack of technical and 
bureaucratic capability and financial resources is a factor that influences 
compliance negatively. Therefore, capacity building (or “technical assistance”) 
has a major function in enabling countries to comply with the requirements of a 
certain treaty.88 These three elements are part of Chayes & Chayes’ management 
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strategy and “merge into a broader process of “jaw-boning” – the effort to 
persuade the miscreant to change its ways – that is the characteristic method by 
which international regimes seek to induce compliance.”89  
 
4.2.6 Concluding observations 
Chayes & Chayes used in their managerial theory many examples of 
compliance with and violations of international law, often drawn from their 
own experiences as lawyers. Like Henkin, they argued that States generally 
comply with international law. Chayes & Chayes reject sanctions and other 
forms of enforcement and instead argue for a “cooperative, problem-solving 
approach” to promoting compliance.90  Factors that contribute to compliance 
with international law are efficiency, national interests and norms. Three factors 
lie at the root of non-compliance, including: ambiguous treaty language, limited 
capacity and the temporal dimension.  
 
4.3 Franck’s legitimacy theory 
 
Franck presented in his article Legitimacy in the International System91 and in his 
book The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations92 an alternative legal theory of 
compliance that has come to be known as the legitimacy theory (also referred to 
as the “fairness model”). Franck started with the following claim: “Most States 
observe systematic rules much of the time in their relations with other States.”93 
This claim reminds us of the famous aphorism of Henkin. Like Henkin and 
Chayes & Chayes, Franck also believed that States generally comply with 
international law and is particularly interested in the question why sovereign 
States voluntarily comply with rules in the absence of a coercive authority, even 
against perceived self-interest. 94  He recognized that States do not always 
comply with all international treaties and noticed that some rules are harder to 
violate than others. 95  His aim is to determine why and under what 
circumstances international law is complied with, or – in Franck’s words – to 
find an answer to the question: “Why do powerful nations obey powerless 
rules?”96  
 
4.3.1 The “compliance pull” 
Franck’s hypothetical answer to the above question is: “Because they [States] 
perceive the rule and its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of 
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legitimacy.”97 In other words, Franck argued that legitimacy is the driving force 
behind State compliance. He defined legitimacy as the quality of a rule “which 
derives from a perception on the part of those to whom it is addressed that is 
has come into being in accordance with the right process.”98 According to 
Franck, “a right process” includes the notion of valid sources, but also 
encompasses linguistic, literary-structural, cultural, anthropological and 
philosophical insights. That some rules or laws in themselves seem to exert more 
pull to compliance than others is Franck’s starting point in his search for a 
theory of legitimacy.99 The (perceived) fairness of international rules themselves 
is – according to Franck – the key to compliance. Legitimacy exerts a “pull to 
compliance” which is powered by the quality of the rule and of the rule-making 
institution and not by coercive authority.100 Rules that are not fair exert little 
“compliance pull.” States comply with international rules, because they would 
like to act in accordance with the perceived fairness of the legal obligations. 
Franck argued that compliance with international rules is a “matter of degree” 
because some rules have a higher legitimacy ratio or index than others.101 
International rules vary in the extent they are able to exert a “compliance pull” 
on those to whom they are addressed.  
 Franck mainly focused on the legitimacy of rules but also paid attention to 
the legitimacy of institutions and processes through which the rules come into 
being, because the legitimacy of a rule depends – according to Franck – on the 
legitimacy of the rule-giving institution. He defined legitimate institutions as: 
institutions that are established and function in accordance with ascertainable 
principles of right process. 102  But when are rules and the rule-making 
institutions and process legitimate? Franck identified four indicators of rule-
legitimacy in the community of States, being: determinacy, symbolic validation, 
coherence and adherence. When these four elements are present in a rule or in 
the rule process, they appear to exert a strong “compliance pull” on States to 
comply with the rule.103 When these elements are lacking, Franck argued that 
States would easier ignore the institution and avoid the rules to pursue the 
State’s short-term self-interest. 104  However, although he considered the 
“compliance pull” to be very strong, he also acknowledged that other pulls 
could be stronger in particular circumstances. Franck argued: “each rule has an 
inherent pull power that is independent of the circumstances in which it is 
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exerted, and that varies from rule to rule.”105 This pull power is its index of 
legitimacy. An analysis of Frank’s four indicators can be found below.  
 
4.3.2 Determinacy106 
The first indicator of legitimacy is rule-clarity or textual determinacy. This 
linguistic element examines the literary properties of the text itself. 
Determinacy is defined by Franck as “the ability of the text to convey a clear 
message, to appear transparent in the sense that one can see through the 
language to the meaning.”107 In other words: if the rule’s requirements are 
transparent and clear, those addressed know exactly what is expected of them. 
This is a necessary first step towards compliance with the rule. Franck also 
acknowledged that some degree of indeterminacy is inevitable in any body of 
rules and indeterminacy may even have benefits, such as promoting agreement 
and permitting a flexible response.108 However, indeterminate or vague rules 
also have its costs. Indeterminate rules not only make it harder to know what is 
expected, but also make it easier to justify non-compliance.109 A vaguely defined 
and fuzzy rule is elastic, open to manipulation, and thus a broad interpretation 
of this rule will eventually result in non-compliance.110  Franck therefore argued: 
“the degree of determinacy of a rule directly affects the degree of its perceived 
legitimacy.”111 Determinacy increases the legitimacy of a rule and a high degree 
of determinacy goes therefore hand in hand with a high degree of compliance. 
The more determinate the rule, the more difficult it is to resist the pull to 
compliance and to justify non-compliance.112 Franck also noted that there is 
another way in which determinacy increases the legitimacy of a rule. He argued 
that highly transparent rules of conduct actually encourage rule compliance. 
 
4.3.3 Symbolic validation113 
The second indicator of legitimacy is symbolic validation, ritual and pedigree. 
This cultural and anthropological element examines the rule’s legitimacy in the 
light of its ability to communicate.114 The rule must be characterized as an 
important part of a system of social order. It is not the content that needs to be 
communicated, but the validity or authenticity. This communication is symbolic 
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rather than literal. Franck labelled these symbolic validating communications as 
“cues.”115 The role of cues is to validate nations, institutions and rules.116 Franck 
defined symbolic validation of a rule, or a rule-making process, or institution as: 
“a signal used as a cue to elicit compliance with a command.”117 Symbolic cues 
may be objects, songs, acts, or spoken words. An example given by Franck is 
the singing of the national anthem, because it is a vocal signal symbolically 
reinforcing the citizen’s relationship to the State. Franck explained that rituals 
are a specialized form of symbolic validation, “marked by ceremonies, often 
mystical, which provide unenunciated reasons or cues for compliance with the 
commands of persons or institutions.”118 Rituals are often a cue presented as 
drama, primarily operate at the symbolic level and they serve to communicate 
and ratify the beliefs and values of “a system”.119 Rituals reinforce the rules and 
authority structure of a community by embracing and involving an in-group 
and by excluding an out-group, which cannot share in, or understand, the 
symbolic communications code.120 An example given by Franck is the swearing 
in of a new U.S. president, in order to validate a community and thus reinforce 
the rule structure that upholds its unity and its values. Pedigree is another 
(universal) form of symbolic validation. Pedigree seeks to enhance the 
“compliance pull” by emphasizing the historical origins and the cultural or 
anthropological deep-rootedness of the rule or the rule-making authority.121 
Franck gave the example of “recognition”, i.e. a new State’s election to 
membership in the UN.  
 Symbolic validation may use ritual, pedigree, or both, as cues to secure 
compliance.122 Franck provided many examples of the use of ritual, pedigree 
and other symbols to reinforce legitimacy in the international system. He 
showed that the legitimacy of the system of rules and institutions is 
undermined when its validating symbols and rituals are violated. Symbolic 
validation thus exerts a “compliance pull” on those to whom the cues of ritual 
or pedigree are communicated. Cues succeed in communicating legitimacy if 
they evoke reality and if those addressed perceive them as true. Conversely, 
when cues are false and do not refer symbolically to what is perceived as a 
historic, social, political or metaphysical reality, the capacity of cues to exert a 
“compliance pull” is diminished.  
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4.3.4 Coherence123 
The third indicator of legitimacy is coherence. Both determinacy and symbolic 
validation are connected to coherence. Franck observed that a rule is coherent 
when similar cases are treated alike in application of the rule and when rules 
relate to other rules of the same system.124 Another aspect of coherence is – 
according to Franck – that it encompasses the further notion that a rule gathers 
force if it is seen to be connected to a network of other rules by an underlying 
general principle.125 In other words, if a rule might seem inconsistent in its 
application and therefore unequally applied, it also needs to be determined that 
no reasonable principle of general application could justify the inequality. If a 
rule is unequal and also unprincipled, the legitimacy is severely depleted. The 
degree of a rule’s legitimacy thus depends on its coherence, both internally 
(among the several parts and purposes of the rule) and externally (between one 
rule and other rules, through shared principles). 126  According to Franck, 
coherence legitimizes a rule, principle, or implementing institution, because: “it 
provides a reasonable connection between a rule, or the application of a rule, to 
1) its own principled purpose, 2) principles previously employed to solve 
similar problems, and 3) a lattice of principles in use to resolve different 
problems.”127 If a rule is applied coherent, it will be able to exert a “compliance 
pull.” Problems arise when standards are not applied coherently. For example 
when rules apply to some, but not to others equally entitled. Or when the rules 
are not connected to principles of general applicability.128  
 
4.3.5 Adherence129 
The fourth indicator of legitimacy is predominantly philosophical and refers to 
adherence to a normative hierarchy. Franck quoted Hart who considered the 
international system to be primitive because individual rules lack adherence to 
a rule hierarchy. With adherence, Franck means “the vertical nexus between a 
single primary rule of obligation […] and a pyramid of secondary rules about 
how rules are made, interpreted and applied.”130 In other words, these are rules 
about the rules. Franck labelled them as secondary rules of process. If primary 
rules of obligation lack adherence to secondary rules of process, they are 
nothing more than “ad hoc reciprocal arrangements.”131 Thus, when primary 
rules are connected to a procedural and institutional framework of an 
organized community, the rules are more legitimate. Franck explained that 
there are nowadays lawmaking institutions and courts in the international 
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system. States accept that they are members of a community with secondary 
rules and recognize that they derive validation from membership in this 
international community. States have an obligation to comply to a treaty once 
they have signed and ratified them. However, Franck argued that this 
obligation does not only derive from consent to the treaty, but also from 
membership in the international community. Thus, Franck concludes that the 
obligation of States to comply with treaties is acquired associatively, rather than 
by specific consent. It is owed generally towards all members of the 
community.132  
 
4.3.6 Concluding observations 
According to Franck and his ‘legitimacy theory’, States comply with 
international rules, because there is a “compliance pull” on States by 
considerations of legitimacy. The more legitimate rules are and the more 
legitimate institutions appear to be, the greater is compliance with these rules. 
The key element explaining compliance is fairness: if rules are not perceived to 
be fair, they will exert little compliance pull. Franck argued that States comply 
with legal rules that they perceive as being made in accordance with the right 
process. Franck identified four indicators (determinacy, symbolic validation, 
coherence and adherence) that predict the right process and thus the “pull” or 
strong pressure towards compliance.  
 
4.4 Koh’s transnational legal process theory 
 
Harold H. Koh presented in his articles Transnational Legal Process133 and Why 
Do Nations Obey International Law?134 another IL theory of compliance, namely 
the theory of ‘transnational legal process’. Koh’s starting point is that 
international law is generally complied with and enforced by a so-called 
transnational legal process. He acknowledged that he is, in that sense, quite 
traditional: “I found myself sounding like Louis Henkin, arguing that the glass 
is half full.”135 Koh argued that, for more than forty years, international legal 
scholars have studied the transnational legal process without knowing it.136 He 
claimed that transnational legal process lies not only at the heart of what 
international legal scholarship is about, but also at the heart of what 
international law scholarship should be about in the future. According to Koh, 
his transnational legal process theory “provides the key to understand the 
critical issue of compliance with international law.”137 He presented both a 
theoretical explanation of why States comply, but also a plan of strategic action 
for stimulating States to comply with international law.138  
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4.4.1 Reflection on Chayes & Chayes and Franck 
In his transnational legal process theory, Koh combined the managerial and 
fairness approaches. Therefore, he first reflected on the books of Chayes & 
Chayes and Franck, before he explained his own theory in more detail. He 
considered both the managerial and the fairness approach as the “most 
comprehensive and sophisticated efforts to date to address this demanding 
[compliance] question.” However, Koh also suggested what Chayes & Chayes 
and Franck have gotten right, wrong, and incomplete.139 He noted that Franck’s 
book reflected and complemented the Chayes & Chayes’ approach. Koh argued 
that in both the managerial theory as the legitimacy theory overlooked the 
account of transnational legal process. Both Chayes and Franck have, according 
to Koh, avoided explaining the process whereby repeated compliance gradually 
becomes “habitual obedience.”140 Although both Chayes & Chayes and Franck 
have posed the critical ‘why-question’ many times, they left – according to Koh 
– this question unanswered in their theories.141 Koh concluded that the books of 
Chayes & Chayes and Franck are very instructive, but “give shape to only parts 
of the blind men’s elephant.”142 In his articles, Koh therefore tried to develop a 
more complete theory about State compliance, by combining the managerial 
and fairness theories with a “deeper analysis of how transnational legal process 
promotes the interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international 
legal norms.” 143  According to Koh, the transnational legal process theory 
provides the “missing link,”144 and presents the “key to unlocking the ancient 
puzzle of why nations obey.”145 He used many examples to justify this claim, 
especially in the field of human rights.  
 
4.4.2 Internalized compliance 
Koh argued that the key to better compliance is more internalized compliance, 
or “obedience.”146 Like Chayes & Chayes and Franck, Koh is also convinced that 
better compliance with international law will be reached by voluntary 
obedience and not by coerced compliance (although he recognizes that coercion 
is sometimes necessary). Interestingly, to give his argument more strength, Koh 
also referred to social psychologists and criminologists who studied why 
individuals comply with national laws. After extensive empirical study, they 
concluded that people comply with the law, not because they fear punishment, 
but because they feel that legal authorities are legitimate. 147  But what is 
transnational legal process? Koh defined “transnational legal process” as the 
theory and practice of how public and private actors including States, 
international organizations, multinationals, NGOs and private individuals, 
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interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to 
make, interpret, enforce and internalize rules of transnational law.148  
 
4.4.3 Interaction, interpretation and internalization 
The process of internalized compliance has three phases.149 In the first phase, 
one or more transnational actors provoke interaction or series of interactions 
with other governmental and non-governmental actors in the international 
system. In the second phase, the interaction forces an interpretation of the 
international laws to the situation. In the third phase, the new interpretation of 
the international law is internalized in the actor’s internal normative system. 
The aim of this internalization process is to “bind that other party to obey the 
interpretation as part of its internal value set.”150 Koh further distinguished 
between social, political and legal internalization. Social internalization occurs 
when a norm acquires so much public legitimacy that there is widespread 
general obedience to it. Political internalization occurs when political leaders 
accept an international norm and adopt it as a government policy. Legal 
internalization occurs when an international norm is incorporated into the 
national legal system, through executive action, legislation and judicial 
decisions. Koh explained that this transaction creates a legal rule that will, in 
the future, guide other transnational interactions between the actors. These 
future transactions will further internalize those norms and repeated 
participation in the process will help to reconstitute the interests of the actors in 
the process.151 In the end, States define promoting the rule of international law 
as part of their national self-interest. Therefore, Koh’s approach could be 
qualified as constitutive, in the sense of operating to reconstitute national 
interests.152 Koh explained that the relationship between the three forms of 
internalization could be complex.153 Therefore, he acknowledged: “the concept 
of transnational legal process has important complications, not just for 
international relations theorists, but also for activists and political leaders.”154 
 
4.4.4 Four distinctive features 
Koh explained that the main difference between international legal process and 
transnational legal process is the “focus on the transnational, normative, and 
constitutive character of global legal process.”155 He further clarified that the 
transnational legal process has four distinctive features.156 In the first place, the 
theory is non-traditional, because Koh broke down the traditional private-
public dichotomy and the traditional national-international dichotomy that was 
historically present in studies of international law. In the second place, the 
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theory is non-statist, because Koh focused not narrowly on States as the key-
actors at the international level. He also took other significant non-State actors 
(such as multinationals, NGOs, private individuals) that emerged at the 
transnational stage into account. He considered non-State actors, international 
institutions and domestic political structures not just observers of the 
transnational legal process, but as “important mediating forces in international 
society.”157 In the third place, the theory is dynamic and not static, because Koh 
focused on the continuities of process. He emphasized that transnational law 
transforms, mutates, and moves up and down, from public to private and from 
the national to the international level, and back again. In the fourth place, the 
theory is normative, because Koh does not embrace the descriptive workings in 
the process interaction, interpretation, internalization, enforcement, but he 
embraced the normativity of the process. Koh focused not simply on how 
international interaction among transnational actors shape law, but also on how 
law shapes and guides future transnational interactions. In Koh’s words: “how 
law influences why nations obey.”158 
 
4.4.5 Complex combination of factors 
In his analysis, Koh mentioned that a combination of five factors could explain 
particular instances of national compliance with international law (although 
some of these factors are contradictory to what he stated before). These factors 
roughly correspond to five historical schools of thought of international lawyers 
and international relations scholars, seeking to explain national compliance 
with international laws. The first explanation Koh mentioned was coercion, 
while referring to the realist values of power and coercion. He suggested that 
States never truly comply with international law, but only comply with it when 
sufficiently coerced.159 The second, and gentler, explanation Koh put forth was 
self-interest, favoured by the school of rational choice theory. He suggested that 
States might choose rationally to comply with international law out of a sense of 
self-interest, when the total benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.160 In the 
third place, Koh argued that another factor explaining compliance is rule-
legitimacy. He assumed that States comply with international law, guided by a 
sense of moral obligation derived from considerations of fairness, democracy 
and legitimacy.161 Communitarianism is a fourth possible explanation that can 
be found in the English international society school of international relations 
and Grotius. They argue that States comply with international law because of 
the values of the international society of which they are a part.162 And finally, an 
explanation could be the internalization of rules through socialization, political 
action, and legal process. Koh stressed that none of the theories or explanations 
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has “the monopoly on wisdom.”163 According to Koh, all five explanations work 
together to help explain why nations comply with international law.  They are 
“complementary conceptual lenses to give a richer explanation of why 
compliance with international law does, or does not, occur in particular 
cases.”164 As Koh phrases: “Each theory or factor gets a piece of the puzzle right, 
but none alone captures the entire picture.”165 In the end, Koh argued that the 
transnational legal process had been overlooked as a key factor.  
 
4.4.6 Human rights and the transnational legal process  
In his article How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?166 Koh applied his 
transnational legal process theory to the international human rights framework. 
He compared the non-compliance with laws at the national level (“Even here in 
Bloomington, Indiana, the height of civilization, are the parking laws or 
burglary laws perfectly enforced?”)167 with the non-compliance with human 
rights norms at the international level (“This process works sporadically, and 
that we often most clearly see its spectacular failures, as in Cambodia, Bosnia 
and Rwanda.”) 168  Koh argued that international human rights norms are 
enforced in much the same way as national laws, through the transnational 
legal process. The three phases are the institutional interaction whereby global 
norms of international human rights are debated, interpreted, and ultimately 
internalized by national legal systems.169 On the one hand, this process does not 
always work very well. On the other hand, Koh argued that sometimes the 
process of enforcing international human rights law has it successes “which 
gives us reason not to ignore that process, but try to develop and nurture it.”170  
 
4.4.7 The horizontal story of human rights law enforcement 
Koh further elaborated on the “horizontal story” 171 on human rights law 
enforcement. He described how international human rights law was born, as a 
product of the UN Charter, the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials and the 
UDHR. Under this conventional international legal process view, the principal 
enforcers of human rights law have always been States, who interacted with 
each other on an inter-State, government-to-government level. At this 
horizontal intergovernmental level, governments and inter-governmental 
organizations (UN Human Rights Commission/UN Human Rights Committee) 
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did put pressure on each other to comply with human rights, invoking 
universal treaty norms as the ICCPR and the ICESCR. New mechanisms were 
created: judicial (the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), new executive actors 
(United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights) and quasi-legislative 
(Vienna Conference on Human Rights, Being Women’s Conference). However, 
Koh argued that “despite these occasional advances, the overall picture of this 
standard enforcement story is one of impotence, ineffectiveness, of a horizontal 
system where the key actors are nation-States and intergovernmental 
organizations, the key forums are governmental forums, and the key 
transactions are transactions between States and other States.”172 
 
4.4.8 The vertical story of human rights law enforcement 
Koh argued that the “horizontal story” is not wrong, but incomplete, because 
“it does not capture the full picture of how international human rights norms 
are currently generated, brought into domestic systems, and then brought back 
up to the international level.”173 According to him, the “vertical story”174 of 
human rights enforcement is much richer and focuses on a transnational legal 
process that includes “a different set of actors, fora and transactions.”175  He 
explained that the human rights norm-internalization did not begin by States, 
but by private transnational organizations and individuals who mobilized 
popular opinion and political support within their country and abroad for the 
development of a universal human rights norm.176 Examples are Christian peace 
activists, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Anti-Slavery 
Society. According to Koh, these non-governmental actors seek to develop 
transnational networks to discuss and generate political solutions among 
concerned individuals at the national, regional and international levels, among 
government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, academics, and private 
foundations. These transnational actors (or “norm entrepreneurs”) seek 
governmental and non-governmental fora capable of declaring norms of 
international law (treaties) and specific interpretations of those norms in 
particular circumstances (interpretation of treaties or customary law). This law 
declaring fora create an global “interpretive community” that includes – 
according to Koh – treaty regimes; domestic, regional and international courts; 
ad hoc tribunals; domestic and regional legislatures; executive entities; 
international publicists; and NGOs. The next vertical step is to internalize norm-
interpretations issued by the “interpretive community” into their national 
bureaucratic and political structures. Through a repeated cycle of interaction, 
interpretation, and internalization, Koh argued that States will comply with 
international human rights law “out of a perceived self-interest that becomes 
institutional habit.”177 
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Koh concluded his article How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?178 
with answering the question on how international human rights law is enforced: 
“not just by nation-States, not just by government officials, not just by world 
historical figures, but by people like us, by people with the courage and 
commitment to bring international human rights law home through a 
transnational legal process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization.”179  
 
4.4.9 Concluding observations 
Koh provides an explanatory framework for understanding how and why the 
process of norm-internalization is considered to be the key to understanding 
State compliance with international law.180 He explained that the best strategies 
are not the horizontal regime management strategies, but rather, vertical 
strategies.181 His transnational legal process theory claims that States comply 
with international law in general and the international human rights framework 
in particular, because of a transnational legal process of interaction, 
interpretation and internalization. Factors explaining particular instances of 
compliance include: coercion, self-interest, rule-legitimacy, communitarianism 
and the values of the international society of which States are a part. 
 
5 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE 
 
5.1 Realism 
 
Realism started to emerge as a school of thought in IR theory in the 1940s. 
However, the realist primary assumptions have been expressed in earlier – even 
ancient – writings. The most famous text in realist tradition is to be found in The 
History of the Peloponnesian War182 of Thucydides (460–411 B.C.E.). He is often 
portrayed as the father of the school of political realism. He is an ancient Greek 
historian and argued: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what 
they must.”183 This oft-quoted sentence can be considered the core of realist 
thinking. Another important realist thinker is Machiavelli (1469-1527), a 
Florentine political philosopher, who wrote Il Principe. He argued that the sole 
aim of a politician is to seek power, regardless of religious or ethical 
considerations. The last important thinker associated with realism is Hobbes 
(1588-1679) who stated in Leviathan that the state of nature is a state of war of all 
against all (bellum omnium contra omnes). These three realist thinkers are 
generally considered to present “the most powerful expressions of realism in 
the Western tradition of political theory.”184 
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5.1.1 Classical realism 
The most traditional version of realism called “classical realism” has long been 
the dominant theory among IR scholars. Classical realism was born in 
challenging the value-driven nature of the idealist approach in the aftermath of 
World War I.185 The goal of the idealist was to build peace with the creation of a 
system of international law, backed by international institutions, procedures, 
and practices in order to prevent another world conflict.186 Idealist emphasized 
the common interests that could unite humanity. However, in the 1940s and 
1950s, realist scholars challenged and criticized this “interwar idealism,”187 
because of the unscientific nature of their knowledge. Realists like Carr even 
used the term “utopians”188 to refer to idealists and blamed the idealists’ focus 
on how the world ought to be instead of how it actually was.189 Morgenthau is 
generally recognized as the leading realist thinker.190 He saw realism as a 
product of human nature. Fundamental aspects of human nature are the drive 
for power and the will to dominate.191 He wrote in Politics Among Nations the 
following: "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way 
through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined 
in terms of power."192  
 In general, classical realists assume that the international system is 
immutably anarchic, that States are the primary actors and that all States are 
unitary, rational actors. The international system is anarchic, because it lacks an 
authoritative government. There is no common power that can enact and 
enforce rules of behaviour. Because of this absence, realists argue: “the law of 
the jungle still prevails.” 193  Another realist assumption is that States are 
exclusively driven by competitive self-interest. The protection of the State’s 
territorial integrity is the most important goal above all other goals.194 The 
primary concern of all States is survival and States have an interest in 
maximizing their power. When reflecting on the realist approach, Slaughter 
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nicely pointed out that “For realists, power is the currency of the international 
system. States interact with one another within that system like billiard balls: 
hard, opaque, unitary actors colliding with one another.”195  Because State 
behaviour is determined by the balance of power, States will not pursue 
cooperation on the basis of normative commitments.196 It is difficult for States to 
‘trust’ other States, because they can never be certain about the intentions of 
other States. States must constantly assume and prepare for the possibility of 
war with other States. Only if it advances the interest of States in maximizing 
their power and prospects for survival, international cooperation is possible. In 
the realist literature, special attention is afforded to powerful States as they 
have most influence at the international level. At the same time, little attention 
is given to less powerful States or to international institutions, Civil Society 
Organizations, multinational corporations, individuals and other actors. Realist 
considered them not to be important, because they have little influence on the 
international level.  
 
5.1.2 Neorealism 
The strong view of classical realists no longer dominates in IR theory, because 
after World War II a more nuanced approach called “neorealism” or “structural 
realism” came to the forefront.197 Neorealism and classical realism do share the 
same assumptions: both have the international system as the appropriate level 
of analysis, both assume that the international system is anarchic, that the 
system is State-centric, both have a systemic focus, assume that States seek to 
ensure their survival, view international politics as inherently competitive, 
leave little room for international institutions and assume States are egoistic 
unitary actors that pursue self-help. However, neo-realism differs from classical 
realism by being less historicist, more positivist and more structuralist.  
The neorealist approach was an attempt to construct a more scientific (more 
methodologically rigorous) approach to the study of IR.  Kenneth Waltz is one 
of the founders198 of this approach and in his book Theory of International 
Politics199 he responds to the “liberal challenge” and the defects of the classical 
realism approach. Waltz observes power and State behaviour in a different way 
from the classical realists. While Morgenthau maintains that States have a will 
to power, Waltz begins his theory with the assumption that States ultimately 
seek survival. According to Waltz, power is a means to survival, not an end in 
itself. He argued that: “the first concern of States is not to maximize power but 
to maintain their position in the system.” 200  The basic “units” of the 
international system are States. Because States merely want to survive, they are 
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therefore driven to maximize security. He explains that international politics 
take place in an international environment defined by anarchy and filled with 
States that are “unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation 
and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination.” 201  To him, the 
decentralized nature of the international legal system is problematic. In the 
absence of central authority, the fundamental interest of each State is security. 
According to neorealists, “security is their [States’] overriding goal, and self-
help their guiding principle.”202 To ensure State security, States must be on 
constant preparation for conflict through economic and military build-up. 
Waltz put the focus predominantly on the anarchic ‘structure’ of the 
international system. This political structure is defined and distinguished by 
their ordering principle (hierarchy and anarchy), differentiation of functions 
among States and the distribution of capabilities among them.203 According to 
Waltz, this is of fundamental importance to understand crucial international 
outcomes. This emphasis on the permanence of the conflict characterizes the 
neorealism approach and means that States are potentially dangerous to each 
other.204 Insecurity and unequal gains are according to Waltz the two reasons 
why there is limited cooperation in the anarchic international system. States are 
afraid that the possible gains they might have when cooperating with each 
other, may favour other States more than itself. This might in turn lead to 
dependence on others: “States do not willingly place themselves in situations of 
increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security 
subordinate economic gain to political interest.” 205  Thus, structural realists 
assume that the anarchical structure of the international system will inevitably 
lead to insecurity and thus competition for power.206 
Neorealists used concepts drawn from microeconomics and game theory to 
understand and explain international cooperation and conflict. Game theory 
gained considerable popularity in the study of IR over the past few decades. 
Waltz argued that States in the international system are like firms in a national 
economy and have the same fundamental interest, namely to survive: 
“Internationally, the environment of States' actions, or the structure of their 
system, is set by the fact that some States prefer survival over other ends 
obtainable in the short run and act with relative efficiency to achieve that 
end.”207 
 
5.1.3 Compliance with international law 
In general, the role of international law and more specifically with the 
international human rights framework is scarcely circumscribed in realist 
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theory of IR. According to Barker, “realists rarely considered the existence of 
international law, let alone its relevance to the relations of States.”208 Most 
classical realists denied the value of international law and argued that 
international law is not relevant to international politics.209 They tend to be 
highly sceptical that international norms could influence State behaviour.210 
They argue that ‘power and coercion’ rather than ‘the rule of law’, is the answer 
to the question why States comply with international law.211  Most classical 
realists argue that international treaties exist only because powerful States 
benefit from their existence. In addition, international law is an instrument for 
powerful States to achieve their objectives. Thus, international law is complied 
with only when it is in the interest of dominant and powerful States, which 
coerce less powerful States into accepting the international legal framework and 
complying with it.212 This coercion could go through reward for compliance or 
threatened sanctions for non-compliance. Thus, the level of compliance with 
international law will depend on the presence of the hegemon(s) and its use. In 
other words: States comply with international law, because “someone else 
makes them.”213 This also means that States are not bound by international law, 
but remain free to violate international law whenever it is in their interest to do 
so. Given the classical realists’ emphasis on power, they are generally sceptical 
about the relevance of morality in international politics. Realists generally 
refused to apply moralistic principles, ethical premises or ideological notions to 
the actions of States, because interests were prioritized over ideologies.214  
 
5.1.4 Compliance with the human rights framework 
Compliance with international law in general and the international human 
rights framework might be a complicated matter in this theory. For realists, it 
will be difficult to explain why States would be willing to incur costs of setting 
up a human rights framework to protect human rights, to provide the 
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framework with power to control and monitor and to agree with sanctioning 
measures to bring other States in compliance.215 However, Waltz accepts the 
possibility that some countries are committed to human rights. He explains that 
human rights regimes are a result of powerful States that seek to impose their 
commitment to human rights on other States: 216  “Like some earlier great 
powers, we can identify the presumed duty of the rich and powerful to help 
others with our own beliefs about what a better world would look like. England 
claimed to bear the white man’s burden; France spoke of her mission civilisatrice 
[…] for countries at the top, this is predictable behaviour.”217 In Waltz’ view, 
States comply with the international human rights framework, because they are 
coerced by doing so by more powerful States. In essence, realists suggest that if 
compliance with international law occurs, it is not the force of law, but merely 
the result of coincidence between international law and the self-interest of 
States. If States comply with international law they do so because it is in their 
interest, even if the specific treaty did not exist. Most realists would likely 
predict that there is no relationship between human rights treaty ratification 
and government behaviour:218 “If they [legal rules] affected the behaviour of 
international actors at all, it would only be at the margins.”219  
 
5.1.5 Concluding observations 
Realism is a leading, well-established, but at the same time quite pessimistic IR 
theory. Mearsheimer summarized the realism approach in his article The False 
Promise of International Institutions and pointed out that: “realism paints a rather 
grim picture of world politics. The international system is portrayed as a brutal 
arena where States look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and 
therefore have little reason to trust each other. Daily life is essentially a struggle 
for power, where each State strives not only to be the most powerful actor in the 
system, but also ensure that no other State achieves that lofty position.”220 
Realism does not take into account national ideologies (nationalism, fascism, 
communism), nor domestic regime type (democracies, dictatorships), or non-
State actors (international institutions, CSOs, multinational corporations, 
individuals).221 Compliance with international law does not occur because the 
law is effective, but because “compliance is coincident with the path dictated by 
self-interest in a world governed by anarchy and relative State power.”222 
Therefore, many realists see no relationship between human rights treaty 
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compliance and State behaviour. They consider international law simply an 
epiphenomenon. Although this theory was dominant in IR for a long time, 
realism had to encounter a lot of criticism in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
5.2 Institutionalism 
 
Institutionalism has been referred to as one of the most prominent theories of 
IR.223 Institutionalism has many varieties and does not (yet) constitute one 
unified body of thought.224 It comprises a family of differing theories and 
approaches, including for example functionalist and neo-functionalist 
approaches, regime theory, (neo-)liberal institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, intergovernmental institutionalism, rational choice 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, ‘new’ institutionalism, collective 
security and critical theory. 225  All these approaches together form the 
institutionalist body of IR literature.  
The ‘functionalist approach’ of Mitrany is the oldest institutional theory of 
IR. He is considered to be the founding father of institutionalism in IR theory.226 
Mitrany argued that international cooperation was the best way to create a 
peaceful international environment. The main rationale behind it was that 
“peace is more than the absence of violence.”227 Mitrany explained that the real 
security concern was not the preservation of peace between separate States, but 
rather the way in which they could be persuaded to cooperate.228 In order to 
facilitate this cooperation, States would have to give (a portion of) their power 
to “functional agencies” or international institutions. Institutionalist theory 
suggests that if States do give their power to institutions, institutions can 
improve the likelihood of cooperation, even in the absence of a common 
government or other formal governance structure.229 
 
5.2.1 Similarities between realism and institutionalism 
Both realism and institutionalism share many assumptions and there are quite 
some similarities between the two IR theories. An early version of the 
institutionalist theory was referred to as “modified structural realism.”230 Both 
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IR theories see States as the primary actors in the international system and both 
assume that States are rational actors that behave on the basis of self-interest 
that seek to maximize their interest.231 Institutionalists and realists also share the 
assumption that the international system is governed by anarchy and that the 
distribution of power is the underlying principle of world politics.232  
 
5.2.2 Distinguishing characteristics of institutionalism 
However, there are also important differences between the two IR theories. In 
the realists view, there is little room for international institutions, but 
institutionalism takes system-wide institutions – often referred to as “regimes” 
– rather seriously. Keohane became a well-known institutionalist in IR theory 
after the publication of his book After Hegemony.233 Regimes are defined as “sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations.”234 Keohane explored why self-interested actors in world politics 
should seek to establish international regimes through mutual agreement.235 
Keohane explained that regimes make it easier for self-interested actors to 
realize their interests collectively.236 He argued that international cooperation is 
essential in a world of economic interdependence. Shared economic interests 
create a “harmony of interests” among States, which in turn generate a demand 
for institutions that States will agree to follow.237 By drawing upon economics, 
and game theory and collective action theory, institutionalist theory explain the 
benefits to be gained through international cooperation. 238  The role of 
institutions and regimes is to facilitate cooperation that is in the States’ long- 
term interests and to prevent short-term defections that might jeopardize those 
long-term interests.239 In the end, the creation of these institutions and regimes 
can independently influence (both constrain and regulate) the behaviour of 
international actors. 
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5.2.3 Reasons for cooperation  
The presupposition in institutionalist theory is that States do create institutions 
and regimes.240 But why would self-interested States that seek to maximize their 
interest cooperate with each other through the creation of regimes and 
institutions? What are the advantages for States to participate in institutions? 
When Keohane discussed the value of regimes and institutions in After 
Hegemony, he asserted the following:  
 
“They [institutions] enhance the likelihood of cooperation by reducing the costs of 
making transactions that are consistent with the principles of the regime. They 
create the conditions for orderly multilateral negotiations, legitimate and 
delegitimate different types of State action, and facilitate linkages among issues 
within regimes and between regimes. They increase the symmetry and improve the 
quality of the information that governments receive. By clustering issues together in 
the same forums over a long period of time, they help to bring governments into 
continuing interaction with one another, reducing incentives to cheat and 
enhancing the value of reputation. By establishing legitimate standards of behavior 
for States to follow and by providing ways to monitor compliance, they create the 
basis for decentralized enforcement founded on the principle of reciprocity.” 
 
In other words: institutions reduce transaction costs in international affairs, 
increase and disseminate information to reduce uncertainty (i.e. to stabilize 
expectations) and facilitate communication. 241  In addition, institutions can 
promote learning, create conditions for orderly negotiations and facilitate 
linkages in complex negotiations.242 Finally, institutions can also enhance the 
value of the reputation of a State for honouring commitments, facilitate 
monitoring of State behaviour to reduce the incentive to cheat and make 
decentralized enforcement of regime rules possible through the creation of 
reciprocity. 243  However, a prerequisite for institutionalist analysis is the 
identification of common interests among States. When there is no common 
interest, States will choose to act contrary to the rules of the regime or 
institution. In the end, the interests of States remain paramount.244  
 
5.2.4 Compliance with international law  
The original institutionalist theory did not focus on international law. For a long 
time, institutionalists have long avoided the ‘l’ word and did not discuss 
international law. 245  However, in the first years of the new millennium, 
institutionalists started to apply their theory to legal rules, legal regimes and 
international law. According to the institutionalists, international law exists and 
has a force, because it provides a means of achieving outcomes possible only 
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through coordinated behaviour: “States consent to commit themselves because 
doing so is the only way to achieve certain goals.”246 Institutionalists argue that 
international institutions enhance compliance and they see compliance with 
international law as a “strategic” choice.247 Compliance with international law 
can thus be explained as a winning long-term strategy to achieve long-term self-
interested goals.248 More specifically, States comply with international law as 
long as the costs of non-compliance outweigh the costs of continued 
compliance.249 International law provides a real constraint, but only insofar non-
compliance entails real costs. But what are, according to institutionalists the real 
costs of non-compliance? The answer to this question is in the first place 
concern for the State’s reputation and in the second place the threat of 
sanctions.250  
Especially in relation to human rights treaties, the costs for a State to bring 
themselves into compliance might be very high. Particularly human rights 
treaties can require States to make potentially costly measures to make 
themselves into compliance with the treaty. Institutionalists argue that States 
would act in compliance with the human rights framework because of a threat 
of direct sanctions, or as a result of obtaining and maintaining a reputation and 
hence good citizenship.251  
 
5.2.5 Concluding observations 
Institutionalism developed as an alternative paradigm to realism in IR theory. 
Like realists, institutionalists are of the opinion that States are the primary 
actors in the international system, that States behave on the basis of self-interest 
and that the international system is governed by anarchy. However, 
institutionalist theory explains that international cooperation is possible and 
that international institutions or regimes play an important role in facilitating 
that cooperation. States comply with international law in general and the 
human rights framework in particular because of strategic choice, which means 
a weighing of compliance costs and benefits. States are strategic actors that will 
comply with international law as long as the long-term benefits of compliance 
outweigh the costs of non-compliance. The threats of direct sanctions and harm 
to reputation are important factors that States take into account when deciding 
to comply (or not) with international law.252  
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5.3 Liberalism253 
 
Liberalism is – to a certain extent – founded on the work of Immanuel Kant. In 
his pamphlet Perpetual Peace254  written in 1795, Kant argues that the first 
condition of perpetual peace is that “the civil constitution of every nation 
should be republican.” By “republican” Kant means a political society where 
juridical freedom is preserved on the basis of a representative government with 
a separation of powers. 255  Morally autonomous citizens are by means of 
representation a self-legislator who makes laws that apply to all citizens equally, 
including himself or herself.256 He pointed out that: “If the consent of the 
citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is 
natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so 
risky a game. […] By contrast, under a nonrepublican constitution, where 
subjects are not citizens, the easiest thing in the world to do is to declare war.”257 
IR scholars later took up Kant’s claim.258 His liberal internationalism was an 
early contribution to liberalism and more specifically the Democratic Peace 
Theory (see section 5.3.5).  
 
5.3.1 Development of the liberal IR theory 
Liberalism was not directly recognized in IR scholarship as an alternative IR 
theory for realism or institutionalism. James Richardson argued that there is 
“no overarching liberal theory comparable to Waltz’s neorealism, but separate 
strands theory are loosely linked in that they draw on traditional liberal 
ideas.”259 Several categories of liberalism have been distinguished, for example: 
ideational, republican, pluralist, commercial, regulatory, military, cognitive and 
sociological liberalism.260 It was often difficult for political scientists to identify 
where realist or institutionalist explanations end and liberal theories begin.261 
Zacher and Matthew argued that liberalism should be considered an 
‘approach’, not a ‘theory’, since “its propositions cannot be […] deducted from 
its assumptions.”262 However, Andrew Moravcsik sets himself precisely this 
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task and he became one of the most prominent liberal IR scholars. He argued 
that the liberal IR theory deserves to be treated as a “paradigmatic alternative 
empirically coequal with and analytically more fundamental than the two 
dominant theories in contemporary IR scholarship: realism and 
institutionalism.”263 He noted that liberal IR theory was ignored for a long time 
and was not regarded as a major paradigmatic alternative for realism and 
institutionalism.264 He integrated the major categories of international liberalism 
in a common framework for a liberal theory of IR that is according to him both 
“non-utopian and non-normative.” 265  Moravcsik’s central insight that 
distinguishes liberalism from other IR theories is that States are embedded in 
domestic and international civil society. His fundamental premise is that “the 
relationship between States and the surrounding domestic and transnational 
society in which they are embedded critically shapes State behavior by 
influencing the social purposes underlying State preferences.” 266  He thus 
argued that State preferences – rather than State capabilities (realism) or 
information and institutions (institutionalism) – are the most important 
determinant of State behaviour. These State preferences are influenced by 
societal ideas, interests and institutions. He identified three core assumptions of 
the liberal IR theory. In short, these assumptions are about the primary actors in 
the international system, the relationship of those actors to State institutions 
and the primary determinants of State relations with one another.267  
 
5.3.2 Assumption 1: primacy of societal actors 
Liberalism rejects the foundational premise of both realism and institutionalism 
that States are the unitary actors in the international system.  This IR theory is 
not State-centred, but puts the focus on the domestic political processes instead. 
Liberalists argue that the key actors in international affairs are “members of 
domestic society, understood as individuals and privately-constituted groups 
with autonomous preferences.”268 These privately constituted groups include 
IGOs, CSOs, multinational corporations and other non-State actors that operate 
in domestic and transnational civil society. They seek to promote their 
independent interests and/or values primarily in domestic politics and their 
demands (rather than objective conditions) determine State preferences. 
Moravcsik argues that it is essential to fully understand State action: “societal 
ideas, interests, and institutions influence State behaviour by shaping State 
preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic 
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calculations of governments.”269 He is of the opinion that domestic politics are 
principally important and argued: “one cannot fully understand State decisions 
in the international realms without understanding the domestic policies that 
underlie them.”270 In other words: according to liberalists, politics is embedded 
in a social context, which determinedly restricts the intentions and possibilities 
of governments.271 Liberalism rests on a “bottom-up” view of politics in which 
the society is analytically prior to the State and domestic State-society relations 
are the central issue of politics. Therefore, liberalism rejects the premise that the 
structure of the international system is the main determinant of State behaviour.  
 
5.3.3 Assumption 2: State-society relations 
Liberalism identified a link between individuals and privately constituted 
groups and State behaviour. States interact with these individuals and privately 
constituted groups in a complex process of both representation and regulation. 
Moravcsik argued: “all governments represent some segment of domestic 
society, whose interests are reflected in State policy.”272 In liberalism, States are 
not seen as actors, but as representative agents for various governmental 
institutions (such as courts, legislative committees and administrative 
agencies) 273  and groups within civil society. They serve as so-called 
“transmission belts.”274 They translate the preferences and social power of 
individuals and privately constituted groups into State policy. Government 
policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and 
power of these individuals and groups who persistently pressure the decision 
makers to pursue policies that are in line with their preferences.275 However, no 
government rests on universal or unbiased political representation and we 
cannot ignore that “every government represents some individuals and groups 
more fully than others.”276 The process of representation entails at the same time 
a regulation of the activities of all these individuals and privately constituted 
groups (including the social actors who are not represented). Not all 
governments represent the entire population and there are various forms of 
representation, ranging from pure tyranny to pure democracy. However, the 
extent of ‘representativeness’ is an important variable in explaining State policy 
and a determinant of what States do at the international level.  
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5.3.4 Assumption 3: interdependence and the international system 
Moravcsik also argued that “the behavior of States – and hence levels of 
international conflict and cooperation – reflect the nature and configuration of 
State preferences.”277 Liberalism analyzes international relations in terms of the 
patterns of divergent State preferences (inter-State conflict) and convergent 
state preferences (inter-State cooperation), which in turn reflect the social 
context of a state.278 Moravcsik claimed: “what States do is determined by what 
they want”279 and this is fundamentally different from realists who would argue 
that “what States do is determined by what they can get.”280 Realists will claim 
that power will determine the outcomes of coercion, bargaining, negotiation 
and other forms of inter-State strategic interaction and institutionalist will claim 
that it is power as conditioned by institutionalized practices.281 Liberals will 
claim that State preferences themselves are the key determinant of inter-State 
bargaining outcomes.282 How much the State is willing to concede to obtain a 
particular preference is determined by the nature, strength and intensity of that 
preference, which in turn will determine its bargaining success.283 Of course, not 
every State simply pursues its ideal policy. Each State seeks to realize its 
preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other 
States.284 However, the liberalism approach implies that inter-State politics are 
more complex than realists and institutionalists assume and acknowledge, 
because States are not unitary actors and “domestic preferences vary widely 
and change unpredictably.”285 Moravcsik pointed out that the most important 
contribution of liberalism to IR theory lies in the “specification of the social 
conditions that determine variations in the underlying level of conflict and 
convergence between the preferences of States.”286 Liberalists argue that ends, 
not means, matter the most. Although liberalism is a comprehensive theory of 
the international system and applies to all States, it takes explicitly domestic 
regime-type into account when analyzing State behavior. The theory permits a 
distinction among different types of States based on their domestic political 
structure and ideology.287  
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5.3.5 ‘Democratic Peace’ 
Doyle and Russett were pioneers on the phenomenon of peace among liberal 
States. Doyle defined liberal States as “States with some form of representative 
democracy, a market economy based on private property rights, and 
constitutional protections of civil and political rights.”288 Democratic peace 
scholars argue that liberal democracies are less likely to go to war with other 
democracies. Levy claimed that the "absence of war between democracies 
comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international 
relations."289 The democratic peace scholars do not claim that liberal States are 
more peaceful by nature than authoritarian or other non-democratic States, but 
they claim that liberal States (or “democratically organized political systems”)290 
are more peaceful in their dealings with each other and have fewer conflicts 
among themselves.291 When liberal democracies come into conflict with each 
other, they hardly ever threaten to use force, because that would be 
“illegitimate” to do so.292 The empirical claim for democratic peace is still a 
great dispute in political science. Mainly realist scholars deny the existence of 
democratic peace and have declared democratic peace “a fantasy.”293 
 
5.3.6 Compliance with international law 
The claim for democratic peace was the foundation for liberalists to develop a 
theory on compliance with international law. Although liberalism focused 
initially more on international politics than on international law, Slaughter 
brought the liberalist approach to the attention of legal scholars.294 She is the 
most prominent advocate of liberalism within the legal academy and argued 
that “lawyers have long recognized differences between sovereign States, but 
they have lacked any means of bridging the gap between legal fiction and 
political reality.”295 In line with the democratic peace literature, she claimed – 
together with Moravcsik – not so much that democracies do not go into war 
with each other, but rather, that democracies are more inclined to “do law” 
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with each other. 296  She argued that compliance with international law is 
determined in significant part by the domestic structure of a country. Her 
hypothesis is that liberal States tend to comply more with international 
commitments (including international and supranational legal judgments) than 
non-liberal States,297 mainly because domestic interest groups will put pressure 
on liberal States to comply with their international legal obligations. More 
specifically, Slaughter and Helfer argued that “government institutions 
committed to both the rule of law and separation  of powers  […]  in  systems  
where  the individuals  themselves  are  ultimately  sovereign,  are  primed  to  
be  the  most receptive  to  the  tools  that  a  supranational tribunal  has  at  its  
disposal.”298 Also in the field of human rights, liberalists assume that liberal 
States are more likely to comply with the human rights framework. They argue 
that human rights treaties will be more effective in changing behaviour in 
liberal States than in non-liberal States. The reason is that domestic interest 
groups use the legal obligations following from human rights treaty 
ratifications in order to put pressure on domestic political institutions to take 
action in conformance with the human rights treaty. In Hathaway’s words: 
“compliance with international law comes, in the liberalist view, from the 
favourable effect of international law and legal institutions on domestic 
interests – a phenomenon not limited to, but more likely to be found in, liberal 
States.”299 Unsurprisingly, many liberal scholars focus on European Union law, 
noting that the European system of human rights works, because the European 
Union is largely composed of liberal democratic States, who share reasons for 
collective obedience. As Koh pointed out, this might help to explain why “the 
embryonic African human rights system – a collection of democracies and 
authoritarian regimes – does not work nearly as well.”300 
 
5.3.7 Concluding observations 
The development of a liberal theoretical framework, mainly done by Moravcsik, 
challenged the dominance of realism (and institutionalism). Slaughter 
concluded in one of her articles that “not one, but two powerful responses now 
exist within political science, responses that recognize the importance and 
relevance of international law under specified conditions.”301 Liberalists argue 
that State preferences are determined by domestic politics and the theory rests 
on three liberal core assumptions (i) the key actors are not States, but 
individuals and privately-constituted groups, (ii) States are representatives, (iii) 
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inter-State behaviour reflects the pattern of State preferences.302 In line with the 
democratic peace literature, a liberal theory regarding compliance with 
international human rights law has been developed. Liberalists argue that 
liberal States are more likely to comply with the human rights framework, 
because domestic interest groups put pressure on governments to take action.  
 
5.4 Constructivism 
 
Constructivism is another approach that emerged in the 1990s as a challenge to 
the dominant realist theoretical paradigms. It has become one of the major 
schools of thought within IR. As is the case with institutionalism, 
constructivism is not (yet) a single theory, but “a family of theories”303 that 
includes postmodernists such as Ashley;304 constructivists such as Kratochwil305 
and Ruggie;306 neo-Marxists such as Cox;307and feminists such as Peterson.308 As 
a result, there are many forms of constructivism.309 However, they all share the 
view that neorealism and neoliberalism are “undersocialized.”310 Contrary to 
the assumptions of (neo)realism, constructivists seek to demonstrate how 
international politics and the international system are “socially constructed.”311 
Wendt is the best-known advocate of social constructivism. In his article 
Constructing International Politics, 312  he laid out the basic assumptions of 
constructivism. Wendt made two basic claims: “The fundamental structures of 
international politics are social rather than strictly material (a claim that 
opposes materialism)”313 and “These structures shape actors' identities and 
interests, rather than just their behaviour (a claim that opposes rationalism).”314 
Wendt opened the way for IR scholars to engage in a wide range of issues from 
a constructivist perspective.  
 
5.4.1 Similarities between realism and constructivism 
Although constructivism challenges some of the basic realist assumptions, both 
schools also share some assumptions about the nature of the international 
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system.315 They both believe for example that States are the dominant actors in 
the international system and both assume that States behave essentially as 
unitary actors.316 In addition, both IR schools believe that international politics 
is anarchic,317 that States have offensive capabilities, that States wish to survive 
and that States cannot be hundred percent sure about other States’ intentions.318 
According to Wendt, another assumption constructivists share with realists is 
“the importance of systemic or "third image" theorizing.”319 In other words, 
both IR schools share the assumption that it is important to theorize about the 
international system for an understanding of IR.320 
 
5.4.2 Distinguishing characteristics of constructivism 
Constructivists make two divergent assumptions in comparison with realists 
about the nature of international politics. Wendt’s first main rejection to realism 
is that it is not structural enough: “adopting the individualistic metaphors of 
micro-economics restricts the effects of structures to State behaviour, ignoring 
how they might also constitute State identities and interest.”321 Constructivists 
and realists differ in their assumptions about what structure (anarchy and the 
distribution of power)322 is made of. Realists argue that structure is made of a 
distribution of material capabilities, whereas constructivists argue that the 
structure is “social” and made of social relationships. According to Wendt, 
“social structures” have three elements: “shared knowledge, material resources, 
and practices.”323 He explains that these three elements are “real and objective,” 
not “just talk.”324  
The second rejection of Wendt to realism is founded in its conception of 
State identity and interests. As opposed to realists and institutionalists, who 
argue that the identity and interests of States are exogenously determined), 
constructivists argue: “interests and identities of States are created and evolve 
through interaction with the international system.”325 In other words, States 
help constitute the structure of the international system through their 
interactions with each other, and the international structure in turn shapes the 
identities and interests of States. This “mutually constitutive” relationship 
between the actor and the structure leads to the conclusion that the 
                                                        
315 A.C. Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics, Virginia Journal 
of International Law, Volume 38, 1997/1998, p. 126.  
316 Ibid.  
317 However, constructivists render anarchy in cultural rather than materialist terms.  
318 A. Wendt, Constructing International Politics, International Security, Volume 20, No. 1, 1995, p. 72. 
319 Ibid.  
320 A.C. Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics, Virginia Journal 
of International Law, Volume 38, 1997/1998, p. 126-127. 
321 A. Wendt, Constructing International Politics, International Security, Volume 20, No. 1, 1995, p. 72. 
322 A. Wendt, Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 
International Organization, Volume 46, No. 2, 1992, p. 391.  
323 A. Wendt, Constructing International Politics, International Security, Volume 20, No. 1, 1995, p. 72-
73.  
324 Ibid, p. 74.  
325 A.C. Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics, Virginia Journal 
of International Law, Volume 38, 1997/1998, p. 128. 
 
 
 
Theories of State Compliance with International Law 
91 
participation in institutional arrangements can “alter the identity and, therefore, 
the interests of States.”326 
 
5.4.3 Compliance with international law 
Constructivists refer much more to international law compared to the other 
three previously discussed IR theories. Constructivists contend that the 
international system is a social structure and international legal rules are part of 
this structure.327 Kocs explains that these legal rules are “a set of underlying, 
implicit rules which create a framework that allows formal agreements between 
States to be meaningful and binding.”328 Consequently, constructivists assert 
that international laws are socially constructed. Furthermore, participation in 
the international regime and the existence of international law may change the 
identity of a State, and accordingly, the interest of a State: “States may have a 
particular identity at any given time but as States develop new rules of 
international law – either through treaty or custom – their participation in the 
legal regime may alter that original identity.”329 Thus, international actors and 
their interests are not fully formed, but can change when States interact with 
each other. International law is therefore able to change State action by 
changing the preferences or interests of States, because they are socially 
constructed.330  
Constructivism differs fundamentally from realism, institutionalism and 
liberalism (that all have rationalist accounts), because they reject the notion that 
the pursuit of self-interest alone can explain the behaviour of States.331 Instead, 
constructivists have a normative interest in promoting social change. 
Constructivists focus attention upon the roles of culture, ideas, institutions and 
discourse. They stressed the role norms play in framing social interaction and 
encouraging a “shared understanding.” 332 These social norms (rather than 
power and interest balances) shape – according to constructivists – the identity 
and behaviour of States and can generate voluntary compliance (when 
particular legitimacy requirements are met).333 In other words, States internalize 
international laws and behave in accordance with international law because 
States find these laws correct or appropriate.334  
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5.4.4 Concluding observations 
Although constructivists share many assumptions with realists, they do not 
agree with the realist conclusion that international law is epiphenomenal and 
that States comply with international law coincidently or when it is in their own 
interest. Compliance is neither a result of rational calculations of how 
compliance or noncompliance will affect their interests or impose constraints. 
Compliance with international law is instead a matter of internalized identities 
and norms of appropriate behaviour. Constructivists demonstrate in their 
theory the significance of international law in the international political arena 
and come to the conclusion that international law matters.335 Constructivism is 
most probably the most compelling IR theory for IL scholars. Arend also argues 
that constructivism provides a theoretical framework “for explaining what 
many international legal scholars take for granted.”336 Constructivists draw on 
the normative power of rules and the importance of shared knowledge and 
discourse in shaping identity and interests.337 Scholars, such as Finnemore,338 
have begun to provide empirical support for constructivism.     
 
6 NEW GENERATION OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SCHOLARSHIP  
 
6.1 International Legal Compliance 
 
For much of the 20th century, a clear gap existed between IL and IR theory on 
compliance. In fact, the two disciplines worked independently on the 
‘compliance question’ and developed their own theories explaining why States 
comply with international law “along parallel, but rarely intersecting paths.”339 
However, this changed in the late 1990s, when there was an increased interest 
to bridge the gap between the two fields. As Slaughter noted in 1998: 
“understanding the sister discipline will enrich international lawyers’ practical 
and intellectual work, from doctrinal analysis and policy prescriptions to 
international legal theory.” 340  This resulted in a growing enthusiasm for 
interdisciplinary collaboration among members of both disciplines when 
addressing the ‘compliance question’. Slaughter argued: “many international 
lawyers and international relations scholars are speaking the same language, or 
at least languages. They may not yet be speaking with one voice, nor should 
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they be. But each side is finding something to say, in a deepening and mutually 
profitable conversation.”341 
Since then, political scientists and international lawyers no longer ignored 
each other’s insights. IL and IR theorists were increasingly talking to one 
another and started to read and draw on one another's work with increasing 
frequency.342 IL and IR scholars started to move towards each other by using 
materials from each other’s discipline. More specifically, IL scholars were 
drawing on IR paradigms to refine their analyses and IR theorists were looking 
to IL scholarship for insights into the structure of international law.343 Both 
disciplines have “rediscovered” one another and made substantive 
contributions to both the IR and IL literature.344 In addition, methodologies 
from the social sciences were used in the analysis of the ‘compliance 
question’.345 As a result, the rather strict ‘legal’ or ‘IR’ views on compliance 
started to disappear.  
This new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship has been referred to by 
Bradford as the joint sub-discipline of ‘International Legal Compliance’ (ILC), 
which is, according to him, the “newest and most rapidly developing subfield 
in international law.”346 He suggested that ILC is in the middle of the two 
traditional IL and IR disciplines and might become a similar concept as law & 
economics in the (near) future.347 However, at this moment, ILC is still referred 
to as a “primitive science” 348  that is according to some scholars 
“underdeveloped”, “fragmented” and “unfocused”.349 Although a true joint 
discipline has not yet emerged, intellectual influence between the two 
disciplines has been taking place and remarkable interdisciplinary progress has 
been made in the past years.350  
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6.2 Advancing traditional International Law and International Relations 
theories 
 
Within this period of change where new interdisciplinary scholarship is 
growing and subfields are emerging, the “old orthodoxies”351 described in 
section 4 and 5 are facing challenges. In the new millennium, scholars from 
different disciplines raised fundamental questions about the way traditional IL 
and IR scholars studied international law and the conclusions they reached 
about compliance with international law. A new generation of IL and IR 
scholars have advanced the traditional IL and IR theories and shared distinct 
perspectives on international law in general and the human rights framework 
in particular. As a result, alternative compliance theories have been developed 
that shed new light on the ‘compliance question’.  
 
6.2.1 Guzman’s reputational theory 
Guzman is an IL scholar who developed, in his own words, a “better” and 
“more realistic” theory of compliance with international law.352 In his theory, he 
explains how State behaviour is influenced by international law. Unlike 
traditional IL scholarship, Guzman used in his theory a model of rational, self-
interested States. He argues that: “States are unitary actors engaged in the 
pursuit of national goals.”353 With a rational-actor model, he explains that a 
State’s decision to comply with international law reflects a judgment that the 
costs of violation outweigh the benefits. 354  In other words, he perceives 
compliance as a result of cost-benefit calculations. According to Guzman, 
reputation plays a central role in this compliance ‘calculation’, as well as direct 
sanctions: “along with the possibility of direct sanctions, reputation provides an 
incentive for States to comply with their obligations.”355 The greater the costs 
incurred by loss of reputation or sanctions for violating international law, the 
greater the propensity of States to comply with international law. He also 
argues that reciprocity can serve as a powerful compliance-enhancing tool.356 
Guzman’s compliance theory is based on the institutionalist tradition of IR,357 
but also aims to compliment liberal theory.358 He explicitly rejects some of the 
notions of Franck and Koh: “States do not concern themselves with the welfare 
of other States but instead seek to maximize their own gains or payoffs. States, 
therefore, have no innate preference for complying with international law, they 
are unaffected by the ‘legitimacy’ of a rule of law (Franck 1995), past consent to 
a rule is insufficient to ensure compliance, and there is no assumption that 
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decision-makers have internalized a norm of compliance with international law 
(Koh 1997).”359 By using a repeated-game model of State behaviour, Guzman 
comes to the conclusion that States generally comply with international law 
(although he recognizes that international law is violated in some instances). 
Guzman explicitly says that he does not agree with many realists who consider 
international law simply an epiphenomenon. At the same time, he argues that 
IL scholars should keep the limits of international law in mind.  
 
6.2.2 Downs, Rocke & Barsoom’s enforcement theory 
IR scholars Downs and colleagues are the authors of the so-called ‘enforcement 
theory’ (also referred to as ‘political economy theory’).360 Their theory is closely 
linked to institutionalism and placed in direct opposition of the managerial 
theory of Chayes & Chayes. In their theory on international law compliance, 
Downs and colleagues first elaborated on the weaknesses of the managerial 
school (including selection problems and endogeneity), after which they 
presented their own sanction-oriented theory. They emphasized the strategic 
dimensions of cooperation and explained that it is useful to think of a treaty’s 
“depth of cooperation” as the extent to which the treaty requires States to 
depart from what they would have done in its absence. The “depth of 
cooperation” is the figure that – according to Downs and colleagues – serves as 
the basis for judging the level of compliance.361 They argue that there is a 
connection between the “depth of cooperation” and the amount of enforcement 
needed to generate compliance.362 Unlike Chayes & Chayes who argue that 
sanctions are never required or appropriate to ensure compliance, Downs and 
colleagues argue that sanctions are needed when strong incentives exist for 
non-compliance. This is especially the case when international law requires 
States to depart significantly from what they would have done in the absence of 
the treaty.363 However, when there is little “deep cooperation” it is likely that 
there is no or little need for enforcement.364 Downs et al. concluded therefore 
that enforcement plays a significant role in relation to compliance with 
international law.  
 
6.2.3 Goldsmith & Posner’s limit theory 
In their book The Limits of International Law,365 Goldsmith and Posner offer, in 
their own words, a “new” and “comprehensive” theory of international law, 
because they aim to explain how international law works by integrating it with 
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the realities of international politics. Although they are both IL scholars, their 
approach is closer to the traditional IR tradition, and in particular to 
institutionalism (and although they distinguish their approach from realism, 
there are quite some overlaps with this theory as well).366 They argue that IL 
scholars exaggerated the normative power and significance of international 
law.367 Goldsmith and Posner criticized Franck’s legitimacy theory and Koh’s 
transnational legal process theory for their assumption that States comply with 
international law for non-instrumental reasons. They argue that “the best 
explanation for when and why States comply with international law is not that 
States have internalized international law, or have a habit of complying with it, 
or are drawn by its moral pull, but simply that States act out of self-interest.”368 
Similar to Guzman, they reject the norm-based methods of international law, or 
more specifically “the traditional explanations of international law based on 
legality, morality, opinio juris, and related non-instrumental concepts.”369 They 
use a State-centred rational-choice model to explain when and why States 
comply with international law.370 They place the State at the centre of analysis 
and their theory implies that international law emerges from States that act 
rationally to maximize their interests, given their perceptions of the interests of 
other States and the distribution of State power.371 Goldsmith and Posner 
identified four factors explaining State behaviour. These are (i) coincidence of 
interest; (ii) coordination; (iii) cooperation; and (iv) coercion.372 Both authors 
reach the conclusion that international law matters, but that there are limits to 
what international law can achieve, because States follow international law only 
when it is in their interest to do so.   
 
6.2.4 Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s spiral model  
In 1999, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink wrote the book The Power of Human Rights in 
which they proposed a five-stage ‘spiral model’ of human rights change to 
explain how human rights regimes are internalized and implemented 
domestically, ultimately changing the behaviour of States.373 Their approach is 
largely drawn on constructivism.374  The five stages of their “socialization 
process” of human rights norms are: (i) repression and activation of network; (ii) 
denial of human rights violations; (iii) tactical concessions; (iv) prescriptive 
status, including the ratification of international human rights treaties and their 
incorporation into domestic law and institutions; (v) rule-consistent 
behaviour.375 They argue that: “norms influence political change through a 
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socialization process that combines instrumental interests, material pressures, 
argumentation, persuasion, institutionalization and habitualization.” 376  The 
model shows the important role of domestic opposition groups in mobilizing 
and effectuating change. 377  In a later version of their spiral model, they 
integrated some elements of rational choice into their constructivist perspective, 
mainly because recent quantitative research showed some lacunas in their 
model.378 They argue that – in addition to the factors mentioned in their original 
‘spiral model’ – institutional (in)capacity might influence compliance with 
human rights norms.379  
 
6.2.5 Goodman & Jinks’ State socialization theory 
IL professors Goodman and Jinks offered an alternative theory on international 
law compliance, while – like Risse and colleagues – focusing specifically on 
human rights law. Their aim is to “improve the understanding of how norms 
operate in international society with a view to improving the capacity of global 
and domestic institutions to harness the process through which human rights 
cultures are built.” 380  Building on the work of Koh and constructivist 
compliance theory, they provide a conceptual framework focusing on a social 
process through which State behaviour is influenced, which they call 
“acculturation.”381 Goodman and Jinks argue that prevailing approaches solely 
focused on “coercion” or “persuasion”, which are indeed factors that influence 
the behaviour of States according to Goodman and Jinks, but that a third 
mechanism what they call “acculturation” is neglected. The two authors argue 
that “acculturation” is key to understand how international law might change 
State behaviour.382 They define “acculturation” as follows: “the general process 
by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding 
culture.”383 This mechanism induces behavioural changes through “pressures to 
assimilate—some imposed by other actors and some imposed by the self.”384 To 
a certain extent, this “acculturation” is similar to what Koh calls “habitual 
obedience.” Goodman & Jinks’ State socialization theory builds on sociological 
(and psychological) approaches and challenges some elements of rational 
choice theories.385  
 
                                                        
376 IT. Risse et al., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, p. 37.  
377 Ibid, p. 22.  
378 E.S. Bates, Sophisticated Constructivism in Human Rights Compliance Theory, The European 
Journal of International Law, Volume 25, No. 4, 2015, p. 1171.  
379 Ibid, p. 1171.  
380 R. Goodman and D. Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights 
Law, Duke Law Journal, Volume 54, 2004, p. 2.  
381 R. Goodman and D. Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, Stanford Law Review, 
Volume 55, 2003, p. 1749. 
382 R. Goodman and D. Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights 
Law, Duke Law Journal, Volume 54, 2004, p. 4.  
383 Ibid, p. 5.  
384 Ibid, p. 13.  
385 E.S. Bates, Sophisticated Constructivism in Human Rights Compliance Theory, The European 
Journal of International Law, Volume 25, No. 4, 2015, p. 1173.  
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6.2.6 Brunnée & Toope‘s interactional theory  
IL professors Brunnée and Toope argued in Legitimacy and Legality in 
International Law: An Interactional Account386 that their interactional theory of 
compliance is primarily a theory of obligation.387 They explain that they do not 
deny that rationalist accounts of compliance have explanatory power, but at the 
same time they argue: “purely rationalist accounts miss an important part of the 
compliance picture precisely because they discount obligation.”388 Both authors 
are in favour of the “cooperative, problem-solving approach” to promote 
compliance, a Chayesian argument. 389  Drawing on Chayes & Chayes 
managerial theory, Franck’s legitimacy theory, Koh’s transnational legal process 
theory, Goodman & Jinks State socialization theory and constructivism, the two 
authors argue: “norms shape the identities and actions of States and other 
international actors.”390  Brunnée and Toope explain that “interactionalism” 
reveals that the power of international law “rests in a conscious sense of 
obligation rooted in a specific form of legal legitimacy.”391 They argue that 
international law’s obligatory power (or its self-binding effect) must be 
maintained.392 Important in that regard is the law-making stage, because the 
creation of obligations presupposes transparent and inclusive processes in 
order to be legitimate. Treaties need to represent genuinely shared 
understandings and need to be “reasonable and predictable in their 
implications for parties.”393 Their theory is not limited to State actors, but both 
authors explain how diverse actors can interact through law.  
 
6.2.7 Moore’s signaling theory 
IL scholar Moore starts his article A Signaling Theory of Human Rights 
Compliance394 with references to existing compliance theories. He mentions the 
theories of Henkin, Chayes & Chayes, Koh as well as the theory of Goldsmith & 
Posner. He explains that “none of these approaches, however, offers a 
comprehensive description of compliance with international law in general or 
human rights law in particular.”395 He explains the shortcomings of these 
theories and concludes that all these theories fail “to take adequate note of a 
significant dynamic that affects human rights compliance: signalling.”396 Moore 
argues that his “signaling theory” is an important addition to the developing 
scholarship on compliance with international law. The “signaling theory” of 
Moore supplements the rational choice perspective (more specifically 
                                                        
386 J. Brunnée and S.J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 91.  
387 Ibid, p. 91, 124.  
388 Ibid, p. 91-92.  
389 Ibid, p. 109. 
390 Ibid, p. 92.  
391 Ibid, p. 97.  
392 Ibid, p. 98.  
393 Ibid, p. 99.  
394 D.H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, Northwestern University Law 
Review, Volume 97, No. 2, 2003. 
395 Ibid, p. 880.  
396 Ibid, p. 881. 
 
 
 
Theories of State Compliance with International Law 
99 
reputational theories) on compliance.397 He defines a “signal” as “a costly 
behaviour that can communicate information about the sender when the 
receiver knows that only senders with a particular characteristic can afford, or 
are willing, to send the signal.”398 In other words: States enter human rights 
treaties because States want to signal particular messages to other States. These 
messages include a State’s willingness to restrain the exercise of power in the 
medium-term for benefits in the long-term.399 Compliance with the human 
rights framework is costly, thus can serve as a signal. He provides a cost-benefit 
analysis that explains the decisions of States to comply or not with human 
rights principles, emphasizing the role of reputation in the decision to comply 
with human rights treaties.  
 
6.3 Combination of factors  
  
When analyzing these new compliance theories more in depth, one can see that 
these new theories are largely in consistence with the considerable body of 
existing work of IL and IR scholars. Recent scholarship on compliance theory 
draws on, and is often a derivative of, the traditional IL and IR theories 
described in sections 4 and 5. Most scholars who developed these “new” 
theories criticized and/or praised one or more traditional IL and IR theories, 
explained what previous theories have overlooked, took several elements of 
different theories and thus constructed their own new theory on compliance 
with international law. Guzman’s reputational theory, Goldsmith & Posner’s 
limit theory and Downs enforcement theory provide a new twist on the 
institutionalist theory, by incorporating for example elements from realism 
(Goldsmit & Posner), incorporating elements from liberalism (Guzman) or by 
placing the theory in direct opposition of the managerial theory (Downs). 
Goodman & Jinks’ State socialization theory is grounded both in constructivism 
as well as in Koh’s transnational legal process theory. What follows from the 
analysis in section 6.2 is that the rational choice perspective on compliance is 
becoming very popular, not only among IR scholars, but also among IL scholars. 
Other scholars also noted that this game-theoretical approach has gained much 
prominence in the more recent compliance literature dealing with international 
law.400 Another insight that follows from the analysis in section 6.2 is that – 
although all these new theories enrich traditional theories with insights and 
elements from other schools, offer interesting insights and make fascinating 
combinations of elements of traditional theories – it is important to note that 
these scholars do not mention many new factors that explain compliance with 
international law in general and the human rights framework in particular. 
Only the factor “acculturation” (following from the State socialization theory of 
Goodman & Jinks’) and the factor “signaling” (following from the signaling 
                                                        
397 D.H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, Northwestern University Law 
Review, Volume 97, No. 2, 2003, p. 881.  
398 Ibid, p. 882.  
399 J.P. Trachtman, The Future of International Law: Global Government, Cambridge University Press 
2013, p. 130-131.  
400 A. van Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to ‘The Limits of International 
Law’, European Journal of International Law, Volume 17, No. 1, 2006, p. 289.   
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theory of Moore) were not mentioned in the traditional IL and IR theories. All 
the other factors following from the seven new theories explaining compliance 
with international law in general and the human rights framework in particular, 
were not new.  
 
7 CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Contradictory premises 
 
More than three decades ago, Henkin’s famous claim “it is probably the case that 
almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of 
their obligations almost all of the time” 401  set the stage for new compliance 
scholarship in the end of the 1970s. Since then, both IL and IR scholars have 
developed a wide variety of theories, in an effort to explain State compliance 
with international law.  
 This chapter showed that IL and IR theories are often based on contradictory 
premises. In general, IL scholars argue that States are guided by legal rules. 
Guzman wrote more than one decade ago the following: “Despite the 
fundamental importance of the compliance in question, however, the legal 
academy has failed to develop a satisfactory theory to explain it.”402 He argues 
that traditional international legal scholars believe or have faith that international 
law matters, but they have failed to develop a coherent theory regarding 
compliance with international law. They have built their theories on an 
assumption of a general propensity of States to comply with international law. 
These assumptions are probably rooted in predominant positivism of the 
traditional IL discipline, “leading many international lawyers to see obligation 
as nothing more than the legal consequence of formal validity, or State 
consent.”403 IR scholars are far more sceptical. They assume the ample opposite 
and have pessimistic expectations on the role of international law to change 
behaviour of States. The IR approach toward State compliance with 
international law challenged, often fundamentally, the theories developed by 
the traditional IL scholars.404 The presuppositions, research agenda, methods 
and terminology of IR were different compared to IL. The IR approach came 
primarily from political science, but also has its roots in economics literature. In 
general, IR scholars have an aversion to the legalistic and normative approach 
towards compliance. IR scholars depart from a different “ideology” and their 
thoughts on compliance with international law are very different compared to 
IL scholars. IR scholars have often regarded international law as “something of 
an epiphenomenon, with rules of international law being dependent on power, 
                                                        
401 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 47. 
402 A.T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, California Law Review, Volume 
90, 2002, p. 1830.   
403 J. Brunnée and S. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 89.  
404 L.R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, Columbia Law Review, Volume 
102, 2002, p. 1835.  
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subject to short-term alteration by power-applying States, and therefore of little 
relevance to how States actually behave.” 405  In general, they argue that 
international law has little or no impact on the behaviour of States.  
 
7.2 Bridging the gap between International Law and International Relations 
 
Initially, both IL and IR theorists worked independently on the issue of 
compliance. The advances made by each discipline in theorizing compliance 
were ignored by the other discipline.406 As Abbott explained: “The agenda, 
methods and terminology of IR differ significantly from traditional legal 
approaches, creating a “two cultures” problem.” 407  However, the chasm 
between the two disciplines has narrowed as IL and IR theorists have begun to 
share insights in the late 1990s. International lawyers and political scientists 
started to talk to each other, read each other’s work, drew on each other’s 
insights and started to cooperate with much greater frequency. In the past 
decade, research agendas in IL and IR have converged around the ‘compliance 
question’.408 As Alkoby explains: “International lawyers turn to IR theory for 
better explanatory models for the evolution of norms and for compliance with 
them, while IR scholars turn to theories on law for normative models in order to 
better understand observed behavioural regularities.”409 A new generation of 
interdisciplinary scholarship has emerged, referred to as the sub-discipline of 
‘International Legal Compliance’ that stands in the middle of the two 
traditional IL and IR disciplines. 
 In this period of new interdisciplinary scholarship, alternative theories in 
relation to the ‘compliance question’ have been developed. However, when 
analyzing this ‘new generation’ of compliance theories more in depth, one can 
conclude that these are not really new theories, but actually traditional IL and 
IR theories that were ‘enriched’ with insights of other theories. These new 
theories do not mention many new factors that explain compliance with 
international law in general and the human rights framework in particular, but 
rather combine elements of different theories.   
 
7.3 Interest-based versus norm-based theories 
 
Research on the ‘compliance question’ encompasses nowadays a wide range of 
theories in the disciplines of law and political science. There are many different 
views and factors explaining what a State leads to act in compliance or in 
violation with international law in general and the human rights framework in 
                                                        
405 M. Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International 
Law, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 8.  
406 O.A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Yale Law Journal, Volume 112, 
2002, p. 1942-1943.  
407 K.W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing 
Atrocities in International Conflicts, American Journal of International Law, Volume 93, 1999, p. 365.  
408 J. Von Stein, The Engines of Compliance, in: J.L. Dunoff and M.A. Pollack, Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012, p. 500.  
409 A. Alkoby, Theories of Compliance with International Law and the Challenge of Cultural 
Difference, Journal of International Law & International Relations, Volume 4, No. 1, 2008, p. 154. 
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particular. When describing all these theories, it seems that there is a lack of 
coherence. However, after careful examination of all these theories, a difference 
could be established between two groups of theories: (i) theories based on 
interest; (ii) and theories based on norms.410 
Interest-based theories are mostly utilitarian. These theories often regard States 
as rational, self-interested actors that calculate costs and benefits in an anarchic 
international system. These theories often claim that States comply with 
international law (if they see international law as having any effect at all) for 
example because of material self-interest, the fear for punishment and sanctions, 
or reputational concerns. The action of States that follow the interest-based 
approach is also referred to as following the “logic of (expected) consequences.” 
 Norm-based theories focus more on the role of identities, the normative 
power of rules, the persuasive power of ideas and the influence of shared 
discourse and knowledge on States’ interests. Accordingly, norm-based theories 
suggest a more cooperative approach to obtaining compliance. These theories 
claim that States comply with international law because of the commitment 
itself and the norms that States feel obliged by. They share the assumption that 
law has the potential to shape the conduct of States or other international actors. 
The action of States following the norm-based approach is also referred to as 
following the “logic of appropriateness.”  
 Although one has to take into account that the two “logics” are not always 
mutually exclusive411 and that the lines between the two “logics” is not always 
sharp, it provides a useful starting point for further analysis. 412 Table 2.1 
provides an overview of all the compliance theories that have been analysed in 
this literature review and their classification as following the “logic of 
consequences” or the “logic of appropriateness.”413  
 
  
                                                        
410 See also J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 
International Organization, Volume 52, 1998, p. 943-969. See also: O.A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights 
Treaties Make a Difference? Yale Law Journal, Volume 112, 2002, p. 1935-1936; L. Hoder, Is there a 
Theory of International Legal Compliance?, Paper for the ECPR Graduate Conference 2010, Panel 
International Norms: Recent Developments in a Growing Debate, Dublin, Ireland, 31 august 2010, p. 
3; J. Brunnée and S.J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 91-92.   
411 J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 
International Organization, Volume 52, 1998, p. 952.  
412 D. Zaelke et al., Making Law Work: Environmental Compliance & Sustainable Development, Cameron 
May, 2005, p. 55.  
413 L. Hoder, Is there a Theory of International Legal Compliance?, Paper for the ECPR Graduate 
Conference 2010, Panel International Norms: Recent Developments in a Growing Debate, Dublin, 
Ireland, 31 august 2010, p. 23. 
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Table 2.1 Interest-based and norm-based theories  
 
Compliance Theory Interest-Based Norm-Based 
 
Henkin’s compliance theory  
 
√ 
Chayes and Chayes’ managerial theory  √ 
Frank’s legitimacy theory  √ 
Koh’s transnational legal process theory  √ 
Realism √  
Institutionalism √  
Liberalism414 √  
Constructivism  √ 
Guzman’s reputational theory √  
Downs, Rocke & Barsoom's enforcement theory √  
Goldsmith & Posner’s limit theory √  
Risse, Ropp & Sikkink’s spiral model415  √ 
Goodman & Jinks’ State socialization theory  √ 
Brunnée & Toope‘s interactional theory  √ 
Moore’s signaling theory  √  
   
 
7.4 Factors explaining compliance 
 
IL and IR scholarship has tended to treat the different compliance theories as 
mutually exclusive and competitive. However, this chapter has shown that 
international lawyers and political scientists often use the same factors in their 
theories explaining compliance and non-compliance. In that sense, the 
disciplines of IL and IR are inevitable inter-linked. Table 2.2 below provides an 
overview of the factors that follow from IL and IR theories that explain 
compliance and non-compliance with international law in general and the 
human rights framework in particular.    
 
                                                        
414 Liberalism is largely an interest-based model, but discards the assumption that states are unitary 
actors.  
415 The Spiral Model is largely a norm-based model, but the recent adjustments of Risse & Sikkink to 
their model (to include more rational choice elements) made their model move towards an interest-
based theory. 
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Table 2.2 Factors explaining compliance and non-compliance  
 
Compliance Non-Compliance 
 
Self-interest 
 
Self-interest 
Legitimacy and fairness Legitimacy and fairness 
Transparent treaty language Ambiguity in treaty language 
Reputation Lack of national capacity 
Power and coercion Lack of deterrence 
Punishment and sanctions Pressure of influential parties 
Political personalities Inadequate legal advice 
Pacta sunt servanda Outdated treaty norms 
Reduce transaction costs Failing treaty negotiation process 
Symbolic validation, ritual and pedigree Time lag between commitment and compliance 
Coherence Clash with local customs 
Communitarianism Unauthorized act 
Internalization of rules  
Pressure of domestic interest groups  
Imitation of others  
Signaling  
Acculturation  
Reciprocity  
 
As explained in the introduction of this thesis, more empirical testing of the 
compliance theories has recently been taking place. Despite the progress made 
in the past years, the current empirical evidence on compliance and non-
compliance with international law and the human rights framework in 
particular is still rather thin and a long way from being settled. In Chapter VI, 
this theoretical framework will be subjected to empirical analysis in order to 
evaluate whether the factors described in IL and IR theories correspond with 
reality, in the context of the practice of FGM/C in Senegal.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE PRACTICE OF FEMALE GENITAL 
MUTILATION/CUTTING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I feel that God made my body perfect the way I was born. […] If God had wanted those 
body parts missing, why did he create them? I just pray that one day no woman will 
have to experience this pain. It will become a thing of the past. […] What a happy day 
that will be, and that's what I'm working toward. In'shallah, if God is willing, it will 
happen.”  
 
Waris Dirie1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Before the factors described in the previous chapter are empirically tested, more 
background information on the practice of FGM/C is presented in this chapter. 
The aim for this chapter to enhance understanding of what the practice of 
FGM/C entails in order to establish a link between the practice and the human 
rights that are being violated. For many people, the practice of FGM/C seems 
incomprehensible. Gruenbaum expressed this as follows: “To outsiders, the 
practice euphemistically known as “female circumcision” is shocking. That 
people surgically alter the genitals of young girls and women, usually in 
painful unhygienic procedures that can cause grave harm to their health, seems 
truly horrible. Why do loving parents allow such things to happen? How can 
they bring themselves to celebrate these events? How can they justify the 
practice when occasionally a girl dies from the injuries?”2 In Western cultures, 
FGM/C is often viewed as a horrific act of cruelty, born from gender inequality, 
perpetrated on young girls under barbaric conditions.3 However, the practice is 
far more complex than this. FGM/C occurs in a wide variety of cultural 
contexts. Many parents see the practice as a necessary act of love, because it 
“purifies” the girl and brings her status: “Cutting one’s daughter is critical to 
her future, ensuring that she will be a respected member of her community and 
preparing her to find a good husband in cultures where marriage is essential for 
a girl’s economic security and social acceptance. To not cut one’s daughter 
                                                        
1 W. Dirie, Desert Flower: The Extraordinary Journey of a Desert Nomad, William Morrow Paperbacks, 
1998, p. 238. 
2 E. Gruenbaum, The Female Circumcision Controversy: An Anthropological Perspective, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2001, p. 1.  
3 A. Molloy, However Long the Night: Molly Melching’s Journey to Help Millions of African Women and 
Girls Triumph, Harper Collins Publishers, 2013, p. x.  
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would be unthinkable – setting her up for a lifetime of rejection and social 
isolation.”4 This chapter will further explain why this deeply rooted tradition 
has met with the approval of communities for thousands of years. By means of 
a literature review, the following research question will be addressed: “What 
does the practice of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting entail?”  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first two sections provide the 
definition and terminology of the practice of FGM/C. Section 4 spells out the 
history and the origins of the practice and section 5 elaborates on the 
documentation and data collection of the practice. Statistics in relation to the 
worldwide prevalence are provided in section 6. Details about how the 
procedure is performed, including the age at FGM/C, the practitioners, setting 
and materials used and the type of FGM/C performed are given in section 7. 
The health consequences are elaborated upon in section 8 and the justifications 
for the practice in section 9. Section 10 addresses the ‘social convention theory’ 
and explains how FGM/C could be considered a social norm in certain 
communities. Concluding observations can be found in section 11.  
 
2 DEFINITION 
 
The WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA issued in 1997 a Joint Statement on FGM/C in 
which they provided the following definition of the practice: “Female genital 
mutilation comprises all procedures involving partial or total removal of the 
external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs whether 
for cultural or other non-therapeutic reasons.”5 This definition was slightly 
modified in 2008 when ten UN agencies adopted an Inter-agency Statement on 
FGM/C. They defined the practice as: “all procedures involving partial or total 
removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital 
organs for non-medical reasons.”6 This definition (“for non-medical reasons”) is 
now generally accepted as the standard (by the international community, 
academia, practitioners and activists).7  
                                                        
4 A. Molloy, However Long the Night: Molly Melching’s Journey to Help Millions of African Women and 
Girls Triumph, Harper Collins Publishers, 2013, p. viv.  
5 World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation: A Joint WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA Statement, 
WHO Library, 1997, p. 3.  
6 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 4. See also World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation, Fact Sheet No. 
241, WHO, February 2014, available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ 
[Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
7 This definition is also used at the national level in African countries. For example in the second 
National Action Plan of Senegal, reference is made to the WHO definition: “L’expression Mutilations 
Génitales Féminines (MGF) désigne selon l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé (OMS), “toutes les 
interventions aboutissant à une ablation totale ou partielle des organes génitaux de la femme et/ou toute autre 
lésion des organes génitaux féminins pratiquée à des fins non thérapeutiques.”” (Translation: The term 
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) refers according to the World Health Organization (WHO), "all 
procedures involving partial or total removal of the genitals of women and/or other injury to the 
female genital organs practiced for non-therapeutic purposes.) See National Plan of Action to 
Accelerate the Abandonment of Excision 2010-2015 (Original in French: Plan d’Action National pour 
l’Acceleration de l’Abandon de l’Excision 2010-2015), Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and 
Female Entrepreneurship , February 2010, p. 7.  
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3 TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION 
 
The WHO recommended a more precise anatomical typology of FGM/C, 
because a standardized classification would be useful “for purposes such as 
research on the consequences of different forms of female genital mutilation, 
estimates of prevalence and trends in change, gynaecological examination and 
management of health consequences, and for legal cases.” 8 In order to ensure 
international consistency, the WHO has broken down the various forms of 
FGM/C into four categories with a standardized typology. The typology 
developed by the WHO at a technical consultation in 1995 and modified in 2007 
can be found in table 3.1.9  
 
Table 3.1 Classification of FGM/C  
 
 WHO Typology  
 
I 
 
Clitoridectomy 
 
Partial or total removal of the clitoris (a small, 
sensitive and erectile part of the female genitals) 
and, in very rare cases, only the prepuce (the fold of 
skin surrounding the clitoris). 
II Excision Partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia 
minora, with or without excision of the labia majora 
(the labia are "the lips" that surround the vagina). 
III Infibulation Narrowing of the vaginal opening through the 
creation of a covering seal. The seal is formed by 
cutting and repositioning the inner, or outer, labia, 
with or without removal of the clitoris. 
IV Other All other harmful procedures to the female genitalia 
for non-medical purposes, for example pricking, 
piercing, incising, scraping and cauterizing the 
genital area. 
 
4 ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL ASPECT OF FGM/C 
 
Unfortunately, no one has been able to identify the origin of FGM/C with any 
accuracy. The roots and spread of the practice remain highly unknown. There is 
no strong evidence documenting when, how or why this practice began. 
However, it is believed that the origin of the practice predates the rise of 
Christianity and Islam and was occurring some 5.000 years ago.10 There is some 
evidence that the practice has arisen in the Nuba region (now known as Egypt 
and northern Sudan) in the Nile valley and then spread by dominant ethnic 
                                                        
8 World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation, Report of a WHO Technical Working Group, 
WHO, Geneva, 17-19 July 1996.  
9 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 24.  
10 World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation, New Knowledge Spurs Optimism, Progress in 
Sexual and Reproductive Health Research, No. 72, 2006, p.3, available at 
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/fgm/progress72_fgm.pdf [Last Accessed 1 1 
October 2015]. 
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groups to Northeast and West Africa “often as a result of tribal, ethnic, and 
cultural allegiances.” 11  Ancient Egyptian mummies have been described 
displaying characteristics of FGM/C, and it is thought that FGM/C may have 
been a mark of distinction amongst the ruling class.12 In other groups it appears 
to have been a mark of enslavement and subjugation.13 
Historically, the first reference to FGM/C appears in the writings of the 
Greek historian Herodotus (484-424 B.C.). He reported the existence of FGM/C 
in ancient Egypt14 and had the following observations: “They are religious 
beyond measure, more than any other people; and the following are among 
their customs. They drink from cups of bronze, which they clean out daily; this 
is done not by some, but by all. They are especially careful always to wear 
newly washed linen. They circumcise their privy parts for cleanliness’ sake; for 
they would rather be clean than more becoming.”15 The Histories of Herodotus 
reveal that the Colchians, Ethiopians, Phoenicians and the Syrians of Palestine 
performed both male circumcision and FGM/C.16 FGM/C also appears in the 
writings by the Greek geographer and historian Strabo (64 B.C.-23), who visited 
Egypt. He reported in 25 B.C. that FGM/C was a tradition along the East Coast 
of the Red Sea.17 More specifically, Strabo wrote in his work Geographica: “One 
of the customs most zealously observed among the Egyptians is this, that they 
rear every child that is born, and circumcise the males, and excise the females as 
is also customary among the Jews, who are also Egyptians in origin."18 A Greek 
papyrus dated 163 B.C. explicitly mentioned FGM/C being performed on girls 
in Memphis, Egypt, at the age when they received their dowries.19 
There are also various reports on the practice of FGM/C by a number of 
18th century travellers, who observed its performance on slave girls by slave 
traders along the Nile. 20 Niebuhr, a German traveller who was part of a 
European scientific expedition, visited Egypt in 1767 and he reported that 
FGM/C was common on slave girls.21  
However, different theories about the origins of the practice exist. Some 
scholars argue that FGM/C had a number of different origins: “The origin of 
                                                        
11 N. Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation, A Call for Global Action, RAINBO publications, 1995, p. 21.  
12 A. Worsley, Infibulation and Female Circumcision: A Study of a Little-Known Custom, Journal of 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology of British Empire, Volume 45, 1938, p. 686-691. 
13 H. Lightfoot-Klein, Prisoners of Ritual: An Odyssey into Female Circumcision in Africa, Harrington 
Park, 1989, p. 28.  
14 S. Joseph and A. Naǧmābādī, Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures: Family, Body, Sexuality and 
Health, Volume 3, Brill Academic Publishers, 2005, p. 129. 
15 S.R. Huebner, Female Circumcision as a Rite of Passage in Egypt: Continuity Through the 
Millennia?, Journal of Egyptian History, Volume 2, 2009, p. 156.  
16 World Health Organization, Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, 
WHO/EMRO Technical Publication No. 2, Report of a Seminar, Khartoum, 10-15 February 1979, p. 
43-52.  
17 F. Hosken, The Hosken Report: Genital and Sexual Mutilation of Females, Women’s International 
Network News, Lexington, MA, 1994, p. 73. 
18 J. Tyldesley, Daughters of Isis: Women of Ancient Egypt, Penguin UK, 1995. 
19 S.R. Huebner, Female Circumcision as a Rite of Passage in Egypt: Continuity Through the 
Millennia?, Journal of Egyptian History, Volume 2, 2009, p. 164. 
20 C.C. Widstrand, Female Infibulation, Studia Ethnographica Upsaliensia, Volume 20, 1965, p. 95-124. 
21 L.J. Kouba, and J. Muasher, Female Circumcision in Africa: An Overview, African Studies Review, 
Volume 28, No. 1, 1985, p. 95-110. 
 
 
 
The Practice of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting 
111 
female circumcision is rooted too distantly in human history to be fruitfully 
traced. The ritual has always been so widespread that it cannot have arisen 
from a single origin.”22 Along the same lines, Abusharaf explains that the 
ascription of the practice to ancient Egypt remains highly controversial in 
historical scholarship.23 
 
5 COLLECTION OF DATA ON FGM/C 
 
The practice of FGM/C started to become more documented in the early 20th 
century in reports of European travellers and missionaries. Furthermore, in the 
late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, small clinical studies by physicians, hospital records, 
and direct interviews with patients in a few countries provided additional 
evidence for the existence of FGM/C. However, the practice did not attract the 
attention of many trained scholars until the late 1970s.24  
 
5.1 The Hosken Report 
 
In 1979, Francis Hosken published the famous Hosken Report: Genital and Sexual 
Mutilation of Females,25 which was the first major comprehensive publication on 
FGM/C in Africa. The first edition of the report26 presented a global review and 
country estimates of the prevalence of FGM/C in many African countries, on a 
country-by-country basis. It marked the beginning of international attention for 
the practice that had been previously unknown in the Western world, since it 
was written at a time when large-scale, nationally representative survey data 
were not generally available. At the same time Hosken has been criticized 
because of her style and (feminist) approach towards the practice.27 Since 
Hosken did not specify the exact methodology by which the data were collected, 
some scholars argue that the report was based on “questionable sources, many 
of which were anecdotal.”28  
 
5.2 DHS and MICS Surveys 
 
The literature on FGM/C was for a long time dominated by “personal accounts 
of tragic events, small-scale studies of circumcision in a town or a set of villages, 
                                                        
22 H.M. Harthout, Some Aspects of Female Circumcision, International Journal of Obstetrics & 
Gynaecology, Volume 70, No. 3, 1963, p. 505. 
23 R.M. Abusharaf, Female Circumcision: Multicultural Perspectives, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013, p. 2.  
24 P.S. Yoder and S. Wang, Female Genital Cutting: The Interpretation of Recent DHS Data, DHS 
Comparative Reports No. 33, Calverton, September 2013, p. ix. 
25 F. Hosken, The Hosken Report: Genital and Sexual Mutilation of Females, Women’s International 
Network News, Lexington, MA, 1994. 
26 A literature review by Nahid Toubia published in 1993 called ‘Female Genital Mutilation: A Call 
for Global Action’ modified Hosken’s figures on the basis of more recent country studies and 
reports. These figures were updated again in 1995 and 1996. 
27 R.M. Abusharaf, Revisiting Feminist Discourses on Infibulation: Responses from Sudanese Feminists, in: 
B. Shell-Duncan and Y. Hernlund, Female "Circumcision" in Africa: Culture, Controversy and Change, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, p. 160-164. 
28 P.S. Yoder and S. Khan, Number of Women Circumcised in Africa: The Production of a Total, DHS 
Working Papers, No. 39, USAID, Calverton, March 2008, p. 2.  
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and studies of medical complications of circumcised women delivering in a 
hospital.”29 This changed in the 1990s, when questions about FGM/C were 
included in population-based surveys. Nowadays, nationally representative 
data on FGM/C are mainly available from two sources: Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS).30  
 Since its initiation in 1984, the DHS project has assisted developing countries 
worldwide to conduct nationally representative31 household- surveys on a wide 
range of topics related to population, health and nutrition.32 DHS Surveys have 
large sample sizes (usually between 5.000 and 30.000 households) and are 
conducted about every five years, to allow comparisons over time.33 The core 
questionnaire for women includes topics covering demographic characteristics, 
fertility, family planning, maternal and child health and nutrition, and 
HIV/AIDS prevalence, knowledge, attitudes and behaviour. In addition to the 
core questionnaire for women, optional modules with questions on several 
topics (including FGM/C, but also malaria, women’s status, maternal mortality, 
gender/domestic violence) are available for countries to use as well.34 Up to 
today, the DHS has conducted over 300 surveys in over 90 countries.35 The 
surveys are conducted with technical support from ICF International (formerly 
Macro International).  
 Reliable estimates of FGM/C prevalence were not available before the 
inclusion of questions about the practice of FGM/C in the DHS surveys.36 An 
“FGM/C module” was developed in 1989 and female respondents in northern 
Sudan were for the first time asked questions about FGM/C in the 1989-1990 
survey. In this survey, women of reproductive age (15-49 years old) were asked 
questions about their own FGM/C status, what type of FGM/C they 
underwent, who performed the practice as well as their opinion about the 
practice.37 These questions about FGM/C were in the early 1990s standardized 
for use in the DHS surveys. Since 1995, countries are able to request the 
inclusion of the “FGM/C module” to the DHS Women’s Questionnaire if 
                                                        
29 P.S. Yoder and S. Khan, Number of Women Circumcised in Africa: The Production of a Total, DHS 
Working Papers, No. 39, USAID, Calverton, March 2008, p. 3.  
30 Other nationally representative household surveys with questions on FGM/C include the Family 
Health Surveys (FHS), conducted by the Pan Arab Project for Family Health (PAPFAM) in Djibouti 
(2002) and Yemen (2003), the Ethiopian Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS, 2011) and the Zambia 
Sexual Behaviours Surveys (ZSBS, 1998-2009).  
31 The DHS is generally representative at the national level, at the residence level (urban-rural) and 
at the regional level (departments/states).  
32 P.S. Yoder et al., Female Genital Cutting in the Demographic and Health Surveys: A Critical and 
Comparative Analysis, DHS Comparative Reports No 7, Calverton, September 2004, p. 2-3. 
33 See the website of the DHS Program, available at http://dhsprogram.com/What-We-Do/Survey-
Types/DHS.cfm [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
34 P.S. Yoder et al., Female Genital Cutting in the Demographic and Health Surveys: A Critical and 
Comparative Analysis, DHS Comparative Reports No 7, Calverton, September 2004, p. 2. 
35 P.S.. Yoder and S. Khan, Number of Women Circumcised in Africa: The Production of a Total, DHS 
Working Papers, No. 39, USAID, Calverton, March 2008, p. 4.  
36 P.S. Yoder and S. Wang, Female Genital Cutting: The Interpretation of Recent DHS Data, DHS 
Comparative Reports No. 33. Calverton, ICF International, September 2013, p. 5. 
37 P.S. Yoder et al., Female Genital Cutting in the Demographic and Health Surveys: A Critical and 
Comparative Analysis, DHS Comparative Reports No 7, Calverton, September 2004, p. 3. 
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FGM/C is practiced in the country.38 Nowadays, the FGM/C module focuses 
on four topics: (i) the FGM/C status of the respondent herself; (ii) details about 
the cutting (for those respondents who underwent FGM/C); (iii) information 
about the FGM/C status of one daughter and details about the cutting (in cases 
where a respondent’s daughter underwent FGM/C); (iv) women’s and men’s 
personal perceptions and opinions of the practice.39 To date, the DHS Program 
has collected data on FGM/C in 23 countries (22 countries in Africa and in 
Yemen).40 
 The MICS programme is an international household survey developed by 
UNICEF to support countries in monitoring the situation of children and 
women. Since 1995, the MICS have been conducted approximately every five 
years, resulting in more than 200 surveys in about 130 countries.41 An “FGM/C 
module” was developed in 2000 and used in selected countries in their MICS 
from 2005 onwards. The current MICS module of FGM/C is essentially the 
same as the “FGM/C module” used in the DHS surveys.42 To date, the MICS 
has collected data on FGM/C in 16 countries.43 UNICEF and ICF International 
worked closely together to harmonize methodologies and indicators used in the 
surveys and to standardize the survey questions on FGM/C in the DHS and 
MICS. Both DHS and MICS surveys rely on self-reports and ask respondents if 
they themselves have been cut for making prevalence estimates.44 In total, 
national prevalence data on FGM/C from population-based surveys are now 
available for 27 countries in Africa as well as Yemen and Iraq. However, in 
many of these countries, the systematic collection and analysis of data on 
FGM/C is quite recent.45  
 
6 PREVALENCE OF FGM/C  
 
6.1 Prevalence according to UNICEF 
 
In 2013, UNICEF published a report46 in which all DHS and MICS data (more 
than 70 surveys) and other nationally representative datasets with information 
                                                        
38 P.S. Yoder and S. Wang, Female Genital Cutting: The Interpretation of Recent DHS Data, DHS 
Comparative Reports No. 33, Calverton, September 2013, p. 1.  
39 Ibid, p. 11. 
40 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 4. 
41 Ibid. 
P.S. Yoder and S. Wang, Female Genital Cutting: The Interpretation of Recent DHS Data, DHS 
Comparative Reports No. 33, Calverton, September 2013, p. 14. 
43 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 4. 
44 For more information about the DHS survey process in the countries that participate in the DHS 
Program, see http://dhsprogram.com/What-We-Do/Survey-Process.cfm [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015].  For more information about the MICS survey process, see: 
http://www.unicef.org/statistics/index_24302.html [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
45 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 3. 
46 This report expands on a previous publication of UNICEF, namely: United Nations Children’s 
Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Exploration, UNICEF, New York, November 
2005.  
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on FGM/C were reviewed over a 20-year period. UNICEF claimed that this 
report “presents the most comprehensive compilation to date of statistics and 
analyses on FGM/C.”47 This report covered all 27 countries48 in Africa and two 
countries in the Middle East (Yemen and Iraq) where, according to UNICEF, 
FGM/C is concentrated.49 UNICEF estimated that 125 million girls and women 
have been cut in these 29 countries.50 The report further revealed that 30 million 
girls are at risk of being cut in the next decade.51  
Figure 3.1 below provides an overview of the percentage of girls and women 
(aged 15-49) who underwent FGM/C, by country, as portrayed in the 2013 
UNICEF report. The map shows that FGM/C concentrated in those countries 
that extend from Senegal in the west to Somalia in the east. FGM/C is not 
prevalent in the northern and southern parts of Africa. With the repeated DHS 
and MICS surveys, trends on prevalence can be analyzed.52 A rather mixed 
picture can be derived from the available data.53 In some countries, a downward 
trend in prevalence of FGM/C indicates that elimination of FGM/C might be 
taking place. For example in the Central African Republic, the national 
prevalence dropped remarkably from 43% in 1994-1995 to 24% in 2010. In 
Kenya, a considerable reduction in the national prevalence can be observed as 
well: 38% in 1998 to 27% in 2008-2009. In Sierra Leone, the national prevalence 
decreased from 94% in 2005 to 88% in 2010. In Egypt, the national prevalence 
decreased from 97% in 1995 to 91% in 2008. However, in other countries there is 
little reduction or no change. For example, the prevalence has remained constant 
in Sudan (from 90% in 2000 to 88% in 2010), Gambia (from 78% in 2005-2006 to 
76% in 2010), Chad (from 45% in 2000 to 44% in 2010), and in Tanzania (from 
18% in 1996 to 15% in 2010). There are also countries where an increase in 
prevalence rate can be observed. For example in Guinea-Bissau, the prevalence 
of FGM/C increased from 45% in 2006 to 50% in 2010. In Burkina Faso, the 
national prevalence increased from 72% in 1998-1999 to 76% in 2010.  
 
                                                        
47 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 3.  
48 Including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and United Republic of 
Tanzania. 
49 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 3.  
50 Ibid, p. 22.  
51 Ibid, p. 114; United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: What Might the 
Future Hold?, UNICEF, July 2014, p. 2.  
52 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 94; P.S. Yoder and S. Wang, 
Female Genital Cutting: The Interpretation of Recent DHS Data, DHS Comparative Reports No. 33, 
Calverton, September 2013, p.19.  
53 Population Reference Bureau, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Data and Trends, Update 2014, 
available at http://www.prb.org/pdf14/fgm-wallchart2014.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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Figure 3.1 Prevalence of FGM/C54 
 
 
 
6.2 Prevalence in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America 
 
However, map 3.1 of the 2013 UNICEF report does not provide a complete 
overview of the worldwide FGM/C prevalence. Several Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) working in the field of FGM/C have criticized UNICEF 
for failing to address other countries where FGM/C is also practiced, especially 
countries in Asia and the Middle East (except for Yeman and Iraq). For example, 
the Iraqi-German human rights organization WADI criticizes UNICEF for 
ignoring the existence of FGM/C in other parts of the world. The association 
conducted the first comprehensive area-wide research on FGM/C in Iraqi 
Kurdish provinces. Ever since, WADI made efforts to “uncover the true 
prevalence of the practice across Iraq, the region, and in other parts of Asia.”55 
                                                        
54 Source: United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview 
and Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 26. 
55 See the website of WADI, One in Four Women in Central and Southern Iraq is Affected by Female 
Genital Mutilation, New Study Suggests, available at http://en.wadi-
online.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1157:one-in-four-women-in-central-
and-southern-iraq-is-affected-by-female-genital-mutilation-new-study-
suggests&catid=15:presseerklaerungen&Itemid=109 [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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Since the “FGM/C module” has not been included in the DHS and/or MICS 
surveys in these countries in Asia and the Middle East (except in Yemen and 
Iraq), there are no official nationwide statistics available on the existence and 
prevalence of FGM/C. For that reason, the exact amount of girls and women 
living with the consequences of FGM/C in this part of the world remains 
uncertain. However, over the past decade, small-scale local research has 
increasingly collected evidence, showing that FGM/C is (widely) practiced in 
Asia and the Middle East. Below, an overview is given of these local studies 
and the findings about the prevalence of FGM/C in these countries. Since (most 
of) these studies are small-scale and not nationally representative, the results of 
these studies need to be interpreted with caution.  
 
6.2.1 FGM/C in Asia 
In the first place, FGM/C has been documented in Asia. A nation-wide study of 
the Population Council in 2003 found an extremely high prevalence of FGM/C 
in Indonesia.56 The report reveals that FGM/C is almost a universal practice in 
Indonesia. In most surveyed regions, the prevalence of FGM/C is as high as 
100% and the prevalence does not go below 86% in any region.57 Many girls and 
women in Malaysia live with the consequences of FGM/C, mostly among the 
Malay communities.58 Prevalence estimations in Malaysia range from 62 to 
94%.59 Evidence also suggests that FGM/C is practiced among the Muslim 
Dawoodi Bohra community in India60 and the Bohra and Sheedi communities in 
Pakistan. 61  FGM/C is also reported in Brunei, 62  Maldives 63  Philippines, 64 
Singapore,65 Sri Lanka,66 Tajikistan67 and Thailand.68  
                                                        
56 See the website of TaskForce, Indonesia: Most Girls Suffer Severe Forms of Genital Mutilation, 25 
November 2012, available at http://www.taskforcefgm.de/en/2012/11/schockierendes-ausmas-
schwerer-formen-von-genitalverstummelung-in-indonesien/ [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
57 M. Budiharsana et al., Female Circumcision in Indonesia: Extent, Implications and Possible Interventions 
to Uphold Women’s Health Rights, Population Council, September 2003, p. 24, available at 
http://www.taskforcefgm.de/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/FGM_in_Indonesien.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015]. See also United States Department of State, Indonesia: Report on Female 
Genital Mutilation (FGM) or Female Genital Cutting (FGC), 1 June 2001, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/46d57879c.html [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
58 See the website of ABC News, Malaysia Storm over Female Circumcision, 7 December 2012, available 
at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-12-07/an-malaysia-debate-over-female-
circumcision/4416298 [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
59 A.R. Isa et al., The Practice of Female Genital Mutilation among the Rural Malays in North 
Malaysia, The Internet Journal of Third World Medicine, Volume 9, Number 1, 2009; I.A. Rahman et al., 
The Practice of Female Circumcision among Muslims in Kelantan, Malaysia, Reproductive Health 
Matters, Volume 7, No. 13, 1999, p. 137–144. 
60 D. Dasgupta, The Yin, Wounded – The Bohras Female Circumcision, Outlook India, December 2011, 
available at 
http://www.outlookindia.com/article/The-Yin-Wounded/279088 [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
61 See the website of IRIN News, Pakistan: Low Awareness of Hidden FGM/C Practices, 26 December 
2011, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/94534/pakistan-low-awareness-of-hidden-
fgm-c-practices [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
62 B.S. Bergawan, Female Circumcision is Cultural Practice, The Brunei Times, 16 June 2012, available at 
http://www.bt.com.bn/news-national/2012/06/16/female-circumcision-cultural-practice [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
63 H. Amir, Islamism and Radicalism in the Maladives, Master Thesis, December 2011, p. 59, available at 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/10724/11Dec_Amir.pdf?sequence=1 [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015]; Haveeru Online, Attorney General: Practice of Female Circumcision Gaining 
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6.2.2 FGM/C in the Middle East 
In the second place, FGM/C has also been documented in other countries in the 
Middle East (except Yemen and Iraq). Studies have found prevalence rates 
between 40 and 85% in Iran.69 FGM/C is mainly practiced in the western part of 
the country, namely in West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Kermanshah provinces, 
and some areas of southern Iran, namely the Hormozgan province and its 
islands.70 FGM/C is also practiced in Oman71 and small-scale studies hint that 
20% of Omani women and girls are affected.72 A small-scale survey conducted 
in the United Arab Emirates showed that 34% of the women underwent 
FGM/C.73 In Saudi Arabia, anecdotal evidence exists suggesting that FGM/C is 
present in the southern part of the country; not among the Saudi population, 
                                                        
Momentum in Addu, 12 December 2009, available at http://www.haveeru.com.mv/news/28292 
[Last Accessed 1 October 2015]; J.J. Robinson, Reported Increase in Practice of Female Circumcision 
Raises Alarm, Minivan News, 30 October 2011, available at 
http://minivannews.com/politics/reported-increase-in-practice-of-female-circumcision-raises-
alarm-27670 [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].    
64 S.A. Calsalin, Female Circumcision among Yakan in Basilan, Philippines, Master Thesis, April 2008, 
available at http://aboutphilippines.ph/filer/toledo-cebu/2008-06-25-135433casalin.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
65 See the website of AWARE Singapore, AWARE Makes a Stand Against Female Circumcision in Islam, 
19 May 2014, available at http://rilek1corner.com/2014/05/19/aware-makes-a-stand-against-
female-circumcision-in-islam/ [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
66 C.A. Jaramillo, Beyond Comfort, Standards, Editorial, Volume 7, No. 2, 2001, available at 
http://www.colorado.edu/journals/standards/V7N2/EDITORIAL/edfgm.html [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
67 S. Joseph, Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures: Family, Body, Sexuality and Health, Volume 3, 
Brill Academic Publishers, 2005, p. 588. 
68 C. Merli, Sunat for Girls in Southern Thailand: Its Relation to Traditional Midwifery, Male 
Circumcision and Other Obstetrical Practices, Finnish Journal Of Ethnicity and Migration, Volume 3, 
No. 2, 2008, p. 32-41. 
69 K. Ahmady, A Comprehensive Research Study on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) 
in Iran – 2015, available at http://kameelahmady.com/wp-content/uploads/Kameel%20-
%20EN%20Final.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]; Südwind, Violations of Girls’ Rights, Child 
Marriage and FGM in the I.R. Iran, 2014, available at http://www.stopfgmmideast.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Iran-FGM-Child-Marriage-2014.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]; G. 
Esfandiari, Female Genital Mutilation Said To Be Widespread In Iraq's, Iran's Kurdistan, Radio Free 
Europe - Radio Liberty, 10 March 2009, available at 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Female_Genital_Mutilation_Said_To_Be_Widespread_In_Iraqs_Ira
ns_Kurdistan/1507621.html [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
70 K. Ahmady, A Comprehensive Research Study on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) 
in Iran – 2015, p. 5, available at http://kameelahmady.com/wp-content/uploads/Kameel%20-
%20EN%20Final.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015] 
71 K. Ginn, The Deepest Cut, Y-Oman, 5 February 2014, available at https://www.y-
oman.com/2014/02/deepest-cut/ [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]; S. Al Sharari, Female Genital 
Mutilation (FGM) in Dhofar: The Woman with the Frankincense Burner, 7 June 2011, available at 
http://susanalshahri.blogspot.de/2011/06/woman-with-frankincense-burner.html [Last Accessed 
1 October 2015]; S. Mubarak, The Issue of Female Genital Mutilation in Oman, Muscat Daily, 1 January 
2013, available at http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Stories-Files/The-issue-of-female-
genital-mutilation-in-Oman-1xye [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
72 See the website of Stop FGM Middle East, Oman, available at 
http://www.stopfgmmideast.org/countries/oman/ [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
73 W. Marzouqi, Desert Dawn, Fatal Tradition: Female Circumcision in the U.A.E., January 2011, 
available at http://de.scribd.com/doc/48726435/DesertDawn22-1-January-2011 [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015]. 
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but among the immigrant population from Egypt, Somalia and Sudan. 74 
FGM/C is also prevalent in Jordan, 75  Bahrain and Qatar. 76  There is also 
circumstantial evidence suggesting that FGM/C is prevalent in Syria77 and 
Kuwait.78 The practice is also found among Palestinians in Gaza and among the 
Bedouin tribes and Ethiopian Jewish Falashas in Israel.79 
 
6.2.3 FGM/C in Latin America 
Thirdly, scarce incidences of FGM/C have been found in Latin America. 
FGM/C has been documented among the indigenous Embera-Chami community 
in Colombia.80 However, little information is available about the practice in this 
community.  
 
6.3 Prevalence in ‘the West’ 
 
As a result of growing international migration and globalization, FGM/C 
became a concern in Europe,81 the United States,82 Canada,83 Australia84 and 
New Zealand.85 The exact number of women and girls who have underwent 
FGM/C or are at risk of undergoing FGM/C in these countries remains 
unknown. Reliable statistics on the incidence of the practice are not available. 
According to estimations of the European Parliament, 500,000 girls and women 
living in Europe have been subjected to FGM/C, while further 180,000 girls and 
                                                        
74 S.A. Alsibiani et al., Sexual Function in Women with Female Genital Mutilation, Fertility and 
Sterility, Volume 93, No. 3, February 2010, p. 722-724, available at  
http://www.kau.edu.sa/Files/140/Researches/50534_20747.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
75 R. Sabbagh-Gargour, The Jordanian Town That Still Circumcises Women, The Daily Star, Libanon, 13 
November 2013, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Culture/Art/2003/Nov-13/111346-the-
jordanian-town-that-still-circumcises-women.ashx [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
76 See the website of IRIN news, In-depth: Razor's Edge - The Controversy of Female Genital Mutilation, 
available at http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthId=15&ReportId=62465 [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
77 See the website of BBC, Female Circumcision, available at 
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women are at risk every year.86 However, no sources are provided for that 
estimation. In the United States, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention estimated that 168,000 girls in America have undergone or are at 
imminent risk of undergoing FGM/C.87 The majority of girls in these Western 
countries do not undergo the procedure in these countries. Families go with 
their daughters to their country of origin (often during the summer holidays) to 
have the procedure performed instead.88 However, there are some studies 
reporting that FGM/C takes place in countries in ‘the West’ as well.89  
 
6.4 Worldwide prevalence  
 
Taking into account the (small-scale) studies in Asia and the Middle East 
addressed in section 6.2, growing evidence suggests that the worldwide 
prevalence of FGM/C is likely to be much higher than 125 million. Several 
CSOs working on FGM/C have recently changed their maps, highlighting more 
countries the Middle East and adding Asia (and in some cases also Latin 
America) where FGM/C is prevalent.90 Although the WHO and other UN 
agencies acknowledged in their Joint Statement that FGM/C is not only 
prevalent in Africa, but also in “some countries in Asia and the Middle East”91 
there is a considerable problem of underreporting in relation to the worldwide 
prevalence of FGM/C.  
If, for example, the data from the nation-wide study in Indonesia is correct, 
it would mean that Indonesia alone has a potential of over 100 million women 
and girls who have undergone FGM/C, which are so far not counted UNICEF 
refers to 125 million. Von der Osten-Sacken, general manager of WADI, said 
during an interview: “Right now in publications people talk of about 140 to 160 
million women who have been genitally mutilated worldwide. But Indonesia – 
the country with the largest Muslim population in the world – is not included, 
and it is estimated that about 80 percent of women are circumcised there. If you 
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add Iraq, Iran, Oman, Yemen and Malaysia, you come to the conclusion that the 
number of victims of FGM is probably twice as high.”92 
It seems puzzling that some countries with possible high prevalence rates 
did not include the “FGM/C Module” to the DHS and/or MICS surveys. What 
are the reasons behind the lack of FGM/C prevalence data in Asia and the 
Middle East? Why is the existence of FGM/C in other parts of the world not 
fully recognized by the international community? Some people argue that the 
answer may lay in the fear of Islamophobia-phobia. Professor Rouzi from Saudi 
Arabia argued: “Western agents are afraid to name this connection [between 
Islam and FGM/C] or come anywhere near it because they are afraid to be 
called islamophobic.93 Along the same lines, Von der Osten-Sacken explained: 
“In Africa, FGM is practiced by Muslims, Christians and pagans, but east of the 
Suez Canal FGM seems to occur only amongst Muslim populations. And in 
general, people are afraid to set off religious discussions. Moreover, the UN can 
only start an investigation into the widespread occurrence of FGM when a 
national government is open to this. And the authorities in the Middle East do 
not want this issue to be discussed publicly. In addition, there is only a limited 
part of civil society that can criticize FGM.”94 In order to be able to uncover the 
true prevalence of the practice of FGM/C across the world, the issues 
highlighted by Von der Osten-Sacken need to be addressed.  
 
7 PERFORMANCE OF FGM/C 
 
7.1 Age at FGM/C 
 
FGM/C occurs at all ages, but the procedure is mostly carried out on girls 
between birth and age of 15 (often in infancy or early childhood).95 According to 
UNICEF, in half of the countries with available data on FGM/C, the majority of 
girls underwent FGM/C before their fifth birthday.96 In the rest of the countries, 
most cutting occurs between 5 and 14 years of age.97 Occasionally, adult women 
are also subjected to FGM/C (for example a few days before marriage, after 
marriage, or after their first pregnancy).98 The age at which girls and women 
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undergo FGM/C varies substantially from country to country, and even within 
countries, depending on local traditions and circumstances.99 For example, at 
least 80% of cut girls in Somalia, Egypt, Chad and the Central African Republic 
underwent FGM/C when they were between the ages of 5 and 14, while in 
countries such as Nigeria, Mali, Eritrea, Ghana and Mauritania, more than 80% 
of cut girls experienced FGM/C before their fifth birthday. In Guinea-Bissau, 
about 18% of cut girls underwent FGM/C after age 15, while in Kenya, 46% 
were not cut until after age 9.100 However, there are also important differences 
in the age of cutting in the same country, among different ethnic groups. For 
example in Kenya, the Somali girls undergo FGM/C when they are 9 years old, 
while the Kamba and Kalenjin cut girls at the age of 16.101 In Guinea, 6% of the 
girls from the Toma population were cut before age 5, compared to 39% of girls 
with a Malinke background.102 The age at cutting has remained fairly stable in 
most countries, although here is an observable trend for FGM/C to be carried 
out at younger ages.103 In some countries, statistical data showed that the 
average age at which FGM/C is performed is decreasing (the timing of FGM/C 
shifted from adolescence to early childhood or infancy). For example in Kenya, 
the proportion of girls and women who underwent FGM/C before age 10 has 
increased from 14% among women aged 45 to 49 to 44% among girls aged 15 to 
19. 104 The same pattern can be observed in Tanzania and in Mali. 105 One 
commonly cited reason for cutting girls at earlier ages is in the first place that 
parents believe that it reduces trauma for their girls.106 In the second place, 
parents will be able to perform FGM/C more discretely, particularly when they 
are aware of campaigns aimed at ending FGM/C or where the practice has 
been criminalized. 107  By cutting younger girls, parents would avoid 
government’s interference and avoid older children to report FGM/C or to 
denounce parents or cutters to the authorities.108 It is also commonly believed 
that young girls heal more quickly than older girls or women, and put up less 
resistance since they do not fully understand the impact of the practice.109  
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7.2 FGM/C practitioners 
 
7.2.1 Traditional practitioners 
The practice of FGM/C is mostly carried out by traditional practitioners,110 who 
are generally elderly women specially designated for this task. These women 
often play a central role in the community and enjoy social recognition for 
performing the cutting. For this reason, FGM/C is widely seen as a “women’s 
business”, because it is organized and practiced by older women on young 
girls.111  
 
7.2.2 Medicalisation of FGM/C 
The ‘medicalisation’ of FGM/C refers to the practice being performed by 
doctors or other members of the health profession.112 Particularly in Egypt, 
Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Yemen and Indonesia medicalisation is 
increasing.113 In these countries, over 30% of the girls and women are cut by a 
health professional. An increased number of younger girls compared with older 
women are undergoing FGM/C by health professionals, demonstrating a trend 
towards the medicalisation of FGM/C.114 The level of medicalisation is highest 
in Egypt, where a trained medical professional (most often a physician) carries 
out 77% of the FGM/C procedures.115 It is estimated that nowadays, health care 
professionals carry out more than 18% of all FGM/C procedures.116 Clinics that 
practice of FGM/C have been identified in Kenya and Guinea.117 The reason for 
the medicalisation of FGM/C is the pretext of better quality or for safety 
reasons.118 
The WHO has consistently and unequivocally condemned the practice of 
FGM/C by health professionals in any setting.119 This statement of the WHO 
rests on “the basic ethics of health care whereby unnecessary bodily mutilation 
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cannot be condoned by health providers.” 120  This condemnation of 
medicalization of the WHO was further highlighted and reiterated by other UN 
agencies.121 Medical licensing authorities and medical professional associations 
(such as the International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, the 
International Confederation of Midwives, the International Council of Nurses 
and the Medical Women’s International Association)122 joined the UN agencies 
in condemning the ‘medicalization’ of FGM/C and called on all health 
professionals to refuse to perform FGM/C.123 Dr. Foldes, a French surgeon who 
performs reconstructive surgery on women who have undergone FGM/C, 
argues that “in the vast majority of cases, medicalisation is clearly an 
aggravating factor in mutilation.”124 He explains the following: “Traditional 
cutters are very well aware of how far they can go, particularly in terms of 
bleeding, and they understand that the death of young girls will neither serve 
their reputation nor help with recruiting new clients. As a result, the main 
nerve trunks are – paradoxically – avoided and thereby protected, as injuring 
them would also involve opening up blood vessels, resulting in an 
uncontrollable haemorrhage. […] However, the use of anaesthesia – whether 
local, locoregional or general – makes it possible to cut, unhindered, a body that 
is open and at rest. Worse, a doctor, surgeon or health-care professional knows 
how to prevent haemorrhage and is therefore much less constrained by the 
presence of major blood vessels – and can cut much more extensively, as we 
have observed.”125 Dr. Foldes claims that when FGM/C was being performed 
by doctors, often have been the ones that were most difficult to repair. He 
therefore argues that the medicalisation of FGM/C is a breach of ethics that 
“effects and tarnishes the entire health-care community.”126 
 
7.3 Setting and Materials 
 
FGM/C is usually performed in rural areas and most girls are cut at the girls’ 
home.127 Even when medical professionals perform the procedure, half of the 
procedures still take place outside a clinical setting, in particular in the home.128 
The practice may be performed individually or girls are cut with a group of 
                                                        
120 World Health Organization, Management of Pregnancy, Childbirth and the Postpartum Period in the 
Presence of Female Genital Mutilation, Report of a WHO Technical Consultation Geneva, 15-17 
October 1997, HO/FCH/GWH/01.2, WHO/RHR/01.13, WHO, 2001, p. 38.  
121 World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation: A Joint WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA Statement, 
WHO Library, 1997; World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An 
Interagency Statement, WHO Library, 2008; World Health Organization, Global Strategy to Stop Health-
Care Providers from Performing Female Genital Mutilation, WHO/RHR/10.9, 2010.  
122 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 38-41. 
123 B. Shell-Duncan, The Medicalization of Female “Circumcision”: Harm Reduction or Promotion of 
a Dangerous Practice?, Social Science & Medicine, Volume 52, 2001, p. 1014.  
124 P. Foldes and F. Martz, The Medicalisation of female genital mutilation, Forced Migration 
Review, May 2015, p. 6.  
125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid, p. 7.  
127 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 45.  
128 Ibid, p. 45.  
 
 
 
Chapter III 
124 
other girls from the community. However, the importance of the ceremonial 
aspects associated with FGM/C is declining.129 Non-sterile cutting devices are 
likely to be used, including: scissors, razor blades, knives, sharpened rocks or 
broken glass. These instruments are often reused on different girls (up to 30 
girls at a time). 130  The practice is generally done without aesthetic, but 
depending on the involvement of health care professionals, the procedures may 
include a local or general aesthetic.   
 
7.4 Type of FGM/C Performed 
 
Although the WHO typology131 offers precise anatomical description, there are 
some limitations to this classification. This typology might be more useful in 
clinical observation than in surveys like the DHS and MICS that rely on self-
reports from women.132 The WHO recognized this and stated: “classification 
naturally entails simplification and hence cannot reflect the vast variations in 
actual practice.”133 Medical anthropologist Yoder clarified that “each society has 
its own language and ways of classifying types of cutting that are known to 
members, types of cutting that do not necessarily correspond to the WHO 
designations. Establishing equivalence between such locally defined types and 
those proposed as guidelines by the WHO is not a simple matter.”134 It therefore 
proved to be difficult to obtain reliable data during the DHS and MICS 
investigations on the type of FGM/C performed. Many women were unaware 
of the specific procedures performed on them, and in many settings it is 
culturally inappropriate to ask detailed questions about such matters, or to 
show illustrations.135 For example, women in Niger used 50 different terms to 
describe the practice during the 1998 DHS survey when asked what happened 
to them.136 For that reason, the typology of the WHO was to a certain extent left 
aside and used as a guideline instead. The DHS now determines which of three 
types of cutting (clitoridectomy, excision, or infibulation) a woman had 
undergone by differentiating between whether a girl or woman has been nicked, 
whether flesh has been removed, and whether tissue has been sewn closed. 
However, these categories do not fully match the WHO classification typology.  
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By far the largest proportion of women who had undergone FGM/C reported 
during the DHS and MICS surveys that they had some flesh removed (as 
opposed to being nicked or sewn closed).137 Only in Eritrea, 46% of the women 
who had undergone FGM/C were ‘nicked only’. In Burkina Faso, Chad, and 
Sudan, between 15-20% of the women were ‘nicked only.’138 The most severe 
form of FGM/C (infibulations) is most prevalent in northeastern Africa. In 
Sudan, 82% of the women who underwent FGM/C are sewn closed and in 
Eritrea this amounts to 39%.139 Infibulations can be found in several West 
African countries as well, for example in Guinea (9%), Mali (10%) and Senegal 
(14%). In Kenya, 13% of the women who underwent FGM/C are infibulated. It 
should also be noted that about 20% of women who reported that they had 
undergone FGM/C said they did not know what was done to them.140  
Local customs and ethnicity often determine which type of FGM/C girls 
undergo. For example in Eritrea, all girls from the Hedarib ethnicity were sewn 
closed, compared to only 2% of girls of the Tigrigna ethnicity.141 UNICEF 
gathered evidence indicating that there is a trend towards less severe cutting 
across generations. For example in Djibouti, 83% of women aged 45-49 had 
undergone Type IIII (sewn closed), compared to 42% of girls aged 15-19.142  
 
8 HEALTH CONSEQUENCES 
 
The practice of FGM/C can cause serious adverse health consequences, since it 
involves removing and damaging healthy female genital tissue. FGM/C does 
not have any known health benefits.143 The immediate and long-term health 
consequences depend on the type of FGM/C performed (the extent of the 
cutting), the expertise of the practitioner, the conditions under which it is 
performed (by a health care professional under hygienic conditions in a clinical 
setting or by a traditional cutter with non-sterile material at home), the amount 
of resistance and the general health condition of the girl or woman who 
undergoes the procedure.144 Although FGM/C of any type is associated with a 
series of health risks, these risks are higher when the procedure is more 
extensive. Most frequent complications occur with infibulations (Type III). 
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8.1 Immediate consequences 
 
In the short term, FGM/C of all types can cause severe pain. Since the 
procedure is often performed without (proper) anaesthesia, cutting the sensitive 
genital tissue often causes extreme pain. FGM/C may also cause haemorrhage 
(excessive bleeding) and shock (caused by pain or haemorrhage or trauma of 
the procedure).145 A common immediate complication with FGM/C is infection 
(including wound infection, septicaemia, gangrene and tetanus) caused by the 
lack of hygiene and the use of unsterile cutting instruments. Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that using the same unsterile cutting instrument on several girls 
who undergo FGM/C together increases the risk of transmission of Hepatitis B, 
C and HIV/AIDS.146 Other immediate complications include pelvic fracture, 
open sores in the genital region and injury to nearby genital tissue.147 Acute 
urinary retention may result from swelling and inflammation around the 
wound (particularly with type III).148 FGM/C can also lead to death, caused by 
haemorrhage or infection (including tetanus and shock). It is unknown how 
many girls and women have died from FGM/C, since complications of FGM/C 
resulting in death may not be recognized or reported.149  
 
8.2 Long-term consequences 
 
The practice of FGM/C can have lifelong health consequences. Long-term 
health consequences may include chronic pain (for example during urination, 
menstruation, sexual intercourse and childbirth), vaginal infections, pelvic 
infections (which can cause chronic back and pelvic pain), recurrent urinary 
tract infections (which can lead to kidney damage), dermoid cysts, chronic 
genital abscesses and excessive scar tissue.150 Damage to the urethra during the 
FGM/C procedure may lead to fistula and urethral strictures.151 
FGM/C has also harmful obstetrical and neonatal consequences, including 
infertility,152 increased risk of childbirth complications and newborn deaths. 
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Women who have undergone FGM/C face a significantly greater risk of 
needing caesarean section and face more post-partum difficulties compared to 
women who have not been cut. 153 Death rates among babies during and 
immediately after birth are higher for those born to mothers who have 
undergone FGM/C. A study conducted on 28.393 women attending delivery 
wards at 28 obstetric centres in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal 
and Sudan revealed that all types of FGM/C pose an increased risk to death to 
the baby. The risk of birth complication increases with the severity of FGM/C: 
death rates are 15% higher for those mothers with Type I, 32% higher for 
mothers with Type II and 55% higher for mothers with Type III.154 The WHO 
estimates that FGM/C leads to one or two additional perinatal deaths per 100 
deliveries.155 
For the most extensive form of FGM/C (Type III), additional risks have been 
documented, since further surgery is usually necessary later in women’s lives 
when infibulations need to be opened to allow for sexual intercourse and 
childbirth. In some countries the girl or woman is stitched several times, 
including after childbirth. This means that a girl or woman goes through 
repeated re-opening (defibulation)156 and closing (reinfibulation)157 procedures, 
further increasing and repeating both immediate and long-term health risks.158 
The amount of re-closure varies, but it often involves additional tightening of 
the introitus to the size before marriage. 
 
8.3 Psychological, social and sexual consequences 
 
The psychological, social and sexual consequences of FGM/C are under-
researched and evidence on the non-medical consequences of FGM/C appears 
to be weak.159 Only a few small-scale studies have tackled these effects of 
FGM/C.160 Some of these studies suggest that women with FGM/C have more 
pain during sexual intercourse (dyspareunia), experience less sexual satisfaction 
and have a reduced sexual desire compared to women without FGM/C.161 In 
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addition, women with FGM/C may be more likely to experience psychological 
disturbances (have a psychiatric diagnosis, suffer from anxiety, somatisation, 
phobia, and low self-esteem).162 Other studies suggest that FGM/C is likely to 
cause various emotional disturbances as well, including depression, post-
traumatic stress disordeand other psychiatric syndromes, including memory 
problems.163 
 
9 REASONS FOR FGM/C 
 
There is no clear-cut answer to the question why people practice FGM/C, since 
the justifications for the practice of FGM/C are numerous. Gruenbaum 
explained: “For some it is a rite of passage. For others it is not. Some consider it 
aesthetically pleasing. For others, it is mostly related to morality or sexuality.”164 
Communities with various ethnical and religious backgrounds practice FGM/C 
and they live in many different countries. The reasons why FGM/C is practiced 
are multiple and include a mix of cultural, religious and social factors within 
families and communities.165 Rahman and Toubia explained: “The reasons for 
FC/FGM are complex, related to each other and woven into the beliefs and 
values communities uphold.”166 Below, an overview is given of the several 
justifications of the practice.  
 
9.1 Custom and tradition 
 
The most commonly cited reasons for the continuation of the practice are 
‘custom’ and ‘tradition’.167 FGM/C is often deeply rooted in local culture and 
has been passed from one generation to another. 168  An Egyptian woman 
testified: ''Of course I shall have them circumcised, exactly as their parents, 
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grandparents and sisters were circumcised. This is our custom.''169 FGM/C is an 
integral part of the cultural heritage of the community and a marker of ethnic 
identity; it defines – along with other physical or behavioural characteristics – 
who belongs to the group. Communities want to preserve their cultural identity 
and therefore uphold traditions like FGM/C. This creates powerful impetus to 
continue the practice. Toubia suggests: "the fear of losing the psychological, 
moral, and material benefits of ‘belonging’ is one of the greatest motivators of 
conformity."170 Where FGM/C is carried out as part of the ritual initiation into 
womanhood, a girl cannot be considered an adult unless she has undergone 
FGM/C. This transition to adulthood is commonly celebrated through a rite of 
passage, usually at the time of puberty, involving a festive ceremony and 
celebration. The event is abundant in ritual and symbolism and can last up to 
weeks. The initiation also includes a period of seclusion and education about 
the rights and duties of a wife in order to prepare the girl for womanhood and 
marriage. 171  This process of “becoming” a woman contributes to the 
preservation of community customs and tradition.172 Jomo Kenyatta, the first 
president of independent Kenya explained in his book Facing Mount Kenya how 
important the tradition is to the people of the Kikuyu ethnicity of central Kenya. 
He wrote: “No proper Gikuyu [Kikuyu] would dream of marrying a girl who 
has not been circumcised and vice versa.”173 He further argued that FGM/C 
was inherent in the initiation, which is in itself an essential part of being a 
Kikuyu, and to such a degree that “abolition… will destroy the tribal system.” 
 
9.2 Women’s sexuality 
 
Another common justification for FGM/C is related to women’s sexuality. In 
many communities, it is believed that uncut women will not be able to control 
their sexuality and that “a girl who is not excised will run wild and disgrace her 
family.” 174  In many communities that practice of FGM/C, family honour 
depends on a girl’s virginity or sexual restraint.175 An uncut girl will bring 
shame on herself and her family. The intention of FGM/C is to reduce women’s 
sexual desire. It is believed that a woman with reduced sexual desire will not 
seek sexual relations outside marriage thereby ensuring marital fidelity. 
FGM/C safeguards the morality of women, prevents a woman from engaging 
in promiscuity and discourages her from sinful and deviant sexual behaviour, 
such as masturbation. FGM/C is also performed to reduce women’s sexual 
demands on her husband, especially in polygamous communities, thus 
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allowing him to have several wives.176 FGM/C in general – but especially Type 
III – is also seen as a proof of chastity and virginity before marriage. In these 
(patriarchal) communities, virginity is a pre-requisite for marriage and is 
equated to female honour. The practice of FGM/C ensures and preserves the 
virginity of girls and keeps them “pure” until marriage. In these communities 
FGM/C is valued as a guarantee of marriage and subsequent economic security 
for the woman.  
 
9.3 Religion 
 
Many people believe that FGM/C is particular to the Muslim religious tradition. 
However, it is important to note that, although the practice is predominant 
among Muslim groups, FGM/C is also practiced across other religions 
including Christians, Jews, Animists and followers of traditional religions.177 
For example in Côte d'Ivoire, the prevalence is 64% among Muslims, 42% 
among those with no religion and 18% among Catholics.178 In Ethiopia and 
Kenya, the prevalence is highest among Christian groups. Prevalence rates vary 
according to ethnicity, not religion.  
 Section 4 of this chapter explained that the practice of FGM/C predates the 
rise of Islam and Christianity.179 None of the holy texts of any of the religions 
prescribe FGM/C.180 For that reason, it has been argued that FGM/C is a 
“cultural” rather than a “religious” practice.181 Although most of the Islamic 
world does not practice of FGM/C, the practice has acquired a religious 
dimension.182 In many African countries (including Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea, Mali 
and Mauritania), significant proportions of the population practice FGM/C, 
because they think it is required by their religion. 183  Similarly, religious 
obligation is cited as the primary reason for performing FGM/C in the Middle 
East and Asia. In these countries, there is a widespread view that FGM/C is a 
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religious requirement. Members of these Muslim communities advocate in 
favour of the practice. Thus, although FGM/C is not referred to as a “religious 
practice”, in many countries FGM/C is strongly identified with Islam and thus 
interwoven with religion. According to UNICEF, the belief that FGM/C is a 
religious requirement contributes to the continuation of the practice.184  
 At the same time, no reference to FGM/C is to be found in the Quran.185 
However, a few Hadiths (traditions and sayings attributed to the Prophet 
Muhammad and other founders of Islam) refer to the practice. In these Islamic 
texts, Type I is referred to as Sunna, which means ‘tradition’ or ‘duty’ in Arabic, 
while the more severe forms of FGM/C (Type II and III) are referred to as Khafḍ. 
The Hadith that is most often cited by proponents of FGM/C to justify the 
practice is the one from the Sunan Abu Dawood and reads as follows: “A woman 
used to perform circumcision in Medina. The Prophet said to her: Do not cut 
severely as that is better for a woman and more desirable for a husband.”186 
Another Hadith used to support FGM/C practices is the one from Musnad 
Ahmad: “Circumcision is a commendable act for men (Sunna) and an honorable 
act (Makromah) for women.”187 In addition to these often quoted Hadiths, there 
exist a few more Hadiths that are used justify FGM/C.188  
 However, the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence hold different 
opinions on the practice of FGM/C and they are not unanimous on the subject. 
There are many debates about the authenticity of the Hadiths cited above 
dealing with FGM/C. Some Islamic scholars argue that the traditions attributed 
to Prophet Mohamed are authentic. Others argue that the Hadiths have a weak 
chain of transmission, which means that they are unreliable. The Imam Safi 
school considers FGM/C to be obligatory for both males and females. The 
Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal school considers FGM/C obligatory for males and an 
honorable act for females. The Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Malik schools 
regard both male circumcision and FGM/C an honorable act for women.189 
However, none of the Islamic schools prohibits the practice and individual 
interpretation has turned FGM/C into a religious doctrine that commands it as 
a basic element of religious faith.190  
 In 2006, during a conference held in Cairo, important Muslim leaders in 
Egypt specifically rejected FGM/C because of the lack of scriptural support for 
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the practice. The highest Sunni Muslim authority in Egypt, Sheikh Mohammad 
Sayyed Tantawi of Al-Azhar University openly stated that FGM/C is not an 
Islamic practice. He also revealed that his own daughter was not cut. In 2007, 
the Al-Azhar Supreme Council of Islamic Research in Egypt issued a fatwa 
(religious edict). It is the most authoritative condemnation of FGM/C in Islam 
to date. The fatwa explains that FGM/C has no basis in Sharia or any of its 
partial provisions, and that it is an act that should be avoided. Several regional 
and national fatwas in other countries have followed in the following years, 
with reference to the original statement of the Supreme Council of Islamic 
Research in Egypt as their basis.  
 
9.4 Hygiene and aesthetics 
 
The practice of FGM/C is also justified on the grounds of hygiene and 
aesthetics. Some practicing communities are of the opinion that the female 
genitalia are dirty, bugly and unsightly.191  Uncut women are regarded as 
unclean. For that reason the female genitalia must be cut to enhance a women’s 
appearance and to facilitate cleanliness.192 This justification of ‘cleanliness’ is 
also interlinked with the concept of gender identity. In some communities the 
clitoris is considered a “male like” or “masculine” part that has to be 
removed.193 In order to create true femininity in women, one must be physically 
altered. Assaad explains: “Excision is practiced to clearly distinguish the sex of 
the person. A boy is a ‘female’ by virtue of his foreskin; a girl is ‘male’ by virtue 
of her clitoris.”194 It is also believed that Type III achieves smoothness that is 
considered to be beautiful and it makes women feminine.195  Local terms used to 
refer to the practice are often synonymous with purification or cleanliness. In 
the Bambara language in Mali FGM/C is known as bolokoli ("washing your 
hands") and in the Igbo language in Nigeria as isa aru ("having your bath"). A 
common Arabic term for the practice is tahara (“purification”).196  
 
9.5 Traditional myths and beliefs 
 
Many myths and false beliefs are associated with the practice of FGM/C. In 
some communities, there is a belief that when the clitoris is not cut, it will 
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continue to grow until “it is as long as or longer than a penis and will dangle 
between legs.” 197  Some communities believe that a woman's clitoris is 
dangerous and that if it touches a man's penis, he will die. FGM/C is also 
believed to make child delivery easier and safer, because the clitoris could 
obstruct the birth of a baby during delivery. Others believe that if the baby's 
head touches the clitoris during childbirth, the baby will die. Some 
communities where FGM/C is practiced are convinced that the practice 
enhances woman’s fertility and safeguards men’s potency. Other communities 
believe that uncut women cannot conceive. In some communities, the 
enhancement of men’s sexual pleasure is mentioned as a justification for 
FGM/C.198 Anecdotal accounts, however, suggest that men prefer women who 
have not undergone FGM/C as sexual partners.  
 
10 FGM/C AS A SOCIAL NORM 
 
10.1 Social expectations 
 
A prominent view of FGM/C is that it is a social norm. A common explanation 
for the continuation of FGM/C is social pressure within communities. 
According to Rahman and Toubia: “In a community where most women are 
circumcised, family, friends and neighbours create an environment in which the 
practice of circumcision becomes a component of social conformity.” 199 
Christina Bicchieri explained that the practice of FGM/C can be considered a 
social norm if it meets the followings conditions: (i) individuals are aware of the 
rule of behavior regarding the cutting of girls and know that it applies to them; 
(ii) individuals prefer to conform to this rule because: a) they expect that a 
sufficiently large segment of their social group will cut their daughters, and b) 
they believe that a sufficiently large segment of their social group thinks that 
they ought to cut their daughters and may sanction them if they do not.200 In 
communities where FGM/C is a social norm, the pressure to conform to what 
other community members are doing is a strong motivation to continue with 
the practice. Because of the social structures within the community, it is difficult 
for individuals to stop the practice of FGMC on their own since there is a strong 
fear of stigmatization and rejection. The following quote illustrates how 
FGM/C is considered a social norm in a Senegalese community:  
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““Let’s talk about why girls are cut,” Ndey said after the women had returned to 
their seats. “What consequences befall a girl who is not cut?” Why were girls cut? It 
was a silly question, like asking why one breathes. Every woman in the room knew 
that the tradition was among the most momentous events of a girl’s life, preparing 
her to become a woman, to eventually be deemed acceptable for marriage, and most 
important of all, to fully belong and have a respected role within her society. For a 
girl not to be cut – to be a bilakoro, a name considered among the worst insults in 
their culture – was unimaginable. Not only would a bilakoro have trouble finding a 
husband, she would also be rejected and ostracized by the rest of the community, 
by women especially. Considered impure and unfit to enter the circle of “real 
women,” the food she cooked would not be eaten, the clothes she washed rewashed 
by others.”201 
 
Similarly, Shell-Duncan also found in her study that girls who were not cut, 
“are contemptuously insulted by being labeled solima, meaning not only 
uncircumcised, but also rude, ignorant, immature, uncivilized, and unclean; 
women who are solima are told they know nothing, and are harassed and 
excluded by women for not knowing how to behave properly.”202   
 
10.2 Social convention theory 
 
Political theorist Mackie worked together with Bicchieri and developed the so-
called ‘theory of self-enforcing social conventions’ (also referred to as the ‘social 
norm approach’). According to Mackie, the social convention theory “offers an 
explanation for how certain harmful social practices are self-enforcing social 
conventions, why they are universal in a community and why they are strongly 
resistant to change.”203 The social convention theory provides insights in how 
harmful practices have been sustained over generations.204 Mackie was inspired 
by the practice of footbinding in China. This harmful practice affected most 
Chinese women for a thousand years, but ended, for the most part, in a single 
generation. Mackie argues that footbinding and FGM/C are closely equivalent 
practices.205  
 
10.2.1 Origins in game theory 
The origins of Mackie’s social convention theory can be found in game theory. 
Game theory is "the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation 
between intelligent rational decision-makers."206 In order words: the study of 
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strategic decision-making. Game theoretic concepts apply whenever the actions 
of individuals are interdependent.207 Mackie used the game-theoretic model and 
Coordination Diagram of the economist Schelling208 to show that the end of 
footbinding in China was a convention shift. He highlighted that when a social 
convention or a social norm is in place, decision-making is an interdependent 
process in which the choice made by one player in the game depends on the 
choice made by the second player, whose choice, in turn, depends on the choice 
made by the first.209 In an interdependent larger group, the choice of each player 
depends on the choice of all as a result of reciprocal expectations.210  
 
10.2.2 Assumption: parents love their children 
Mackie’s initial assumption in relation to the decision-making process of 
FGM/C is that “parents love their children and ultimately want to do what is 
best for them.” 211  Families carry out FGM/C in order to ensure the 
marriageability and status of their daughters within the ‘intramarrying’ 
group. 212  In a community where all girls have undergone FGM/C as a 
prerequisite for marriage, fathers and mothers believe that girls must be cut as a 
condition for marriage. 213  Families will therefore choose to cut their own 
daughter(s), to ensure they are prepared for adulthood and can have a ‘proper’ 
marriage. This marriage is very often essential for the girl’s economic and social 
security. If a family decides not to cut their daughter(s), they will find it more 
difficult (if not impossible) to get married. In addition, the failure to conform to 
the norm of FGM/C may lead to social exclusion, avoidance, ostracism, 
disapproval, rebuke or even violence.214 Uncut girls are likely to become socially 
outcast (see also quote in para. 3.9.1). On the other hand, when families conform 
to the norm, they meet with social approval; it brings respect and admiration, 
and maintains social standing for a girl and her family in the community.215 
Taking into account these social rewards and sanctions, FGM/C is perceived as 
the best choice for parents to ensure their daughters to have a ‘good’ future.  
                                                        
207 T.L. Turocy and B. von Stengel, Game Theory, Encyclopedia of Information Systems, Volume 2, 2002, 
p. 403-420. 
208 T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 225.  
209 United Nations Children’s Fund, Coordinated Strategy to Abandon Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting 
in one Generation: A Human Rights-Based Approach to Programming, Technical Note, UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre, 2007, p. 14.  
210 G. Mackie and J. LeJeune, Social Dynamics of Abandonment of Harmful Practices: A New Look at the 
Theory, Innocenti Working Paper 2009-06, Special Series on Social Norms and Harmful Practices, 
UNICEF Innocenti Research Center, Florance, May 2009, p. 9.  
211 G. Mackie, Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account, American Sociological 
Review, Volume 61, No. 6, 1996, p. 1003 and 1007.  
212 G. Mackie and J. LeJeune, Social Dynamics of Abandonment of Harmful Practices: A New Look at the 
Theory, Innocenti Working Paper 2009-06, Special Series on Social Norms and Harmful Practices, 
UNICEF Innocenti Research Center, Florance, May 2009, p. 10. 
213 United Nations Children’s Fund, The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the Abandonment of 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five African Countries, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 
October 2010, p. 6. 
214 United Nations Children’s Fund, The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the Abandonment of 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five African Countries, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 
October 2010, p. 6. 
215 Ibid, p. 6. 
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10.2.3 Two equilibrium states 
When FGM/C is universal within the intramarrying group, not only the 
parents, but girls themselves may want to be cut as well.216 According to Mackie, 
FGM/C in this way is a powerful social convention, because FGM/C is a social 
rule that members of a community follow, based on the expectation that others 
have done the same and that others will follow.217 What one family chooses to 
do in communities where FGM/C is widely practiced depends upon what 
other families do. No single family will deviate from that. Mackie describes this 
as an ‘equilibrium state’, because no family has an incentive to deviate from the 
social expectation of FGM/C. Women believe that men would not marry a 
woman who did not undergo FGM/C, and men believe that a woman who did 
not undergo FGM/C would not be a faithful partner in marriage.218 A peculiar 
characteristic of the social convention theory applied to FGM/C is that even if 
each family in the intramarrying community thinks that it would be better to 
abandon the practice, no family acting on their own can succeed.219 Every 
family can come to the conclusion that FGM/C is wrong, but that is not enough. 
FGM/C would in that case continue, because any family abandoning FGM/C 
on its own would negatively affect the future of its daughters. Enough families 
must abandon it at once so that their daughters’ futures are secured.220 The 
social convention theory illustrates that when all families in a community 
choose not to have their daughters cut, then FGM/C would not be a 
prerequisite for marriage any more. For that to be effective, it is necessary for 
everyone in the intramarrying community to abandon FGM/C together. This is 
an ‘equilibrium state’ too, because all families are acting in the same way and 
no family has an incentive to cut their daughters.  
 
10.2.4 Collective abandonment 
The main challenge is to move all families from the worse equilibrium (when all 
daughters have undergone FGM/C) to the best equilibrium (where no 
daughters have undergone FGM/C), a so-called ‘convention-shift’. Mackie 
argues that abandonment is possible, but only by coordinating a collective 
abandonment within the intramarrying community. Families will only abandon 
FGM/C when they are convinced that (most of) the other families in the 
community will make the same choice at the same time.221 According to Mackie, 
collective abandonment of FGM/C makes everyone better off, as families 
preserve their status and daughters preserve their marriageability, but do not 
                                                        
216 United Nations Children’s Fund, Changing a Harmful Social Convention: Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2005, p. 11.  
217 Ibid.  
218 G. Mackie, Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account, American Sociological 
Review, Volume 61, No. 6, 1996, p. 1008. 
219 G. Mackie, Female Genital Cutting: The Beginning of the End, in: B. Shell-Duncan and Y. Hernlund 
(eds.), Female “Circumcision” in Africa: Culture, Controversy, and Change, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 
2000, p. 255. 
220 Ibid.  
221 United Nations Children’s Fund, The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the Abandonment of 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five African Countries, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 
October 2010, p. 6. 
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undergo the FGM/C.222 Collective abandonment will occur if a ‘tipping point’, a 
large enough portion of the community, is willing to abandon FGM/C. The 
‘tipping point’ can be achieved by mobilizing a relatively small group of 
community members seeking change (the so-called ‘first-movers’ or ‘critical 
mass’), who are motivated to persuade and show others in the group the 
benefits of not practicing FGM/C. They also have the incentive to recruit other 
members of the community to join them in the effort to abandon FGM/C. The 
process through which the critical mass spread the knowledge and action to 
other families and communities is called ‘organized diffusion’.223 According to 
Mackie, “Organized diffusion uses local networks of social relationships to 
promote conditional commitment to abandon FGM/C, within not only the 
residential community but also beyond it to other communities, not always 
nearby, that intramarry with the target community.” It is not necessary at the 
outset to gain the support of the entire community, but a large part of the 
community needs to be in favour of community abandonment of FGM/C.224 In 
order to attain stable abandonment of FGM/C, Mackie argues that a public 
commitment is required of the greater part of the intramarrying community to 
show that each member can see that most others in the community abandon the 
practice of FGM/C.225 The community commitment must results in a moment of 
social recognition when the abandonment of FGM/C is rendered public and 
explicit. This could be an authoritative written statement or public declaration 
at a large public gathering.226 This is a milestone in the process of abandonment, 
because then there is a permanent change in reciprocal expectations and there is 
no reason for the community to go back to FGM/C.227 There is a shift in the 
convention, because community members are now expected to not cut their 
daughters and will be socially rewarded or sanctioned accordingly.228 
 
10.3 Social convention theory & UNICEF 
 
The social convention theory has been embraced by UNICEF and is also at the 
core of the programme framework of the ‘UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme 
                                                        
222 G. Mackie and J. LeJeune, Social Dynamics of Abandonment of Harmful Practices: A New Look at the 
Theory, Innocenti Working Paper 2009-06, Special Series on Social Norms and Harmful Practices, 
UNICEF Innocenti Research Center, Florance, May 2009, p. 11. 
223 United Nations Children’s Fund, Coordinated Strategy to Abandon Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting 
in one Generation: A Human Rights-Based Approach to Programming, Technical Note, UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre, 2007, p. 19-21. 
224 G. Mackie and J. LeJeune, Social Dynamics of Abandonment of Harmful Practices: A New Look at the 
Theory, Innocenti Working Paper 2009-06, Special Series on Social Norms and Harmful Practices, 
UNICEF Innocenti Research Center, Florance, May 2009, p. 12.  
225 Ibid, p. 14-15.  
226 United Nations Children’s Fund, The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the Abandonment of 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five African Countries, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 
October 2010, p. vii.  
227 United Nations Children’s Fund, Coordinated Strategy to Abandon Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting 
in one Generation: A Human Rights-Based Approach to Programming, Technical Note, UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre, 2007, p. 13.  
228 United Nations Children’s Fund, The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the Abandonment of 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five African Countries, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 
October 2010, p. vii.  
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on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change.’ According to 
UNICEF, there is a “growing appreciation of the usefulness of a social norms 
perspective in addressing FGM/C.”229 Many UN documents refer to Mackie’s 
social convention theory. For example, the UN Interagency Statement on 
FGM/C states the following: “Where female genital mutilation is widely 
practised, it is supported by both men and women, usually without question, 
and anyone departing from the norm may face condemnation, harassment, and 
ostracism. As such, female genital mutilation is a social convention governed by 
rewards and punishments, which are a powerful force for continuing the 
practice. In view of this conventional nature of female genital mutilation, it is 
difficult for families to abandon the practice without support from the wider 
community.” 230  The UN Secretary-General’s report to the United Nations 
General Assembly on the girl child also highlighted the social norms 
perspective in the discussion of FGM/C: “It is now widely acknowledged that it 
[FGM/C] functions as a self-enforcing social convention or social norm. In 
societies where it is practiced it is a socially upheld behavioural rule. Families 
and individuals uphold the practice because they believe that their group or 
society expects them to do so. Abandonment of the practice requires a process 
of social change that results in new expectations on families.”231  
However, the social convention theory of Mackie was recently seriously 
criticized. Several scholars argued that there is a lack of empirical research 
providing evidence that a public declaration reduces the practice of FGM/C.232 
More specifically, in a recently published article in Science, they argue that, 
given the considerable development funds at stake, “no one has provided data 
clearly showing that female genital cutting exhibits the characteristics of a social 
norm based on coordination.” By conducting an empirical study in Sudan, these 
scholars did not find any evidence for the social convention theory.  
 
11 CONCLUSION 
 
FGM/C is a very complex and multifaceted practice. The reasons and 
justifications for the (continuation of the) practice are numerous, intertwined 
and related to each other. Frazer noted: “In reality, no two places engage in 
FGC for the exact same reasons, at the same age, or even perform the exact 
same procedure.”233 The practice of FGM/C differs from country to country and 
even within countries among different ethnic groups, depending on local 
traditions and circumstanes. Taking into account the age at which FGM/C 
                                                        
229 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 15.  
230 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 5.  
231 United Nations General Assembly, The Girl Child: Report of the Secretary-General, A/64/315, 21 
August 2009, p. 17, para. 68.  
232 C. Efferson et al., Female Genital Cutting is not a Social Coorination Norm, Science, Volume 349, 
No. 6255, September 2015, p. 1447.  
233  J.E. Frazer, Topical Review Digest: Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 6, available at 
http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/africa/HRinSubSaharanAfrica.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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occurs, the conditions under which FGM/C is practiced, the health 
consequences and risks associated with the practice, as well as the justifications 
of the practice as described in this chapter, the international community framed 
the practice of FGM/C as a human rights violation. The next chapter will 
explain which human rights are at stake in relation to the practice of FGM/C, 
and describes the efforts of the international community (UN) and African 
Union (AU) to eliminate the practice. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION/CUTTING: 
A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Any harmful aspect of certain traditional, customary or modern practices that violates 
the rights of women should be prohibited and eliminated. Governments should take 
urgent action to combat and eliminate all forms of violence against women in private 
and public life, whether perpetrated or tolerated by the State or private persons.” 
 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 19951 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter showed that – although FGM/C is a practice that is 
approximately 5000 years old – it was only in the second half of the 20th century 
that the practice of FGM/C became known in the Western world.2 European 
travellers and missionaries documented the practice and evidence for the 
existence of FGM/C was provided by small clinical studies. The earliest UN 
initiatives to place FGM/C on the international agenda also date back from the 
1950s3 when African activists and medical practitioners brought (the harmful 
health consequences of) FGM/C to the attention of the UN and the WHO.4 
Initially, the UN was reluctant to take action in the field of FGM/C and placed 
the practice outside the scope of international human rights law. However, this 
changed in the 1990s with the global movement against VAW. The international 
community considered FGM/C a form of VAW, falling within the human 
rights framework, and classified the practice as a violation of various human 
rights. In this chapter, a legal analysis will be conducted and the human rights 
that are being violated with the practice of FGM/C will be addressed, as well as 
the obligations and recommendations for States that follow from the human 
rights framework.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The research question (section 2) 
and methodology applied for this legal analysis is laid out in section 3. Section 4 
                                                        
1 United Nations, Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on 
Women, 27 October 1995, para. 224. 
2 See Chapter III, section 4 and 5 of this research.  
3 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 23, Harmful 
Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, August 1995, No. 23, p. 2, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/479477410.html [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
4 F.A. Althaus, Female Circumcision: Rite of Passage Or Violation of Rights?, International Family 
Planning Perspectives, Volume 23, No. 3, September 1997, p. 1. 
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will further describe how the classification of FGM/C as a human rights 
violation evolved over time. A short analysis of the universalism-cultural 
relativism debate is provided in section 5. A legal analysis of the human rights 
violated by FGM/C can be found in section 6, as well as a short overview of the 
human rights that can be invoked in favour of the practice. An analysis of the 
obligations and recommendations for States prescribed by the human rights 
framework in relation to the practice of FGM/C are provided in section 7. 
Concluding observations are spelled out in section 8.  
 
2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The two research questions that will be addressed in this chapter are the 
following: “Which human rights are being violated with the practice of Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting?” and “What are the duties of States (and non-State actors) 
concerning Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting prescribed by the human rights 
framework?”  
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to provide an answer to these two research questions, a legal analysis 
was conducted. Since the international community considers the practice of 
FGM/C a form of VAW and a harmful practice,5 all human rights instruments 
and documents focussing on VAW and harmful practices were consulted 
during the analysis, as well as instruments and documents specifically 
focussing on practice of FGM/C. The publication Female Genital Mutilation: A 
Guide to Laws and Policies Worldwide of Rahman and Toubia was a very useful 
starting point during the search for relevant instruments and documents. As 
explained in the introduction of this thesis, the ‘human rights framework’ 
consists not only of international human rights laws strictu sensu, but must be 
                                                        
5 Harmful practices are defined as: “persistent practices and forms of behaviour that are grounded 
in discrimination on the basis of, among other things, sex, gender and age, in addition to multiple 
and/or intersecting forms of discrimination that often involve violence and cause physical and/or 
psychological harm or suffering.” Harmful practices specifically addressed in the Joint general 
recommendation are: FGM/C, child and/or forced marriage, polygamy, and crimes committed in 
the name of so-called honour. In addition, other practices that the CEDAW and CRC Committee 
consider harmful are the following: “neglect of girls (linked to the preferential care and treatment of 
boys), extreme dietary restrictions (forced feeding, food taboos, including during pregnancy), 
virginity testing and related practices, binding, scarring, branding/tribal marks, corporal 
punishment, stoning, violent initiation rites, widowhood practices, witchcraft, infanticide and incest. 
Harmful practices also include body modifications that are performed for the purpose of beauty or 
marriageability of girls and women (such as fattening, isolation, the use of lip discs and neck 
elongation with neck rings) or in an attempt to protect girls from early pregnancy or from being 
subjected to sexual harassment and violence (such as breast ironing/“repassage”). In addition, 
many women and children throughout the world increasingly undergo medical treatment and/or 
plastic surgery to comply with social norms of the body and not for medical or health reasons and 
many are also pressured to be fashionably thin which has resulted in an epidemic of eating and 
health disorders.” United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
and the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint general Recommendation No. 31 of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women/General Comment No. 18 of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, 14 
November 2014, para. 9, 15, and 19-30.  
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understood broadly and includes also soft law documents (i.e. non-binding 
declarations, resolutions, general recommendations, general comments, 
consensus documents, guidelines, statements of intent, memoranda of 
understanding, principles).6  
Senegal has been chosen as a case study in this research. Therefore, the legal 
analysis focused on the human rights documents and instruments of the UN 
and the AU.7 Since Senegal is one of the Member Countries8 of Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 9  the documents and 
instruments of ECOWAS were looked at as well. However, ECOWAS did not 
adopt any instruments or documents that have direct relevance in relation to 
the practice of FGM/C.10 ECOWAS refers to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights instead.11 UN treaties were found at the United Nations Treaty 
Collection12 and other UN documents via Refworld13 and the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).14 Documents of the AU were 
found at the website of the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights.15 In addition, academic literature and reports of CSOs about the human 
rights framework in relation to FGM/C were also consulted.  
 Search terms used to find the human rights documents and instruments 
needed were not only ‘female genital mutilation/cutting’ or ‘FGM/C’ – the 
terms used in this thesis – but also ‘female genital mutilation’, ‘FGM’, ‘female 
genital cutting’, ‘FGC’, ‘female circumcision’, ‘FC’, ‘circumcision’, ‘female 
genital surgery’, ‘FGS’, ‘female genital operations’, ‘genital operations’, ‘female 
sexual mutilation’, ‘sexual mutilation’, ‘mutilation’, ‘harmful practice’, 
‘harmful’, ‘practice’, ‘customary practice’, ‘custom’, ‘traditional practice’, 
‘traditional custom’, ‘cultural practice’, ‘social practice’, ‘tradition’, ‘traditional’ 
                                                        
6 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 210-229. 
7 In addition, human rights documents and instruments adopted by the Council of Europe, 
European Union and Organization of American States (including the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and the American Convention on Human Rights) were excluded from the analysis, since 
they are not applicable in Senegal.  
8 The other member countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’ Ivoire, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo. 
9 The aims of ECOWAS are to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of 
an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to 
maintain and enhance economic stability, see Economic Community of West African States, Revised 
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, 24 July 1993, Article 3(1). 
10 ECOWAS refer in their Fundamental Principles to the “recognition, promotion and protection of 
human and peoples’ rights” and ECOWAS has also established the ECOWAS Gender Development 
Centre, see Economic Community of West African States Gender Development Centre, Priority 
Areas, available at http://dummy.ccdg.ecowas.int/what-we-do/priority-areas/ [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015]. 
11 Economic Community of West African States, Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West 
African States, 24 July 1993, Article 4(g). 
12 United Nations Treaty Collection, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015].  
13 Refworld, available at http://www.refworld.org/ [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
14 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
15 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, available at 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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and ‘culture’. Although all human rights instruments and documents of the UN 
and AU generally focusing on VAW and harmful practices were consulted, 
only those human rights instruments and documents that specifically focused 
on FGM/C and instruments and documents that have direct relevance in 
relation to the practice of FGM/C were included in the analysis. 
The overall aim of the legal analysis was in the first place to describe which 
rights are being violated and in the second place to provide an overview of the 
obligations and recommendations for States in relation to the elimination of 
FGM/C. The aim of this legal analysis was not to assess whether the human 
rights framework in general or a specific human rights instrument or document 
has a good or a bad approach, or whether the rationale of specific provisions in 
human rights instruments and documents is efficient in order to achieve the 
elimination of FGM/C. Instead, the human rights framework as developed by 
the UN and AU will be taken as it is when answering the ‘compliance question’. 
This human rights framework will be described and analyzed, without making 
a substantive normative judgment about the framework itself.  
 
4 CLASSIFICATION OF FGM/C AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION 
 
4.1 Attention for FGM/C in the 1950s 
 
Several intergovernmental bodies of the UN started to carefully address 
harmful traditional practices in the early 1950s. 16  For example, the UN 
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) began to focus on FGM/C as part 
of an attempt to “confront the problem of customs, ancient laws and rituals that 
harm women's health and well-being and trample on their rights.”17 In 1952, 
acting on the recommendations of CSW, the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) requested Member States to “take immediately all necessary 
measures with a view to abolish progressively […] all customs that violate the 
physical integrity of women and which thereby violate the dignity and worth of 
the human person as proclaimed in the Charter and in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”18 The response of UN Member States was mixed. 
Some Member States emphasized that FGM/C is detrimental to women's and 
girl’s health and well-being and should therefore be abolished. They argued 
that education would gradually change these deeply rooted customs.19 Other 
UN Member States argued that abolishing traditional practices like FGM/C 
was in violation with the Principles of Article 2 of the UN Charter,20 which 
forbids interference in the domestic affairs of Member States.21  
                                                        
16 United Nations General Assembly, Traditional or Customary Practices Affecting the Health of Women: 
Report of the Secretary-General, A/53/354, 10 September 1998, p. 2.  
17 United Nation Children’s Fund, To the Symposium on Female Genital Mutilation in Berlin, 8 March 
2003, available at http://www.unicef.org/french/media/media_9297.html [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].   
18 Economic and Social Council, Resolution E/RES/445 C (XIV), 28 May 1952. 
19 P.D. Jain, Women, Development, and the UN: A Sixty-Year Quest for Equality and Justice, United 
Nations Intellectual History Project Series, Indiana University Press, 2005, p. 29. 
20 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter reads as follows: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
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In 1958, ECOSOC requested the WHO to undertake an inquiry on the 
persistence of customs subjecting girls to “ritual operations” and of the 
measures adopted or planned to stop such practices.22 However, the WHO 
turned down the request and refused to study the issue of FGM/C, claiming 
that this practice felt “outside the competence” of the WHO since the practice is 
based on social and cultural backgrounds, rather than medical.23 The WHO 
continued to uphold this stance until the late 1970s.  
 
4.2 African Activism in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
As a consequence, FGM/C was not focus of international attention between the 
1950s and 1960s. International organizations concluded that the practice of 
FGM/C “formed a part of African customs and traditions and that, out of 
respect, they [the international community] should not interfere.”24 Lee explains 
that international organizations “were cautious to address a problem that was a 
local phenomenon and embedded with a high degree of cultural sensitivity.”25  
In the 1960s and 1970s, African activism against FGM/C further developed. 
Women’s organizations led campaigns in many countries, raising awareness 
and educate the people about the harmful effects of FGM/C on the health of 
girls and women. Rahman and Toubia explained: “doctors – mostly in Sudan, 
Somalia and Nigeria – who observed patients suffering from complications of 
FGM/C began to document the procedure and write about its clinical 
complications in medical journals.”26  
 
4.3 Condemnation of FGM/C by the WHO in 1979 
 
The UN GA proclaimed the period from 1976 to 1985 the ‘United Nations 
Decade for Women’.27 During these years, several important seminars and 
international meetings took place, where the silence surrounding FGM/C was 
broken.28 These seminars paved the way towards international recognition that 
the practice of FGM/C contains a human rights violation. In 1976, the Director-
                                                        
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII.” United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, Article 2(7).  
21 M.L. Penn, Overcoming Violence Against Women and Girls: The International Campaign to Eradicate a 
Worldwide Problem, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 4.  
22 World Health Organization, Resolution 680 B II (XXVI) of the Economic and Social Council: Ritual 
Operations, Eighteenth and Twentieth Meetings, EB23.R75, 2 and 3 February 1959, available at 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/87417/1/EB23R75_eng.pdf?ua=1 [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
23 Ibid.   
24 A. Martinez and M.E. Stuart, Out of the Ivory Tower: Feminist Research for Social Change, Canadian 
Scholars’ Press, 2003, p. 125. 
25 K.S. Lee, Female Genital Mutilation: Multiple-Case Studies of Communication Strategies Against a Taboo 
Practice, ProQuest, 2008, p. 35.  
26 A. Rahman and N. Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide to Laws and Policies Worldwide, Zed 
Books, 2000, p. 10. 
27 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 3520 (XXX) on the World Conference of the 
International Women’s Year, A/RES/30/3520, 15 December 1975.  
28 F.A. Althaus, Female Circumcision: Rite of Passage Or Violation of Rights?, International Family 
Planning Perspectives, Volume 23, No. 3, September 1997, p. 130.  
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General of the WHO, Dr. Mahler, addressed the need to “combat taboos, 
superstitions and practices that are detrimental to the health of women and 
children, such as female circumcision and infibulations,”29 although FGM/C 
was till then not an issue against which the WHO actively campaigned.30 This 
changed in 1979 when the Seminar on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health 
of Women and Children was held in Khartoum, Sudan. It was the first 
educational seminar addressing the harmful health consequences of FGM/C in 
an international forum. After the initial reluctance to address the issue of 
FGM/C, the WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean sponsored 
this seminar that devoted a special two-day discussion to the subject of FGM/C. 
Among other speakers, Hosken, an American feminist, presented her Hosken 
Report: Genital and Sexual Mutilation of Females,31 which was the first major 
comprehensive publication on FGM/C in Africa.32 This report was influential in 
persuading the WHO to take action in the field of FGM/C. The Seminar was 
seen as a breakthrough for the campaign against FGM/C, as the “WHO gave its 
name and credibility to NGOs and campaigners working directly in the field.”33 
The seminar was significant because it was the first time a formal policy 
statement in relation to FGM/C was made. The WHO condemned the practice 
of FGM/C in all its forms and recommended a total eradication of the practice, 
including when it is performed under appropriate medical or hygienic 
conditions.34 Moreover, representatives from countries where FGM/C exists 
formulated recommendations for governments on measures to be taken to 
eliminate the practice.35 It was recommended to establish national commissions 
for the coordination of activities and intensification of general education in 
relation to FGM/C.36 This Seminar is referred to as a “historical triumph of 
women’s advocates”37 and a “milestone for international mobilization against 
FGM.”38 
Another major step was the Second Regional Conference on the Integration 
of Women in Development in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1979. During this conference, 
it was recognized that although traditional practices constitute an important 
                                                        
29 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Female Circumcision in Africa, 
ST/ECA/ATRCW/81/02, 1981, available at 
http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/10048/bib-50678.pdf?sequence=1. 
 [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
30 Ibid, p. 43.  
31 F. Hosken, The Hosken Report: Genital and Sexual Mutilation of Females, Women’s International 
Network News, Lexington, MA, 1994. 
32 See also Chapter III, section 5.1 of this research.  
33 E. Dorkenoo, Combating Female Genital Mutilation: An Agenda for the Next Decade, World 
Health Statistics Quarterly, Volume 49, No. 2, 1996, p. 142.  
34 United Nation Children’s Fund, Changing a Harmful Social Convention: Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2005, p. 16 and World Health Organization, 
Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, WHO/EMRO Technical Publication 
No. 2, Report of a Seminar, Khartoum, 10-15 February 1979, p. 51-52. 
35 Ibid, p. 4.  
36 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices 
Affecting the Health of Women and Children, Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1986/42, 4 
February 1986, para. 80.  
37 A. Rahman and N. Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide to Laws and Policies Worldwide, Zed 
Books, 2000, p. 10. 
38 Ibid.  
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element of African culture, “sexual mutilations” have adverse effects on the 
health of young girls and women and recognized that “health is a fundamental 
human right of every human being.” 39  The conference condemned 
“infibulations and other female sexual mutilations” 40  and called upon 
governments to assist African CSOs to find “solutions to this particular 
problem.”41  
After these two important conferences, international attention for FGM/C 
grew, also because the practice became widely publicized in the Western 
world. 42  Brennan explained: “The revelation that girls have their genitals 
excised as part of an ancient cultural practice shocked and angered many in the 
West who learned about this practice for the first time. This angry reaction 
resulted in international efforts to eradicate female circumcision.”43 Heat-up 
debates about the practice of FGM/C emerged in the early 1980s. Western 
feminists and human rights activists condemned the practice as fostering a 
submissive role of women and criticized the UN for failing to address the issue 
and to take a stance against it.44 They argued that FGM/C is a form of gender-
based violence that could no longer be justified in the name of culture, religion 
or tradition. However, these feminists and human rights activists provoked 
negative reactions among practicing communities. Some African women, while 
trying to eliminate FGM/C in their own way, perceived their efforts as 
condescending and derogatory toward their culture and criticized feminists for 
their writings on the topic.45  
 
4.4 UN World Conferences on Women  
 
Between 1975 and 1985, three UN sponsored World Conferences on Women 
took place. The first World Conference of the International Women's Year took 
place in Mexico City (1975). This conference resulted in the drafting of the 
CEDAW, which was adopted in 1979 by the UN GA and entered into force in 
1981. It was the first international legal instrument to stipulate what constitutes 
discrimination against women. The World Conference of the United Nations 
Decade for Women in Copenhagen (1980) and the World Conference to Review 
and Appraise the Achievements of the UN Decade for Women in Nairobi (1985) 
were both significant milestones in promoting the human right’s perspective on 
                                                        
39 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Report of the Second Regional Conference on the 
Interpretation of Women in Development, Lusaka (Zambia), E/CN.14/744, 3-7 December 1979, p. 26, 
available at http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/10591/Bib-
51371.pdf?sequence=1 [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
40 Ibid.  
41 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices 
Affecting the Health of Women and Children, Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1986/42, 4 
February 1986, para. 103. 
42 M.L. Penn, Overcoming Violence Against Women and Girls: The International Campaign to Eradicate a 
Worldwide Problem, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 4.  
43 K. Brennan, The influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human Rights Law: Female 
Circumcision as a Case Study, Law & Inequality, Volume 7, 1989, p. 376.  
44 R. Howard, Human Rights and Development in Africa: Women's Rights in English-Speaking Sub-
Saharan Africa, Rowman and LittleField, 1986, p. 202. 
45 D.M. Westley, Female Circumcision and Infibulation in Africa, Electronic Journal of Africana 
Bibliography, Volume 4, 1999, p. 2.  
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VAW and strengthened the CSOs that were moving to the forefront in the effort 
to promote the advancement of women.46 During these three conferences, 
FGM/C became an issue for discussion.47  
 
4.5 UN Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the 
Protection of Minorities 
 
In 1981, a London-based human rights organization urged the UN to consider 
the practice of FGM/C after documenting the harmful physical and 
psychological health consequences in a report.48 During the seventh session of 
the Working Group on Slavery of the UN Sub-Commission for the Prevention 
of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, the representative of human 
rights organization recommended that the information in the report should be 
brought to the attention of international organizations for their information “so 
that they might take it into account in their programmes relating to such 
practices.”49 The representative was a woman from Ghana who argued that 
FGM/C was a violation of human rights50 and should be eliminated, but at the 
same time she emphasized to pay due consideration to the sensitivity of the 
topic. She asserted that elimination of the practice should be done gradually 
“because of the sensitivity of the issue and its roots in traditional culture.”51 She 
called upon the UN Sub-Commission to establish a special Working Group to 
consider FGM/C and other harmful practices. The Working Group on Slavery 
responded to that call and recommended in 1982 that a study on all aspects of 
the problem of “female sexual mutilation” should be undertaken with a view to 
examining all aspects of the problem, including “the current extent and causes 
of the problem and how it might best be remedied.”52 In 1983, the Sub-
Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of 
Minorities recommended to establish a working group to carry out a study on 
FGM/C, which was endorsed by the Commission on Human Rights and the 
Economic and Social Council.53  
 
                                                        
46 M.L. Penn, Overcoming Violence Against Women and Girls: The International Campaign to Eradicate a 
Worldwide Problem, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 6.  
47 K. Brennan, The Influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human Rights Law: Female 
Circumcision as a Case Study, Law and Inequality, Volume 7, 1989, p. 378. 
48 McLean, S., et al, Female Circumcision, Excision and Infibulation: The Facts and Proposals for Change, 
Minority Rights Group, 1985. 
49 B.G. Ramcharan, The Principle of Legality in International Human Rights Institutions: Selected Legal 
Opinions, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 183.  
50 K. Brennan, The Influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human Rights Law: Female 
Circumcision as a Case Study, Law and Inequality, Volume 7, 1989, p. 380.  
51 Report of the Working Group on Slavery on its Seventh Session, E/CN.4/Sub.2/486, 1981, para. 
17. 
52 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the UN Sub-Commission for the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/43, 1982, p. 88 and Annex III.  
53 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1983/1, 31 August 1983. 
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4.6 Working Group on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women 
and Children  
 
As a follow-up from the recommendation of the Working Group on Slavery of 
the UN Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the 
Protection of Minorities, the Working Group on Traditional Practices Affecting 
the Health of Women and Children was established in 1984 to investigate and 
report on FGM/C and other traditional practices (although FGM/C was the 
main focus). The Sub-Commission nominated Warzazi and Mudawi to serve as 
experts in the Working Group to carry out the study. 54  The report was 
completed and presented during the 42nd session of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights in 1986.55 The report evaluated FGM/C within its own cultural 
context.56 The Working Group explored various aspects of FGM/C; including 
the definition of FGM/C, forms of FGM/C, the age at which FGM/C is carried 
out, origins and scope, reasons for the practice, practitioners, effects on physical 
and mental health, evolution of the problem, practicing countries and action 
taken at the regional, national and international level. The Working Group was 
reticent on the question whether FGM/C constitutes a violation of human 
rights. The report described in detail the physical and psychological 
consequences of FGM/C. According to the Working Group, FGM/C has 
serious mental and physical consequences for girls and women, “the gravity of 
which increases with the degree of mutilation.”57 The Working Group also 
noted that traditional practices are “at variance” with new standards defined by 
various international instruments relating to human rights.58 Furthermore, the 
Working Group concluded that there is unavoidable “incompatibility” between 
human rights instruments and traditional practices: 
 
“In the light of these principles which today have the force of law, all countries 
which have ratified the International Covenants on Human Rights and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and 
which have morally endorsed the principles enunciated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
the Child are currently confronted with the incompatibility which exists between 
these principles and the obligations they assume as States parties to the above-
mentioned instruments, and the maintenance of certain traditional practices, 
especially since these practices have proved prejudicial to the physical and mental 
health of women and children.”59 
 
                                                        
54 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1984/48, 13 March 1984; United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1984/34, 24 May 1984; United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, Decision 1984/104, 10 February 1984. 
55 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the UN Sub-Commission for the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/43, 1982. 
56 K. Brennan, The Influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human Rights Law: Female 
Circumcision as a Case Study, Law and Inequality, Volume 7, 1989, p. 395. 
57 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices 
Affecting the Health of Women and Children, Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1986/42, 4 
February 1986, para. 114.  
58 Ibid, para. 117. 
59 Ibid, para. 118.  
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The Working Group used evasive language in its report and did not specify 
which human rights would be “incompatible” with the practice. According to 
Brennan, the Working Group “engaged in a balancing process which weighed 
the cultural function of female circumcision against the harmful 
consequences.”60  
A couple of years later, the Sub-Commission adopted Resolution 1988/34 in 
which they determined that harmful traditional practices “violate the rights of 
women and children.”61 In the same year, Warzazi was appointed as Special 
Rapporteur on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and 
Children.62  
 
4.7 Establishment Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices  
 
In 1984, the Working Group on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of 
Women and Children organized a seminar in Dakar, Senegal, on traditional 
practices. During this seminar, the FGM/C was condemned as a “health hazard” 
and as “unnecessary human suffering” that should be eliminated.63 During this 
seminar, the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the 
Health of Women and Children (IAC) was created. With the support of UNFPA, 
UNICEF, WHO and the Ministry of Health of Senegal, follow-up was given on 
the implementation of the recommendations made at the seminar for the 
prevention and elimination of the practice. In 1985, IAC set up an office in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Its objectives are to (i) prevent and eliminate traditional 
practices that are harmful to or impede the health, human development and 
rights of women and girls and advocate for care for those who suffer the health 
consequences of harmful practices; and (ii) promote and support those 
traditional practices that improve and contribute to the health, human 
development and rights of women and children.64 The IAC was mandated to (i) 
create national committees capable of handling FGM/C in collaboration with 
governmental bodies; (ii) encourage action-oriented research; (iii) support 
income-generating activities; (iv) organize workshops and seminars; and to (v) 
raise funds.65 Since its establishment in 1985, the IAC has been working on 
policy programmes and actions to eliminate FGM/C and other harmful 
practices in the African region. The Committee has established national 
                                                        
60 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices 
Affecting the Health of Women and Children, Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1986/42, 4 
February 1986, p. 389.  
61 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1988/34, 1 September 1988, preamble.  
62 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1988/57, 9 March 1988. 
63 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices 
Affecting the Health of Women and Children, Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1986/42, 4 
February 1986, para. 87.  
64 For more information, see the website of the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices 
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65 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices 
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committees in 30 countries66 and have made African governments aware of the 
harmful effects of FGM/C and other harmful practices affecting the health of 
women and children.67 According to UNICEF, the IAC has played a major role 
at the international level “in ensuring that the practice is raised at international 
conferences and addressed by legal instruments relating to girls and women.”68  
 
4.8 General Recommendation No. 14 on Female Circumcision   
 
In 1990, at its ninth session, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAWCee) addressed the issue of FGM/C and other 
practices harmful to the health of women. During this session, the CEDAWCee 
issued General Recommendation (GR) No. 14 on “Female Circumcision.” The 
CEDAWCee noted with satisfaction that governments, national women’s 
organizations, CSOs and bodies of the UN system “remain seized of the issue 
having particularly recognized that such traditional practices as female 
circumcision have serious health and other consequences for women and 
children.” The CEDAWCee referred to cultural, traditional and economic 
pressures as contributing toward the continuation of harmful practices. The 
CEDAWCee did not explicitly classify FGM/C as a human rights violation, but 
the Committee expressed its concern about the continuation of FGM/C and 
other traditional practices, which are “harmful to the health of women.” GR No. 
14 included detailed recommendations for States Parties to take further action 
with a view to eradicating the practice.69  
 
4.9 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action  
 
The issue of harmful practices was again addressed during the World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. The concluding document, the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action does not make specific mention 
of the practice of FGM/C, but focused on the broad category “traditional or 
customary practices.”70 The World Conference on Human Rights stressed the 
importance of “working towards the elimination of violence against women in 
public and private life”71 and the eradication of any conflicts that may arise 
between the rights of women and the harmful effects of traditional practices.72 
The document proclaimed gender-based violence a human rights issue, by 
stating that “gender-based violence and all forms of sexual harassment and 
                                                        
66 See the website of the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of 
Women and Children, available at http://www.iac-
ciaf.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24&Itemid=12 [Last Accessed 1 October 
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67 F.A. Althaus, Female Circumcision: Rite of Passage Or Violation of Rights?, International Family 
Planning Perspectives, Volume 23, No. 3, September 1997, p. 1.  
68 United Nations Children’s Fund, Changing a Harmful Social Convention: Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2005, p. 16. 
69 These recommendations will be discussed in detail in section 7 of this chapter.  
70 United Nations General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23, 
12 July 1993, para. 38 and 49. 
71 Ibid, para. 38.  
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exploitation, including those resulting from cultural prejudice and international 
trafficking, are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person, 
and must be eliminated.”73 The Vienna Conference thus expanded the human 
rights agenda to include gender-based violence, but only implicitly stated that 
traditional or customary practices are considered gender-based violence and 
consequently a human rights violation.  
 
4.10 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women  
 
Half a year after the Vienna Conference, the UN GA adopted the UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW). 74 
Although not legally binding, it provides a set of international standards to 
address the problem of VAW. This declaration became the first (and to-date it 
remains the only) international human rights instrument explicitly addressing 
VAW. The GA stressed its concern that VAW is an “obstacle to the achievement 
of equality, development and peace.” 75   The Preamble to the Declaration 
recognizes that VAW is a manifestation of “historically unequal power relations 
between men and women, which have led to domination over and 
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full 
advancement of women.”  
 Unlike the Working Group on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of 
Women and Children and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
that used implicit language by explaining that “traditional practices” are 
“incompatible” with human rights standards, the DEVAW explicitly addressed 
“female genital mutilation” and stated that the practice is a form of VAW and 
that VAW constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of 
women.76  
 
Article 1 of DEVAW provides a definition of the term VAW:  
 
“For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means 
any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, 
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, 
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in 
private life.”  
 
In Article 2(a) of the DEVAW, FGM/C is explicitly identified as a form of VAW:  
 
“Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, 
the following: (a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the 
family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, 
dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other 
traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related 
to exploitation.”  
                                                        
73 United Nations General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23, 
12 July 1993, para. 18.  
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It is remarkable that, for the first time, new language is used to refer to the 
practice. While the term “female circumcision” was used in GR 14, the DEVAW 
adopted the term “female genital mutilation”, specifically condemning the 
practice. Although the DEVAW is not legally binding, the inclusion of FGM/C 
as a form of VAW aligned the international campaign against FGM/C with the 
global movement against VAW. Apart from defining VAW, the DEVAW also 
codified steps that States, UN agencies and UN organs should take to address 
VAW.77  
 
4.11 General Recommendation No. 19 on Violence Against Women 
 
Although adopted a year earlier than the DEVAW, GR No. 19 on VAW78 of the 
CEDAWCee became applicable to the practice of FGM/C only after the 
adoption of the DEVAW, since FGM/C was only then formally identified as a 
form of VAW. GR No. 19 explicitly states that gender-based violence79 is a form 
of gender discrimination (within the meaning of Article 1 CEDAW) that impairs 
or nullifies women’s enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
under international law.80 Furthermore, a definition of gender-based violence is 
provided in GR No. 19 and reads as follows: “violence that is directed against a 
woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.”81 
Gender-based violence includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm 
or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.82 
The human rights that are being violated with gender-based violence are listed 
in GR No. 19, which are the following: (a) the right to life; (b) the right not to be 
subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
(c) the right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of 
international or internal armed conflict; (d) the right to liberty and security of 
person; (e) the right to equal protection under the law; (f) the right to equality in 
the family; (g) the right to the highest standard attainable of physical and 
mental health; and (h) the right to just and favourable conditions of work.83 The 
CEDAWCee explicitly states that gender-based violence may breach specific 
provisions of the convention, “regardless of whether those provisions expressly 
mention violence.”84 
 
                                                        
77 These recommendations will be discussed in detail in section 7 of this chapter.  
78 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, 1992. 
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80 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 
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4.12 Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and 
Development 
 
In 1994, the UN organized the International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) that was held in Cairo. The main objective of the ICPD 
was to emphasize the direct links between reproductive health and human 
rights.85 The concluding document, the Programme of Action on Population 
and Development86 recognized that VAW is a widespread phenomenon. More 
specifically, the Programme of Action acknowledged that in a number of 
countries, “harmful practices meant to control women's sexuality have led to 
great suffering.”87 Unlike the concluding documents of the Vienna Conference, 
in the Cairo Programme of Action “female genital mutilation” is specifically 
mentioned. The practice was considered a “violation of basic human rights and 
a major lifelong risk to women’s health.”88 In addition, governments and 
communities are advised to “urgently take steps”89 in order to stop the practice 
and to prohibit it “wherever it exists.”90 Governments should protect women 
and girls from “all such similar unnecessary and dangerous practices.” 91 
Specific recommendations were made in relation to the steps to be taken in 
relation to the elimination of FGM/C.92  
 
4.13 Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action 
 
During the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, the 
human rights implications of “female genital mutilation” were again addressed. 
The Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action stated that the practice had 
harmful effects and pose “grave health risks”93 on girls. Consistent with the 
DEVAW, the definition of VAW as set out in Article 1 of the DEVAW was 
restated during the Beijing Conference. FGM/C was again categorized as a 
form of VAW.94 The Beijing Declaration reiterated that VAW “both violates and 
impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”95 In addition, the Beijing Declaration stated: “Any 
harmful aspect of certain traditional, customary or modern practices that 
violates the rights of women should be prohibited and eliminated.”96 States 
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were urged to take action to combat and eliminate all forms of VAW.97 The 
Beijing Declaration recommended governments to “prohibit female genital 
mutilation wherever it exists and give vigorous support to efforts among non-
governmental and community organizations and religious institutions to 
eliminate such practices.”98 In addition, one of the strategic objectives of the 
Platform for Action was to eliminate negative cultural attitudes and practices 
against girls.99 The Beijing Declaration also called upon governments to take 
action against FGM/C and made specific recommendations in relation to the 
actions to be taken in relation to the elimination of FGM/C.100  
 
4.14 Joint Statement WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA   
 
In 1997, the WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA issued a Joint Statement on “Female 
Genital Mutilation.”101 The Statement started off by stating that FGM/C is a 
deeply rooted practice that has severe health consequences for girls and 
women.102 In addition, they explain that their arguments against FGM/C “are 
based on universally recognized human rights, including the rights to integrity 
of the person and the highest attainable level of physical and mental health.”103 
The agencies argue that FGM/C is “universally unacceptable” because it is an 
infringement on the physical and psychosexual integrity of women and girls.104 
The Statement describes the implications of FGM/C on public health and 
declared support for the elimination of the practice.  
In 2008, a new Joint Statement on “Female Genital Mutilation”105 was issued, 
this time written and signed by ten UN agencies instead of three. Based on new 
evidence and lessons learned, this Interagency Statement highlights the “wide 
recognition of the human rights and legal dimensions of the problem.”106 The 
document stresses the common commitment of these agencies to continue 
working towards the elimination of FGM/C. The Interagency Statement clearly 
clarified that FGM/C is a dangerous practice and a “critical human rights 
issue.”107 The Statement identified that the following human rights are being 
violated by FGM/C: (i) the right to be free from gender-discrimination; (ii) the 
right to life; (iii) the right to the highest attainable standard of health; (iv) the 
right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment; and (v) the rights of the child.108  
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5 UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The practice of FGM/C stands at the crossroads of two schools of thought as 
regards the applicability and interpretation of human rights: universalism and 
cultural relativism. There are strong proponents of both doctrines in relation to 
cultural practices in general and FGM/C in particular.  
As the previous section showed, the WHO was reluctant and refused to take 
action in the field of FGM/C in the 1950s. The WHO invoked “culture” as a 
justification for non-involvement in the practice. 109  The WHO and other 
international organizations gradually changed their approach in the following 
decennia, mainly due to increased knowledge of the (health consequences of 
the) practice. International organizations moved from claiming that the practice 
“incompatible” with human rights standards, to a classification of FGM/C as a 
form of gender-based violence and an act of VAW. As Jain explains: “First, 
“customs” were viewed as barbaric, then “barbaric” became “violence against 
women,” and finally “violence against women” became “rights violations.””110  
International organizations struggled with the fact that the practice of 
FGM/C was representing an ethical dilemma: Who, if anyone, has the moral 
authority to condemn FGM/C? 111  Is it appropriate for international 
organizations to criticize a longstanding cultural tradition that conflicts with its 
established human rights norms?112  
As the previous section showed, the UN took in the 1990s a clear 
universalistic stance in relation to FGM/C. They condemned FGM/C, 
considered the practice unacceptable, and classified the practice as a human 
rights violation under international law. However, a highly debated issue is the 
role that international human rights law should play in addressing a practice 
that is strongly anchored in cultural beliefs and norms.113 Some critics argue that 
FGM/C should not be considered a clear-cut violation of basic human rights, 
but should be regarded as an expression of one people’s culture and identity in 
which the international community should not interfere.  
 
5.1 Human rights a Western concept? 
 
Ever since the adoption of the UDHR, cultural relativists expressed hesitation 
by fully adopting a UN human rights system and challenged the universal 
                                                        
109 N. Berkovitch and K. Bradley, The Globalization of Women’s Status: Consensus/Dissensus in the 
World Polity, Sociological Perspectives, Volume 42, No. 3, 1999, p. 491.  
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Nations Intellectual History Project Series, Indiana University Press, 2005, p. 28.   
111 B. Shell-Duncan and Y. Hernlund, Female "Circumcision" in Africa: Culture, Controversy and 
Change, Lynne Rienner, 2000, p. 25; R.M. Abusharaf, Revisiting Feminist Discourses on Infibulation: 
Responses from Sudanese Feminists, in: B. Shell-Duncan and Y. Hernlund, Female "Circumcision" in 
Africa: Culture, Controversy and Change, Lynne Rienner, 2000, p. 155. 
112 K. Brennan, The influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human Rights Law: Female 
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validity of human rights norms.114 According to Brennan, cultural relativism is 
the theory that “there is infinite cultural diversity and that all cultural practices 
are equally valid.”115 The critique of cultural relativists is that the concept of 
human rights is a Western philosophy and ideology. Cultural relativists assert 
that the human rights doctrine is firmly rooted in Western political liberalism 
and individualism116 and their concern is that Western values or norms are 
imposed on other societies, particularly in third world countries, which they 
refer to as “cultural imperialism” or “Western moral imperialism.”117 No culture 
is, according to relativists, superior to another and therefore one needs to have 
respect for other traditions and practices that are not the “majority” culture’s 
traditions. In other words: universal rights do simply not exist, due to the wide 
variety of cultures and ethnic groups in the world. Cultural relativists urge the 
“need for tolerance and respect of all cultures”118 and argue that cultural 
behaviour should be judged only through cultural specific, rather than 
universal norms and values.119 They argue that there is no universal standard, 
since cultures vary in what they accept and/or prohibit. The meaning of human 
rights depends, according to relativists, upon the specific cultural context.120 
Cultural relativists assert that FGM/C has a legitimate function indigenous to 
the culture. Although FGM/C is “wrong” according to Western standards, it 
may be permissible according to the values of other societies, they argue. 
Therefore, judging the practice of FGM/C according to international human 
right norms is, according to cultural relativists, incorrect. 121  Universalists 
counter this argument by arguing that human rights standards must apply 
across national, cultural and political boundaries in order to have force and 
meaning.122  
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5.2 Universalistic stance of the UN 
 
The UN has taken a strong universalistic stance, which was already evident 
with the adoption of the UDHR. The GA proclaimed the UDHR as “a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”123 Also in relation to 
VAW, the universalistic approach of the UN was already mirrored in early 
human rights instruments, such as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action (1993), the DEVAW (1993), the International Conference on Population 
and Development (1994) and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 
(1995).124 All these conference documents emphasized: “the human rights of 
women and of the girl child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of 
universal human rights.”125 The DEVAW recognized the “urgent need for the 
universal application to women of the rights and principles with regard to 
equality, security, liberty, integrity and dignity of all human beings.”126 More 
specifically, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action claimed that the 
universal nature of human rights is “beyond question”:  
 
“The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the solemn commitment of all 
States to fulfil their obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance 
and protection of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights, 
and international law. The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond 
question.”127 
 
In addition to this statement, the Vienna Declaration further explained that:  
 
“While the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty 
of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote 
and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”128 
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5.3 Cultural relativist stance 
 
5.3.1 The right to culture, minority rights and the right to religious freedom 
Supporters of FGM/C justify the practice on grounds of culture, the rights of 
minorities and the right to religious freedom.129 These rights have also been 
recognized in human rights instruments and documents. 
In the first place, supporters of FGM/C invoke the right to enjoy one’s 
culture or to take part in cultural life. They see efforts to eliminate FGM/C as 
efforts that are threatening their culture. Article 27(1) of the UDHR guarantees 
for example the right to “freely participate in the cultural life of the 
community.”130 Similar provisions can be found in the ICESCR,131 the ACHPR,132 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,133 the UNESCO Declaration 
of the Principles on International Cultural Co-operation,134 and the Declaration 
on Race and Racial Prejudice.135 In the African context, the ACHPR describes in 
Article 29(7) that the individual shall have the duty “to preserve and strengthen 
positive African cultural values.”   
In the second place, supporters of FGM/C invoke minority rights, because 
the communities that practice FGM/C belong in many countries to a minority 
group.136 They can see the decision of the majority to eliminate FGM/C as an 
infringement upon the autonomy of the minority group. Protection for 
minorities can be found for example in the ICCPR, which explains in Article 27: 
“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”137 Similar provisions 
can be found in the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.138 
In the third place, supporters of FGM/C often consider FGM/C a religious 
act. As explained in Chapter III of this thesis, in many countries there is a 
widespread view that FGM/C is a religious duty (although no religious text 
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prescribes the practice). The right to religious freedom is an important human 
right and protected by many human rights instruments and documents. Article 
18(1) of the ICCPR reads for example as follows: “Everyone shall have the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom 
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.” Similar 
provisions can be found in the UDHR,139 the ACHPR140 and the Declaration on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief.141 
 
5.3.2 Conflicting human rights 
The question is how these three rights have to be viewed in light of the 
elimination of FGM/C. It seems that a conflict arises between on the one hand 
the right to be free from gender-discrimination, the right to life, the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health, the right to freedom from torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the rights of the child; and 
on the other hand the right to culture, minority rights and the right to religious 
freedom.  
The human rights framework itself provides guidance on how to deal with 
these conflicting rights. The right to culture, the rights of minorities and the 
right to religious freedom are not absolute and the human rights framework 
recognizes prescribed limitations of these rights. Article 30 of the UDHR claims 
for example that “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying 
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform 
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth 
herein.”142 Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR have a similar general clause in 
Article 5(1). This overall restriction ensures that no one may invoke a right 
recognized in these treaties to infringe upon (other) human rights and 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by international law. 143 For example, in 
relation to the right to religious freedom, the ICCPR provides in Article 18(3) 
that this right may be subject to limitations that are “prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.” Thus, the right to religious freedom is limited 
by State’s duty to protect public health and the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others.  
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Table 4.1 Conflicting human rights 
 
Human rights invoked against FGM/C Human rights invoked in favour of FGM/C 
 
Right to be free from gender-discrimination 
 
Right to culture 
Right to life Minority rights 
Right to health Right to religious freedom 
Right not to be subjected to torture  
Rights of the child  
  
 
5.4 Invoking custom, tradition or religious consideration?  
  
According to Ertürk, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences [hereinafter “Special Rapporteur on VAW”] the 
invocation of cultural relativist arguments by States for ignoring VAW in 
general and FGM/C in particular is one of the “major obstacles” to the 
implementation of women’s rights.144  However, since the 1990s, the UN clearly 
rejected cultural relativist claims that seek to justify or condone VAW. The 
DEVAW made a strong claim against cultural relativism in the context of VAW. 
Under Article 4 of the DEVAW, States are required to refrain from invoking 
“any custom, tradition or religious consideration”145 to avoid their obligations 
with respect to the elimination of VAW. The DEVAW also urged States to adopt 
measures, especially in the field of education, in order to “modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women and to eliminate prejudices, 
customary practices and all other practices based on the idea of the inferiority 
or superiority of either of the sexes and on stereotyped roles for men and 
women.”146 Reference to Article 4 of the DEVAW can be found in many other 
human rights documents, including, amongst others, the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action, 147  UN GA Resolutions, 148  reports of the Special 
Rapporteur on VAW,149 and documents of the CSW.150   
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Women, 27 October 1995, para. 124(a).  
148 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 61/143 on the Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate all 
Forms of Violence Against Women, A/RES/61/143, 30 January 2007, para. 5; United Nations General 
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6 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATED BY FGM/C 
 
The Interagency Statement on the elimination of FGM/C 151  clarified that 
FGM/C is a harmful practice and a “violation of the human rights of girls and 
women.”152 The Statement recognized that FGM/C violates a number of well-
established human rights protected by international and regional human rights 
instruments. More specifically, the Statement refers to the right to be free from 
gender-discrimination (section 6.1); the right to life (section 6.2); the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health (section 6.3); the right to freedom from 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (section 6.4); 
and the rights of the child (section 6.5).153 Below, these five human rights will be 
shortly addressed in order to provide an understanding on why and how these 
human rights can be at stake in relation to the practice of FGM/C and in which 
human rights instruments these rights are enshrined.   
 
6.1 The right to be free from gender discrimination 
 
In the first place, the practice of FGM/C constitutes a form of gender-based 
discrimination and hampers women’s enjoyment of human rights on an equal 
footing with men. According to the Interagency Statement, FGM/C has been 
recognized as a form of discrimination based on sex because “it is rooted in 
gender inequalities and power imbalances between men and women and 
inhibits women’s full and equal enjoyment of their human rights.”154  
 
Article 1 of the CEDAW defines “discrimination against women” as:  
 
“Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field.”  
 
FGM/C fits within this definition and can be seen as a form of gender 
discrimination on the basis of sex. In the first place, the practice is exclusively 
directed towards women and girls. In the second place, it has the effect of 
impairing or nullifying women and girls’ enjoyment of human rights.155 The 
practice of FGM/C carries a fundamental discriminatory belief of the 
subordinate role of women and girls in society. The previous chapter showed 
that arguments justifying the practice are based on perceptions of women as 
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Against Women and State Response, A/HRC/7/6, 29 January 2008, para. 5.  
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inferior, since the intention of FGM/C is to control women’s sexuality and to 
reduce women’s sexual desire.156 The practice reflects deep-rooted inequality 
between men and women. According to Coomaraswamy, Special Rapporteur 
on VAW, FGM/C is a result of “the patriarchal power structures, which 
legitimize the need to control women’s lives.”157 Furthermore, she explains: “it 
arises from the stereotypical perception of women as the principal guardians of 
sexual morality, but with uncontrolled sexual urges.”158 The prohibition of 
gender discrimination is a fundamental principle of human rights law and 
supported in various international and regional human rights instruments (see 
table 4.2 below).  
 
6.2 The right to life  
 
FGM/C can also bring the right to life into bearing in the most extreme cases 
when a girl dies when undergoing the procedure. Uncontrolled and excessive 
bleeding can lead to hemorrhagic shock, neurogenic shock as a result of pain 
and trauma. Infection after the procedure can be severe enough to cause death 
of the girl undergoing FGM/C.159 In addition, FGM/C may also contribute or 
cause maternal mortality160 as well as early neo-natal death, as a consequence of 
a tight infibulations or other FGM/C-related problem. 161  As explained in 
chapter III,162 there is no data available on the mortality rate of women and girls 
undergoing FGM/C.163 Complications of FGM/C resulting in death may not be 
recognized and are rarely reported as such, since they might be attributed to 
other causes (including medical causes, but may also reflect traditional beliefs 
attributed to supernatural causes).164 The right to life is considered a core 
human right and protected by a number of international and regional 
instruments (see table 4.2 below).  
 
6.3 The right to the highest attainable standard of health 
 
FGM/C can also consititute an infringement of the right to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.165  As described in 
chapter III of this thesis, the practice of FGM/C can cause serious adverse 
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164 United Nations Children’s Fund, Changing a Harmful Social Convention: Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2005, p. 16. 
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immediate health consequences (section 8.1), long-term health consequences 
(section 8.2), as well as psychological, social and sexual consequences (section 
8.3). The UN GA reaffirmed in their latest Resolution that “female genital 
mutilations are a harmful practice that constitutes a serious threat to the health 
of women and girls, including their psychological, sexual and reproductive 
health, which can increase their vulnerability to HIV and may have adverse 
obstetric and prenatal outcomes as well as fatal consequences for the mother 
and the newborn.”166 Hunt, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health [hereinafter “Special Rapporteur on the right to health”] stated in 
his report that “Rape and other forms of sexual violence, including […] female 
genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), […] all represent serious breaches of 
sexual and reproductive freedoms, and are fundamentally and inherently 
inconsistent with the right to health.”167 Subjecting a girl or woman to health 
risks, in the absence of medical necessity, is a violation of the right to health.168 
The right to health is protected in various international and regional human 
rights instruments (see table 4.2 below). 
  
6.4 The right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment 
 
The international community considers the practice of FGM/C a form of torture, 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. However, the classification of 
FGM/C as torture is quite complex.169 Article 1(1) of the CAT defines “torture” 
as:  
 
“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions.”  
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The definition of torture consists of three elements: (i) severe pain or suffering; 
(ii) intentional infliction; and (iii) the consent or acquiescence of a public official.  
The first element is the “severity of the pain and suffering.” As stipulated in 
Chapter III, FGM/C can lead to severe immediate and long-term health 
consequences, as well as to severe psychological, social and sexual 
consequences. According to Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment [hereinafter 
“Special Rapporteur on torture”], the pain inflicted by FGM/C “does not stop 
with the initial procedure, but often continues as ongoing torture throughout a 
woman’s life.”170 FGM/C can also lead to death shortly after the practice is 
performed or at the time when the woman is giving birth. However, the 
complications and health consequences depend on the type of FGM/C 
performed, the expertise of the practitioner, the conditions under which it is 
performed, the amount of resistance and the general health condition of the girl 
or woman who undergoes the procedure.171 It could for example be argued that 
the ‘lightest’ form of FGM/C does not amount to ‘severe pain and suffering’ 
and then this first element is not fulfilled.  
The second element is the “intentionally infliction […] for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind.” Contrary to the WHO, the UNHCR included 
the “intention” in their definition of FGM/C and defines the practice as a 
procedure that “intentionally alter or cause injury to the female genital organs 
for non-medical reasons.”172 The question is whether parents and cutters have 
an intention to harm. As explained in the previous chapter, the intent of parents 
is not to harm their child, but they want to do what is best for their daughters.173 
As explained in Chapter III, loving parents subject their daughter to FGM/C in 
order to secure their acceptance in society and to provide them with many 
social and cultural benefits – and they may therefore not recognize the 
(discriminating) implications of FGM/C.174 However, the element of “intent” is 
not subjective, but rather objective, since the Committee against Torture 
(CATCee) emphasized in its General Comment (GC) No. 2 that: “the elements 
of intent and purpose in article 1 do not involve a subjective inquiry into the 
motivations of the perpetrators, but rather must be objective determinations 
under the circumstances.” 175  Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on torture, 
explains: “like torture, female genital mutilation (FGM) involves the deliberate 
                                                        
170 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, A/HRC/7/3, 15 January 2008, para. 51. 
171 See Chapter III, section 8; United Nations Population Fund, A Holistic Approach to the 
Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting, UNFPA, 2007, p. 4, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/726_filename_fgm.pdf [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
172 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Too Much Pain: Female Genital Mutilation & 
Asylum in the European Union - A Statistical Overview, February 2013, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/531880249.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
173 Chapter III, section 10.2.2 of this research; G. Mackie, Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A 
Convention Account, American Sociological Review, Volume 61, No. 6, 1996, p. 1003 and 1007. 
174 A. Rahman and N. Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation, A Guide to Laws and Policies Worldwide, 
Zed Books, 2000, p. 26.  
175 United Nations Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by 
States Parties, CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev.4, 23 November 2007, para. 9.  
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infliction of severe pain and suffering.”176 The international community argues 
that FGM/C is deliberately inflicted (for discriminatory reason), since the 
parent(s) and cutter know that they are inflicting pain on the girl or women 
when the external female genitalia are removed or injured.  
The third element requiring “the consent or acquiescence of a public official” 
might seem a very problematic element, since FGM/C is in (almost) all 
circumstances performed in private settings by non-State actors, beyond the 
view of public officials. However, the international community argues that 
FGM/C can nevertheless amount to torture if States fail to act with due 
diligence to prevent, investigate and punish these acts.177 In 2000, the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) stated in GC No. 28 that FGM/C is in breach of 
Article 7 of the ICCPR.178 In 2002, Coomaraswamy, UN Special Rapporteur on 
VAW wrote that it is “imperative” that practices such as FGM/C “brutalize the 
female body.” 179  She explained that “those cultural practices that involve 
“severe pain and suffering” for the woman or the girl child, those that do not 
respect the physical integrity of the female body” as amounting to torture under 
customary international law.180 In 2007, the CATCee indicated in its GC No. 2 
that “Since the failure of the State to exercise due diligence to intervene to stop, 
sanction and provide remedies to victims of torture facilitates and enables non-
State actors to commit acts impermissible under the Convention with impunity, 
the State’s indifference or inaction provides a form of encouragement and/or de 
facto permission.”181 The CATCee has applied this principle to States Parties’ 
failure to prevent and protect victims from gender-based violence, including 
FGM/C.182 In 2008, Nowak, Special Rapporteur on torture considered FGM/C a 
“violation falling within his mandate.”183 He reiterated the statements of the 
HRC184 and the CATCee185 and explained that FGM/C may constitute torture 
and that States have the responsibility to take all the necessary measures to 
eliminate the practice.186 The Special Rapporteur on torture further explained in 
his report that even if a national law authorizes the practice, “any act of FGM 
would amount to torture and the existence of the law by itself would constitute 
consent or acquiescence by the State.” 187  He also highlighted that the 
medicalization of FGM/C does not make the practice more acceptable. The 
                                                        
176 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, A/HRC/7/3, 15 January 2008, para. 50.  
177 Ibid, para. 32.  
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182 Ibid.  
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184 Ibid.  
185 Ibid, para. 32.  
186 Ibid, para. 54.  
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Rapporteur also clarified that even in contexts where FGM/C has been 
recognized as a criminal offence, but where FGM/C is performed in public 
hospitals, FGM/C constitutes torture or ill-treatment.188 In cases where FGM is 
performed in private clinics and physicians carrying out the procedure are not 
being prosecuted, the State de facto consents to the practice and is therefore 
accountable.189 The Special Rapporteur on torture concluded that the concept of 
“acquiescence” entails “a duty for the State to prevent acts of torture in the 
private sphere and recalls that the concept of due diligence should be applied to 
examine whether States have lived up to their obligations.”190 More information 
about the ‘due diligence test’ can be found in section 6.1.3 of this chapter. 
Surprisingly enough, Nowak was not the first Special Rapporteur that has 
clarified that FGM/C amounts to torture and the responsibility of States in 
relation to this practice. The first UN Special Rapporteur on torture, Kooijmans, 
already addressed this issue in 1986. While discussing the notion of the 
“qualified perpetrator”, he argued: “Nevertheless, the authorities’ passive 
attitude regarding customs broadly accepted in a number of countries (i.e. 
sexual mutilations and other tribal traditional practices) might be considered as 
“consent or acquiescence”, particularly when these practices are not prosecuted 
as criminal offences under domestic law, probably because the State itself is 
abandoning its function of protecting the citizens from any kind of torture.”191 
All elements of this definition are met in the case of FGM/C and as a 
consequence, the practice can amount to “torture” under the CAT. The right not 
to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is 
protected in various international and regional human rights instruments (see 
table 4.2 below). 
 
6.5 Rights of the child  
 
Because FGM/C is commonly carried out on girls between 0 and 15 years,192 the 
practice is fundamentally important in relation to the protection of the rights of 
the child. In general, FGM/C can violate children’s general rights as defined in 
the CRC and in the ACRWC, such as the right to be free from discrimination,193 
the right to life,194 the right to be protected from all forms of mental and 
physical violence and maltreatment,195 the right to highest attainable standard 
                                                        
188 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, A/HRC/7/3, 15 January 2008, para. 53. 
189 Ibid.  
190 Ibid, para. 68.  
191 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, E/CN.4/1986/15, 19 February 1986, para. 38.  
192 See also Chapter III, section 7.1 of this research.   
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Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), 11 July 1990, Article 3. 
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of physical, mental and spiritual health196 and the freedom from torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.197  
More specifically, as the preamble of both the CRC and the ACRWC clarifies, 
a child needs special safeguards and care, by reason of the child’s “physical and 
mental immaturity.” 198  CRC GC No. 13 explains that children at risk of 
“harmful traditional practices” are likely to be exposed to violence and 
therefore labelled as “children in potentially vulnerable situations.”199 Human 
rights law grant children special protection. One of the general principles of the 
CRC can be found in Article 3(1) of the CRC that clarifies that in all actions 
concerning children “the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.”200 Similarly, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child (ACRWC) addressed in Article 4(1) the same principle: “In all actions 
concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best interests of 
the child shall be the primary consideration.”201 In addition, Article 18(1) of the 
CRC and Article 20(1) of the ACRWC explain that parents (or other persons 
responsible for the child, such as legal guardians) shall have the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child.  
The previous chapter described in section 10 that FGM/C is endorsed by 
practicing communities and loving parents who perceive FGM/C to be in their 
daughter’s best interests. In communities where FGM/C is a social norm, the 
practice is often a prerequisite for marriage. Parents will decide to cut their 
daughters, because a marriage is essential for a girl’s economic security and 
social acceptance in the community. In addition, when families conform to the 
norm, they meet with social approval; it brings respect and admiration, and 
maintains social standing for a girl and her family in the community.202  If a 
family decides not to cut their daughters, it will be more difficult (if not 
impossible) to get married. In addition, the failure to conform to the social norm 
in the society may lead to rejection, social exclusion, avoidance, ostracism, 
disapproval, rebuke or even violence. 203  Taking into account these social 
                                                        
Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), 11 July 1990, Article 10 and 
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196 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 20 November 
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197 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 20 November 
1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1577, Article 37(a); Organization of African 
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198 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 20 November 
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201 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), 11 
July 1990, Article 4(1).  
202 United Nations Children’s Fund, The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the Abandonment of 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five African Countries, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 
October 2010, p. 6. 
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rewards and sanctions, FGM/C is perceived as the best choice for parents to 
ensure their daughters to have a ‘good’ future.  
Although the concept of the child’s best interests is rather complex, the 
CRCee has taken a very clear position. The CRCee emphasized in GC No. 13 
that the interpretation of a child’s best interest must be consistent with the 
whole Convention, including the obligation to protect children from all forms of 
violence. The CRCee explained: “an adult’s judgment of a child’s best interests 
cannot override the obligation to respect all the child’s rights under the 
Convention.”204 FGM/C can therefore never be justified, because the practice 
conflicts with the child’s human dignity. Similarly, in GC No. 14 the CRCee 
recognized: “Although preservation of religious and cultural values and 
traditions as part of the identity of the child must be taken into consideration, 
practices that are inconsistent or incompatible with the rights established in the 
Convention are not in the child's best interests. Cultural identity cannot excuse 
or justify the perpetuation by decision-makers and authorities of traditions and 
cultural values that deny the child or children the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention.”205 Therefore, FGM/C is not in the best interest of the child.  
In the majority of cases, FGM/C is performed without the consent of the girl. 
This can constitute a violation of Article 12(1): “States Parties shall assure to the 
child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those 
views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given 
due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.”206 Similarly, 
the ACRWC also addresses the right to freedom of expression in Article 7.207 A 
violation of these provisions is most obvious when girls are forcibly restrained 
during the procedure. However, also girls who consent to FGM/C or who 
asked for the procedure themselves are “highly susceptible to coercion by 
adults, who may subject a child to various types of persuasion.”208 The question 
is whether the consent of the girl is truly informed and meaningful. It is highly 
questionable whether a girl is capable to understand what happens to her 
genitalia (and consequences and potential implications) when she undergoes 
the procedure. In reality, the girl’s consent might be flawed by tradition and 
culture as a result of a lack of comprehensive information, social pressure (fear 
for non-acceptance of their communities),209 and allurement by means of gifts, 
clothes, and celebrations. These are all motivations for a girl (or woman) to 
                                                        
204 United Nation Children’s Fund, Changing a Harmful Social Convention: Female Genital 
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Child to Have his or her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (Article 3, para. 1), CRC 
/C/GC/14, 29 May 2013, para. 57.  
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consent to the procedure.210 The rights of the child are protected in various 
international and regional human rights instruments (see table 4.2 below).  
 
The table below provides an overview of the six human rights violated by 
FGM/C, and the international and regional human rights instruments in which 
they are enshrined. The table shows that the international community has 
incorporated a rich number of human rights in the discourse in relation to the 
practice of FGM/C. Although it could be argued that this list might be too rich, 
some people argue that more human rights are at stake, including the right to 
education and the rights of persons with disabilities. According to the 
International Federation of University Women, “the consequences of FGM can 
cause girls to miss school repeatedly and to drop out in order to manage their 
menstrual problems which are aggravated by FGM. Thus, FGM puts girls at a 
distinct disadvantage in all levels of education. In some communities, girls are 
removed from school to undergo the procedure and then marry immediately 
and their education comes to an abrupt and premature end.”211 In addition, the 
UNFPA argues that FGM/C can result in disability and maternal morbidity: 
“The health consequences of FGM (especially from infibulation) can be 
considered a disability inflicted after birth.”212 Therefore, the UNFPA argues 
that the rights established in the CRPD are applicable for girls and women who 
have undergone FGM/C as well, including the “obligation to ensure access to 
care to correct injuries from FGM” and an “obligation to provide psychosocial 
and other rehabilitation services for persons with disabilities.”213 However, 
since the human rights framework is taken as it is, these two rights will not be 
taken into account when the duties of States will be analyzed.  
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Table 4.2 Human rights violated by FGM/C 
 
 
Right to be free 
from gender 
discrimination 
Right to 
life 
 
Right to 
health 
 
 
Right not 
to be 
subjected 
to torture 
 
 
Rights of 
the child 
 
 
UDHR 
 
Art. 2 
 
Art. 3 
 
Art. 25 
 
Art. 5 
 
Art. 25 
ICESCR Art. 2(2) and 3  Art. 12  Art. 10 
ICCPR Art. 2(1), 3 and 26 Art. 6(1)  Art. 7 Art. 24 
CEDAW Art. 1 and 2  Art. 12  Art. 5(b) 
CAT    All articles.  
CRC Art. 2(1) Art. 6(1) Art. 24(1) Art. 37(a) All articles. 
ACHPR Art. 18(3) and 28 Art. 4 Art. 16 Art. 5 Art. 18(3) 
Maputo 
Protocol Art. 2 Art. 4 Art. 14   
ACHWC Art. 3 Art. 5(1) Art. 14(1) Art. 16(1)  
AYC Art. 2 and 23  Art. 16 Art. 18(2) All articles 
 
7 DUTIES OF STATES IN RELATION TO THE ELIMINATION OF FGM/C  
 
Now FGM/C is classified as a human rights violation, the next step is to specify 
the legally binding obligations (and non-binding recommendations) in relation 
to the elimination of FGM/C, with which States need to comply with once they 
have ratified the human rights treaties. Shelton and Gould explain that “human 
rights law has a dual nature, because it is not sufficient to proclaim rights; it is 
also necessary to identify duty-holders and their obligations.”214 In case of 
international human rights instruments, this means specifying the obligations 
of States Parties to human rights treaties.  
 
7.1 State responsibility 
 
7.1.1 Traditional State-centric approach  
The doctrine of State responsibility, a fundamental principle in international 
law, governs when and how States are held accountable for a breach of an 
international obligation. The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 215  (DARSIWA) formulate the basic rules of 
international law concerning the responsibility of States for their 
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“internationally wrongful acts.” The traditional State-centric approach to 
international law considered States as the primary subjects of international law, 
since States were considered the dramatis personae (the characters of the play) on 
the international scene.216 Article 4(1) of the DARSIWA includes acts and 
omissions that can be attributed to the State and State organs. 217  The 
commentary of the DARISWA clarifies that as a general principle, the conduct 
of private actors is not attributable to the State.218 The State was only responsible 
for its own acts (or public acts performed by State organs or agents).219 For that 
reason, the practice of FGM/C was initially placed beyond the scope of 
international law and felt outside the scope of State responsibility. After all, the 
practitioners who perform FGM/C are private individuals, rather than public 
(State) officials.  
 
7.1.2 Horizontal effect of human rights 
In the field of human rights law, the centrality of the State has considerably 
diminished, since the principal beneficiaries of international human rights are 
private individuals. When a State accepts a human rights treaty through 
ratification, accession or succession, it assumes an obligation under 
international law to ‘respect’, ‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’ the rights set out in the 
treaty. 220  The obligation to ‘respect’ means that States must refrain from 
interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights (negative 
obligation). The obligation to ‘protect’ requires States to protect individuals and 
groups against human rights abuses. The obligation to ‘fulfil’ means that States 
must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of human rights.221 Both the 
obligation to ‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’ are positive obligations.222  
                                                        
216 A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 71.  
217 Article 4(1) of the DARSIWA reads as follows: “The conduct of any State organ shall be 
considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, 
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, 
and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the 
State.” See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries, 2001, p. 40, available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Last Accessed 1 
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218 Ibid, p. 38.   
219 D. Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review, Volume 25, No. 2, 2002, p. 273.  
220 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food 
(Art. 11 of the Covenant), E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 15; United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant), E/C.12/1999/10, 
8 December 1999, para 46. This typology was introduced by H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, 
Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 52, and then developed by A. 
Eide: United Nations, The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, Final Report submitted by A. 
Eide, Special Rapporteur, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23, 1987. 
221 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Human Rights Law, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
222 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 December 2010, 
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Although international human rights law was initially seen as guarantees to 
protect individuals (and groups) from abuse action by States, State 
responsibility for violations committed in the private sphere is established as 
well. The protection of women from VAW in general and FGM/C in particular 
has been defined as a positive obligation on States. As already touched upon in 
section 5.5 of this chapter (while addressing the question whether FGM/C 
violates the right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment), it was established that States must act with due 
diligence to protect women who are at risk of being violently abused.223  
 
7.1.3 Due diligence 
But what is the due diligence standard? This principle establishes the 
attribution of private actor’s acts or omission of acts to the State under 
international law. In 1992, the CEDAWCee established in GR No. 19 that the 
State may also be responsible for “private acts if they fail to act with due 
diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of 
violence, and for providing compensation.” 224 The CEDAWCee also made 
specific recommendations for States to provide effective protection of women 
against VAW, including legal, preventive and protective measures.225 In 1993, 
the DEVAW stated that States should condemn VAW and should “exercise due 
diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, 
punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by 
the State or by private persons.”226 Where governments fail to act with due 
diligence to ensure protected rights, they may themselves be held responsible 
for violations of those rights by private parties. The same provision can be 
found in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.227 
A landmark decision in relation to State responsibility for acts by private 
individuals is the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
the case of Velásquez Rodríguez.228 The Government of Honduras was held 
responsible for the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez, even 
without proof of direct government action. The Inter-American Court 
established that “An illegal act which violates human rights and which is 
initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a 
private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can 
lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but 
                                                        
223 European Court of Human Rights, Opuz v. Turkey, (Application No. 33401/02), Judgment of 9 
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because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it 
as required by the Convention.”229  
Other international230 and regional231 human rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
have also adopted the due diligence principle. According to the recent Joint GR 
No. 31 of the CEDAWCee / GC No. 18 of the CRCee on harmful practices, 
States parties to both the CEDAW and CRC have a due diligence obligation “to 
prevent acts that impair the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of rights by 
women and children and ensure that private actors do not engage in 
discrimination against women and girls, including gender-based violence in 
relation to CEDAW, or any form of violence against children, in relation to 
CRC.” According to both Committees, due diligence should be understood as 
“an obligation of States parties to the Conventions to prevent violence or 
violations of human rights, protect victims and witnesses from violations, 
investigate and punish those responsible, including private actors, and provide 
access to redress for human rights violations.”232 
 
7.2 Obligations for States in relation to the elimination of FGM/C 
 
Now that it is established that States have a due diligence obligation to prevent, 
protect, investigate, prosecute and punish acts of VAW, including FGM/C, the 
next step is to explain what the obligations for States are in relation to the 
elimination of FGM/C.   
 
7.2.1 FGM/C in human rights treaties 
While there are American and European treaties that specifically address 
VAW233 (and contain specific provisions on FGM/C)234 there is no international 
treaty specifically dealing with VAW or FGM/C in particular. The practice of 
FGM/C is not specifically mentioned in any of the nine international “core” 
human rights treaties at the international level (as listed in Table 1.1). The 
                                                        
229 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Vel ́asquez Rodr ́ıguez, Ser. C, No. 4, Judgment of 29 July 
1988, para 172. 
230 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 December 2010, 
para. 13 and 19; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 13: The 
Right of the Child to Freedom from all Forms of Violence, CRC/C/GC/13, 18 April 2011, para. 5.  
231 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No 155/96, 2001. 
232 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint general Recommendation No. 31 of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women/General Comment No. 18 of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, 14 November 2014, 
para. 10.  
233 For instance the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence against Women (Convention of Belem Do Para) and the Council of Europe Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention). 
234 Council of Europe, Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic 
Violence, 11 May 2011, Article 38: “Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to 
ensure that the following intentional conducts are criminalised: a) excising, infbulating or 
performing any other mutilation to the whole or any part of a woman’slabia majora, labia minora or 
clitoris; b) coercing or procuring a woman to undergo any of the acts listed in point a; c) inciting, 
coercing or procuring a girl to undergo any of the acts listed in point a.”  
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CEDAW for example does only specifically mention ‘trafficking in women’ and 
‘exploitation of prostitution’, but not the practice of FGM/C.235  
The extent to which human rights conventions explicitly deal with FGM/C 
varies, because the issue of harmful practices and FGM/C specifically was less 
known at the time of the drafting of most human right instruments.236 However, 
some conventions make explicit reference to harmful practices. The CEDAW 
includes for example references to “customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women,”237 and “customary and all other practices.”238 
The CRC mentions “traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.”239 
The ACRWC addresses “harmful social and cultural practices”240 and the AYC 
include reference to “harmful social and cultural practices.”241  
The Maputo Protocol is the only human rights instrument (applicable in 
Africa) in which “female genital mutilation” is expressly mentioned. Article 5 
obliges States parties to take steps to ensure that the practice of FGM/C is 
eliminated.  
 
7.2.2 Legally binding obligations in relation to FGM/C 
State’s duty to take action against FGM/C has its foundations in the provisions 
of human rights treaties. In the first place, States have a duty to modify customs 
that discriminate against women. Article 2(f) of the CEDAW obligate States 
Parties to “take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices, which constitute 
discrimination against women.” In addition, States have a duty to take 
measures to address discriminatory customs. Article 5(a) of the CEDAW 
requires States Parties to: “take all appropriate measures to modify the social 
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving 
the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are 
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women.” 242 Similarly, the Maputo Protocol 
established in Article 2(2) that States parties shall commit themselves “to 
                                                        
235 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1249, Article 6: 
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of 
traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.” 
236 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint general Recommendation No. 31 of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women/General Comment No. 18 of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, 14 November 2014, 
para. 10.  
237 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1249, Article 2. 
238 Ibid, Article 5. 
239 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 20 November 
1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1577, Article 24(3).  
240 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), 11 
July 1990, Article 21(1)(a)(b).  
241 African Union, African Youth Charter, 2 July 2006, Article 25. 
242 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1249, Article 
5(a).  
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modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men through 
public education, information, education and communication strategies, with a 
view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional practices 
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the 
superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and 
men.”243 The GA reiterated this duty in several Resolutions.244 
In the second place, states have a duty to abolish practices that are harmful 
to children. Article 24(3) of the CRC obliges State Parties to “take all effective 
and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices 
prejudicial to the health of children.”245 Although Article 24(3) does not mention 
the practice specifically, the travaux preparatoires make it clear that the Working 
Group had “female circumcision” in mind when they were debating 
“traditional practices.”246 A similar provision can be found in the ACRWC in 
Article 21(1) that State Parties oblige to “take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate harmful social and cultural practices affecting the welfare, dignity, 
normal growth and development of the child and in particular: (a) those 
customs and practices prejudicial to the health or life of the child; and (b) those 
customs and practices discriminatory to the child on the grounds of sex or other 
status.”247 
In the third place, States have a duty to ensure health care services and 
access to health information. Art. 12(1) of the CEDAW obliges States to “take all 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of 
health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access 
to health care services.” CEDAW GR No. 24 explains that this duty implies an 
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil women’s right to health care. In 
addition, Article 10(h) of the CEDAW obliges States to ensure “access to specific 
educational information to help to ensure the health and well-being of families, 
including information and advice on family planning.” Other international and 
regional conventions oblige governments as well to ensure necessary medical 
assistance and health care.248 The ACHPR obliges States for example in Article 
16 to “take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to 
ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick.” The ICESCR 
obliges States parties to take steps necessary for “the provision for the reduction 
                                                        
243 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa, 11 July 2003, Article 2(2).  
244 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/48/104, 20 December 1993, Article 4(j); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 63/155 
on Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate all Forms of Violence Against Women, A/RES/63/155, 30 
January 2009, para. 16(i).  
245 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 20 November 
1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1577, Article 34(3).  
246 S. Detrick et al., The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the "Travaux 
Préparatoires", Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992, p. 352.  
247 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), 11 
July 1990, Article. 21(1).  
248 Ibid, Article 14(2); United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1577, Article 24(2). 
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of the still-birth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of 
the child.”249  
However, the most elaborate human rights instrument is the Maputo 
Protocol. This African treaty is the only legally binding instrument applicable in 
Africa that explicitly addresses the practice of FGM/C. It is a comprehensive 
tool upon which African States can devise both legal and non-legal measures to 
eliminate FGM/C. Article 5 of the Protocol includes duties for States to take 
measures in order to eliminate FGM/C and obliges States Parties to: 
 
“Prohibit and condemn all forms of harmful practices which negatively affect the 
human rights of women and which are contrary to recognised international 
standards. States Parties shall take all necessary legislative and other measures to 
eliminate such practices, including: 
a. Creation of public awareness in all sectors of society regarding harmful 
practices through information, formal and informal education and outreach 
programmes; 
b. Prohibition, through legislative measures backed by sanctions, of all forms of 
female genital mutilation, scarification, medicalisation and para-
medicalisation of female genital mutilation and all other practices in order to 
eradicate them; 
c. Provision of necessary support to victims of harmful practices through basic 
services such as health services, legal and judicial support, emotional and 
psychological counselling as well as vocational training to make them self-
supporting; 
d. Protection of women who are at risk of being subjected to harmful practices or 
all other forms of violence, abuse and intolerance.” 
 
7.3 Action to be taken by States in relation to the elimination of FGM/C 
 
Apart from these legally binding obligations, soft law documents provide 
recommendations for States in relation to the practice of FGM/C. The section 
below provides an overview of the actions to be taken by States in relation to 
the elimination of FGM/C that follow from the international (UN) and regional 
(AU) human rights framework. This is a categorization of all actions (including 
obligations and recommendations) that follow from both legally binding 
instruments (as described in section 7.2.2) and non-binding documents.  
 
7.3.1 Ratification of human rights treaties 
First of all, the GA stressed the need for universal ratification of human rights 
instruments250 and called upon States to sign and ratify, if they have not yet 
done so, all human rights treaties, in particular the CEDAW, CRC, and its 
optional protocols.251 Apart from becoming a State party, States are urged to 
                                                        
249 United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 993, Article 12.  
250 See for example United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 58/156 on The Girl Child, 
A/RES/58/156, 26 February 2004, para. 1.  
251 See for example United Nations General Assembly, Resolution S-27/2 on A World Fit For Children, 
A/RES/S-27/2, 11 October 2002, para. 29; United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women, A/RES/48/104, 20 December 1993, Article 4(c); United 
Nations General Assembly, Resolution 52/99 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of 
Women and Girls, A/52/637, 12 December 1997, para. 3(b); United Nations General Assembly, 
Resolution 53/117 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and Girls, 
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respect and fully implement their treaty obligations under the relevant human 
rights treaties to which they are parties and to withdraw reservations 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the relevant treaty.252 The GA 
emphasized the “incompatibility” between the continuation of “harmful 
traditional or customary practices” and the obligations States have voluntarily 
undertaken through the ratification of international human rights 
instruments.”253 In addition, States are called upon by the GA to implement 
(further) their international commitments in this field, inter alia, under the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the Programme of Action of the 
ICPD and the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action.254 States are also 
called upon to take measures to address the obstacles that continue to affect the 
achievement of the goals set forth in the Beijing Platform for Action.255  
 
7.3.2 Cooperation with Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
In the second place, once States have ratified a human rights treaty, they are 
under the obligation to submit periodic reports to the relevant treaty body on 
how the rights are being implemented. States must report initially one year 
after the entry into force and then whenever the Committee requests (usually at 
least every four years). There are ten UN256 treaty-monitoring bodies and two 
                                                        
A/RES/53/117, 1 February 1999, para. 3(a); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 54/133 on 
Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/54/133, 7 February 
2000, para. 3(a); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 56/128 on Traditional or Customary 
Practices affecting the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/56/128, 30 January 2002, para. 3(a); United 
Nations General Assembly, Resolution 58/156 on The Girl Child, A/RES/58/156, 26 February 2004, 
para. 1, 2 and 7; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 60/141 on The Girl Child, 
A/RES/60/141, 11 January 2006, para. 1-2; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 61/143 on 
the Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate all Forms of Violence Against Women, A/RES/61/143, 30 
January 2007, para. 8(b); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 62/140 on The Girl Child, 
A/RES/62/140, 19 February 2008, para. 1-2; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 66/140 on 
The Girl Child, A/RES/66/140, 27 March 2012, para. 1 and 10. 
252 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution S-27/2 on A World Fit For Children, A/RES/S-27/2, 
11 October 2002, para. 29; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 61/143 on the Intensification 
of Efforts to Eliminate all Forms of Violence Against Women, A/RES/61/143, 30 January 2007, para. 8(b). 
253 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 52/99 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting 
the Health of Women and Girls, A/52/637, 12 December 1997, para. 3(b).  
254 See for example United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 52/99 on Traditional or Customary 
Practices affecting the Health of Women and Girls, A/52/637, 12 December 1997, para. 3(a); United 
Nations General Assembly, Resolution 53/117 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health 
of Women and Girls, A/RES/53/117, 1 February 1999, para. 3(b); United Nations General Assembly, 
Resolution 54/133 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and Girls, 
A/RES/54/133, 7 February 2000, para. 3(b); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 56/128 on 
Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/56/128, 30 January 
2002, para. 3(b); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 58/156 on The Girl Child, 
A/RES/58/156, 26 February 2004, para. 7; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 60/141 on 
The Girl Child, A/RES/60/141, 11 January 2006, para. 7 and 11;  
255 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 62/140 on The Girl Child, A/RES/62/140, 19 
February 2008, para. 7; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 66/140 on The Girl Child, 
A/RES/66/140, 27 March 2012, para. 9.  
256 The Human Rights Committee is monitoring the ICCPR, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights is monitoring the ICESCR, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination is monitoring the ICERD, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women is monitoring CEDAW, the Committee against Torture is monitoring CAT, the 
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT) is monitoring the OP-CAT, the Committee on the 
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AU257 treaty-monitoring bodies. For example, according to Article 18 of the 
CEDAW, States parties are under the obligation to submit to the Secretary-
General, for consideration by the CEDAWCee, a report on “the legislative, 
judicial, administrative or other measures which they have adopted to give 
effect to the provisions of the present Convention and on the progress made in 
this respect.”  
More specifically in relation to VAW, GR No. 12 of the CEDAWCee 
recommended States parties to include in their periodic reports information 
about the legislation in force to protect women against the incidence of all kinds 
of violence in everyday life and other measures adopted to eliminate VAW.258 In 
addition, States are recommended to include statistical data in their reports on 
the incidence of all kinds of VAW.259  This recommendation was reiterated in 
CEDAW GR No. 19.260 The CEDAWCee concluded in GR No. 19 that not all the 
reports of States parties “adequately reflected the close connection between 
discrimination against women, gender-based violence, and violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.”261 The Committee further explained that 
States parties should identify the nature and extent of attitudes, customs and 
practices that perpetuate VAW in their reports.  
More specifically in relation to FGM/C, GR No. 14 of the CEDAWCee 
recommended States parties to include in their periodic reports information 
about measures taken to eliminate FGM/C.262 The GA called upon States “to 
include specific information on measures taken to eliminate traditional or 
customary practices harmful to the health of women and girls” in their reports 
to the CEDAWCee and CRCee.263 
 
7.3.3 Constitutional guarantees on non-discrimination and gender-equality 
Article 2(a) of the CEDAW establishes the obligation of States parties to 
condemn discrimination against women in all its forms and “to embody the 
principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or 
other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, 
through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this 
principle.”264 In addition, CEDAW GR No. 28 explains that States must ensure 
                                                        
Rights of the Child is monitoring the CRC, the Committee on Migrant Workers is monitoring the 
ICRMW, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is monitoring the CRPD, the 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances is monitoring the ICED.  
257 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is monitoring the ACHPR and the 
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is monitoring the ACRWC.  
258 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 12: Violence Against Women, 1989, para. 1-2.   
259 Ibid, para. 4.   
260 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, 1992, para. 2.  
261 Ibid, para. 4.  
262 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision, A/45/38, 1990, para. (d).  
263 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 52/99 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting 
the Health of Women and Girls, A/52/637, 12 December 1997, para. 3(c).  
264 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1249, Article 
2(a).  
 
 
 
Chapter IV 
180 
that, “through constitutional amendments or by other appropriate legislative 
means, the principle of equality between women and men and of non-
discrimination is enshrined in domestic law with an overriding and enforceable 
status.”265 The GA also emphasized that States should review and, where 
appropriate, revise, amend or abolish all laws, regulations, practices and 
customs that discriminate against women or have a discriminatory impact on 
women.266  
 
7.3.4 Criminalizing FGM/C   
In the first place, the Maputo Protocol obliges States to condemn and prohibit 
all forms of harmful practices, including the medicalisation and para-
medicalisation 267 of FGM/C.268 The UN GA and WHO also addressed the 
medicalization of the practice in their respective Resolutions, in which they 
expressed their concern about emerging evidence of an increase in the incidence 
of FGM/C being carried out by medical personnel in all regions.269 Therefore, 
the GA urged States to condemn all forms of FGM/C “whether committed 
within or outside a medical institution.”270  
The Maputo Protocol obliges States Parties to prohibit FGM/C “through 
legislative measures backed by sanctions.”271 This obligation is mentioned in 
several (much earlier adopted) human rights documents as well. The ICPD 
Programme of Action urged governments for example “to prohibit female 
genital mutilation wherever it exist.”272 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action asked governments “to enact and enforce legislation against the 
perpetrators of practices and acts of violence against women, such as female 
genital mutilation.” 273  The prohibition of FGM/C by the enactment and 
effective enforcement of legislation to protect girls and women, including the 
                                                        
265 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 December 2010, 
para. 31.  
266 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 63/155 on Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate all 
Forms of Violence Against Women, A/RES/63/155, 30 January 2009, para. 16(b);  
267 For more information about the medicalization of FGM/C, see Chapter III, section 7.2.2 of this 
research.  
268 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa, 11 July 2003, Article 5.  
269 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the 
Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, preamble; World Health 
Organization, World Health Assembly Resolution on Female Genital Mutilation, WHA61.16, 24 May 2008, 
preamble.  
270 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the 
Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, para. 4; Economic and Social 
Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN.6/2010/6, 3 
December 2009, para. 39.  
271 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa, 11 July 2003, Article 5.  
272 United Nations Population Fund, Report of the International Conference on Population and 
Development, Cairo, A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1, 5-13 September 1994, para. 4.22.  
273 United Nations, Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on 
Women, 27 October 1995, para. 124(i) and 283(d); United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of 
all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/2005/4, 11 August 2005, para. 29. 
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prosecution of perpetrators of FGM/C, has been mentioned in many human 
rights documents.274  More specifically in relation to sanctions, the Secretary-
General wrote in his report that States should put in place effective sanctions 
“to discourage health professionals from performing female genital mutilation, 
and to ensure that all relevant professionals, including those in schools and 
health and social services, are duty-bound to report cases of female genital 
mutilation and cases in which they believe girls or women are at risk.”275 In 
addition, the CSW urged States to review, and, where appropriate, revise, 
amend or abolish all laws, regulations, policies, practices and customs that 
discriminate against women or have a discriminatory impact on women.276  
In order to ensure the effective implementation of national laws prohibiting 
FGM/C, the UN GA urged States to establish “a concrete national mechanism 
for the implementation and monitoring of legislation, law enforcement and 
national policies"277 and to put in place “adequate accountability mechanisms at 
the national and local levels to monitor adherence to and implementation of 
these legislative frameworks.”278 In addition, States should allocate “sufficient 
                                                        
274 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 52/99 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting 
the Health of Women and Girls, A/52/637, 12 December 1997, para. 3(e); United Nations General 
Assembly, Resolution 53/117 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and 
Girls, A/RES/53/117, 1 February 1999, para. 3(c); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 
54/133 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/54/133, 7 
February 2000, para. 3(d); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 56/128 on Traditional or 
Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/56/128, 30 January 2002, para. 
3(d); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 58/156 on The Girl Child, A/RES/58/156, 26 
February 2004, para. 9; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 60/141 on The Girl Child, 
A/RES/60/141, 11 January 2006, para. 9; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 62/140 on 
The Girl Child, A/RES/62/140, 19 February 2008, para. 13; United Nations General Assembly, 
Resolution 63/155 on Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate all Forms of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/63/155, 30 January 2009, para. 16(b); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 66/140 
on The Girl Child, A/RES/66/140, 27 March 2012, para. 24; United Nations General Assembly, 
Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, 
A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, para. 4; United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/2005/4, 11 August 2005, para. 29; United Nations Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the 
Convention (Women and Health), A/54/38/Rev.1, 1999, para. 15(d); World Health Organization, 
World Health Assembly Resolution on Female Genital Mutilation, WHA61.16, 24 May 2008, para. 1(2) 
275 Economic and Social Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, 
E/CN.6/2010/6, 3 December 2009, para. 39. 
276 Economic and Social Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, 
E/CN.6/2010/L.8, 5 December 2011, para. 13.  
277 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 53/117 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting 
the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/53/117, 1 February 1999, para. 3(c); United Nations General 
Assembly, Resolution 54/133 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and 
Girls, A/RES/54/133, 7 February 2000, para. 3(f); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 
56/128 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/56/128, 30 
January 2002, para. 3(e); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 63/155 on Intensification of 
Efforts to Eliminate all Forms of Violence Against Women, A/RES/63/155, 30 January 2009, para. 16(f).  
278 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the 
Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, para. 12; Economic and 
Social Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN.6/2010/L.8, 5 
December 2011, para. 15.  
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resources” 279  to the implementation of legislative frameworks aimed at 
eliminating FGM/C. 280  The DEVAW also recommended governments to 
include in government budgets “adequate resources” related to the elimination 
of VAW.281 To sum up, legislation aimed at eliminating FGM/C must include 
“appropriate budgeting, implementing, monitoring and effective enforcement 
measures.”282  
 
7.3.5 Policies and National Action Plans 
In order to ensure the effective implementation of national legislative 
frameworks, States are urged to develop effective and appropriate measures, 
including NAPs, strategies, policies, protocols, rules and regulations aimed at 
preventing and abolishing FGM/C.283 These NAPs and strategies should to be 
“comprehensive” and “multidisciplinary” in scope and “incorporate clear 
targets and indicators for the effective monitoring, impact assessment and 
coordination of programmes among all stakeholders.” 284  The CEDAWCee 
recommends to States parties in GR No. 14 to include in their national health 
policies appropriate strategies aimed at eliminating FGM/C in public health 
care. More specifically, “such strategies could include the special responsibility 
of health personnel, including traditional birth attendants, to explain the 
                                                        
279 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the 
Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, para. 14.  
280 Economic and Social Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, 
E/CN.6/2010/6, 3 December 2009,), para. 39.  
281 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/48/104, 20 December 1993, Article 4(h).   
282 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint general Recommendation No. 31 of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women/General Comment No. 18 of the Committee on the 
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harmful effects of female circumcision.” 285  The GA also urged States, the 
international community, the relevant United Nations entities, civil society and 
international financial institutions to continue to actively support other 
“targeted innovative programmes” that address ending FGM/C.286 States are 
also urged to allocate “adequate human and financial resources”287 to the 
implementation of FGM/C policies and NAPs.288 The UN SG writes in his 
report that “Strong political commitment is required at the national level, 
demonstrated by comprehensive national laws and policies and the allocation 
of sufficient resources, including budgets, for their implementation.”289  
 
7.3.6 Data-collection and research 
According to the Secretary-General, the availability of better data is critical for 
informed legal and policy development to address FGM/C.290 Therefore, States 
are recommended to collect and disseminate basic data about the prevalence, 
trends, attitudes and behaviour regarding FGM/C, as well as on reported cases 
and enforcement of legislation. The ultimate aim is to achieve a “strong 
knowledge base for effective action.”291 This recommendation can be found in 
many human rights documents.292 Universities, medial or nursing associations, 
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national women’s organizations or other bodies, can do the data collection and 
dissemination.293 When data collection and analysis on FGM/C is already 
taking place, it should, according to the UN Secretary General “be strengthened 
and made more systematic, especially with respect to data on younger girls.”294 
In addition, qualitative research should also be intensified “to improve 
understanding of sociocultural factors that could facilitate abandonment and 
inform effective strategies to eliminate female genital mutilation." 295 
Unfortunately, the GA stated in their most recent Resolution that FGM/C is still 
“underdocumented.” 296 Both the CRCee and CEDAWCee recommended to 
“prioritizing the regular collection, analysis, dissemination and use of 
quantitative and qualitative data on harmful practices disaggregated on the 
basis of sex, age, geographical location, socio-economic status, education levels 
and other key factors, and ensure that these activities are adequately 
resourced.”297 These data collection systems should be established within health 
care and social services, education, judicial and law enforcement sectors on 
protection related issues.298 States are also recommended to collect data through 
the use of national demographic and indicator surveys and censuses, which 
may be supplemented, by data from nationally representative household 
surveys. Qualitative research should be gathered through focus group 
discussions, in-depth key informant interviews with a wide variety of 
stakeholders, structured observations, social mapping and other appropriate 
methodologies.299 Specifically in relation to FGM/C, States are called upon to 
develop unified methods and standards for the collection of age-disaggregated 
data and to develop additional indicators to effectively measure progress in 
eliminating FGM/C.300  
 
7.3.7 Awareness-raising and school curricula 
The punitive measures described above need to be complemented with 
awareness-raising and educational activities. Article 5 of the Maputo Protocol 
includes an obligation for States to create public awareness in all sectors of 
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society regarding harmful practices “through information, formal and informal 
education and outreach programmes.”301  
The CEDAWCee recommended States parties in GR No. 14 to introduce 
appropriate educational and training programmes and seminars based on 
research findings on the problems arising from FGM/C.302 In GR No. 19, the 
CEDAWCee recommended States parties to take effective measures to 
overcome attitudes, customs and practices that perpetuate VAW; and to 
introduce education and information programmes to help eliminate prejudices 
that hinder women’s equality.303  
The CRCee strongly urged States parties in GC No. 4 to “develop and 
implement awareness-raising campaigns, education programmes and 
legislation aimed at changing prevailing attitudes, and address gender roles 
and stereotypes that contribute to harmful traditional practices.”304 Further, 
States parties should facilitate the establishment of multidisciplinary 
information and advice centres regarding the harmful aspects of FGM/C.305 The 
CRCee explains in GC No. 13 that educational measures “should address 
attitudes, traditions, customs and behavioural practices which condone and 
promote violence against children.” 306  These educational measures can be 
initiated and implemented by both the State and civil society actors under the 
responsibility of the State. The CRCee also gave specific examples of these 
educational measures, including: “public information programmes, including 
awareness campaigns, via opinion leaders and the media, to promote positive 
child-rearing and to combat negative societal attitudes and practices which 
condone or encourage violence; dissemination of the Convention, the present 
general comment and State Party reports in child friendly and accessible 
formats; supporting measures to educate and advise on protection in the 
context of ICTs.”307  
One of the strategic objectives of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action was to strengthen preventive programmes that promote women’s 
health. 308 States were asked to give priority to both formal and informal 
educational programmes that “support and enable women to develop self-
esteem, acquire knowledge, make decisions on and take responsibility for their 
own health, achieve mutual respect in matters concerning sexuality and fertility 
and educate men regarding the importance of women’s health and well-being, 
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placing special focus on programmes for both men and women that emphasize 
the elimination of harmful attitudes and practices, including female genital 
mutilation.”309  
The GA emphasized the importance of education and the dissemination of 
information in raising awareness of the serious consequences of FGM/C and 
the responsibilities of governments in that regard.310 The GA therefore called 
upon States to intensify efforts to raise awareness of and to mobilize 
international and national public opinion concerning the harmful effects of 
FGM/C, in particular “through education, the dissemination of information, 
training, the media and local community meetings, in order to achieve the total 
elimination of these practices.”311 Furthermore, the inclusion of the discussion of 
the empowerment of women and their human rights in the primary and 
secondary education curricula should be promoted.312 The GA also called upon 
States to strengthen advocacy and awareness-raising programmes, as well as 
formal, non-formal and informal education and training in order to promote “a 
process of consensus towards the elimination of female genital mutilations.”313 
States are called upon to mobilize boys and girls to take an active part in 
developing “preventive and elimination programmes to address harmful 
practices, especially female genital mutilations.”314 Importantly, States are called 
upon to allocate increased financial resources to support such efforts.315  
The GA also called upon States to promote the inclusion of the discussion of 
the empowerment of women and their human rights in primary and secondary 
education curricula.316 More specifically, States are urged to promote “gender-
sensitive, empowering educational processes”317 by reviewing and revising 
school curricula, educational materials and teacher-training programmes and 
“elaborating policies and programmes of zero tolerance for violence against 
girls, including female genital mutilations.”318 States are also called upon to 
further integrate “a comprehensive understanding of the causes and 
consequences of gender-based violence and discrimination against women and 
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girls into education and training curricula at all levels.”319 The GA also called 
upon States to develop information and awareness-raising campaigns and 
programmes on the elimination of FGM/C to systematically reach the general 
public, relevant professionals, families and communities, including through the 
media and featuring television and radio discussions.320 
The WHA urged all Member States to accelerate actions towards the 
elimination of FGM/C, including “education and information necessary for full 
understanding of the gender, health and human rights dimensions of female 
genital mutilation.”321 
 
7.3.8 Training for students and professionals 
According to the Beijing Declaration and Programme for Action, gender-
sensitive human rights education should be provided to “public officials, 
including, inter alia, police and military personnel, corrections officers, health 
and medical personnel, and social workers, including people who deal with 
migration and refugee issues, and teachers at all levels of the educational 
system, and make available such education and training also to the judiciary 
and members of parliament in order to enable them to better exercise their 
public responsibilities.”322 The CEDAWCee recommended States in GR No. 14 
to include in their national health policies “appropriate strategies aimed at 
eradicating female circumcision in public health care.”323 Such strategies could 
include the special responsibility of health personnel, including traditional birth 
attendants, to explain the harmful effects of FGM/C.324 In GR No. 24, the 
CEDAWCee explains that the obligation to protect rights relating to women’s 
health requires States Parties to ensure “gender-sensitive training to enable 
health-care workers to detect and manage the health consequences of gender-
based violence.”325 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) explains in GC No. 16 that the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health requires States to 
provide adequate training for health care workers to deal with women’s health 
issues.326 The GA also emphasized the importance of adequate training of 
health-care providers at all levels on the harmful consequences of FGM/C.327 
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The training for health personnel should specifically address “the increased 
vulnerability of women and girls to HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted 
infections” due to FGM/C.328 The GA called upon States to develop, support 
and implement the training of “social workers, medical personnel, religious and 
community leaders and other relevant professionals” and ensure that they 
provide competent, supportive services and care to girls and women who are at 
risk of FGM/C and to girls and women who have undergone FGM/C.329 In 
addition, the CSW called upon States to compel these professionals to report 
cases to the appropriate authorities where they believe girls or women are at 
risk.330 
 
7.3.9 Role of CSOs 
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action recognized the important 
role of CSOs in the promotion of all human rights and in humanitarian 
activities at national, regional and international levels in general.331 CEDAW GC 
No. 14 recommends States parties to support women’s organizations at the 
national and local levels working for the elimination of FGM/C.332 The GA also 
specifically welcomed the work carried out by CSOs in raising awareness of the 
harmful effects of FGM/C.333 The GA and the Special Rapporteur on VAW 
recommend States to recognize the important role that CSOs play in the 
elimination of FGM/C and to give “vigorous support”334 and “all necessary 
support and encouragement”335 to the efforts of civil society organizations, 
community organizations, women’s groups and women’s organizations. The 
importance of the work of CSOs is emphasized in several other human rights 
documents as well.336 The Special Rapporteur on VAW stated for example: “the 
involvement of local women’s groups and civil society in the movement to 
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eradicate harmful practices is the only guarantee that the practice will not re-
emerge in the future."337 
 
7.3.10 Support services 
The Maputo Protocol obliges States Parties to protect women who are at risk of 
FGM/C and to provide necessary support to victims of FGM/C “through basic 
services such as health services, legal and judicial support, emotional and 
psychological counselling as well as vocational training to make them self-
supporting.”338 The CRCee explains in GC No. 4 that States Parties have an 
obligation to protect adolescents from all harmful traditional practices, 
including FGM/C.339 In addition, the CESCR explains in GC No. 14 that the 
obligation to protect the right to health includes that States are obliged to 
ensure that: (i) FGM/C does not interfere with access to pre- and post-natal care 
and family planning; and (ii) to prevent third parties from coercing women to 
undergo FGM/C.340  
The GA has urged States as well to protect and support women and girls 
who have been subjected to FGM/C and those at risk, including “by 
developing social and psychological support services and care, and to take 
measures to improve their health, including sexual and reproductive health, in 
order to assist women and girls who are subjected to the practice.”341 The 
establishment and reinforcement of social and psychological support services 
and care to respond to the needs of FGM/C victims by developing 
comprehensive and accessible sexual and reproductive health services has been 
reiterated in other human rights documents. 342 States have been urged to 
develop age-appropriate safe and confidential programmes and medical, social 
and psychological support services to assist girls who are subjected to 
violence,343 which should – according to the ICPD Programme of Action – 
include counselling for women and men to discourage FGM/C.344  
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The Secretary-General recommended that victims of FGM/C should be 
provided with a range of specialized services, including legal, psychological, 
social assistance and health services to ensure their recovery from trauma and 
the prevention of serious health conditions.345 Both the Secretary-General and 
the Special Rapporteur on VAW have called for specialized shelter services for 
women and girls at risk of FGM/C.346 The report of the Special Rapporteur on 
VAW noted: “While shelters are generally associated with intimate partner 
violence, such sanctuary is also required by girls and young women escaping, 
for example, […] female genital mutilation.”347   
 
7.3.11 Involve all actors 
States are called upon to engage a wide range of stakeholders, including law-
enforcement and judicial personnel, immigration officials, health-care 
providers, national independent human rights institutions, civil society, 
community and religious leaders, teachers, employers, media professionals and 
those directly working with girls, as well as parents, families and communities 
who engage in FGM/C to work together in strategies aimed at eliminating 
FGM/C.348  
The most recent GA Resolution urged States to “pursue a comprehensive, 
culturally sensitive, systematic approach that incorporates a social perspective 
and is based on human rights and gender-equality principles in providing 
education and training to families, local community leaders and members of all 
professions relevant to the protection and empowerment of women and girls in 
order to increase awareness of and commitment to the elimination of female 
genital mutilations.”349 Other human rights documents similarly mention the 
importance of a comprehensive, coordinated, multidisciplinary, systematic 
approach based on human rights; an integrated strategy for the prevention and 
elimination of FGM/C; and the involvement of multiple stakeholders at all 
levels. 350  The GA reaffirmed that the elimination of FGM/C can only be 
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Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences on Indicators on Violence 
Against Women and State Response, A/HRC/7/6, 29 January 2008, para. 98. 
347 Ibid. 
348 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint general Recommendation No. 31 of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women/General Comment No. 18 of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, 14 November 2014, 
para. 35; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the 
Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, para. 2.  
349 Ibid, para. 10. 
350 Economic and Social Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, 
E/CN.6/2010/L.8, 5 December 2011, para. 8 and 18; Economic and Social Council, Ending Female 
Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN.6/2010/6, 3 December 2009, para. 38; 
 
 
 
 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Violation of Human Rights 
191 
achieved as a result of “a comprehensive movement that involves all public and 
private stakeholders in society, including girls and boys, women and men.”351 
Especially men’s understanding of their role and responsibilities with regard to 
promoting the elimination of FGM/C is emphasized by the GA.352 In addition, 
States have been recommended by the CEDAWCee in GR No. 14 to encourage 
politicians, professionals, religious and community leaders at all levels, 
including the media and the arts, to co-operate in influencing attitudes towards 
the elimination of FGM/C.353 
States have also been called upon to involve diverse actors in advocacy and 
awareness-raising campaigns, including public opinion leaders, educators, 
religious leaders, chiefs, traditional leaders (both community and religious), 
medical practitioners, teachers, women’s health and family planning 
organizations, social workers, health care providers, child care agencies, non-
governmental organizations, arts organizations and the media. The objective is 
to promote both collective and individual awareness of the human rights of 
women and girls and of how harmful practices violate those rights. Groups and 
individuals working directly with girls, as well as parents, families and 
communities are also urged to participate in such campaigns.354 The Secretary-
General wrote in his report that “the integral role of communities in the 
abandonment of female genital mutilation should be recognized and 
community-based abandonment initiatives supported."355  
 
7.3.12 Alternatives  
States are called upon to explore, through consultations with communities and 
religious and cultural groups and their leaders, alternatives to FGM/C, in 
particular where FGM/C is part of a ritual ceremony or rite of passage.356 With 
                                                        
Economic and Social Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, 
E/CN.6/2012/8, 5 December 2011, para. 47, 50 and 54; United Nations Human Rights Council, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences on Intersections 
between Culture and Violence Against Women, A/HRC/4/34, 17 January 2007, para. 31. 
351 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the 
Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, preamble; Economic and 
Social Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN.6/2010/L.8, 5 
December 2011, preamble.  
352  United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 54/133 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting 
the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/54/133, 7 February 2000, para. 3(i); United Nations General 
Assembly, Resolution 56/128 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and 
Girls, A/RES/56/128, 30 January 2002, para. 3(k).  
353 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision, A/45/38, 1990. 
354 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 54/133 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting 
the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/54/133, 7 February 2000, para. 3(j); United Nations General 
Assembly, Resolution 56/128 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and 
Girls, A/RES/56/128, 30 January 2002, para. 3(i); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 
67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 
March 2013, para. 3; United Nations General Assembly, Traditional or Customary Practices Affecting 
the Health of Women and Girls: Report of the Secretary-General, A/56/316, 22 August 2001, para. 40.  
355 Economic and Social Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, 
E/CN.6/2010/6, 3 December 2009, para. 41.  
356 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 56/128 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting 
the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/56/128, 30 January 2002, para. 3(m); United Nations General 
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regard to those cutters who perform the procedure, States are called upon, “as 
part of a comprehensive approach”357 to eliminate FGM/C, to support and 
provide alternative training and education possibilities.358 These training and 
education programmes have the aim to adopt an “alternative profession”359 or 
“alternative livelihoods” 360 in order to provide cutters with an alternative 
source of income.361 
 
7.4 Action to be taken by non-State actors in relation to the elimination of 
FGM/C 
 
Human rights documents do not only address States, but also other actors, 
including, among others, ‘the international community’, ‘UN entities’, ‘the UN 
system’, ‘UN treaty bodies’, ‘civil society’, international financial institutions’, 
‘regional and sub-regional organizations’ and ‘all stakeholders’. Although the 
focus of the research is on State compliance, in order to provide a 
comprehensive overview of the obligations and recommendations that follow 
from the human rights framework, the obligations and recommendations that 
directed to non-State actors will be shortly addressed below. 
 
7.4.1 Continue to support programmes 
In the first place, the GA called upon the international community, the relevant 
UN entities and civil society and international financial institutions “to continue 
to actively support, through the allocation of increased financial resources and 
technical assistance, targeted comprehensive programmes that address the 
needs and priorities of women and girls at risk of or subjected to female genital 
mutilations.” 362  More specifically, the GA called upon the international 
community to strongly support a second phase of the ‘UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
                                                        
Assembly, Resolution 54/133 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting the Health of Women and 
Girls, A/RES/54/133, 7 February 2000, para. 3(l).  
357 Economic and Social Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, 
E/CN.6/2010/L.8, 5 December 2011, para. 19.  
358 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 56/128 on Traditional or Customary Practices affecting 
the Health of Women and Girls, A/RES/56/128, 30 January 2002, para. 3(m); Report of the Secretary-
General on Traditional or customary practices affecting the health of women and girls (A/53/354, 
of 10 September 1998), para. 14; Economic and Social Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: 
Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN.6/2010/6, 3 December 2009, para. 42.  
359 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 62/140 on The Girl Child, A/RES/62/140, 19 
February 2008, para. 29; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 66/140 on The Girl Child, 
A/RES/66/140, 27 March 2012, para. 45.  
360 Economic and Social Council, Ending Female Genital Mutilation: Report of the Secretary-General, 
E/CN.6/2010/L.8, 5 December 2011, para. 19; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 
on Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 
2013, para. 16.  
361 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 62/140 on The Girl Child, A/RES/62/140, 19 
February 2008, para. 29; Report of the Secretary-General on Traditional or customary practices 
affecting the health of women and girls (A/53/354, of 10 September 1998), para. 55. 
362 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the 
Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, para. 17; United Nations 
General Assembly, Resolution 66/140 on The Girl Child, A/RES/66/140, 27 March 2012, para. 45; 
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 60/141 on The Girl Child, A/RES/60/141, 11 January 
2006, para. 18.  
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Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change’ as 
well as national programmes focused on the elimination of FGM/C.363  
 
7.4.2 Promote human rights education 
In the second place, the GA also called upon States, civil society (including the 
media and NGOs) “to promote human rights education and full respect for and 
the enjoyment of the human rights of the girl child, inter alia, through the 
translation, production and dissemination of age-appropriate and gender-
sensitive information material on those rights to all sectors of society, in 
particular to children.”364 
 
7.4.3 Take FGM/C into account in country programmes 
In the third place, the GA requested the Secretary-General to ensure that “all 
relevant organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, in particular 
the United Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the 
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women 
(UN-Women), the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Development 
Programme and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, individually and collectively, take into account the protection 
and promotion of the rights of women and girls against female genital 
mutilations in their country programmes, as appropriate and in accordance 
with national priorities, in order to further strengthen their efforts in this 
regard.”365 
 
7.4.4 Observe 6 February as ‘International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital 
Mutilation’ 
In the fourth place, the GA called upon States, the UN system, civil society an 
all stakeholders to observe 6 February as the ‘International Day of Zero 
Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation’ and to use the day to enhance 
awareness- raising campaigns and to take concrete actions against FGM/C.366 
  
8 CONCLUSION  
 
The practice of FGM/C is framewd within a human rights framework, viewing 
the practice as a form of VAW and classified as a human rights violation. The 
international community recognized that the following human rights are being 
violated by FGM/C:  (i) the right to be free from gender-discrimination; (ii) the 
right to life; (iii) the right to the highest attainable standard of health; (iv) the 
right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
                                                        
363 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the 
Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, para. 18.  
364 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 66/140 on The Girl Child, A/RES/66/140, 27 March 
2012, para. 37.  
365 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the 
Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, para. 22.  
366 Ibid, para. 21.  
 
 
 
Chapter IV 
194 
punishment and (v) the rights of the child.367  These five human rights are 
protected in various international and regional human rights instruments, 
including the ICESCR, ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT, CRC, ACHPR, ACHWC, AYC 
and the Maputo Protocol.  
This chapter also illustrated that conflicts between human rights can arise 
when supporters of FGM/C invoke the following human rights: (i) the right to 
culture; (ii) minority rights; and (iii) the right to religious freedom. These rights 
are protected in the same human rights instruments, including the UDHR, 
ICESCR, ICCPR, ACHPR. However, these three human rights are not absolute 
and the human rights framework allows for limitations of these rights. Since 
FGM/C ‘destroys’ other rights – more precisely the five rights mentioned above 
– the human rights framework does not allow persons to invoke other human 
rights to suggest that FGM/C should not be eliminated. 
States have a due diligence obligation to prevent, protect, investigate, 
prosecute and punish those responsible, including private individuals for 
human rights violations. Although private individuals practice FGM/C (rather 
than State officials), States are still responsible for these private acts, if they fail 
to act with due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with 
national legislation, punish acts of VAW in general and FGM/C in particular. 
States have a duty to take action in order to eliminate FGM/C. Table 4.3 
provides an overview of the obligations and recommendations for States that 
are especially relevant in relation to the elimination of FGM/C.  
 
Table 4.3 Obligations and recommendations for States 
 
 
Obligations: Recommendations: 
 
Take all appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices 
which constitute discrimination against 
women. (Art. 2(f) CEDAW) 
 
Commit themselves to modify the social 
and cultural patterns of conduct of women 
and men through public education, 
information, education and 
communication strategies, with a view to 
achieving the elimination of harmful 
cultural and traditional practices and all 
other practices which are based on the 
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of 
either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles 
for women and men. (Art. 2(2) Maputo 
Protocol) 
 
Sign and ratify all human rights treaties, in 
particular the CEDAW, CRC, and its 
optional protocols (and withdraw 
reservations). 
 
Include information in periodic reports 
about measures taken to eliminate FGM/C. 
 
Enact and enforce legislation against 
FGM/C. 
 
Establish national mechanism for 
implementation and monitoring of 
legislative frameworks against FGM/C.   
 
Review, and, where appropriate, revise, 
amend or abolish all laws, regulations, 
policies, practices and customs that  
                                                        
367 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 1 and p. 9.  
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Take all appropriate measures to modify 
the social and cultural patterns of conduct 
of men and women, with a view to 
achieving the elimination of prejudices 
and customary and all other practices 
which are based on the idea of the 
inferiority or the superiority of either of 
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men 
and women. (Art. 5(a) CEDAW) 
 
Take all effective and appropriate 
measures with a view to abolishing 
traditional practices prejudicial to the 
health of children. (Art. 24(3) CRC) 
 
Take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
harmful social and cultural practices 
affecting the welfare, dignity, normal 
growth and development of the child and 
in particular: (a) those customs and 
practices prejudicial to the health or life of 
the child; and (b) those customs and 
practices discriminatory to the child on the 
grounds of sex or other status. (Art. 21(1) 
ACRWC) 
 
Take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field 
of health care in order to ensure, on a basis 
of equality of men and women, access to 
health care services (Art. 12(1) CEDAW) 
 
Prohibit and condemn all forms of 
harmful practices which negatively affect 
the human rights of women and which are 
contrary to recognised international 
standards. States Parties shall take all 
necessary legislative and other measures 
to eliminate such practices, including: 
creation of public awareness in all sectors 
of society regarding harmful practices 
through information, formal and informal 
education and outreach programmes; 
prohibition, through legislative measures 
backed by sanctions, of all forms of female 
genital mutilation, scarification, 
medicalisation and para-medicalisation of 
female genital mutilation and all other 
practices in order to eradicate them; 
provision of necessary support to victims 
of harmful practices through basic services 
such as health services, legal and judicial 
support, emotional and psychological 
counselling as well as vocational training 
to make them self-supporting; 
protection of women who are at risk of 
being subjected to harmful practices or all 
other forms of violence, abuse and 
intolerance. (Art. 5 Maputo Protocol) 
 
 
discriminate against women or have a 
discriminatory impact on women. 
 
Develop comprehensive and 
multidisciplinary policies and National 
Action Plans aimed at eliminating FGM/C. 
 
Collect and disseminate basic data about the 
prevalence, trends, attitudes and behaviour 
regarding FGM/C, as well as on reported 
cases and enforcement of legislation.  
 
Introduce appropriate educational and 
training programmes and seminars. 
 
Develop and implement awareness raising 
campaigns, education programmes and 
legislation aimed at changing prevailing 
attitudes, and address gender roles and 
stereotypes that contribute to harmful 
traditional practices.  
 
Intensify efforts to raise awareness of and to 
mobilize international and national public 
opinion concerning the harmful effects of 
FGM/C, in particular “through education, 
the dissemination of information, training, 
the media and local community meetings, in 
order to achieve the total elimination of 
these practices. 
 
Promote the inclusion of the discussion of 
the empowerment of women and their 
human rights in primary and secondary 
education curricula. 
 
Provide adequate training for students and 
professionals. 
 
Support and recognize important role of 
CSOs. 
 
Develop social and psychological support 
services and care, and to take measures to 
improve their health, including sexual and 
reproductive health, in order to assist 
women and girls who are subjected to the 
practice. 
 
Engage a wide range of stakeholder to work 
together in strategies aimed at eliminating 
FGM/C.  
 
Explore alternatives to FGM/C. 
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Submit reports to treaty monitoring 
bodies. 
 
Embody the principle of the equality of 
men and women in their national 
constitutions or other appropriate 
legislation if not yet incorporated therein 
and to ensure, through law and other 
appropriate means, the practical 
realization of this principle. (Art. 2(a) 
CEDAW) 
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CHAPTER V 
FGM/C IN SENEGAL:  
A CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter showed that FGM/C is a classified as a form of VAW and 
considered a human rights violation. A comprehensive human rights 
framework exists at both the international and regional levels that addresses 
VAW and harmful practices in general, and FGM/C in particular. A global goal 
has been set by the UN to end the practice of FGM/C within a generation.1 
Although the human rights framework has been developed at the international 
level, the work on eliminating FGM/C must be done at the national level. The 
challenge to ensure that these human rights standards are translated into 
effective action, and bring positive change to the girls and women (at risk of) 
undergoing this practice, remains at the national level. This chapter aims to 
illustrate whether, and to what extent, Senegal is in compliance with the human 
rights framework in relation to FGM/C. In addition, this chapter aims to 
provide a better understanding of the possible problems that come to the 
surface when the human rights framework in relation to FGM/C is being 
implemented at the national level. The factors that influence compliance (and 
non-compliance) positively and/or negatively will be highlighted.   
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The research question is spelled 
out in section 2 and the design and methodology is elaborated upon in section 3. 
A country profile of Senegal is sketched in sections 4 and 5 for background and 
context purposes. Furthermore, section 6 spells out the ratification behaviour of 
Senegal. Section 7 and 8 examine the existing monitoring mechanisms, 
including the Treaty Monitoring Bodies (TMBs) and the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR). Section 9 elaborates upon the national human rights institutions 
and section 9 on the constitutional guarantees. Section 10 to 19 present the 
empirical findings in relation to the ‘compliance question’ in Senegal. Section 20 
draws up conclusions.  
 
                                                        
1 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 67/146 on Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination 
of Female Genital Mutilations, A/RES/67/146, 5 March 2013, para. 19; World Health Organization, 
Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO Library, 2008, p. 21.  
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2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The research question that guided the empirical study in Senegal is the 
following: “To what extent is Senegal in compliance with the human rights framework 
in relation to Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting, and which factors explain compliance 
and/or non-compliance with this framework?” 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Research design 
 
This empirical study used a qualitative case study research strategy with a 
socio-legal approach. The research was exploratory in nature. A qualitative 
approach was considered to be appropriate, “because of its attention to detail, 
complexity and contextuality.”2 A qualitative approach suited the intention of 
this research to offer a thorough understanding of the complex process of 
compliance with the human rights framework at the national level in relation to 
FGM/C. According to Hancock et al, “qualitative research attempts to explore a 
host of factors that may be influencing a situation”3 and that is exactly the 
intention of this research. Taking into account the nature of the research 
question, a case study research strategy was considered to be appropriate. Case 
study methodologies are flexible and allow for studying complex situations. As 
Mills explains, “these flexible methodologies are beneficial as it gives 
researchers the ability to be as general or as specific as is felt appropriate in 
order to capture adequate detail.”4 The main data collection methods were desk 
research (section 3.2) and semi-structured interviews (section 3.3.1). These 
multiple data sources resulted in a wealth of rich information.   
 
3.2 Desk research  
 
An extensive a priori desk study of existing documents concerning FGM/C in 
Senegal was conducted from January 2013 until August 2015. The desk research 
was not limited to the English language, but literature and documents in the 
French language were included in the search as well.  
In the first place, the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) that were conducted in Senegal were 
analysed in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of FGM/C 
in Senegal. These Surveys provide extensive data on the prevalence and nature 
of FGM/C, including: knowledge about FGM/C; type of FGM/C; age on which 
girls undergo FGM/C; practitioners that perform FGM/C; and believes and 
opinions about FGM/C.  
In the second place, the national reports that the Senegalese government 
submitted to the subsequent treaty bodies that monitor implementation of the 
                                                        
2 J. Mason, Qualitative Researching, SAGE, 2002, p. 175. 
3 D.R. Hancock et al., Doing Case Study Research, Teachers College Press, Columbia University, New 
York, 2006, p. 8.  
4 A.J. Mills et al, Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, Sage Publications, 2009, p. 99-100.  
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“core” UN and AU human rights instruments were thoroughly studied. As 
described in the previous chapter, States Parties to treaties are under the 
obligation to submit periodic reports to the relevant treaty body on how the 
rights in the treaty are being implemented. Senegal participated regularly in the 
process of State reporting and the Senegalese government addressed the issue 
of FGM/C frequently in its national reports. Analyzing these reports provided 
a first glimpse of the human rights situation in Senegal in general as well as a 
general idea of the actions taken in the field of FGM/C. In addition, the 
‘concluding observations’ of the monitoring bodies and international 
supervisory institutions were analyzed in order to read how they assessed 
Senegal’s performance towards eliminating FGM/C. The same applies for the 
National Reports that Senegal submitted to the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Human Rights Council. In these reports, 
Senegal stated what actions they had taken to improve the human rights 
situations in their country and to fulfil their human rights obligations. 
Especially when Senegal was reviewed for the second time in October 2013, 
FGM/C was frequently mentioned in reports and during the procedures. 
Therefore, it was essential to study the UPR documents in order to gain a better 
understanding of the action taken in the field of FGM/C in Senegal.  
Thirdly, the desk research also focused on the search for academic literature, 
such as journal articles, books and dissertations about FGM/C in Senegal. The 
following search terms in the English language were used: ‘female genital 
mutilation/cutting’, ‘FGM/C’, ‘female genital mutilation’, ‘FGM’, ‘female 
genital cutting’, ‘FGC’, ‘female circumcision’, ‘FC’, ‘circumcision’, ‘harmful 
practice’, ‘harmful’, ‘practice’, ‘custom’, ‘customary practice’, ‘tradition’, 
‘traditional’, ‘traditional practice’, ‘traditional custom’, ‘cultural practice’, 
‘culture’, ‘social practice’, ‘female sexual mutilation’, ‘sexual mutilation’, 
‘mutilation’, ‘female genital operations’, ‘genital operations’ and ‘Senegal.’ The 
following search terms in the French language were used: ‘mutilation génitales 
féminines/excision’, ‘MGF/E’, ‘mutilations génitales féminines’, ‘MGF’, 
‘l'excision’, ‘excision’, ‘circoncision féminine’, ‘CF’, ‘circoncision’,  ‘pratique 
néfaste’, ‘néfaste’, ‘pratique’, ‘coutume’, ‘pratique coutumière’, ‘tradition’, 
‘traditionnelle’, ‘pratique traditionnelle’, ‘coutume traditionnelle’, ‘pratique 
culturelle’, ‘culture’, ‘pratique sociale’, ‘mutilation sexuelle feminine’, 
‘mutilations sexuelles’, ‘mutilation’, ‘opérations génitales féminines’, 
‘opérations genitals’ and ‘Sénégal.’ I entered combinations of these search terms 
into several electronic databases, including Worldcat, Heinonline, Westlaw, 
Jstore, Lexis, Web of Science and Sage Journals Online. In addition, citation 
indexes (such as SSRN) were searched. In order to be comprehensive, I also 
conducted a search on the web, using search engines (such as Google Scholar) 
to search for literature. In addition, the so-called ‘snowballing effect’ was a 
helpful tool as well to find more academic literature on the topic. All academic 
literature relevant in relation to FGM/C in Senegal was included in the 
document analysis.  
In the fourth place, the desk research also focused on the search for reports 
and evaluations of CSOs (such as Tostan) and international organizations (such 
as UNICEF and UNFPA) about FGM/C in Senegal. These reports provided 
practical information about the role of the Senegalese government, the role of 
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civil society organizations at the community level and the role of the UNICEF-
UNFPA Joint Programme in Senegal.  
In the fifth place, the national legal framework in relation to FGM/C was 
mapped. Therefore, applicable national laws (including Act No. 99-05 of 29 
January 1999) were studied, as well as the Senegalese constitution (including 
amendments).  
Lastly, a search on the Internet was conducted in order to find (non-
academic) articles – or so-called ‘grey literature’ and blogs – about (recent) 
developments concerning FGM/C in Senegal to make sure all (and the most up-
to-date) information was included in the study. The same search terms were 
used.  
 
3.3 Fieldwork in Senegal 
 
During a period of 4.5 months (September 2013 until February 2014) the field 
research was conducted in Senegal. A two-week pilot study in Dakar was 
conducted in May 2013 to map out the field and prepare for the subsequent 
field research period. 
 
3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews  
Semi-structured in-depth interviewing represented the primary method of data 
collection during the fieldwork in Senegal. In-depth interviews were optimal 
for collecting data on respondents’ personal perspectives and experiences. 
Unlike structured interviews – which follow a rigid format of set questions – 
semi-structured interviews are conducted with a fairly open framework that 
allows two-way communication.5 The semi-structured interviews were informal 
in tone and focused on specific themes that provided a degree of flexibility to 
explore a certain theme more in detail. The semi-structured format facilitated a 
flowing discussion and allowed for an open response in the respondents’ own 
words rather than a ‘yes or no’ type answer.6 The interviews unfolded in a 
conversational manner offering respondents the chance to explore issues they 
felt were important. This method of data collection allowed new ideas to be 
brought up during the interview. An interview guide was prepared that 
included a list of themes and questions that were covered during the interviews.  
 
3.3.2 Development of the interview guide 
No specific instrument exists that assesses compliance with the human rights 
framework in relation to FGM/C. Endeavours to properly evaluate and 
monitor the efforts of States with regard to FGM/C have been limited. 
However, recent developments in relation to developing ‘human rights 
indicators’ are highly relevant for this research and provided a source of 
inspiration when developing the interview guide. The purpose of these human 
rights indicators is “to monitor compliance with international human rights 
treaties with a view to evaluating progress towards the realization of human 
                                                        
5 D.W. Stacks, Primer of Public Relations Research, Guilford Press, 2010, p. 347.  
6 N. Clifford, et al., Key Methods in Geography, SAGE, 2010, p. 105.  
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rights.” 7  The pioneering work of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is essential in this regard. At the 
request of UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies, the OHCHR has developed a 
framework for human rights indicators as well as lists of illustrative indicators 
relating to several human rights.8 The OHCHR identified three categories of 
human rights indicators: structural, 9  process, 10  and outcome 11  indicators. 
Experts in the area of human rights indicators have generally accepted this 
methodology.12 While structural indicators measure de jure compliance with 
international human rights treaties, process and outcome indicators measure de 
facto compliance.13 Another source of inspiration for the development of the 
interview guide were the efforts of Ertürk, Special Rapporteur on VAW, in 
relation to the development of indicators on Violence Against Women (VAW) 
and measuring States’ responses to combat VAW.14 In her report of 25 February 
2008, Yakin Ertürk responds to the call in Resolution 2004/46 15  of the 
Commission on Human Rights and proposes indicators on VAW and on 
measures taken by States to eliminate VAW. In her report, she stated the 
                                                        
7 G. de Beco, Human Rights Indicators: From Theoretical Debate to Practical Application, Journal of 
Human Rights Practice, Volume 5, No. 2, 2013, p. 2. 
8 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on Indicators for 
Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights Instruments, HRI/MC/2006/7, 11 May 2006; 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on Indicators for 
Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights, HRI/MC/2008/3, 6 June 2008; United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to 
Measurement and Implementation, HR/PUB/12/5, 2012, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Human_rights_indicators_en.pdf.  
9 Structural indicators measure a state’s intention to abide by international human rights law, 
examining the ratification of international human rights treaties and their incorporation into 
domestic legislation.  
10 Process indicators measure the efforts undertaken by states to implement human rights, 
identifying what steps states have taken to meet their human rights obligations. 
11 Outcome indicators measure a state’s human rights performance, evaluating the results of its 
human rights policies. 
12 G. de Beco, Human Rights Indicators: From Theoretical Debate to Practical Application, Journal of 
Human Rights Practice, Volume 5, No. 2, 2013, p. 2. 
13 T. Landman and J. Häusermann, Map-Making and Analysis of the Main International Initiatives on 
Developing Indicators on Democracy and Good Governance, University of Essex, Human Rights Centre, 
Final Report, July 2003, p. 5-6; G. de Beco, Human Rights Indicators for Assessing State Compliance 
with International Human Rights, Nordic Journal of International Law, Volume 77, No. 1–2, 2008, p. 
42-43. 
14 For more information, see United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe and the United Nations Statistical Division, Report of the 
Expert Group on Indicators to Measure Violence Against Women, 8-10 October 2007, Geneva, 
Switzerland, p. 5, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/IndicatorsVAW/IndicatorsVAW_EGM_report.pdf 
[Last Accessed 1 October 2015]; United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences on Indicators on Violence Against 
Women and State Response, A/HRC/7/6, 29 January 2008; United Nations Human Rights Council, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences on The Next 
Step: Developing Transnational Indicators on Violence Against Women, A/HRC/7/6/Add.5, 25 
February 2008; United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Friends of the Chair of the 
United Nations Statistical Commission on the Indicators on Violence Against Women, E/CN.3/2009/13, 
11 December 2008. 
15 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/46: 
Elimination of Violence Against Women, E/CN.4/RES/2004/46, 20 April 2004.  
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following: “It [a set of indicators on VAW] does not claim to resolve long-
standing academic debates on how to define and measure forms of violence. 
Rather, issues and questions that are often neglected are considered and 
proposals on measuring violence against women and State response are 
suggested.”16 In her report, she refers to the work and typology of the OHCHR17 
and she further proposes two sets of indicators. In the first place, the Special 
Rapporteur on VAW refers to  “indicators for measuring VAW.” In the second 
place, she refers to indicators on measures taken by Member States to eliminate 
VAW, so-called “indicators for State responses.” 
Despite these numerous initiatives, not only in the field of VAW but also for 
example in relation to the right to education,18 most human rights indicator sets 
have never been applied, mainly because their great complexity.”19 However, 
building on the work of Ertürk in relation to indicators on VAW, an instrument 
to assess a country’s level of performance regarding the prevention of FGM/C 
was drafted in 2009 by the International Centre for Reproductive Health of 
Ghent University in collaboration with the Institute for Human Rights of the 
University of Valencia, the Committee for the Abolition of Sexual Mutilation 
(Commission pour l’Abolition des Mutilations Sexuelles) and the Foundation for 
Women’s Health, Research and Development. 20  This instrument contains 
indicators that can be used to measure commitments and efforts of a country 
regarding the prevention of FGM/C, and in extension, of all forms of sexual 
and gender based violence.21 The Assessment Tool aims to give a clear overview 
of the level of efforts and commitments in any given country. In addition, it 
provides an insight into the various country approaches and ongoing initiatives 
to bring FGM to a halt. Overall, the application of the instrument would 
facilitate a coordinative approach, and simultaneously provide NGOs and other 
interest groups with a tool to pressure governments to take action. This 
Country Assessment Tool has not yet been tested and validated, and needs 
further development. According to the authors, it needs to be worked out 
further with legal experts, academics and UN agencies.22 Lastly, two other 
documents were used as a source of inspiration when developing the interview 
guide, namely the Supplement to the Handbook for Legislation on Violence 
                                                        
16 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 
Its Causes and Consequences on Indicators on Violence Against Women and State Response, A/HRC/7/6, 
29 January 2008, para. 23.  
17 Ibid, para. 28.  
18 Chapman, A., Development of Indicators for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The rights to 
Education, Participation in Cultural Life and Access to the Benefits of Science, in: Y. Donders and V. 
Volodin (eds), Human Rights in Education, Science and Culture: Legal Developments and Challenges, 
UNESCO Publishing, 2007, p. 111–51; S. Kalantry et al., Enhancing Enforcement of Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights Using Indicators: A Focus on the Right to Education in the ICESCR, Cornell Law 
Faculty Publications, Paper 1076, 2010.  
19 G. de Beco, Human Rights Indicators: From Theoretical Debate to Practical Application, Journal of 
Human Rights Practice, Volume 5, No. 2, 2013, p. 3.  
20 For more information, see E. Leye and A. Sabbe, Responding to Female Genital Mutilation in Europe: 
Striking the Right Balance Between Prosecution and Prevention, International Center for Reproductive 
Health, Ghent University, June 2009.  
21 Ibid, p. 58.  
22 Ibid.  
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Against Women: “Harmful Practices” against Women 23  developed by UN 
Women in 2012 and the checklist for the development of laws on FGM/C24 
developed by UNICEF in 2010. The purpose of this checklist is to suggest issues 
to consider while drafting laws on FGM/C. Components of the checklist are for 
example: contextual analysis, definitions and guiding principles, prevention of 
FGM/C, support and assistance for victims, punishment of perpetrator, 
implementation and evaluation. Policy makers, lawmakers, development 
practitioners and others responsible for legislative reform in relation to FGM/C 
are intended to use the checklist.25 
Although still in its infancy, the undertakings in relation to human rights 
indicators described above provided valuable input and inspiration for the 
development of the interview guide for the case study in Senegal. When 
drafting the interview guide, these efforts to establish human rights indicators 
and indicators on VAW were combined with the obligations and 
recommendations that follow from the human rights framework as described in 
Chapter IV (section 7.3). With the interview guide, I aimed to be as 
comprehensive as possible, covering all actions to be taken by Senegal in 
relation to the elimination of FGM/C, but at the same time allowing new topics 
to emerge. The interview guide consisted of 11 themes and 36 questions and 
ensured a focused in-depth exploration of the compliance question.  
 
Theme I. Ratification of human rights treaties 
The first theme tapped respondents’ personal perspectives on the ratification 
behaviour of the Senegalese government. Since ratification is an expression by 
the State of its consent to be bound by a human rights treaty under international 
law, it is an indication of a government’s commitment to safeguarding human 
rights. Respondents were asked whether and why the Senegalese government 
has (not) ratified all “core” human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).   
 
Theme II. Cooperation with Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
The second theme assessed the respondents’ perspectives on the reporting 
behaviour of the Senegalese government to the Treaty Monitoring Bodies. 
Respondents were asked whether and why the Senegalese government does 
(not) respect its legal obligation to submit periodic reports to the respective 
Treaty Monitoring Body on how the human rights are being implemented.  
 
                                                        
23 UN Women, Supplement to the Handbook for Legislation on Violence Against Women: “Harmful 
Practices” Against Women, New York, 2012, available at 
http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2
012/12/unw-legislation-supplement-en%20pdf.pdf?v=1&d=20141013T121502 [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
24 United Nations Children’s Fund, Legislative Reform to Support the Abandonment of Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting, August 2010, p. 41-44.  
25 Ibid, p. 41.  
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Theme III. Criminalizing FGM/C 
The third theme explored why the national law against FGM/C was adopted in 
Senegal, whether the human rights framework had any influence on the 
adoption of the law, if the general population has knowledge about the 
existence of the law criminalizing FGM/C, if the law has a deterrent effect, if it 
is important to have a law against FGM/C, if the law is sufficiently 
implemented and enforced, if there are mechanisms in place to monitor 
adherence and implementation of the law and if the number of court cases is 
representative for the incidence of FGM/C in Senegal.  
 
Theme IV. Policies and National Action Plans 
The fourth theme investigated the policies developed at the government level 
(including National Action Plans (NAPs), strategies, rules and regulations) 
aimed at preventing and eliminating FGM/C. Respondents were asked which 
policies have been adopted, why these policies have been adopted, whether the 
human rights framework had in their opinion any influence on the adoption of 
these policies, if the policies are well implemented and if the policy documents 
have been successful.  
 
Theme V. Role of the government 
The fifth theme addressed the role of the government in relation to the 
elimination of FGM/C in Senegal. Respondents were asked what the role is of 
the government in relation to the elimination of FGM/C in Senegal, whether 
FGM/C is a priority for the Senegalese government, whether sufficient 
resources (including budgets) allocated towards the implementation of the 
legislative and policy frameworks and if there are any outreach activities to 
communities by government agencies.  
 
Theme VI. Role of CSOs 
The sixth theme addressed the role of CSOs in relation to the elimination of 
FGM/C in Senegal. Respondents were asked what they considered the role of 
CSOs in this field, but also how the role of CSOs in relation to the elimination of 
FGM/C relates to the work of the government. Respondents were also asked 
whether the government supports and recognizes the role that COSs play in the 
elimination of FGM/C and whether CSOs are given all necessary support and 
encouragement.  
 
Theme VII. Role of the UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme 
The seventh theme addressed the role of UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme. In 
2007, UNFPA and UNICEF launched the ‘UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme 
on Female Genital Mutilation and Cutting: Accelerating Change.’ This Joint 
Programme was established, as the main UN instrument to promote 
acceleration of the elimination of FGM/C. Senegal was one of the first countries 
where the Joint Programme was implemented. Respondents were asked what 
they considered the role of the Joint Programme in Senegal. Respondents were 
also asked how the role of the Joint Programme relates to the work of the 
government and the work of CSOs in the field.  
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Theme VIII. Data collection and research  
The eighth theme covered data collection and research. Respondents were 
asked if basic data about the prevalence, trends, attitudes and behaviour 
regarding FGM/C, as well as on reported cases and enforcement of legislation 
are collected and disseminated. Respondents were also asked whether there is a 
need for more research on FGM/C.  
 
Theme IX. Support services  
The ninth theme included the availability of support services (medical, social, 
psychological) to assist and protect girls who have been subjected to FGM/C or 
those at risk of FGM/C. Respondents were asked whether, and if so which 
support services are available for these girls and women.  
 
Theme X. Training for students and professionals 
The tenth theme studied the training for students and professionals. 
Respondents were asked if awareness of FGM/C is integrated in the curricula 
of students and whether health professionals (doctors, nurses, midwives, 
psychologists) are trained to detect, manage and counsel FGM/C. In addition, 
respondents were asked if trainings on FGM/C are provided for the following 
other sectors: family services and child protection services, teachers and other 
school staff, legal professionals (judges, magistrates, lawyers), immigration 
officers and law enforcement professionals. 
 
Theme XI. Alternatives 
The last theme covered the availability of alternatives to FGM/C. Because 
FGM/C is not a rite of passage in Senegal, respondents were asked if 
alternative training and education programmes for cutters are available with 
the aim to adopt an alternative profession and an alternative source of income.  
 
Each of the themes were explored in-depth through sets of questions, both open 
– allowing the emergence of information – and closed – probing for specific 
information. The interview was concluded by making specific inquiries about 
the impact of the human rights framework in relation to the elimination of 
FGM/C in Senegal. The interview guide used during this case study in Senegal 
can be found in Annex III.   
 
3.3.3 Identification and selection of respondents 
The aim of the case study in Senegal was to find an answer to the ‘compliance 
question,’ but not to find an answer to the question whether the human rights 
framework has made a difference in the lives and well being of individuals and 
groups at the community level in Senegal. The answer to the ‘compliance 
question’ lies primarily at the governmental level. For that reason, I decided to 
focus solely on the national level and not on the community level. As a 
consequence, practicing communities or victims of FGM/C were not considered 
interview respondents.  
Three categories of respondents were identified: (i) representatives of the 
Senegalese government; (ii) representatives of CSOs; and (iii) representatives of 
international organizations (IO). The knowledge, experiences and opinions of 
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these three categories of respondents were considered relevant and necessary in 
order to be able to answer the research question to the case study in Senegal. 
 
Representatives of the Senegalese government 
In the first place, representatives of the Senegalese government were 
interviewed, because the Senegalese government is ultimately responsible for 
complying with the human rights framework, guaranteeing the rights described 
in the human rights instruments to the people in their jurisdiction. National 
governments are accountable for fulfilling its human rights obligations and 
must ensure compliance with human rights standards. The Inter-agency 
Statement on FGM/C explained: “The responsibility for action lies with many 
players, […] but the accountability ultimately rests with the government of a 
country, to prevent female genital mutilation, to promote its abandonment, to 
respond to its consequences, and to hold those who perpetrate it criminally 
responsible for inflicting harm on girls and women.”26 The previous chapter 
showed that governments have legal obligations to respect, protect and 
promote human rights, and can be held accountable for failing to fulfil these 
obligations.27 This entails taking necessary measures to eliminate FGM/C in 
Senegal. The purpose of investigating at the level of the State was to find out 
whether, and in what manner, the Senegalese government had taken any of 
such measures, actions or initiatives to address FGM/C in line with the 
obligations and recommendations following from the human rights framework.  
Several representatives of Ministries were selected as respondents, most 
importantly from the Department of the Family (Direction de la Famille) of the 
Ministry of Women, Family and Children (Ministre de la Femme, de la Famille et 
de l’Enfance) which is the main governmental agency mandated to take action in 
the field of FGM/C. Other relevant Ministries include the Ministry of Health, 
the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Education. In addition, National 
Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) and Parliamentarians were also interviewed. 
Parliamentarians play a critical in bringing the issue of FGM/C into policy 
debates28 and NHRI are important in relation to the promotion and protection 
of human rights and deal with matters concerning the implementation of 
international and regional human rights law.  
 
Representatives of CSOs 
In the second place, representatives of CSOs were interviewed, because they are 
considered key actors in designing and implementing programmes for the 
elimination of FGM/C.29 CSOs are often the translators of norms and rights, 
and therefore important actors to take into account when researching the 
‘compliance question’. Civil society comprises non-governmental organizations, 
including women’s groups, men’s groups, religious groups, independent 
experts/consultants and activists. Civil society has a critical role in providing 
                                                        
26 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 17.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid, p. 19. 
29 Ibid.  
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expertise and support and is one of the main actors involved in eliminating 
FGM/C in Senegal.30 
 
Representatives of international organizations 
In the third place, representatives of international organizations were 
interviewed, because they play an important role in supporting international 
and national initiatives by providing technical and financial support. 31 
Representatives of UNICEF and UNFPA were interviewed, because of the 
existence of the ‘UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital 
Mutilation and Cutting: Accelerating Change.’ However, also the WHO, the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) as well as UN 
Women were also identified as important actors in relation to the elimination of 
FGM/C in Senegal.    
 
In order to avoid biases in relation to the selection of respondents (as much as 
possible), I carried out the fieldwork in Senegal on my own, without any formal 
cooperation agreement with for example Cheikh Anta Diop University (or any 
other research institute), Tostan (or any other CSO), UNICEF or UNFPA (or any 
other international organization). A helpful tool in identifying respondents 
within these three categories was to check annexes of relevant documents that 
have been written about FGM/C in Senegal, i.e. the evaluation of the first 
NAP,32 the evaluation of the national law in Senegal criminalizing FGM/C33 
and the evaluation of the UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme on FGM/C in 
Senegal.34 In the annexes of these evaluations, lists of stakeholders and/or 
experts in relation to FGM/C in Senegal who were consulted during the 
evaluations can be found. These lists of stakeholders and/or experts provided a 
valuable starting point for the identification of respondents. In addition, 
minutes of meetings organized at the Department of the Family (Direction de la 
Famille) of the Ministry of Women, Family and Children (Ministre de la Femme, 
de la Famille et de l’Enfance) were studied in order to further identify experts that 
work in the field of FGM/C in Senegal.  
                                                        
30 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change (2008-2012) 
– Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF sur les 
Mutilations Génitales Féminines/Excision: Accélérer le Changement (2008-2012) – Sénégal), New York, 
July 2013, p. 11.  
31 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 19 
32 A. Diop-Diagne, Evaluation of the National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female 
Genital Mutilation (Original in French: Evaluation du Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la 
Pratique des Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and Female 
Entrepreneurship, September 2008, p. 53.  
33 B. Ndiaye, State Application of the Law on Excision in Senegal (Original in French: L’Etat d’Application 
de la Loi sur l’Excision au Sénégal), Ministry of Family and Women’s Organizations, UNFPA and 
UNICEF, December 2010, p. 76-77.  
34 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change (2008-2012) 
– Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF sur les 
Mutilations Génitales Féminines/Excision: Accélérer le Changement (2008-2012) – Sénégal), New York, 
July 2013, p. ii and p. 68-70. 
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After drawing a short-list of government departments and organizations, the 
next step was to identify which persons would be most interesting for my 
research to interview. Within the government departments, people who were 
responsible for the FGM/C agenda and/or had most expertise about FGM/C 
and human rights were selected.35 Within the international organizations, the 
same selection criteria were applied. The respondents who were responsible for 
the FGM/C agenda or most knowledgeable about FGM/C within the 
organization were selected. The selection of CSOs was based on the criteria that 
the organization should work specifically in the field of FGM/C. Respondents 
within the CSOs were selected on the basis of their position and function within 
the organization. In the first place, individuals in executive positions of CSOs 
were targeted for their in-depth knowledge of the women’s rights movement 
(and struggle) in Senegal. In the second place, individuals working for CSOs 
who are involved in advocacy, education, community mobilization and 
awareness-raising at the grassroots level were interviewed as well.   
The snowball method was also used. Respondents were asked after the 
interview if s/he would know another expert working in the field of FGM/C in 
Senegal. If this person was not yet on my short-list, I checked whether this 
person would fit in my research design. During the last month of the field study 
period, I showed the respondents after the interview a list with names of 
persons I already interviewed. I asked the respondents whether – according to 
them – someone was missing on this list. This proved to be an important 
method to identify respondents, since the starting-point for the selection of 
respondents were the annexes of evaluations of the first NAP, the national law 
and the Joint Programme. Apparently, the same persons were consulted over 
and over again and an often-heard critique was that “always the same persons 
were asked to evaluate certain programmes.” In order to avoid this response 
bias, and to make sure that not only the ‘usual suspects’ were included in my 
research, I gave other experts and stakeholders (who do not appear on these 
lists) the opportunity to participate in my research and I included their 
experiences, views and knowledge.36  
 
3.3.4 Contacting respondents 
The first step to recruit the respondents was to contact them via e-mail. The 
respondents received an e-mail with an invitation to participate in my research. 
This invitation e-mail contained three attachments: (i) a document with 
information and a summary of my research project to inform the targeted 
respondents about the purpose and aim of the study; (ii) the interview guide; 
and (iii) a letter of consent. The e-mail and the documents attached were written 
in French. When respondents did not reply to the e-mail, they were contacted 
by phone. If they agreed to participate, a date, place and time were agreed upon 
for the interview to take place. I also inquired whether the respondents 
preferred to do the interview in English or in French (with a translator).  
                                                        
35 I found out who had most expertise about FGM/C and human rights during my “internship” at 
the Department of the Family, see section 3.4 of this Chapter.  
36 This proved to be a good strategy, since the ‘usual suspects’ mentioned names and provided the 
contact details of other experts and stakeholders.  
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3.3.5 Informed consent 
Before the interview took place, informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. Since none of the participants were illiterate, all respondents 
signed the form and received a copy. Participation to this study was completely 
voluntary. Respondents could refuse to participate, refuse to answer a question 
or withdraw from the interview at any time without the need to explain or 
justify their decision. All respondents were informed that the information given 
would be treated anonymously and remained confidential. Although the 
respondents agreed that their names and details regarding their professional 
positions could be found in an annex of this book, the information gathered 
during the field research was made anonymous to avoid any possibility of 
identification. The respondents were guaranteed that their names would not 
appear in any analysis. All respondents gave their consent for the interview to 
be recorded, although one interview was not recorded, since this interview took 
place at the U.S. Embassy in Dakar. It was not allowed to bring in any recording 
instrument. Directly after the interview, a detailed report of the interview was 
made and sent to the respondent for approval via e-mail. This respondent 
approved the interview report with some minor changes. The participants were 
informed that they could ask to stop the recording at any time. One respondent 
used this possibility and shared information when the recorder was turned off 
for a couple of minutes. The respondents were also informed that the interviews 
were going to be transcribed. Three respondents inquired if they could review 
and approve the transcript of their interview. In these three cases, the 
transcripts were sent to these respondents via e-mail for approval. Without any 
modifications, these three respondents approved the transcripts. The letter of 
consent used during this case study in Senegal can be found in Annex IV.   
 
3.3.6 Interview procedure 
I conducted all interviews myself, face-to-face in order to be able to observe 
non-verbal behaviour and verbal tones of the respondent. Notes were made 
during the interview. All interviews comprised of individual discussions (no 
group conversations or ‘focus groups’ with two or more respondents were 
organized).  
Before the interview started, I made sure that the respondent was 
sufficiently informed about the content and purpose of my study. I asked 
whether they had read the documents attached to the e-mail and if this was not 
the case, I briefly explained the rationale of my study. All interviews started 
with an introduction where the respondent was asked to introduce him/herself 
and to elaborate on his/her position and his/her main tasks and duties. This 
allowed me to assess whether the expertise of the respondent was in accordance 
with my expectations. Then, five or six themes of the interview guide were 
discussed. At the end of each interview, I asked the respondent whether there 
was anything that s/he wanted to share that had not come up during the 
interview.  
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3.3.7 Critical reflection on my own role 
Qualitative research is sometimes viewed as unreliable because it reflects the 
normative predispositions of the researcher.37 Being a foreigner, more precisely 
a young woman from the Netherlands with a white skin, blond hair and blue 
eyes, or in Ahmadadu’s terms an “outsider”38 (individuals who are not from the 
societies they analyze and who have no personal experience of any form of the 
practice), might have positively and/or negatively influenced this research. I 
had a sincere wish to gain a deeper understanding of the ‘compliance question’ 
in relation to the practice of FGM/C and I tried my best not to be biased. I 
conducted the fieldwork in Senegal with an open mindset, being very much 
aware of the importance of non-judgmental language and approaching people 
in a very respectful manner, eager to learn more and deepen my knowledge 
about the practice. Although I was aware of any possible bias while conducting 
this study, I always tried to be as careful, transparent and neutral as possible 
when carrying out this research. As described in the section above, I have tried 
to control researcher bias by using the method of ‘triangulation’. In addition, 
the conference organized at the end of the field study in Senegal, where I 
presented preliminary findings and received feedback, also helped to avoid 
researcher bias.  
 
3.4 Pilot study 
 
A two-week pilot study in Dakar was conducted in May 2013. As suggested by 
an African proverb from the Ashanti people in Ghana "No one tests the depth of a 
river with both feet", the main goal of my pilot study was to assess the feasibility 
of my empirical study so as to avoid consequences that could potentially 
“drown” my research project.39 The preliminary field research set the stage for 
the exploration of Senegalese civil society work and the work of international 
organizations. I made most of my contacts with relevant Civil Society 
Organizations (such as Tostan, COSEPRAT, ASBEF and Save the Children) and 
international organizations (UNFPA, UNICEF, OHCHR) during the pilot 
study.40  
During the desk research, I found out that the Senegalese government has 
mandated the Department of the Family (Direction de la Famille) of the Ministry 
of Women, Family and Children (Ministre de la Femme, de la Famille et de 
l’Enfance)41 in Dakar to be the coordinating body to take action in the field of 
                                                        
37 G. Shaffer and T. Ginsburg, Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, American Journal of 
International Law, Volume 106, No. 1, 2012, p. 3.  
38 F. Ahmadu, Rites and Wrongs: An Insider/Outsider Reflects on Power and Excision, in: B. Shell-
Duncan and Y. Hernlund, Female "Circumcision" in Africa: Culture, Controversy and Change, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2000, p. 283.  
39 L. Thabane et al., A Tutorial on Pilot Studies: The What, Why and How, BMC Medical Research 
Methodology, Volume 10, No. 1, 2010, p. 1. 
40 For all CSOs included in this research, see Annex II. 
41 This Ministry changed its name several times in recent years. At the time of the adoption of the 
National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of FGM/C (2000-2005), the Ministry was referred to 
as the Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship (Ministère de la 
Famille, de la Solidarité Nationale de L’Entreprenariat Féminin). Afterwards, it became the Ministry of 
Family, National Solidarity, Food Security, Female Entrepreneurship, Micro Finance and Early 
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FGM/C. During the pilot study, I “interned” at this Department of the Family, 
that allowed me to gain insights in the day-to-day practice and the way the 
FGM/C agenda was put forth at the governmental level. I shared the office 
with the civil servant who was responsible for the FGM/C agenda, which 
allowed me to get a first impression of the involvement of the Ministry of 
Women, Family and Children and the collaboration between different actors in 
relation to the actions taken to eliminate FGM/C in Senegal. During this 
“internship” I made detailed notes of my observations.  
During the pilot study, the interview guide was tested through five pilot 
interviews with respondents. In this pilot phase, the study design was iterative, 
since data collection strategy and research questions in the interview guide 
were adjusted according to what was learned. Piloting the interview guide 
helped to eliminate leading questions. During the pilot study, the interview 
guide was discussed with two local Senegalese researchers (one with a legal 
and one with an anthropological background) who can be considered experts in 
relation to the practice of FGM/C in Senegal. They identified possible 
weaknesses and ambiguities in the interview guide. These two researchers also 
adjusted the language and terminology of the interview guide in order to be 
more suitable for the targeted respondents.  
An important finding during the pilot study was that the interview guide 
was too long. Taking into account the considerable amount of themes and 
questions, it proved to be impossible to address all themes during one 
interview (of approximately one hour). The pilot interviews demonstrated that 
5 or 6 themes on average per interview were feasible. Since the aim of the case 
study was to provide a complete picture of the ‘compliance question’, a solution 
for this problem was not to delete certain themes and to limit the interview 
guide in length. Instead, I decided to keep all eleven themes, but to select 
specific themes per respondent instead. During the course of the fieldwork, this 
proved to be a fruitful decision, since there was no single respondent who had 
sound knowledge about all eleven themes. Depending on the background, 
expertise and knowledge of the respondent, I therefore decided which themes I 
wanted to discuss with a specific respondent during the interview. I made these 
decisions in a structured way (see table 5.1 below for a complete overview of 
the themes discussed per respondent). For example: parliamentarians, civil 
servants, government consultants were mostly asked questions about the 
adoption of the law against FGM/C and policy development, while doctors, 
nurses, gynaecologists, sexologists, counsellors, social workers were mostly 
asked questions about support services and trainings for professionals. As table 
5.2 shows, I also made sure that all eleven themes were covered by at least all 
three different groups (government, international organizations and civil 
society organizations). 
During the pilot study, I also gathered relevant documents (such as NAPs, 
other policy documents, reports and evaluations of the government, CSOs and 
                                                        
Childhood (Ministère de la Famille, de la Solidarité Nationale, de la Sécurité Alimentaire, de 
l’Entreprenariat Féminin, de la Micro Finance et de la Petite Enfance) and it was renamed the Ministry of 
Women, Children and Women Entrepreneurship (Ministère de la Femme, de l’Enfant et de 
l’Entreprenariat Feminine) in 2012. 
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international organizations) that I could not access in the Netherlands because 
they were not available online. I asked all organizations I visited if they had any 
reports, documents or information of other kind concerning FGM/C in Senegal 
(National Action Plans, policy documents, leaflets, folders, programmes, 
minutes of meetings, etc.) that could be useful for my study. These documents 
enabled me to deepen my knowledge about the action taken at the national 
level in relation to FGM/C. This was important for the preparation of the actual 
field study that followed a few months later.  
 
3.5 Field research 
 
During a period of 4.5 months (September 2013 until February 2014) the field 
research was conducted in Senegal. In total, 60 respondents were invited to 
participate in my research. The majority of the interviews took place in Dakar,42 
with a few exceptions: four interviews took place in Thiès and one interview in 
Guediawaye. Most of the interviews were conducted at the location of the 
respective department or organization where the respondent worked, but a 
number of interviews took place at the home of the respondent, in a restaurant, 
café or in the lobby of a hotel. The interviews took on average one hour. All 60 
respondents reacted positively and agreed to participate in the research. In the 
end, 54 interviews were conducted. Due to busy time schedules, holidays and 
work missions outside Senegal of the remaining 6 respondents, it was not 
possible to schedule a meeting with them. More specifically, 12 interviews were 
conducted at the government level, 12 interviews with international 
organizations (IO) and 30 interviews with CSO. In total 32 women and 22 men 
were interviewed; 49 had the Senegalese nationality, 5 were non-Senegalese.  
 
Table 5.1. Details of respondents 
 
 Number of interviews Male 
 
Female 
 
 
Senegalese 
 
 
Non-
Senegalese 
 
 
Government 
 
12 
 
5 
 
7 
 
12 
 
0 
IO 12 5 7 9 3 
SCO 30 12 18 28 2 
Total 54 22 32 49 5 
 
 
In total, 21 interviews were conducted in English, 33 interviews were conducted 
in French with a translator. In total, three different translators were involved in 
this study (two females and one male). All three were professional translators 
                                                        
42 Although all interviews were conducted in the capital city of Senegal, I have visited practicing 
communities in remote areas in Saint-Louis, Louga, Diourbel, Thiès, Fatick, Kaolack, Sédhiou and 
Kolda (upon invitation of some CSOs and/or UNICEF).  
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and had a lot of experience in translating. One of the translators had extensive 
knowledge about FGM/C in Senegal. All three translators were Senegalese 
nationals and had knowledge of the culture of the people under study. 
Although the translators were carefully selected, it could be that the presence of 
this person in the room during the interview influenced the answers given to 
the questions posed. For example, it is possible that government officials gave 
politically correct and/or social desirable answers to certain questions, because 
another Senegalese national was present.  
Respondents had a wide variety of backgrounds: executive directors, heads 
of units, legal officers, politicians, policy officers, human rights officers, 
programme coordinators, lawyers, project managers, activists, consultants, 
child protection officers/specialists, gender advisors, civil servants, government 
consultants, researchers, university professors, psychologists, sociologists, legal 
scholars, doctors, nurses, gynaecologists, sexologists, counsellors, social 
workers, imams, journalists, parliamentarians. For a complete overview of the 
persons interviewed and the respective organizations they work for, see Annex 
II.  
All respondents had the opportunity to reflect on the preliminary research 
results during a conference that was organized at the end of the field study in 
January 2014 at the Residence of the Netherlands Embassy in Dakar. All 
respondents were invited and approximately 90% of them were present. During 
this conference, the preliminary findings of the fieldwork were presented. After 
the presentation, a Q&A session followed where the respondents were given 
the opportunity to give responses and provide feedback on the preliminary 
research results. The feedback of the respondents was very positive and useful. 
The conference proved to be a good way to validate the preliminary research 
results. 
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
 
As described in section 3.3.5, interviews were audio-recorded. All interview 
recordings were transcribed verbatim43 in Word documents, with the help of 
research assistants, using the software programme F5. The transcripts were 
later anonymised. The three different categories (Government, IO and CSO) 
were kept. In addition to the transcripts, my notes made during the interviews, 
my notes made during the “internship” at the Department of the Family as well 
as my notes made at the conference at the Residence of the Netherlands 
Embassy in Dakar were taken into account as well.  
The aim of this study was not to quantify the results of the in-depth 
interviews, but to look at how and why respondents differ in views in order to 
discover patterns, factors and new ideas. The data analysis consisted of a 
thematic analysis, which was carried out manually. In a systematic way, all 
transcripts were coded in terms of the predetermined eleven themes of the 
interview guide. Although my aim was not to quantify the results (for example 
                                                        
43 ‘Verbatim’ means that there is no editing involved and everything is typed out just as it is on the 
recording: "word for word." 
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to state that “six out of ten respondents said…”), I was nevertheless interested 
in how many respondents gave a specific answer to a specific question. 
Therefore, I made eleven excel sheets for each theme and I identified the 
different answers given to the questions. I counted how many times a specific 
answer was given, in order to assess whether the answer was given by the 
following category: “all respondents”, “many respondents”, “some respondents” 
or “none of the respondents” and I differentiated in the three groups of 
respondents. In this way, I was able to identify how many respondents gave 
which answer to a specific question, but also whether one group gave a specific 
answer, while another group did not. Table 5.2 provides an overview of the 
themes discussed with how many respondents (differentiated per category).  
 
Table 5.2 Themes discussed with respondents 
 
 I II 
 
III 
 
 
IV 
 
 
V 
 
VI VII 
 
VIII 
 
 
IX 
 
 
X 
 
 
XI 
 
 
Government 
 
10 
 
10 
 
11 
 
6 
 
5 
 
3 
 
3 
 
7 
 
2 
 
1 
 
5 
IO 12 12 11 9 2 3 4 9 2 3 4 
SCO 18 18 29 17 9 6 8 16 9 4 8 
Total 40 40 51 32 16 12 15 32 13 8 17 
 
In order to increase the credibility and validity of the research results, the 
method ‘triangulation’ was used, which enabled me to “compare different 
kinds of data from different sources to see whether they corroborate each 
other.”44 Multiple data collection methods were used in this case study; not only 
semi-structured interviews, but also desk research (section 3.2). The data 
following from the analysis with the interviews was compared with the data 
collected during the extensive a priori desk study of the existing literature and 
documents concerning FGM/C in Senegal, in order to see whether there were 
any differences. This mixed study design approach proved to be a successful 
method to avoid and control researcher bias. It enabled me to provide a more 
detailed and balanced picture and enhanced the rigour of this field research.45  
 
3.7 Limitations and constraints 
 
3.7.1 Sensitive subject 
Since FGM/C is a very sensitive issue, it leaves room to question the 
truthfulness of a respondent when questioned by an unknown interviewer. The 
likelihood for respondents to give culturally acceptable answers constitutes a 
concern.  
                                                        
44 C. Seale, Researching Society and Culture, Sage Publications Ltd, 2000, p. 231. 
45 H. Altrichter et al., Teachers Investigate their Work; An Introduction to Action Research across the 
Professions, Routledge, 2008, p. 147. 
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3.7.2 Isolating FGM/C from its context 
While I am fully aware that the practice of FGM/C cannot be isolated from its 
context (and acknowledging that the main problem of the current campaign 
against FGM/C is the tendency to do that), taking into account the limited time 
and resources for this research, the decision has been made to focus only upon 
the practice of FGM/C. While I tried to address in the analysis, other problems 
many Senegalese women face (for example inequality in relation to marital 
authority, parental authority, choice of residence, property, divorce, levirate 
and sororate)46 and women’s dependence on male family members, it proved 
not to be possible in this thesis to fully address the debilitating conditions, 
which constitute the reality of many Senegalese women.  
 
4 THE REPUBLIC SENEGAL 
 
4.1 Geographic, Demographic and Economic Characteristics47 
 
The Republic of Senegal is located in the extreme west of the African continent 
along the Atlantic Ocean with 700 km of coastline. Covering a land area of 
approximately 197,000 square kilometres, Senegal is bounded to the north by 
Mauritania, to the east by Mali and to the south by Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. 
Internally, Senegal almost completely surrounds the Gambia, namely on the 
north, east and south, except for Gambia's short Atlantic coastline (see Annex I 
for a map of Senegal).   
Dakar, the capital city of Senegal, is located at the westernmost tip of the 
country. Senegal is divided into 14 administrative regions: Dakar, Diourbel, 
Fatick, Kaffrine, Kaolack, Kédougou, Kolda, Louga, Matam, Saint-Louis, 
Sédhiou, Tambacounda, Thiès and Ziguinchor. Regional capitals have the same 
name as their respective regions. The autonomy of local governments is 
strengthened by Act No. 96-06 of 22 March 1996 by transferring major areas of 
responsibility to the regions. Each regional government is now administered by 
a governor and regional councillors, which are both elective posts.48 The 14 
administrative regions are subdivided into 45 departments, 165 municipalities, 
123 arrondissements and 383 rural administrative areas. Elected mayors and 
municipal councillors administer the municipalities. A chief councillor and 
rural councillors, all of whom are elected at the local level, govern the rural 
administrative areas.49  
Senegal has a large amount of demographic and economic data through 
surveys conducted over the past thirty years. These various investigations have 
yielded basic demographic and economic data and trends. Senegal’s population 
is growing rapidly and almost doubled between 1988 and 2012: from 6,9 to 13,2 
                                                        
46 Traditional practices where a man may marry his dead brother’s widow or his dead wife’s sister. 
47 Unless otherwise cited, the information in this paragraph is cited from the most recent DHS 
survey: Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie [Sénégal], et ICF International, 
Enquête Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue 2012-2013), ANSD et ICF International, 
2012, p.1-2.  
48 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Third Periodic Report of Senegal, CAT/C/SEN/3, 5 
October 2011, p. 4, para. 9.  
49 Ibid, p. 4, para. 9.  
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million inhabitants (including 6,5 million men and 6,7 million women). In 2014, 
Senegal had 14,55 million inhabitants. 50  The under-representation of men 
compared to women can be explained largely by emigration, which affects 
more men. The strong growth results in an extreme young population: more 
than 50% of the Senegalese population is younger than 20 years (45% are under 
15 years and only 5% over 65 years). Over the past 25 years, the fertility of 
women in Senegal has declined from 6.4 children per woman in 1986 to 5.3 
children in 2013. Some differences in fertility appear between areas of residence: 
urban women have a significantly lower level of fertility (4.1 children per 
woman) than rural women (6.3 children per woman). Senegalese households 
are large: a household consist of an average of 9.3 members. Rural households 
are larger than those in urban areas (respectively 10.1 and 8.5 people on 
average).51 In 75% of the cases, the head of the household is a man; women head 
one-quarter of households. Almost half (45%) of household members are 
children under age 15.52 Infant and child mortality remains high in Senegal, 
although childhood mortality levels have been decreasing over the past years. 
On 1000 infants born alive, 47 infants die before reaching their first birthday 
(26% in the first month and 17% between month 1-12). Among infants over one 
year, 23% did not reach their fifth birthday. Overall, the risk of dying between 
birth and the fifth birthday is 65 per 1000 births, or about one in 15.  
The average population density is 68 inhabitants per square kilometre. 
However, the population is unevenly distributed among the 14 administrative 
regions. For example, Dakar is home to nearly 20.5% of the total population 
with 2,7 million people. In the regions Thiès and Diourbel live respectively 1,7 
million and 1,4 million inhabitants. Conversely, the eastern regions of the 
country are sparsely populated. The Kédougou region has the lowest 
population size with 137,485 inhabitants (only 1.0 % of the total population) and 
the largest region, Tambacounda, houses approximately 6 % of the population.  
The illiteracy rate at the national level is 65%. The illiteracy rate varies from one 
region to another: the lowest was observed in Dakar (35%); Ziguinchor follows 
with 43%. In other areas, outside of St. Louis and Thiès, illiteracy is over 75%. 
The results of the 2010-11 DHS-MICS53 show that the education level of the 
Senegalese population is low, especially among women. Overall, 57% of 
Senegalese women aged 15-49 have no formal education, compared to 48% of 
men in the same age-category. By contrast, only 3.1% of the women and 3.2% of 
men have completed primary education (while 26.1% of women and 27.5% of 
men did not complete the cycle). Only 2% of the Senegalese women reported 
having completed secondary education or higher (while 11.4% of women and 
                                                        
50 See the website of the World Bank, Data Senegal, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/senegal [Last accessed 1 October 2015].  
51 Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie [Sénégal], et ICF International. Enquête 
Démographique et de Santé à Indicateurs Multiples au Sénégal (EDS-MICS) 2010-2011, ANSD et ICF 
International, 2012, p. 23-24.  
52 Agence Nationale de la Statistique and ICF International, 2010-11 Senegal Demographic and Health 
and Multiple Indicators Survey: Key Findings, ANSD and ICF International, 2012, p. 2.  
53 Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie [Sénégal], et ICF International. Enquête 
Démographique et de Santé à Indicateurs Multiples au Sénégal (EDS-MICS) 2010-2011, ANSD et ICF 
International, 2012, p. 24-26.  
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15.4% of men did not complete the cycle), compared to 4.1% of men. 
Examination of the results by age shows a significant improvement in the level 
of education from older to newer generations. The proportion of men with no 
education increased from 80.5% among those aged 65 and over to 33.2% of 
those aged 10-14. Among women, the progress has been more rapid in recent 
years. The proportion of those uneducated pass 94.4% among those aged 65 and 
over and 30.7% of those aged 10-14. However, only 51% of school-aged children 
(6-11 years) are enrolled in primary school. Girls attend primary school a little 
more than boys: 50.4% of boys and 51.8% of girls are enrolled (gender parity 
index is 1.03). The school attendance rate is influenced by the place of residence 
of the children (66% in urban areas and 43% in rural areas) and the level of 
economic well being of the household (39% of children of households in the 
lowest quintile and 70% for households in the highest quintile). At secondary 
level, the enrolment rate of school-aged children of (12-16) years is much lower 
compared to the primary level, namely 24.5%. Boys attend secondary school a 
little more than girls: 24.6% boys and 24.4% girls are enrolled (gender parity is 
index is 0.99). The proportion of children enrolled at the secondary level is 
much higher in urban areas (36%) compared to rural areas (17%). 
The 2010-11 DHS-MICS54 results show disparities in men and women’s 
employment; 49% of married women aged 15-49 have work, compared to 98.8% 
of married men aged 15-49. Moreover, this proportion increases with the age 
(from 27.4% among young women aged 15-19 to 68.6% among those aged 45-
49). Among the women who worked, 79% were paid in cash (compared to 77% 
of men). Among women who received cash payment for their work, 8 in 10 
earned less than their husbands or partners. In total 12% of married women and 
11.1% of married men were not paid for their work.  
As in most West African countries, Senegal has a wide variety of ethnic 
groups. Although Senegal has more than 20 ethnic groups, more than 90% of 
the population belongs to one of the five dominant ethnic groups. Wolof is the 
largest single ethnic group in Senegal (43%), followed by Poular (24%) and 
Sérer (15%). Other groups are located in the southern areas of the country, 
particularly in the region of the Casamance. They include the Diola (5%), and 
the smaller communities of the Mandingue (4%), which are located in outlying 
regions close to Mali or Guinea.55  
Senegal’s population is predominantly Muslim (94%). The Christian 
population (4%) includes mostly Roman Catholics, but also diverse Protestant 
denominations. Animist and other indigenous beliefs (Traditional African 
religion – for example the Serer religion) account for the remaining 2%. French 
is the official language of Senegal,56 but is used regularly only by the literate 
minority. The national languages are Wolof, Diola, Malinké, Pular, Sérère and 
Soninké, of which Wolof has the largest usage. Life expectancy at birth in 
                                                        
54 Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie [Sénégal], et ICF International. Enquête 
Démographique et de Santé à Indicateurs Multiples au Sénégal (EDS-MICS) 2010-2011, ANSD et ICF 
International, 2012, p. 275-277.  
55 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Third Periodic Report of Senegal, CAT/C/SEN/3, 5 
October 2011, para. 6.  
56 Constitution of the Republic of Senegal, 2010, As Amended to Constitutional Law No. 2009-22 of 
19 June 2009, Article 1.  
 
 
 
Chapter V 
220 
Senegal increased from 60 years in 2004 to 62 years in 2007 and 63 years in 
2012.57  
Since Senegal has limited natural resources, the economy of Senegal gains 
most of its foreign exchange from fish, phosphates, groundnuts, tourism and 
services. Thanks to the launch of a structural economic reform program in 1994 
(backed by the donor community), Senegal made significant progress, which 
led to real growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaging over 5% 
annually during 1995-2007. From the year 2000 on, the main engines of growth 
were construction, commerce, transport and telecommunications. The effects of 
the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2009 have slowed this positive trend. 
Since 2010, Senegal's economy began to recover under the double effect of the 
recovery of the world economy and the measures taken by the authorities in 
favour of national economic activity. Indeed, the growth rate of GDP increased 
from 2.2% in 2009 to 4.2% in 2010 and decreased to 2.8% in 2013. The GDP was 
$14,79 billion in 2014. 
While the 1994 programme succeeded in improving public finances and 
increasing the currency’s stability, it did not result in a significant reduction in 
poverty or unemployment (which stands between 40-50% and is particularly 
high among young people).58 In 2011, 46.7% of the population was living below 
the poverty line. In 2006 this was 48.3% and in 2001 it was 55.2%. Poverty is 
lower in Dakar (26%) than in other urban areas (41%) and rural areas (57%). 
Although the incidence of poverty declined slightly, it was accompanied by an 
absolute increase in the number of poor over the period (from 5.7 million in 
2006 to 6.3 million in 2011). The outstanding domestic as well as the external 
public debt increased remarkably over the past years. The total outstanding 
external debt reached 39.7% of GDP, against 26.0% in 2008.   
 
4.2 Constitutional, Political and Legal Structure59 
 
After Senegal gained its independence from France in 1960, the country had a 
single-party system (the Senegalese Progressive Union, which became in 1976 
the Socialist Party of Senegal) under the leadership of the first president 
Léopold Sédar Senghor. The Constitution of the Republic of Senegal was 
adopted in 1963. 60  With establishment of democratic institutions and a 
multiparty system between 1970 and 1980, Senegal has long been cited as an 
example to follow in a continent where authoritarian regimes predominate. 
President Léopold Sédar Senghor voluntarily relinquished power in 1980. The 
Senegalese Constitution was amended in 1981 to formally allow for multiparty 
system. In 1981, Abdou Diouf became the new President of the Republic. 
Abdou Diouf served four terms as President between 1981 and 2000. For 40 
                                                        
57 See the website of the World Bank, Data Senegal, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/senegal [Last accessed 1 October 2015].  
58 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Third Periodic Report of Senegal, CAT/C/SEN/3, 5 
October 2011, p. 4, para. 10.  
59 Unless otherwise cited, the information in this paragraph is cited from the third periodic report of 
Senegal to the Committee Against Torture: United Nations Committee Against Torture, Third 
Periodic Report of Senegal, CAT/C/SEN/3, 5 October 2011, p. 7, para. 22-28.  
60 Constitutional Law 63-22 of 7 March 1963.  
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years, Senegal ‘s principal political party was the Socialist Party of Senegal. This 
domination came to an end in 2000, when Senegal experienced its second 
peaceful transition of power, and its first from one political party to another. 
Abdoulaye Wade, who was an opponent of the Socialists and the leader of the 
Senegalese Democratic Party, won the presidency. This transition stands as an 
example of one of the rare cases of a peaceful transfer of power in Africa. In a 
referendum held in January 2001, Senegalese voters (with a turnout of over 90 
per cent) approved the new Constitution presented by President Abdoulaye 
Wade. He was re-elected in 2007 and served till April 2012, when Macky Sall 
(member of the political party Alliance for the Republic) became the new 
President. Senegal is one of the few African states that have never experienced a 
coup d’état and it remains one of the most stable democracies in Africa. The 
president and the executive branch hold executive power. The Head of State is 
elected by direct universal suffrage (by majority vote in two rounds) for a 
renewable five-year term. The 2001 constitution introduced a two-term limit for 
the president. The prime minister is the Head of Government and appointed by 
the President. The prime minister nominates the cabinet ministers. The 
Government directs and coordinates the nation’s policies. The constitutional 
amendments of 2007 and 2008 led to the reinstatement of the Senate (100 seats), 
which, together with the National Assembly (150 seats), now makes up the 
country’s bicameral legislature. The judiciary is (theoretically) independent of 
the executive and legislative branches. The country’s justice system is patterned 
after the French system and includes the Constitutional Council, the Supreme 
Court and a number of lower courts, members of which are named by the 
president. 
 
5 FGM/C IN SENEGAL 
 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys (MICS) provide extensive data on prevalence and nature of FGM/C. 
Data regarding FGM/C was for the first time61 collected in Senegal in 2005,62 
subsequently in 2010-2011,63 again in 2012-201364 and the most recent statistics 
date from 2014.65 This section provides an overview of the available data in 
relation to FGM/C in Senegal. 
                                                        
61 Although the DHS and MICS were conducted in Senegal in 1986, 1992 and 1997, questions about 
FGM/C were not included.  
62 S. Ndiaye and M. Ayad, Enquête Démographique et de Santé au Sénégal 2005, Centre de Recherche 
pour le Développement Humain [Sénégal] et ORC Macro, 2006, p. 237-258. 
63 Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie [Sénégal], et ICF International. Enquête 
Démographique et de Santé à Indicateurs Multiples au Sénégal (EDS-MICS) 2010-2011, ANSD et ICF 
International, 2012, p. 293-302. 
64 The DHS-Continue 2012-2013 only collected data on FGM/C prevalence among young girls aged 
0-15 years, see Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie [Sénégal], et ICF 
International, Enquête Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue 2012-2013), ANSD et ICF 
International, 2012, p. 85-88. 
65 Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie [Sénégal], et ICF International, Sénégal: 
Enquête Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue 2014), ANSD et ICF International, 2015, p. 
95-104.  
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5.1 Knowledge about FGM/C 
 
According to the DHS-2014, the proportion of Senegalese women who reported 
knowledge about FGM/C is high: 92.1% of the women66 and 88.5% of the men67 
surveyed indicated that they know the practice. There are slight variations in 
knowledge about the practice, depending on the socio-demographic 
characteristics (such as age, religion, residence, ethnicity, region, level of 
education and economic well-being). For example, 96.3% of the women and 
99.3% of the men in the age group 45-49 reported knowledge about FGM/C, 
while 84.4% of women and 67.6% of the men in the age group 15-19 know about 
the practice. While 91.9% of the Muslim women and 88.3% of the Muslim men 
reported knowledge about FGM/C, 96.6% of the Christian women and 92.3% of 
the Christian men knew about the practice. There are also slight differences in 
place of residence: 96.1% of the women and 93.2% of the men from urban areas 
know about the practice, while 87.4% of the women and 82.4% of the men living 
in rural areas reported knowledge about FGM/C.   
 
5.2 National prevalence 
 
According to the DHS-2014, 24.7% of the girls and women aged between 15 and 
49 have been subjected to FGM/C in Senegal. In 2005, the national prevalence 
was 28.2% and in 2010-2011, the national prevalence was 25.7%. Thus, between 
2005 and 2014, the prevalence of FGM/C among girls and women aged 15-49 in 
Senegal dropped with 3.5%. A comparison of prevalence rates across age 
groups indicates a slight decline in prevalence of FGM/C between generations, 
see table 5.3.  
 
Table 5.3 National prevalence of FGM/C  
 
FGM/C Prevalence 2005 2010-2011 
 
2014 
 
 
National prevalence 
 
28.2% 
 
25.7% 
 
24.7% 
Age group 15-19 24.8% 24.0% 21.1% 
Age group 45-49 30.6% 28.5% 25.7% 
 
There are significant differences in prevalence rates in Senegal depending on 
the region and ethnicity. 
 
5.3 Regional differences 
 
In Senegal, FGM/C is not practiced consistently across the country and there 
are major differences between regions. Although the DHS-2014 differentiates 
only between the North (30.4%), West (16.6%), Central (6.3%) and South (69.4%); 
                                                        
66 In 2005 this proportion was 94% and in 2010-2011 this was 91.3%. 
67 In 2005 this proportion was 92.4% and in 2010-2011 this was not included in the survey.  
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the DHS-2010-2011 provides more detailed information about the prevalence 
per region. In Kédougou (92.0%), Matam (87.2%), Sédhiou (86.3%), 
Tambacounda (85.3%) and Kolda (84.8%) the practice is widespread, while in 
the regions of Diourbel (0.5%), Thiès (3.5%), Louga (3.8%), Kaolack (5.6%) and 
Fatick (7.3%), the prevalence is low. Differences in prevalence also exist 
between urban (21.9%) and rural areas (27.9%). Table 5.4 also provides an 
overview of the statistics of 2005 and 2010-2011. 
 
Table 5.4 Differences between urban and rural areas 
 
Area 2005 2010-2011 
 
2014 
 
 
Urban 
 
21.7% 
 
23.4% 
 
21.9% 
Rural 34.4% 27.8% 27.9% 
 
The prevalence in the Dakar region increased: the amount of women in the 
Dakar region who underwent FGM/C rose with 2.8% (from 17.3% in 2005 to 
20.1% in 2010).68  
 
5.4 Ethnic differences 
 
The prevalence of FGM/C in Senegal is strongly influenced by ethnicity. There 
are significant differences among the different ethnic groups. FGM/C is 
commonly practiced among the Mandingue, the Poular, the Diola, and the 
Soninké ethnic groups. FGM/C is much less commonly found among other 
ethnic groups such as the Wolof and the Serer, see table 5.5.  
 
Table 5.5 Ethnic differences 
 
Ethnic 
group 2005 
2010-
2011 
 
2014 
 
 
Mandingue 
 
73.7% 
 
81.9% 
 
64.4% 
Poular 62.1% 54.5% 51.8% 
Diola 59.7% 51.5% 46.2% 
Soninké 78.2% 64.9% 42.9% 
Serer 1.8% 2.2% 2.4% 
Wolof 1.6% 0.9% 1.3% 
 
                                                        
68 It is not possible to provide statistics about the prevalence in the Dakar region of 2014, since the 
DHS-2014 only differentiates between the north (30.4%), west (16.6%), central (6.3%) and south 
(69.4%). 
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5.5 Type of FGM/C 
 
During the investigations for the DHS and MICS, it proved to be difficult to 
obtain reliable data on the type of FGM/C performed. The typology of the 
WHO69 was to a certain extent left aside, and instead, during the survey the 
women were asked specific questions to identify the type of FGM/C performed 
on them. The women were asked if they had undergone a simple cut or 
whether parts in the area of genitals had been removed. This question was 
posed to differentiate between a “symbolic” form or "simple" cut and the total 
or partial removal of the external female genitalia. In addition, attempting to 
identify women who have undergone the most extreme form of FGM/C 
(infibulation), women were asked whether the genital area was sewn closed 
during the procedure. The answers to these questions were divided into three 
categories, being (I) a cut without the removal of any tissue (entaille, pas de chair 
enlevée), (II) removal of tissue in the genital area (parties de chair enlevées) and (III) 
closure of the vagina (fermeture du vagin).  
According to the data of the DHS-2005 and the DHS-MICS 2010-2011, the 
majority of Senegalese women (respectively 82.7% and 52.7%) had undergone 
type II. However, according to the most recent data of the DHS-2014, the 
majority of Senegalese women (50.5%) had undergone type I. This might 
indicate a trend towards less severe cutting in Senegal, see table 5.6 below. A 
high percentage of women (23.2%) were not able to give an answer or a specific 
response, probably because they were too young at the time of the procedure.70 
 
Table 5.6 Type of FGM/C 
 
Type of 
FGM/C 2005 
2010-
2011 
 
2014 
 
 
I 
 
0.2% 
 
9.9% 
 
50.5% 
II 82.7% 52.7% 14.2% 
III 11.9% 13.8% 12.1% 
 
 
5.6 Person performing FGM/C 
 
According to the DHS-2005, the practice of FGM/C is still very traditional in 
Senegal. A traditional practitioner performed FGM/C on almost all women 
(90.8%), regardless of the type of FGM/C performed. In 1.5% of the cases, 
matrones (traditional midwives or birth attendants) have conducted the 
procedure and in 0.3% of the cases FGM/C other traditional persons have 
                                                        
69 For more information about the different types of FGM/C performed and the classification of the 
WHO, see Chapter III, section 3 of this research.  
70 Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie [Sénégal], et ICF International, Sénégal: 
Enquête Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue 2014), ANSD et ICF International, 2015, p. 
97.  
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performed it. The DHS-2005 also indicated that health care professionals 
(doctors, nurses, midwives) performed FGM/C in 0.6% of the cases. In 6.9% of 
the cases, women were unable to respond.  
According to the DHS 2010-2011, FGM/C is performed by a traditional 
practitioner in 91.4% of the cases, in 1.0% of the cases by matrones. In the 
remaining 7.6% of the cases, other traditional persons have done the procedure. 
However, the DHS-MICS 2010-2011 does not report cases performed by health 
care professions, despite the increasing rumours of medicalization of the 
practice in Senegal. Unfortunately, the DHS-2014 did not include any data 
about the persons performing FGM/C. Table 5.7 summarizes the information 
above.  
 
Table 5.7 Persons performing FGM/C 
 
Person  2005 2010-2011 
 
2014 
 
 
Traditional 
practitioner  
 
90.8% 
 
91.4% 
 
N/A 
Traditional 
midwife 1.5% 1.0% N/A 
Other 
traditional 
person  
0.3% 7.6% N/A 
Health care 
professional  0.6% N/A N/A 
 
5.7 Age at FGM/C 
 
FGM/C in Senegal is practiced at very young ages. The statistics of the DHS-
2014 show that 64.2% of the women underwent FGM/C before the age of 5 
years. In addition, 15.4% of the women have undergone the procedure between 
5 and 9 years and 8.8% between 10 and 14 years. In less than one percent (0.6%) 
of the cases, the women was 15 years old or above. Table 5.8 provides an 
overview of the statistics of 2005, 2010-2011 and 2014. It should be noted that 
respectively 6.3% (2005), 8.3% (2010-2011) and 10.9% (2014) of the women were 
unable to give any indication regarding the age at which they underwent the 
procedure.  
 
Table 5.8 Age at FGM/C 
 
Age 2005 2010-2011 
 
2014 
 
 
<5 
 
72.8% 
 
71.3% 
 
64.2% 
5-9 14.9% 13.8% 15.4% 
10-14 5.1% 6.0% 8.8% 
15+ 0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 
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Important to note is that there might be a trend observable towards performing 
FGM/C at younger girls, because the proportion of women cut before the age 
of 5 increased from 54.8% among women aged 45-49 to 69.3% among those 
aged 15-19.  
It does appear that FGM/C occurs at different ages when comparing urban 
and rural areas. For example, 51.5% of the women living in urban areas 
reported that they had undergone FGM/C before the age of 5, while 75.8% of 
the women in rural areas. The DHS-2014 also show that slightly more Muslim 
women reported to have undergone FGM/C before the age of 5, compared to 
Christian women (respectively, 64.2% against 56.7%). The proportion of 
Christian women having FGM/C performed between 10 and 14 years is much 
higher than among Muslim women (24.4% against 8.6%). The results based on 
ethnicity show that in the ethnic groups where FGM/C is a common practice, 
such as the Mandingue and Poular, a high proportion of women underwent the 
procedure before the age of 5 (respectively 55.7% and 71.2%). In these ethnic 
groups, the majority of the girls are cut before they are 9 years old.  
There are also variations between the high prevalence areas and those areas 
where FGM/C is not practiced or less practiced. In areas where FGM/C 
practice is common, a vast majority of girls (61.8% in the South and 92.0% in the 
North) were cut before the age of 5, against 45.2% in the West and 53.7% in the 
Central area.  
 
5.8 Prevalence of FGM/C among young girls 
 
The DHS 2012-2013 and the DHS-2014 collected data on the prevalence of 
FGM/C among girls aged 0-14 years. This is very relevant, since FGM/C is 
practiced at very young ages in Senegal. During these two surveys, all women 
who had one or more daughter(s) under the age of 15 were asked if one (or 
more) of them had undergone FGM/C. In case the mother reported that one (or 
more) girl(s) had undergone FGM/C, the mothers were asked if they had 
“sewn the genital area” (Type III).  
According to the DHS 2012-2013, 17.5% of all girls under 15 had – according 
to the statements of their mothers – undergone FGM/C. According to the DHS-
2014, this proportion was 12.9%. This might indicate a decrease in the practice 
among young girls.  
According to the DHS 2012-2013, 6.8% of the girls aged 0-9 years had 
undergone the most extreme form of FGM/C and had their genital area closed 
(Type III). According to the DHS-2014, 5.3% of the girls aged 0-14 years had 
undergone this type of FGM/C. Type III is especially prevalent among the 
Soninké (12.4%) and among girls whose mother also underwent type III (11.9%). 
Table 5.9 provides a more detailed overview of the statistics of FGM/C among 
young girls.   
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Table 5.9 Prevalence of FGM/C among young girls 
 
 
Age 2012-2013 2014 
 
<5 
 
10.5% 
 
7.4% 
5-9 21% 16.4% 
10-14 25.1% 16.9% 
0-14 17.5% 12.9% 
 
Overall, the same variations compared to the statistics for all women aged 15-49 
can be found in the DHS-2014. Ethnic groups with a high prevalence of FGM/C 
among young girls are the Mandingue (35.9%), the Poular (28.6%), the Diola 
(21.7%), and the Soninké (33.2%); and low prevalence can be found among the 
Wolof (0.2%) and the Serer (1.0%). A high percentage of young girls have 
undergone FGM/C in the regions in the North (21.6%) and South (38.5%) and 
low prevalence in the West (4.5%) and Central (1.8%) area. Moreover, the 
prevalence of FGM/C is much higher when the mother had undergone FGM/C 
compared to when this is not the case (27.1% against 0.2%). The difference in 
prevalence between areas of residence is important, the proportion of young 
girls that have undergone FGM/C are about twice as high in rural areas (16.5) 
compared to urban areas (8.1%).  
It is important to note that the prevalence of FGM/C among young girls 
decreases, when the education level of the mother increases. The DHS-2014 
showed that the prevalence among young girls is 14.7% when the mother has 
no education compared to 6.7% when the mother has at least completed 
secondary education.  
 
5.9 Beliefs and opinions about FGM/C 
 
In order to better understand the reasons for the persistence of FGM/C, the 
DHS-2005, the DHS 2010-2011 and the DHS-2014 included questions about the 
beliefs and opinions about FGM/C. The DHS-2005 collected data on the 
benefits for a girl to undergo FGM/C. In total, 48.5% of the women and 58% of 
the men said that there is no advantage for a daughter to undergo FGM/C. The 
following benefits of undergoing FGM/C were cited: social recognition, 
preservation of virginity, religious necessity, better hygiene, better changes for 
marriage and more sexual pleasure for men. Table 5.10 provides an overview of 
the benefits of undergoing FGM/C.  
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Table 5.10 Benefits for a girl to undergo FGM/C 
 
Benefits 2005 (female) 
2005  
(male) 
 
No benefit 
 
48.5% 
 
58.0% 
Social recognition 18.9% 9.8% 
Preservation of virginity 13.9% 8.1% 
Religious necessity 7.1% 5.3% 
Better hygiene 6.4% 4.4% 
Better chances for marriage 2.8% 2.4% 
More pleasure for men 0.7% 1.5% 
Other 18.5% 21.4% 
 
The DHS-2005 also collected data on the benefits for a girl not to undergo 
FGM/C. In total, 29.1% of the women and 14.1% of the men said that there is no 
advantage for a daughter not to undergo FGM/C. The following benefits for 
not undergoing FGM/C were cited: avoiding health problems, less suffering, 
more sexual pleasure for women, more sexual pleasure for men and not to 
undergo FGM/C was considered consistent with religion. Table 5.11 provides 
an overview of the benefits of not undergoing FGM/C.  
 
Table 5.11 Benefits for a girl not to undergo FGM/C 
 
Benefits 2005 (female) 
2005  
(male) 
 
No benefit 
 
29.1% 
 
14.1% 
Less health problems 27.5% 38.2% 
Avoids suffering 20.7% 21.7% 
More pleasure for women 9.5% 12.6% 
More pleasure for men 4.5% 5.8% 
In accordance with religion 3.9% 0% 
Other 27.4% 34.5% 
 
 
Unfortunately, the DHS-MICS 2010-11 and the DHS-2014 did not include 
questions in relation to the benefits of a girl (not) to undergo FGM/C. However, 
women and men were only asked if they agreed with the following assertions: 
(i) FGM/C is required by religion and (ii) FGM/C is a way to prevent sex 
before marriage. Table 5.12 below provides an overview of the answers given.  
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Table 5.12 Beliefs in relation to FGM/C 
 
 2005 (female) 
2005 
(male) 
2010-
2011 
(female) 
2010-
2011 
(male) 
2014 
(female) 
2014 
(male) 
Required by religion  16.9% 
 
11.6% 
 
17.1% 
 
N/A 
 
15.5% 
 
13.1% 
Prevent sex before 
marriage 30.6% 13.1% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
According to the most recent statistics of the DHS-2014, 79.2% of the women 
and 75% of men reported that FGM/C is not a required by religion. Among 
ethnic groups and in areas where FGM/C is more prevalent, the opinion that 
FGM/C is a religious requirement is more common.  
Finally, the opinions on the continuation and/or abandonment of FGM/C 
were surveyed. The amount of women and men who believe that FGM/C 
should be abandoned is increasing and the amount of women and men who 
believe that FGM/C should continue is decreasing. Table 5.13 provides an 
overview of the statistics of 2005, 2010-2011 and 2014.  
 
Table 5.13 Opinions on the continuation/abandonment of FGM/C 
 
 
2005 
(female) 
2005 
(male) 
2010-
2011 
(female) 
2010-
2011 
(male) 
2014 
(female) 
2014 
(male) 
FGM/C should 
continue 
 
17.6% 
 
11.6% 
 
16.6% 
 
N/A 
 
15.9% 
 
11.7% 
FGM/C should be 
abandoned 74.8% 69.3% 78.7% N/A 80.7% 79.2% 
 
According to the most recent statistics of the DHS-2014, 49.1% of the women 
who have undergone FGM/C believed that FGM/C should continue, against 
45.4% who believed that the practice should be abandoned. This percentage is 
much higher among women who did not undergo the procedure themselves: 
1.7% believed that the practice should continue, against 95.8% who believed 
that FGM/C should be abandoned. Analysis by region shows that in areas of 
high prevalence, the majority of women and men believe that FGM/C should 
continue. Similarly, in the ethnic groups where FGM/C is a common practice, 
women and men believe that FGM/C should continue. 
When the level of education increases, the view that FGM/C should be 
abandoned is more common: 18.0% of the women and 16.6% of the men 
without any education believe that the practice should continue, against 7.8% of 
the women and 8.1% of the men who completed secondary education or higher. 
The same trend can be observed when the level of welfare of the household 
improves: 27.9% of women and 23.8% of men from poor households believe 
that FGM/C should continue, against 5.7% of the women and 7.4% of men from 
very rich households. It can also be noted that there is also a small difference 
between Muslim and Christian women: 80.7% of the Muslim women and 79.0% 
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of the men believe that FGM/C should be abandoned, compared to 87.4% of the 
Christian women and 83.5% of the Christian men.  
 
6 RATIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
 
6.1 Status of ratifications 
 
Senegal became a member of the UN in September 1960, soon after its 
independence. The country has ratified all nine “core” human rights treaties at 
the international level as well as regional human rights treaties.71 Table 5.14 
provides an overview of the ratification behaviour of Senegal.72 The table shows 
that Senegal did not sign the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR-OP 2), aiming at the abolition of 
the death penalty. The death penalty was abolished in Senegal by Act No. 2004-
38 on 10 December 2004 and the latest execution was carried out in 1967.73 
When the UN Human Rights Council reviewed Senegal’s human rights record 
under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2009, Senegal wrote in its 
national report: “Senegal has ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of 
the death penalty, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
on 15 December 1989.”74 However, this is not true. Up to today,75 Senegal did 
not sign nor ratify the ICCPR-OP 2. During the second UPR in October 2013, 
several countries (including Australia, Montenegro, Benin, France, Switzerland, 
Gabon and Rwanda) recommended Senegal to ratify the ICCPR-OP 2. However, 
Senegal rejected these recommendations.76 Table 5.14 also shows that Senegal 
did sign the OP-ICESCR, the OP-CRC-IC, and the OP-CRPD, but these Optional 
Protocols are not yet ratified. This has consequences for the individual 
complaints procedure (see also section 7.1.2).  
 
 
                                                        
71 Senegal has also ratified other international human rights instruments, including the following: 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951 (ratified on 9 May 
1963) and the Protocol thereto, signed in New York on 31 January 1967 (ratified on 3 October 1967); 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on 17 July 1998 (ratified on 2 February 
1999); United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the supplementary 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
and the supplementary Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, signed in 
Palermo, Italy, in December 2000 and ratified on 19 September 2003 in accordance with Act No. 
2003-17 of 18 July 2003. 
72 As of 1 October 2015, see Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratification Status 
for Senegal, available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=153&Lang=en 
[Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
73 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Third Periodic Report of Senegal, CAT/C/SEN/3, 5 
October 2011, p. 9, para. 36; United Nations Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, CAT/C/SEN/CO/3, 17 January 2013, p. 2, para. 6.  
74 United Nations General Assembly, National Report of Senegal, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/WG.6/4/SEN/1, 5 November 2008, p. 11, para. 74.   
75 As of 1 October 2015. 
76 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review on 
Senegal, Addendum, A/HRC/25/4/Add.1, 4 March 2014, p. 2.  
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Table 5.14 Ratification status for Senegal 
 
 
 
Treaty Signature Date 
Accession 
(a) or 
Ratificatio
n Date 
Declarat
ions/ 
Reserva
tions 
Recognition of specific competences 
of treaty bodies 
     
ICERD 22-07-68 19-04-72 None Individual communications (art. 14): 
Yes (03-12-1982) 
ICESCR  06-07-70 13-02-78 None  
OP-ICESCR  24-09-09 N/A N/A  
ICCPR  06-07-70 13-02-78 None Inter-State complaints (art. 41): Yes 
(05-01-1981) 
ICCPR-OP 1  06-07-70 13-02-78 None  
ICCPR-OP 2   N/A N/A N/A  
CEDAW 29-07-80 05-02-85 None  
OP-CEDAW  10-12-99 26-05-00 None  
CAT 04-02-85 21-08-86 None Inter-State complaints (art. 21): Yes 
(16-10-1996) 
     Individual communications (art. 22): 
Yes (16-10-1996) 
OP-CAT  04-02-03 18-10-06 None  
CRC  26-01-90 31-07-90 None  
OP-CRC-AC  08-09-00 03-03-04 Yes  
OP-CRC-SC 08-09-00 05-11-03 None  
OP-CRC-IC  01-10-12 N/A N/A  
ICRMW N/A 09-06-1999 
(a) 
None Inter-State complaints (art. 76): No 
     Individual Complaints (art. 77): No 
CRPD 25-04-07 07-09-10 None  
OP-CRPD 25-04-07 N/A N/A  
ICED  06-02-07 11-12-08 None Individual Complaints (art. 31): No 
ACHPR 23-09-81 13-08-82 None  
Maputo 
Protocol 
26-12-03 27-12-04 None  
ACRWC 18-05-92 29-09-98 None  
African Youth 
Charter 
09-10-07 17-09-09 None  
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6.2 Reservations and declarations 
 
As table 5.14 shows, Senegal has not made any reservations to the treaties that 
they have ratified. Senegal made only one declaration with the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC).77  
 
6.3 Trying to understand the ratification behaviour of Senegal 
 
During the interviews, I sought to identify what factors influenced Senegal’s 
decisions to sign and ratify international and regional human rights treaties. 
Although I realized that one could never know specifically why treaties are 
signed and ratified, and what the Senegalese State motivated to enter into 
treaty-based agreements, I was interested in the point of view of the 
respondents. The answers of the respondents enabled me to understand the 
reasons and justifications why Senegal signed and ratified the international 
human rights instruments listed in table 5.14.  
 First of all, I noticed that all respondents were well aware of the strong 
ratification record of Senegal. Many respondents referred to Senegal as the 
“champion of ratification in Africa” and stated that Senegal is “a country of 
human rights.” A government representative said: “human rights are deeply 
rooted in our culture since our independence.” The respondents also noted that 
Senegal is often one of the first (African) countries that signs and ratifies a 
human rights treaty.78 A representative of civil society said: “They sign quickly 
and they sign everything.”  
 Secondly, some representatives of civil society organizations referred to the 
importance of the context in which the ratification behaviour of Senegal should 
be placed. Although the DHS showed that the levels of education in Senegal are 
quite low, these respondents explained me that the Senegalese elite is highly 
educated. They often studied abroad, mostly in France as a result of the colonial 
ties. The Senegalese elite recognizes the importance of being part of the 
international community, ratifying human rights treaties and having legislation 
in place. One representative of a civil society organization explained: “I think 
there is a sort of mindset within the educated population of Senegal that legal 
instruments are critical and important.” The respondent further explained that 
the elite stood up for human rights: “They went to university and believe in 
equality and justice and have a much easier time of accepting and being open to 
these things.” Below, an overview is given of the various factors that – 
according to the respondents – influenced Senegal’s ratification behaviour.  
                                                        
77 Senegal declared that the minimum age required for regular conscription and for entry into the 
schools for officers and sub-officers is twenty years. Furthermore, candidates shall enlist in an 
individual capacity and shall sign enlistment and re-enlistment contracts freely and in person.  
78 Senegal was for example the first country to ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
Senegal was also the first country that has ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. 
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6.3.1 Political will to promote human rights  
Further analysis of the data revealed that the majority of the respondents see 
Senegal as a State that is deeply committed to respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Many respondents (including representatives from the 
government, civil society and international organizations) explained that the 
fact that Senegal ratified many international human rights instruments, bears 
witness to the political will of the Senegalese authorities to protect the citizens 
of their country against human rights violations. They believe that there is a 
sincere desire and engagement of the government to improve the human rights 
condition on the ground. A representative of an international organization 
explained: “The Senegalese government has a real political will to have a 
national framework in accordance with international standards of law.” A 
representative of civil society said: “I believe that the State of Senegal has a 
mentality, a willingness to respect human rights.” Some respondents (mostly 
representatives of the government) pointed in this respect to the active 
engagement in legislative efforts at the international and regional levels that 
demonstrate to the Senegalese Government’s steadfast political will to protect 
and promote human rights.79 Indeed, Senegal helped to codify international 
human rights law by actively participating in the drafting process of several 
treaties, including the CRC.80 Senegal was also one of the founding members of 
the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU). Representatives of the government 
also referred to the first meeting of a committee of experts in 1979 hosted in 
Dakar to draft a regional human rights instrument for Africa.81 A Senegalese 
judge, Keba M’Baye, is generally regarded as the “father” of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 82  In addition, representatives of the 
government also referred to the prominent positions held by Senegalese leaders 
in international human rights work since the early 1990s.  
 
6.3.2 Example in the sub-region  
Many respondents (including representatives from the government, civil 
society and international organizations) explained that the Senegalese 
government cares a lot about the image of the country. Senegal would like to be 
perceived as a country that is respectful in the promotion and protection of 
human rights, they said. A representative of civil society explained: “Senegal 
wants to be among the good students in the classroom.” Some respondents 
argued that Senegal wants to set a good example for other African countries 
and even make other countries ratify human rights treaties. In this regard, a 
representative of civil society argued: “they want to be a mirror for Africa.” 
Other respondents (mainly representatives of civil society) pointed to the fact 
that Senegal is in general a very proud country. More specifically, they are 
                                                        
79 See also United Nations Committee Against Torture, Third Periodic Report of Senegal, 
CAT/C/SEN/3, 5 October 2011, p.9, para. 33.  
80 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations, Senegal, 
CRC/C/15/Add.44, 27 November 1995, p. 1, para. 3.  
81 See also R. Gittleman, The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights: A Legal Analysis, 
Virginia Journal of International Law, Volume 22, Issue 4, 1982, p. 667-668. 
82 See also A. EI-Obaid and K. Appiagyei-Atua, Human Rights in Africa - A New Perspective on 
Linking the Past to the Present, MCFill Law Journal, Volume 41, 1996, p. 827. 
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proud to be an exception in the region with regard to the level of democracy 
and the absence of a military coup. A representative of an international 
organization argued: “We are seen as a good model of African democracy.” 
Furthermore, a government representative stated: “Senegal is a democratic 
country, a big country, which respects democracy, which respects human 
rights.” Some respondents (including civil society, international organizations 
and the government) stated that Senegal likes to be ahead of other African 
countries and wants to be perceived as a “leader” in West Africa. The preamble 
of the Constitution that refers to “the will of Senegal to be a modern State”83 also 
hints in that direction. A few respondents (representatives of international 
organizations) said that the Senegalese have a better understanding about the 
body of human rights treaties compared to other African countries. A 
representative of civil society argued that Senegal ratifies all the human rights 
treaties mainly because “it is just because they are afraid that their counterpart 
would look down at them.”  
 
6.3.3 Diplomatic reasons  
Some respondents (including representatives from the government, civil society 
and international organizations) explained that human rights have played an 
important part in establishing foreign relations. Senegal wants to show their 
engagement and commitment towards human rights at the regional and 
international level, because “the country wants to have a good relationship with 
other countries”, according to a civil society representative. Senegal belongs to 
the international community and wants to be part of the global human rights 
movement. According to a civil society representative, signing up to treaties is a 
way to improve bilateral ties. The Senegalese diplomacy is a contributing factor 
to ratify human rights treaties. Further more, a civil society representative said: 
“the Senegalese government want to do what the others do.”   
 
6.3.4 Role of the president  
From the start, the first Senegalese President, Leopold Senghor, considered 
international relations to be of great importance and the country had been 
committed to consolidate democracy and the rule of law as well as the respect 
for the protection of human rights. 84  Some respondents (including 
representatives from the government, civil society and international 
organizations) pointed to the fact that President Leopold Senghor was very 
“open-minded” and “encouraging” in this regard. They explained that the 
leader of their country believed in human rights and that he wanted to extend 
his influence in West Africa. Some civil society representatives said that he 
would go very far in the sense that “he wanted to please the West so much that 
he would accept everything.” 
 The important role Senegal played during the drafting process of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is already demonstrated above. In 
                                                        
83 Constitution of the Republic of Senegal, 2010, as amended to Constitutional Law No. 2009-22 of 19 
June 2009, preamble.   
84 See also C.H. Heyns and F. Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the 
Domestic Level, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, p. 518.  
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addition, according to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
it is important to note that “the work of the Expert Committee was greatly 
influenced by the opening address of the host president, President Senghor, 
who joined the Committee to draw inspiration from African values and 
tradition and also to focus on the real needs of Africans, the right to 
development and the duties of individuals.”85  
 
6.3.5 Pressure of the international community 
Some representatives of civil society argued that the Senegalese government 
signed and ratified human rights treaties, because they felt pressure from the 
international community to do so. More specifically, according to these 
respondents, the Senegalese authorities feel the pressure to be part of the 
globalization and the international human rights movement.  
 
6.3.6 Pressure of CSOs  
Some representatives of civil society explained that CSOs in Senegal have a 
very strong voice. They argued that civil society organizations – mostly 
women’s rights groups – were fighting for ratifications of international and 
regional human rights treaties. These representatives argued that they have 
been very active and promoted human rights for many years. They explained 
that CSOs were very much aware of the existence of the treaties and engaged to 
push the government to sign and ratify these treaties and conventions and to 
harmonize at the national level. One civil society representative said: “We have 
some organizations that are really playing their watchdog role about the 
violation of human rights and they even have ways to reporting at international 
level.”  
 
6.3.7 Requirement to receive donor aid  
Since its independence, Senegal is dependent on international co-operation and 
foreign aid. In relation to the distribution of foreign aid among recipient 
countries, some representatives of civil society pointed to economic factors that 
play a role in human rights treaty ratification.86 They argued that the ratification 
of human rights treaties has secured aid to Senegal: “They signed up to these 
conventions so they can receive aid, that’s for sure. […] Because if they don’t, 
then they miss out on all these things that they can get.”  
 
6.4 Reference to compliance gap 
 
When respondents were asked the question about the ratification behaviour of 
Senegal, an overwhelming majority of the respondents (including 
representatives from the government, civil society and international 
organizations) immediately expressed their concern about the gap between 
Senegal’s propensity to join international and regional human rights treaties on 
                                                        
85 See the website of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, available at 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/history/ [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
86 See also A. Magesan, Human Rights Treaty Ratification of Aid Receiving Countries, World 
Development, Volume 45, May 2013, p. 175-188.  
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the one hand, and to bring their human rights practice into compliance with 
those treaties on the other. They explained that becoming a party to a treaty is 
only the first step, because recognition of rights on paper is not sufficient to 
guarantee that they will be enjoyed in practice. A representative of an 
international organization argued: “The fact that Senegal has been ratifying all 
these treaties and conventions doesn't mean that the human rights situation on 
the ground is much better compared to the human rights situation of other 
similar countries in the region.” A representative of civil society said: “We ratify 
a lot, but the implementation is very limited, sometimes even non-existent.” 
Another civil society representative stated: “Senegal ratifies everything possible 
at the international level. […] However, the problem is that after the ratification, 
there is no application.” A government representative said: “Senegal ratified 
everything, almost everything, but they do not respect these conventions, once 
they are ratified.” These respondents clearly pointed to the limited 
implementation of the human rights treaties and identified problems related to 
putting human rights into practice. A representative of civil society said: “The 
problem is that after the ratification, there is no application.” Another 
representative of civil society said: “It is good to have international laws, but we 
also have to think about the practice.” Another representative of civil society 
said:  “The thing is that signing doesn’t necessarily mean applying. Applying is 
another thing. The problem that they still have is that they are always ready to 
sign human rights conventions, but applying the actual law in real time, in real 
society, that’s the issue.” Another civil society representative said: “Adopting a 
convention is good, but it is better to well-implement it.” Another civil society 
representative said: “Because even there is ratification at the international level 
and even Senegal accepted and adopted these treaties, we can talk about 
ratification, but we have also to talk about the concrete ratification. Like, how 
it’s going in the practice. Is it respected or not? […] So, we can talk about the 
international ratification, but we also have to talk about what is going in the 
practice.” 
 
7 TREATY MONITORING BODIES 
 
This section examines the cooperation of Senegal with the Treaty Monitoring 
Bodies (TMBs). First, a short introduction is given about the functions of the 
TMB. Afterwards, a general analysis is given of the consideration of Senegal’s 
periodic reports by the TMB, including remarks about the human rights 
situation in Senegal in general, Senegal’s cooperation, the issue of non-
compliance with reporting guidelines and the problem of outstanding and 
overdue reports. Lastly, an analysis is provided specifically in relation to the 
issue FGM/C in Senegal. An overview is given of the national reports of 
Senegal that discussed the issue FGM/C, as well as the concluding observations 
of the various TMB that provide recommendations, concerns and compliments 
in relation to FGM/C in Senegal.  
 
7.1 Introduction to the Treaty Monitoring Body System 
 
The previous paragraph showed that Senegal is a State Party to all the “core” 
human rights treaties. These treaties provide the normative framework to 
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support the implementation of human rights norms at the national level. The 
principal objective of the human rights TMB system is to monitor compliance 
with these human rights standards in order to offer protection at the national 
level through the implementation of the human rights obligations contained in 
the treaties.87 The TMB perform a number of functions in accordance with the 
provisions of the treaties that established them.  
 
7.1.1 Consideration of State Parties’ periodic reports 
In the first place this includes the consideration of State Parties’ periodic reports. 
When a country ratifies a UN treaty, it assumes a legal obligation to implement 
the rights recognized in that treaty. In addition to their obligation to implement 
the substantive provisions of the treaty, each State Party is also under an 
obligation to submit periodic reports to the relevant treaty body on how the 
rights are being implemented. States must report initially one year after 
acceding to the Covenant and then whenever the Committee requests (usually 
every four years). The TMB examines each National Report and advises States 
on ways to achieve better compliance with human rights obligations. They 
address their concerns and recommendations to the State Party in the form of 
“Concluding Observations.”  
 
7.1.2 Individual complaints procedures 
In the second place, some of the TMB88 may, under certain conditions, receive 
and consider individual complaints or communications from individuals who 
feel that his or her rights have been violated. Individual complaints can be 
brought only against a State that has recognized the competence of the 
committee established under the relevant treaty or when the State became a 
party to the relevant Optional Protocols. The Senegalese government 
recognized the competence of four human rights TMBs (namely the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 89  Human Rights 
Committee (HRC),90 CEDAWCee91 and Committee against Torture (CAT))92 to 
                                                        
87 International Human Rights Instruments, Concept Paper on the High Commissioner's Proposal for a 
Unified Standing Treaty Body: Report by the Secretariat, HRI/MC/2006/2, 22 March 2006, p. 4, para. 4.  
88 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Human Rights Committee (HRC), Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAWCee), Committee against Torture (CATCee), 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRCee), Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) and Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) may receive and consider 
individual complaints. For the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), the individual complaint 
mechanism has not yet entered into force [as of 1 October 2015]. Article 77 of the ICRMW gives the 
Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) competence to receive and consider individual 
communications alleging violations of the Convention by States parties who made the necessary 
declaration under Article 77. This individual complaint mechanism will become operative when 10 
parties have made the necessary declaration under Article 77. Senegal did not make the declaration 
under Article 77 either and thus did not recognize the competence of the Committee. 
89 Senegal specifically recognized in 1982 in accordance with Article 14 of the Convention the 
competence of the CERD Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals 
within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by Senegal of any of the rights set forth in 
the CERD. So far, no communications have been submitted to the CERD Committee. 
90 The ICCPR-OP1 established an individual complaints mechanism, allowing individuals to 
complain to the Human Rights Committee about violations of the Covenant. By becoming a State 
Party to the ICCPR-OP1 in 1978, Senegal recognized the competence of this Committee to receive 
 
 
 
 
Chapter V 
238 
receive and consider communications from individuals.93 However, there are no 
complaints submitted at UN TMB concerning FGM/C. Under the African 
system, the competence of the Committees does not have to be explicitly 
recognized, but its jurisdiction is compulsory and automatic for those States 
that ratify its founding treaty. Senegal ratified the ACHPR and the ACRWC and 
thus recognized automatically the competences of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR)94 and the African Committee of Experts 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC).95 So far, there have been 
four communications received by the ACmHPR against Senegal, but they were 
all ruled inadmissible. 96  The ACERWC had thus far only received three 
                                                        
and consider individual communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. One 
communication has been submitted and finalized by the UN Human Rights Committee in 1994, 
namely the case of Famara Koné v. Senegal. 
91 Senegal became a State Party to the CEDAW-OP in 2000 and therefore recognized the competence 
of the CEDAW Committee to receive and consider communications submitted by or on behalf of 
individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims 
of a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Convention by that State Party. So far, no 
communications have been submitted to the CEDAW Committee. 
92 In 1996, Senegal made a declaration under article 22 CAT to recognize the competence of the CAT 
Committee to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its 
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the 
Convention. So far, one communication is submitted to the UN Committee Against Torture, namely 
the case of Suleymane Guengueng et al. v. Senegal. 
93 Since Senegal is not a State Party to the Optional Protocols of the CESCR and the CRPD, it does 
not recognize the competence of the CESCR Committee and the CRPD Committee to receive and 
consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the respective Covenant and the 
Convention. Although Senegal signed and ratified the CED, the country did not declare that it 
recognizes in accordance with Article 31 CED the competences of the CED Committee to receive 
and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim 
to be victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the Convention. In April 2014, the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure 
(OP-CRC-IC) entered into force following its ratification by the required 10 UN Member States. This 
third Optional Protocol gives competence to the CRC Committee to receive and consider individual 
communications alleging violations of the CRC and its Protocols (OP-CRC-AC and OP-CRC-SC) by 
States parties to the Optional Protocol (on a communications procedure). Senegal signed the OP-
CRC-IC in October 2012, but did not ratify it. Therefore, individual children from Senegal cannot 
submit complaints regarding specific violations of their rights under the Convention and its first 
two optional protocols. 
94 The ACmHPR developed its Rules of Procedure in such a way to accept communications from 
individuals alleging human rights violations by a state party. States, individuals or organizations on 
behalf of an individual may submit a complaint to the Commission. The process for filing a 
communication to the ACmHPR is specified under Articles 55-58 of the African Charter. The 
Commission considers communications from individuals if a simple majority of its members so 
decide (Article 55.2). Article 56 of the African Charter details the conditions under which the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights may receive complaints from individuals. 
According to Article 46, the ACHPR can call upon any form of investigation that is deemed 
appropriate.  
95 The ACERWC’s competences come from Article 44 of the ACRWC. Under Article 44, the 
ACERWC may receive communications, from any person, group or NGO recognized by the 
Organization of African Unity, by a Member State, or the United Nations relating to any matter 
covered by the Charter. The ACERWC has developed guidelines on communications. 
96 162/97 Mouvement des réfugiés mauritaniens au Sénégal / Senegal; 304/05 FIDH, Organisation 
nationale des droits de l'Homme (ONDH) and Rencontre africaine pour la défence des droits de 
l'Homme (RADDHO) / Senegal; 254/02 Mouvement des réfugiés mauritaniens au Sénégal pour la 
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communications.97 None of these communications concerned FGM/C.  
 As the above shows, the individual complaints procedure has hardly played 
a role in Senegal. A reason put forward by Heyns and Viljoen is that people, 
including lawyers, are mostly unaware of the specific mechanisms for possible 
implementation and the “potential of the UN complaints system.”98 In addition, 
the Senegalese legal scholar Mbaye argued that the individual complaints 
procedure is incompatible with Senegalese culture. According to his view, 
“traditional African reluctance to engage in confrontational litigation has 
resulted in a general resistance to ‘modern’ law. The limited number of 
communications to the UN human rights treaty bodies corresponds with the 
small number of constitutional complaints lodged in the domestic system. The 
resistance is all the more pronounced in respect of more remote and recent 
systems, such as that of the UN.”99 Other factors that explain the limited 
number of communications submitted following from the research done by 
Heyns and Viljoen are: the high illiteracy rate, resulting in a lack of information, 
and a lack of financial means. They also found some practical obstacles, for 
example the requirement that all available domestic remedies have to be 
exhausted: “Exhausting local remedies is not only very costly, in the absence of 
legal aid, but also a very long process. It is not uncommon for a case to take five 
years to proceed to the level of the highest domestic court. In respect of CAT, 
the possibility of using the procedure has been open for only three years.”100  
 
7.1.3 Inter-State complaint procedures 
In the third place, some TMB101 set out procedures that allow State Parties to 
initiate a procedure against another State Party, which is not giving effect to the 
provisions of the Convention. In most cases, such a complaint may only be 
submitted if both States parties have made a declaration accepting the 
competence of the Committee in this regard. Senegal only recognized the 
competence of the HRC and the CATCee to receive and consider 
communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is 
not fulfilling its obligations under the respective Conventions. However, no 
such inter-State complaint has ever been made and these procedures have never 
                                                        
defense des droits de l'Homme / Senegal; 226/99 Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes du 
Sénégal (UNSAS) / Senegal. 
97 These communications allege violations of children’s rights by Kenya, Uganda, and Senegal. Of 
these three, only the communication involving Kenya (Decision No 002/Com/002/2009) has been 
resolved. The communication against Senegal alleges that children in Senegal are sent by their 
parents to live at religious schools (known as daaras) to receive religious education, and the children 
are then forced by their instructors at the schools (known as Marabouts) to beg in the streets. If the 
children fail to collect enough food or money from their begging, they are customarily beaten. It is 
the most recent communication filed with the ACERWC and was submitted in July 2012 by Centre 
for Human Rights (based at the University of Pretoria in South Africa) and La Rencontre Africaine 
pour la Défense des Droit de l’Homme (“RADDHO”; based in Senegal).  
98 C.H. Heyns and F. Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic 
Level, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, p. 523 and p. 535. 
99 C.H. Heyns and F. Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic 
Level, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, p. 535. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Including ICERD (Article 11), OP-ICESCR (Article 10), ICCPR (Article 41), CAT (Article 21), OP-
CRC-IC (Article 12), ICRMW (Article 74) and CED (Article 32). 
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been used. The ACmHPR is also authorized to consider inter-State 
communications about breaches of human rights (art. 47–49 and 52 of the 
African Charter). State Party can, if they allege that another State is violating the 
obligations of the ACHPR submit a case to the ACHPR. The inter-State 
communications procedure has been used once in 1999, in which Senegal was 
not involved.102 
 
7.1.4 Inquiry procedures 
In the fourth place, some TMB103 may, on their own initiative, initiate inquiries 
upon receipt of reliable information containing well-founded indications of 
serious, grave or systematic violations by a State Party of the Conventions they 
monitor. Inquiries may only be undertaken with respect to States parties who 
have recognized the competence of the relevant Committee in this regard. 
States may opt out, at the time of signature or ratification or accession by 
making a declaration that they do not recognize the competence of the 
Committee in question to undertake inquiries. The Senegalese government 
recognized the competence of three human rights treaty bodies (namely the 
CEDAWCee,104 CATCee105 and CED106)107 to initiate an inquiry procedure, but 
Senegal was never invited to cooperate in any inquiry procedure. 
 
7.2 Consideration of Senegal’s Periodic Reports 
 
7.2.1 Remarks about the human rights situation 
Several TMB commended the delegation of Senegal for its efforts to establish a 
democratic State based on the rule of law.108 The members of the CERD pointed 
out that Senegal was a tolerant country that promoted human rights109 and 
welcomed Senegal’s “obvious commitment to human rights and the important 
role Senegal played at the international level.”110 The CRCee also recalled the 
active participation of the Senegalese government in the drafting process of the 
CRC and expressed satisfaction at the early ratification of the CRC by 
                                                        
102 Democratic Republic of Congo vs. Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, 15th annual activity report 
1001-2 227/99. 
103 Including CESCR, CEDAWCee, CATCee, CRCee, CRPD and CED. 
104 Senegal ratified the OP-CEDAW in 2000 and therefore the country recognized the competence of 
the CEDAWCee to start an inquiry procedure (under Article 8 OP-CEDAW). The CEDAWCee 
never invited Senegal to cooperate in an inquiry procedure.  
105 With the ratification of the CAT in 1986, Senegal recognized in the second place the competence 
of the CATCee to start an inquiry procedure (under Article 20 CAT). The CATCee never took the 
initiative to investigate allegations of systematic torture being practiced in Senegal.  
106 Senegal ratified the ICED in 2008 and recognized the competence of the CED to start an inquiry 
procedure (under Article 33 CED). The CED never undertook a visit to investigate violations of the 
provisions of the CED in Senegal.  
107 Since Senegal is not a State Party to the CESCR-OP, the CRC-OP-IC and the CRPD-OP, it does 
not recognize the competence of these three TMBs to initiate inquiries.  
108 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, A/42/18 9 (para. 227-245), 12 March 1986, p. 53, para. 229.  
109 Ibid.  
110 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, Supplement No. 18, A/49/18, 17 August 1994, p. 53, para. 335.  
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Senegal.111 The HRC further noted that the Government and people of Senegal 
were “deeply attached to the principle of respect for human rights.”112 
 
7.2.2 Remarks about cooperation 
In some instances, the TMB expressed their satisfaction about the collaboration 
with Senegal. The CATCee thanks the Senegalese delegation “for its frank 
collaboration, as demonstrated by its constructive dialogue with the 
Committee.”113 The HRC showed its “warm appreciation to the delegation of 
Senegal for its co-operation and for the competence it had shown in responding 
to questions and providing explanations concerning the implementation of the 
Covenant in Senegal”114 The CERD was also “satisfied with the frank and 
constructive dialogue it held with the delegation of the State Party, which 
included representatives of a number of ministries, and notes with satisfaction 
the oral statement and detailed replies provided by the delegation during its 
consideration of the report.”115 The CESCR expressed its appreciation for the 
detailed report submitted by Senegal and the additional information provided 
by the delegation of Senegal in response to the Committee’s questions and 
comments.116 The CRCee also “appreciated the open, frank and constructive 
dialogue with the multisectoral delegation.”117 
 
7.2.3 Non-compliance with reporting guidelines 
However, the TMB were not always positive. Critical notes about non-
compliance with reporting guidelines can be found in several Concluding 
Observations. The TMB were in some instances quite critical about the quality 
of the reports submitted. When the CERD considered the ninth and tenth 
periodic reports of Senegal, they said that the report was silent on several 
important points: “it contained almost no information on the effective 
implementation of national legislation on discrimination; it contained only very 
general and abstract information on the implementation of articles 5, 6 and 7 of 
the Convention; it did not contain any information on judicial practice; and, in 
particular, it made no mention of cases where the provisions of the Convention 
had been invoked in court, where associations had been banned, or where 
perpetrators of acts of racial discrimination had been prosecuted and 
punished.” 118  When the CERD considered the sixteenth, seventeenth and 
                                                        
111 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations, Senegal, 
CRC/C/15/Add.44, 27 November 1995, p. 1, para. 3.  
112 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Senegal, A/42/40(para. 197-
238), 6 April 1987, p. 59, para. 220.  
113 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations, Senegal, Supplement No. 44, 
A/51/44, 1 May 1996, p. 19, para. 103.  
114 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Senegal, A/42/40(para. 197-
238), 6 April 1987, p. 59, para. 220.  
115 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, CERD/C/SEN/CO/16-18, 24 October 2012, p. 1, para. 2.  
116 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, E/C.12/1993/18, 5 January 1994, p. 1, para. 2.  
117 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations, Senegal, 
CRC/C/SEN/CO/2, 20 October 2006, p. 1, para. 2.  
118 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, Supplement No. 18, A/49/18, 17 August 1994, p. 53, para. 336. 
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eighteenth periodic reports of Senegal, it noted that the report “does not contain 
sufficient information on the practical application of the Convention.”119 When 
the CESCR considered the second periodic report of Senegal, it was particularly 
concerned that the report “lacks detailed information and statistical data as to 
the concrete measures and policies which have been adopted to implement the 
Covenant rights.”120 When the HRC considered the third periodic report of 
Senegal, the Committee found that the report “focuses on laws and 
administrative regulations rather than on the actual implementation of the 
Covenant's provisions and contains little information on factors and difficulties 
encountered in their application.121 Again, when the HRC considered the fourth 
periodic report, it reiterated its previous comment on the State Party’s third 
periodic report, “regretting the lack of information in the document on 
implementation of the provisions of the Covenant in practice.” 122  The 
CEDAWCee regretted the absence of information regarding the factors and 
difficulties that were impeding the implementation of the Convention.123 More 
specifically, the Committee felt that the second report should have addressed 
the actual situation of women to determine their progress, and it was suggested 
that “the next report should include more statistical data on the de jure and de 
facto situations.”124 Apart from the fact that the Senegalese National Reports 
paid insufficient attention to the practical implementation and de facto 
enjoyment of rights by individuals, the country did not always follow the 
guidelines for the preparation of reports with the result that some areas covered 
by the Conventions were not addressed in the report.125 When the Committee 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families (CMW) considered the initial report of Senegal, the Committee 
regretted that “during the dialogue several of the questions went unanswered, 
that it did not receive in writing all the replies to its list of issues and that the 
replies that it did receive did not arrive in time to be translated into the 
Committee’s other working languages.”126 It happened more often that the 
Senegalese delegation did not provide written replies to the list of issues.127 The 
CESCR also deeply regretted the absence of a delegation from the State Party 
when they considered the second periodic report of Senegal. Consequently, the 
                                                        
119 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, CERD/C/SEN/CO/16-18, 24 October 2012, p. 1, para. 2.  
120 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, E/C.12/1/Add.62, 24 September 2001, p. 2, para. 3.  
121 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Senegal, 
CCPR/C/79/Add.10, 28 December 1992, p. 1 para. 2.  
122 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Senegal, 
CCPR/C/79/Add.82, 19 November 1997, p. 1, para. 2.  
123 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations, Senegal, A/49/38(SUPP) para. 666-728, 12 April 1994, p. 126, para. 718.  
124 Ibid, p. 121, para. 679. 
125 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations, Senegal, 
CRC/C/15/Add.44, 27 November 1995, p. 1, para. 2.  
126 United Nations Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families, Concluding Observations, Senegal, CMW/C/SEN/CO/1, 10 December 2010, p. 1, 
para. 2.  
127 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, E/C.12/1/Add.62, 24 September 2001, p. 1, para. 2. 
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Committee was denied the opportunity of having a detailed and constructive 
dialogue with representatives of the State Party.128  
 
7.2.4 Outstanding and overdue reports 
Since Senegal is a State Party to all the “core” human rights treaties, the country 
is obliged to submit periodic reports to all TMB on how the human rights are 
being implemented. Nine “core” international human rights treaties and two 
optional protocols establish a reporting obligation for States parties. At the time 
of this research,129 Senegal submitted 29 reports130 to the various UN TMB. Table 
5.15 provides an overview of Senegal’s reporting status. It shows that there are 
currently five reports overdue, namely the nineteenth to twenty-second reports 
of the CERD (since May 2015), the third periodic report of the CESCR (since 
2003), the fifth periodic report of the HRC (since 2000), as well as the initial 
reports of the OP-CRC-AC (since 2006) and the OP-CRC-AC (since 2005).  
 
Table 5.15 Cooperation with UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
 
Treaty body Latest report submitted Due date 
 
Reporting status 
 
CERD 25-02-11 19-05-15 
 
Nineteenth to twenty-second reports 
overdue since 2015  
CESCR 28-09-99 30-06-03 Third report overdue since 2003 
HRC 19-09-95 04-04-00 Fifth report overdue since 2000 
CEDAWCee 31-07-13 01-07-19 Eighth report due in July 2019 
CATCee 09-02-11 23-11-16 Fourth report due in 2016 
CRCee 29-04-13 Unknown Waiting for concluding observations 
CMW 01-12-09 01-11-15 Second report overdue in 2015 
CRPDCee 23-03-15 Unknown Waiting for concluding observations 
CED 28-04-2015 Unknown Waiting for concluding observations 
OP-CRC-AC x 03-04-06 Initial report overdue since 2006 
OP-CRC-SC x 05-12-05 Initial report overdue since 2005 
 
 
However, since this table only shows the latest report submitted and the due 
date, it does not show that there have been in the past more (extreme) delays in 
the submission of periodic reports to the TMB. It took the Senegalese 
                                                        
128 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, E/C.12/1/Add.62, 24 September 2001, p. 1, para. 2. 
129 As of 1 October 2015, see Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Reporting Status for 
Senegal, available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/countries.aspx?CountryCode=SEN&La
ng=EN [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
130 Counting the consolidated reports (for example the fifth to seventh periodic report to the CERD, 
the third to sixth periodic report to the CAT and the third to the fifth periodic report to the CRCee) 
as one report.  
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government for example 22 years to submit the third to seventh periodic report 
to the CEDAWCee. The initial report was submitted in 1986, the second in 1991 
and the third to seventh periodic report in 2013. The combined sixteenth, 
seventeenth and eighteenth periodic reports to the CERD were submitted 7 
years late, which the CERD regretted.131 The initial report of Senegal concerning 
the rights covered by Articles 6 to 9 of the ICESCR was submitted nearly 10 
years late, which the CESCR regretted.”132 The third periodic report to the CAT 
was submitted 15 years late, which the CATCee regretted. 133  The second 
periodic to the CRCee was submitted 8 years late. Unfortunately, this is not 
only the case for the UN TMB system, but also for the African Union’s 
monitoring system. Senegal’s initial report to the African Committee of Experts 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) was due in 2001, but Senegal 
has submitted its initial, first and second report in 2009.134  
 During the interviews, I explored the views of my respondents regarding, 
amongst others, the reasons behind the (sometimes extreme) delay in the 
submission of periodic reports of the Senegalese government to the TMB, which 
are described below.  
 
Political will 
The respondents gave a rather mixed picture regarding the role of political will 
in relation to the delays. About half of the respondents (including 
representatives from civil society organizations, international organizations and 
the government) explained that the Senegalese government is “engaged” and 
“motivated” to submit periodic reports to the respective TMB on the 
implementation of their treaty obligations. The other half of the respondents 
(including representatives from civil society organizations, international 
organizations and the government) claimed just the opposite and explained that 
there is a “lack of political will and wish” to adhere to their treaty obligations. A 
civil society representative said that the Senegalese government “does not want 
to put effort in writing a report that is going to the West, to prove to them that 
we are good people.” However, all respondents indicated that there are some 
essential additional problems (apart from the political will) at the national level 
preventing the State to live up to their reporting obligations. These problems 
are listed below.  
 
Institutional instability 
The most frequently mentioned reason for the delay in the submission of 
periodic reports of the Senegalese government was the problem of institutional 
instability and the lack of continuity at the Ministerial level. Representatives of 
international organizations mostly indicated this reason during the interviews, 
but a few civil society and government representatives mentioned this problem 
                                                        
131 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, CERD/C/SEN/CO/16-18, 24 October 2012, p. 1, para. 2.  
132 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, E/C.12/1993/18, 5 January 1994, p. 1, para. 2.  
133 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations, Senegal, 
CAT/C/SEN/CO/3, 17 January 2013, p. 1, para. 2.  
134 The Committee began examining State Party reports during its 11th Session in May 2008.  
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as well. A representative of an international organization said: “I think that one 
of the main issues for a country like Senegal is the institutional instability. We 
went through a lot, a lot, a lot of changes.” One representative from civil society 
explained that when the government changes, the technical staff often also 
changes and that there is no good follow-up: “the institutions are empty when 
the people leave, because the ministers leave with their cabinet and with all the 
documents.” A representative of an international organization said: “When 
people move, they do not hand over their tasks. They just leave. There is no 
coordination.” A government representative acknowledged this problem and 
referred in this regard to the development of recently submitted CEDAW report. 
Although this CEDAW report stated that the preparation of the report began in 
August 2012, when a ministerial decision was taken to set up the technical 
committee,135 the representative explained that people within the Ministry of 
Women, Family and Children started writing the report already in 2000. 
However, when the cabinet changed, their successors did not continue writing 
the report and the process were not completed. A civil society representative 
stated: “We worked on the CEDAW report a few years ago with many civil 
society organizations. The Family Ministry gathered us to work on that. And I 
never understood why it was not send. I think the Ministry did not know the 
right channel to send it. So, they send it, but not through the right channel. So, it 
was not acknowledged.” 
 
Lack of coordination 
Another major concern of many respondents (including representatives from 
civil society organizations, international organizations and the government) 
was the lack of coordination at the government level. It seems unclear who has 
the responsibility at the government level with regard to the preparation, 
writing, reviewing, revising and presentation of Senegal’s various periodic 
reports to the TMBs. The role of the different Ministries vis-à-vis other 
institutions (such as the Senegalese Human Rights Committee and the National 
Human Rights Advisory Council) is confusing and constantly changing. It 
seems that nobody knows exactly who is in charge. A representative of an 
international organization said: “There are a lot of these organizations and they 
are not very well coordinated.” A representative of civil society said: “They are 
always wondering in the governmental bodies, which is responsible for sending 
the reports? So, that’s also one of the factors why the reports are not being sent 
on time. They’re not sure who exactly is responsible for it. And so, there is no 
monitoring: “You, it’s your job and you’re not doing it.” That structure. We’re 
not monitoring whose job it is and how far are they in that.” Some respondents 
took the latest UPR session in October 2013 as an example in order to 
emphasize this problem. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (more specifically the 
Direction de la Affaires Juridique and Consulaire) led the drafting process. However, 
the Senegal’s Minister of Justice went to Geneva and headed the delegation of 
Senegal. According to some representatives of international organizations, this 
example shows the lack of coordination between the different ministries and 
                                                        
135 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined Third 
to Seventh Periodic Reports of Senegal, CEDAW/C/SEN/3-7, 13 December 2013, p. 6.   
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between the different institutions in writing and submitting the report. 
However, one government representative did not agree with this argument and 
stated: “It’s not a lack of coordination, it’s group work and everybody gives 
advice. Everybody gives the information needed. And as a government, not all 
the Ministries can be represented in Geneva. There should be one leader and 
they chose the key Ministry to represent them, to represent the opinion of the 
government [the Ministry of Justice]. But it is based on the work that has been 
done together and it has been coordinated as a whole. So, it’s not a desperate 
work like this, this Ministry goes this way and another the other way around. 
No, they coordinate and they choose a leader. And the key Minister has been 
chosen to represent the government there, to submit the report.” 
 
Lack of capacity 
Another concern put forward by representatives of civil society and 
international organizations (government representatives did not mention this 
problem) was the lack of capacity to analyze the situation. In addition, 
representatives of civil society and international organizations referred to a lack 
of human, financial and material resources as a reason why the Senegalese 
government is not able to properly live up to the reporting obligations.  
With regard to the lack of human resources, they explained that there is 
often a lack of “knowledge” and “skills” on how to collect information and how 
to write the reports at the Ministerial level. According to these respondents, 
government officials who are responsible for writing the reports don’t exactly 
know how to do it. A representative of an international organization argued: 
“When the capacity behind the Ministries is weak, it is quite easy to just cross 
your arms and say: Ok, I'm waiting and I will see what will happen.” However, 
a representative of an international organization did not agree with this ‘lack of 
knowledge argument.’ This representative said that this is a “very weak 
justification” and referred to the highly educated elite in Senegal who would be 
“perfectly able to do this task.” In addition, this representative stated that there 
is not a lack of capacity: “I think it's just being lazy in doing it. And which is... I 
mean it is not a justification or an excuse of the fact that their obligation to 
initial and periodical reports is not being fulfilled.” With regard to the lack of 
financial resources, a representative of an international organization said: 
“There are not sufficient funds to write the report. Writing the report is not just 
doing research and having the good person at the right place. You also need 
funds to write it and review it and sometimes it is difficult to get access to these 
funds.” Some respondents suggested that there is a need for capacity 
development in this regard. 
In relation to the need for capacity development, many respondents (from 
civil society and international organizations) indicated that this problem is 
partially covered by the technical and financial support of the West Africa 
Regional Office of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) in Dakar. They considered the support of the OHCHR 
and the civil society engagement an important factor why the third to seventh 
reports to the CEDAWCee and the third to fifth reports to the CRCee were 
submitted in 2013. A representative from an international organization said: 
“the OHCHR pushed the government in putting more effort in writing the 
report. […] They also supported the government technically and financially.” 
 
 
 
FGM/C in Senegal: A Case Study 
247 
The OHCHR made available to the Ministry of Women, Family and Children a 
consultant who was to support the two experts and the technical team in 
finalizing the drafting of the report. In addition, due to the financial support of 
the UNFPA and the OHCHR West Africa Regional Office, a national validation 
workshop was held on 19 and 20 July 2013, at Saly-Mbour, bringing together 
about 60 participants from parliament, sector ministries, civil society human 
rights organizations, non-governmental organizations and technical and 
financial partners.136   
 
Complex and overlapping reporting obligations 
Some respondents (representatives of international organizations and 
government representatives) referred to the ongoing growth of the Treaty Body 
System as a reason for the delay in submission periodic reports. They explained 
that it was challenging for the Senegalese government to meet complex and 
overlapping reporting obligations, bearing in mind all reporting requirements 
for Senegal since the government has ratified all “core” human rights treaties. 
They explained that the rising number of separate periodic reports, according to 
an uneven schedule, is demanding. In a time frame of 10 years, approximately 
20 reports need to be submitted. A representative of an international 
organization explained: “One reason that I do believe is that those treaty bodies 
need to improve the way and the mechanisms that are in place to get the 
reports from the countries […] there is probably a need to review and to find 
some other mechanism to get more compliance from countries.”  
 
Overall, most probably a mix of all these factors will provide an answer to the 
question why reports are (long) overdue and remain outstanding, and those 
reports that have been submitted to the TMBs have been submitted late. A 
representative of civil society said during one of the interviews: “I expect it to 
be a combination of lack of political will, lack of capacity, lack of resources, lack 
of coordination. I think all these things mount up.  In the end, I don’t think it’s 
any one particular thing.”  
 
7.3 FGM/C in national reports and concluding observations 
 
Many of the TMBs have addressed FGM/C in their concluding observations on 
how Senegal meets the treaty obligations. It is evident that the issue of FGM/C 
has been discussed during sessions of the CEDAWCee and the CRCee. 
However, perhaps more unexpectedly, FGM/C in Senegal has also been 
discussed in six other Committees, namely the CERD, CESCR, HRC, CATCee, 
(ACmHPR) and the ACERWC.137   
 
7.3.1 National reports of Senegal 
When analyzing the national reports that Senegal submitted to the various 
                                                        
136 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined Third 
to Seventh Periodic Reports of Senegal, CEDAW/C/SEN/3-7, 13 December 2013, p. 6.   
137 FGM/C has not been discussed in the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, the Committee on 
Migrant Workers and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
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TMBs, it is interesting to note that almost every presentation of a report to a 
Committee, the Senegalese representative starts off with an allusion to Senegal’s 
long-standing commitment to democracy and its tradition of promoting, 
protecting and respecting human rights.  
 In the many national reports that the Senegalese government submitted to 
the TMBs, the country reported that the ratification of international human 
rights instruments is matched by concrete legislative measures to provide better 
protection for women, including the adoption of Act No. 99-05 of 29 January 
1999 criminalizing FGM/C.138 The Senegalese government explained that the 
courts have handed down unconditional sentences in this regard139 and that an 
assessment of the enforcement of the new legislation had been conducted in 
2011. 140  Furthermore, the government explained in their reports that two 
National Action Plans supplemented the national law prohibiting FGM/C.141 
The Action Plan is managed by a National Council chaired by the Prime 
Minister and a Steering Committee composed of the various Ministries 
concerned and of civil society organizations operating in the sector.142 The 
reports also reveal that former cutters were financially, materially and 
economically supported.143 Women who performed FGM/C were being trained 
in income-generating activities so that they could take up alternative 
professions (become entrepreneurs or artisans in areas such as solar energy, 
craft works and small-scale gardening) to earn their living, meet the needs of 
their families and stand up to society pressure.144  
                                                        
138 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined Third 
to Seventh Periodic Reports of Senegal, CEDAW/C/SEN/3-7, 13 December 2013, p. 13, para. 32, p. 23 
para. 44, p. 72; United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Sixteenth to 
Eighteenth Periodic Reports of Senegal, CERD/C/SEN/16-18, 31 October 2011, p. 9, para. 52; United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Report of Senegal, CRC/C/SEN/2, 20 
February 2006, p. 25, para. 92 and p. 72; United Nations Committee Against Torture, Summary 
Record of the 1109th Meeting, CAT/C/SR.1109, 13 November 2012, p. 4-5 and p. 9, para. 26; African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Third to Seventh Periodic Reports of Senegal, 2003, p. 14; 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Combined Periodic Reports of Senegal (2004-2013), 
April 2013, p. 36 and p. 83; African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 
Initial, First and Second Report of Senegal (1998-2009), 2009, p. 93-94. 
139 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Report of Senegal, 
CRC/C/SEN/2, 20 February 2006, p. 25, para. 92.  
140 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Summary Record of the 1109th Meeting, 
CAT/C/SR.1109, 13 November 2012, p. 4-5 and p. 9, para. 24; United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined Third to Seventh Periodic Reports of Senegal, 
CEDAW/C/SEN/3-7, 13 December 2013, p. 65, para. 140.  
141 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Report of Senegal, 
CRC/C/SEN/2, 20 February 2006, p. 21, para. 82; United Nations Committee Against Torture, 
Summary Record of the 1109th Meeting, CAT/C/SR.1109, 13 November 2012, p. 4-5 and p. 9, para. 24; 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined Third to 
Seventh Periodic Reports of Senegal, CEDAW/C/SEN/3-7, 13 December 2013, 13 December 2013, p. 81; 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Combined Periodic Reports of Senegal (2004-2013), 
April 2013, p. 36 and p. 83.  
142 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Combined Periodic Reports of Senegal (2004-
2013), April 2013, p. 36 and p. 85.  
143 African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Initial, First and Second 
Report of Senegal (1998-2009), 2009, p. 27-30.    
144 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Sixteenth to Eighteenth 
Periodic Reports of Senegal, CERD/C/SEN/16-18, 31 October 2011, p. 7, para. 35; African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Combined Periodic Reports of Senegal (2004-2013), April 
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In December 2005, Dakar hosted an inter-parliamentary Conference on 
“Violence against women, abandoning female genital mutilation:  the role of 
national Parliaments” organized by the African Parliamentary Union, the Inter-
Parliamentary Union and UNICEF.145 In addition, the government had “acted 
on the recommendations of the United Nations and adopted a holistic cross-
border approach to raising awareness of the problem, which also affected 
neighbouring countries, at various levels.”146  Senegal had been sharing the 
lessons it had learned about FGM/C prevention with other countries in the 
region and organized a conference in Dakar in 2010 on FGM/C that was 
attended by 28 African countries.147 The Senegalese government organized also 
“Several Islamic conferences with Egyptian theological experts, on Islam and 
children’s rights and, in particular, Islam and excision”148 in order to sensitize 
on and involvement of marabouts,149 priests and other religious guides and 
public figures including traditional leaders in the promotion of the rights of the 
child, girl and boy alike, with focus on FGM/C.150 
 The Senegalese government is in their National Reports very optimistic 
about the progress made in the past two decades and the decline in the practice 
at the national level. According to the reports, “significant progress”151 and 
“giant steps”152 were made in combating FGM/C in Senegal. The Senegalese 
government even wrote: “there is a groundswell towards public renunciation of 
female genital mutilation […] making Senegal become a model country at the 
international level.”153 They even reported the expectation that, by 2015, the 
deadline for the Millennium Development Goals, “total eradication of excision 
would have been achieved. A worse case scenario will be the continued 
existence of very negligible pockets of resistance to changing the practice.”154 
The Senegalese government explained that this decline is “a result of the 
                                                        
2013, p. 36 and p. 85; United Nations Committee Against Torture, Summary Record of the 1109th 
Meeting, CAT/C/SR.1109, 13 November 2012, p. 4-5 and p. 9, para. 25. 
145 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Written Replies by the Government of Senegal 
to the List of Issues Relating to the Consideration of the Second Periodic Report of Senegal, 
CRC/C/SEN/Q/2/Add.1, 10 August 2006, p. 20.  
146 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Summary Record of the 1109th Meeting, 
CAT/C/SR.1109, 13 November 2012, p. 4-5 and p. 9, para. 24.  
147 Ibid, p. 4-5 and p. 9, para. 24-26 and para. 69.  
148 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Written Replies by the Government of Senegal 
to the List of Issues Relating to the Consideration of the Second Periodic Report of Senegal, 
CRC/C/SEN/Q/2/Add.1, 10 August 2006, p. 26.  
149 A Marabout is a Muslim religious leader and teacher in West Africa, and (historically) in the 
Maghreb. The Marabout is often a scholar of the Qur'an and a religious teacher.  
150 African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Initial, First and Second 
Report of Senegal (1998-2009), 2009, p. 42. 
151 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Summary Record of the 1109th Meeting, 
CAT/C/SR.1109, 13 November 2012, p. 9, para. 69; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, Written Replies by the Government of Senegal to the List of Issues Relating to the Consideration of the 
Second Periodic Report of Senegal, CRC/C/SEN/Q/2/Add.1, 10 August 2006, p. 22.  
152 African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Initial, First and Second 
Report of Senegal (1998-2009), 2009, p. 27. 
153 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Written Replies by the Government of Senegal 
to the List of Issues Relating to the Consideration of the Second Periodic Report of Senegal, 
CRC/C/SEN/Q/2/Add.1, 10 August 2006, p. 20.  
154 African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Initial, First and Second 
Report of Senegal (1998-2009), 2009, p. 27. 
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mobilization of women’s groups, NGOs, development partners and the 
Government to conduct awareness- raising, research and advocacy activities.”155 
In 2013, the Senegalese government reported to the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights that “between 2009 and 2011, 4452 communities 
out of 5000 surveyed in 1997 abandoned FGM/C as a result of the impact of the 
Community Capacity Building Programme based on a strategy of education on 
the rights of the individual spearheaded by civil society and supported by 
UNICEF, which programme helped to promote awareness among the 
population.”156 The report further stated, “These results were so encouraging 
that donors (UNICEF-UNFPA-USAID) decided to support a National Action 
Plan launched in February 2010 to fast-track the elimination of excision (2010-
2015).”157  
At the same time, Senegal warns in its report that this achievement should not 
result in “relaxation of efforts”, because there is still strong resistance, especially 
in Fouta, Kédougou, Casamance and elsewhere, and that FGM/C “continues to 
be practiced clandestinely even in Grand Yoff, a densely populated district of 
Dakar with rudiments thereof in Mbour.”158 Outreach and awareness-raising 
programmes continue to be implemented in order to change the behaviour of 
communities in areas resistant to change.159 In the high-prevalence zones, the 
Senegalese government established technical monitoring committees in order to 
continue to communicate with the people concerned and try to modify their 
behaviour.160  
 
7.3.2 Concluding observations of Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
The practice of FGM/C was for the first time discussed in the CEDAWCee in 
1988. Although the practice was not mentioned in the initial report of Senegal, 
the Committee requested during the proceedings further information on 
“traditions and practices regarding mothers and children in general, on 
measures taken to eliminate old sex-stereotyped traditions and practices and on 
obstacles to overcoming them.”161 The CEDAWCee further asked the Senegalese 
government which steps were being taken to intensify and modify 
discriminatory customs and practices in connection with […] female 
circumcision and patriarchal attitudes and whether any education or guidance 
programmes existed to eliminate family stereotypes.”162 The representative of 
                                                        
155 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined Third 
to Seventh Periodic Reports of Senegal, CEDAW/C/SEN/3-7, 13 December 2013, p. 61, para. 127. 
156 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Combined Periodic Reports of Senegal (2004-
2013), April 2013, p. 36 and p. 85.  
157 Ibid.  
158 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Summary Record of the 1109th Meeting, 
CAT/C/SR.1109, 13 November 2012, p. 4-5 and p. 9, para. 24-26 and para. 69; African Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Initial, First and Second Report of Senegal (1998-2009), 
2009, p. 27. 
159 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined Third 
to Seventh Periodic Reports of Senegal, CEDAW/C/SEN/3-7, 13 December 2013, p. 23, para. 46.  
160 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Summary Record of the 1109th Meeting, 
CAT/C/SR.1109, 13 November 2012, p. 4-5 and p. 9, para. 24-26 and para. 69.  
161 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations, Senegal, Suppl. No. 38 (A/43/38), 2 March 1988, p. 3, para. 566.   
162 Ibid, p. 3, para. 567. 
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the Senegalese government responded that “the Government and women’s 
groups were conscious of its detrimental effects on women’s health and a 
growing number of women were fighting against it.”163 The representative of 
the Senegalese State also said that there was no justification for the practice and 
that African Governments undertook many efforts to make it disappear, in 
particular through education of the population and training of medical 
personnel.164  
 
Concerns of Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
Many TMBs expressed in their concluding observations also their concern 
about the persistence of FGM/C in Senegal. A principal subject of concern of 
the CEDAWCee was that despite the efforts of the Government to guarantee 
equal rights for women, certain discriminatory practices persisted, including 
FGM/C, which “gravely offended the dignity of women.”165 Although the 
CATCee noted the measures taken by Senegal to combat all forms of violence 
against women, the Committee remained deeply concerned about the 
persistence of FGM/C in Senegal.166 The HRC also noted “the persistence of 
certain customs and the existence of outmoded legislation, hinder Senegal's full 
compliance with its obligations under the Covenant”167 and regretted that 
“certain traditional cultural attitudes with respect to women are not compatible 
with their dignity as human beings.”168 Further more, the HRC stated that it 
“continues to be especially disturbed at the persistent custom of female genital 
mutilation, which violates articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, and the high rate of 
maternal mortality which results from that practice.”169 The CESCR noted that 
the persistence of certain traditions, customs and cultural practices in Senegal 
continue to impede the full enjoyment by women and girls of their rights under 
the ICESCR.170 The Committee was also concerned that “significantly lower 
literacy rates for women as well as certain cultural practices seriously 
compromise their opportunities for employment and advancement.”171 The 
CRCee was concerned that  “some traditional cultural attitudes towards 
children may hamper the full enjoyment of the rights embodied in the 
Convention by children in Senegal. An understanding of children as subjects of 
                                                        
163 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations, Senegal, Suppl. No. 38 (A/43/38), 2 March 1988, p. 8, para. 605. 
164 Ibid, p. 9, para. 609. 
165 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations, Senegal, A/49/38(SUPP) para. 666-728, 12 April 1994, p. 127, para. 721.   
166 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations, Senegal, 
CAT/C/SEN/CO/3, 17 January 2013, p. 5, para. 14.  
167 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Senegal, 
CCPR/C/79/Add.10, 28 December 1992, p. 2, para. 4.  
168 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Senegal, 
CCPR/C/79/Add.82, 19 November 1997, p. 3, para. 12.  
169 Ibid.  
170 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, 
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rights has not yet penetrated all strata of Senegalese society.”172 The CRCee 
remained concerned by the continuous impact of traditional and customary 
attitudes and the persistence of practices harmful to girls, including FGM/C, 
which hamper the implementation of the Convention.173  
 
Recommendations of Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
The TMBs made several recommendations to the Senegalese government in 
relation to the practice of FGM/C in their concluding observations. In 1997, 
before the national law that criminalizes FGM/C was adopted, the HRC 
recommended that judges and lawyers “make use of ordinary criminal law 
provisions to deal with instances of female genital mutilation until a specific 
law for this offence, the adoption of which the Committee strongly supports, is 
enacted.”174 The CRCee recommended that Senegal should ensure that national 
legislation conforms fully to the provisions and principles of the Convention of 
the Rights of the Child and that “specific provisions should be included with a 
view to clearly forbidding female genital mutilation.”175 In addition, the CRCee 
recommends that adequate legislative and other measures should also be taken 
to establish a complaints procedure for children whose fundamental rights have 
been violated.176 The HRC encouraged the State Party in 1997 to “launch a 
systematic campaign to promote popular awareness of persistent negative 
attitudes towards women and to protect them against all forms of 
discrimination; it urges the State Party to abolish practices prejudicial to 
women's health and to reduce maternal mortality. 177  The CEDAWCee 
encouraged Senegal in 1994 to “step up its public information campaigns on 
behalf of women and to expand its programmes to combat traditional practices 
which affect women’s health and advancement in order to eliminate persistent 
forms of discrimination against women.”178 In 2001, the CESCR was concerned 
that FGM/C was still practiced with impunity,179 despite the existence of 
legislation banning FGM/C, and urged Senegal to enforce the existing 
legislation against FGM/C.180 The CATCee recommended Senegal in 2013 to 
continue to publicize Act No. 99-05 of 29 January 1999 on the penalization of 
FGM/C and to run awareness and information campaigns for the general 
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public and law-enforcement officers.181 According to the CATCee, the State 
Party should investigate all allegations of such violence, prosecute and punish 
the perpetrators and offer victims effective protection and immediate redress.182 
The CATCee also recommended Senegal to “Ensure that the programme to 
combat gender violence and to promote human rights, and the related national 
action plan, include access to shelter, medical and psychological assistance, and 
reintegration programmes. The State Party should provide further information 
on this programme and on the implementation of the second national action 
plan to hasten the end of the practice of excision (2010–2015).”183 The CRCee 
encouraged the Government to “pursue its efforts aiming at promoting 
advocacy and awareness and understanding of the Convention and having its 
basic principles grasped by the general public, in particular by ensuring the 
translation of the Convention in all national languages and paying particular 
attention to people living in rural areas. The Government should pursue such 
efforts in close cooperation with community and religious leaders, with a view 
to promoting change in persisting negative attitudes towards children, 
particularly girls, and to abolishing practices prejudicial to the health of 
children, in particular female genital mutilations.” 184  More concretely, the 
CRCee recommended Senegal to (a) continue with awareness-raising 
campaigns to combat and eradicate FGM/C; (b) to introduce education and 
awareness-raising programmes for practitioners and the general public to 
encourage change in traditional attitudes and discourage harmful practices, 
engaging with the extended family and the traditional and religious leaders and 
support practitioners of female genital mutilation to find alternative sources of 
income; and (c) to ensure the implementation of the Law No. 99-05 regarding 
the prohibition of FGM/C and ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice.185 
 
Compliments of Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
Senegal has also been commended by the TMBs for its efforts in the fight 
against FGM/C. The CERD noted with satisfaction Senegal’s efforts in “the 
banning of genital mutilation”186 and welcomed “the encouraging results of 
various measures taken by the State Party to eradicate female genital 
mutilation.”187 The CESCR noted with appreciation the enactment of the law of 
January 1999 that criminalizes FGM/C.188 The CATCee welcomed “the second 
national action plan to hasten the end of the practice of excision (2010–2015), 
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approved and launched in February 2010.”189 The CRCee took notes of the 
progress made by Senegal in the effort to bring domestic law into compliance 
with the Convention. 190  The CEDAWCee and CRCee welcomed the in 
enactment of Law No. 99-05 of 1999 prohibiting FGM/C191 and noted with 
appreciation the efforts made by Senegal in combating FGM/C.192  
 
8 UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW 
 
This section examines the cooperation of Senegal with the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR). First, a short introduction is given on the UPR mechanism and 
process. Afterwards, an analysis is provided of the two periodic reviews of the 
human rights record of Senegal that took place relatively in 2009 and 2013 with 
a specific focus on the comments, recommendations, concerns and questions of 
UN Member States in relation to FGM/C in Senegal.   
 
8.1 Introduction to the Universal Periodic Review  
 
The UN General Assembly created the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) on 15 
March 2006 in Resolution 60/251.193 The UPR is a UN mechanism that involves 
a periodic review of the human rights records of all UN Member States. It is an 
inter-State review process under the support of the Human Rights Council. It 
provides the opportunity for each State to declare what actions they have taken 
to improve the human rights situation in their countries and to overcome 
challenges to the enjoyment of human rights.194 The UPR also includes a sharing 
of best practices among States. The ultimate aim of the UPR mechanism is to 
improve the human rights situation in all countries and address human rights 
violations wherever they occur. According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon, the UPR mechanism “has great potential to promote and protect human 
rights in the darkest corners of the world.”195 The reviews are conducted by the 
UPR Working Group, which consists of the 47 members of the Human Rights 
Council. The reviews are based on three key documents (i) a national report 
(information provided by the State under review); (ii) a compilation prepared 
by the OHCHR (information contained in the reports of UN TMBs, Special 
Procedures, including observations and comments by the State concerned, and 
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other relevant official UN documents); (iii) a summary prepared by the 
OHCHR (information submitted by other relevant stakeholders, such as NGOs, 
NHRIs, human rights defenders, academic institutions and research institutes, 
regional organizations, as well as civil society representatives).196 The reviews 
take place during a meeting of the UPR Working Group through an interactive 
dialogue between the State under review and other UN Member States. During 
the dialogue, UN Member States can make recommendations or comments, 
raise their concerns and pose questions to the States under review to address 
specific human rights challenges. The results of each review are reflected in an 
“outcome report”. By October 2011, the human rights records of all 193 UN 
Member States had been reviewed. The human rights situation of Senegal was 
examined for the first time in February 2009 and for the second time in October 
2013. The next review of Senegal will be in April 2018.  
 
8.2 First Review in February 2009   
 
The UPR Working Group reviewed Senegal for the first time on 6 February 2009. 
Although the National Report of Senegal did not contain any information on 
FGM/C,197 during the interactive dialogue several UN Member States made 
comments/recommendations, raised concerns and posed questions in relation 
to FGM/C.  
 
8.2.1 Positive comments by UN Member States 
Positive achievements were noted by the delegations of Ireland and Botswana. 
Ireland welcomed the good progress underway in Senegal on women’s rights, 
including the adoption of legislation eliminating discrimination against women 
and protecting women against FGM/C.198 Botswana recommended that the 
government of Senegal continues its positive efforts towards implementation of 
relevant legislation pertaining to, inter alia, the prohibition of certain cultural 
practices adjudged harmful.199  
 
8.2.2 Concerns and recommendations of UN Member States 
Several UN Member States (including Ireland,200 Luxembourg,201 Switzerland)202 
expressed their concern that legislation was not always translated into concrete 
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results for women and girls. They noted that FGM/C remains common in 
Senegal203 and recommended Senegal to enforce or implement more effectively 
the provisions of law 99-05 prohibiting FGM/C. Palestine 204 and Ghana205 
recommended Senegal to pursue and increase efforts at eliminating all forms of 
discrimination against women, including adopting effective measures to 
implement existing legislation on this subject. Canada noted that VAW 
continues, despite the legislation punishing it. 206  Canada therefore 
recommended that Senegal takes measures to raise awareness among the public 
and all players involved in the judicial system regarding the need to respect and 
apply this legislation.207 Further more, some countries (including Switzerland,208 
Ireland,209 South Africa,210 Luxembourg,211 United Kingdom212 and the United 
States213) recommended undertaking and/or continue an effective national 
awareness-raising campaign to prevent, combat and eradicate FGM/C. 
According to Luxembourg, these awareness-raising campaigns seek to bring 
about positive trends in traditional behaviour.214 Ireland, Switzerland, the UK, 
Luxembourg and the United States of America encouraged Senegal to 
undertake an awareness-raising campaign to prevent and eradicate FGM/C 
and other traditional harmful practices against women and girls.215 Senegal 
accepted all these recommendations.216  
 
8.2.3 Questions of UN Member States 
Apart from these recommendations, several questions and issues were raised in 
relation to FGM/C. Romania217 and France218 asked for example how Senegal 
intends to combat discrimination against women, including FGM/C. Ireland 
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asked what activities the government is undertaking with regard to the effective 
enforcement of law 99-05 prohibiting FGM/C and if there are any plans 
proposed which would seek to raise public awareness about the practice.219 
Germany asked which concrete legislative and other measures the Senegalese 
Government envisages fighting and eradicating harmful practices. In their 
response, the Senegalese delegation stated that the eradication of FGM/C is a 
priority, with severe penalties in place and expanded awareness-raising efforts 
in villages.220 In the Addendum of the Report of the Working Group on the UPR, 
in which views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary 
commitments and replies presented by the State under review are compiled, 
one can read that the Senegalese delegation also stated that: “With regard to 
female genital mutilation, sustained efforts at awareness-raising, training and 
support among the general public have resulted in abandonment of the practice 
of excision in 75 per cent of Senegal’s 5,000 communities. Increasingly, those 
who refuse to comply are prosecuted and punished. By Decree No. 10545 of 10 
December 2008, the Minister of Justice established a committee to look into 
violence against women and children.”221  
 
8.2.4 Concluding remarks 
Ireland thanked the delegation of Senegal for the constructive way in which it 
had participated in the universal periodic review process and it noted with 
appreciation that “Senegal had accepted its recommendation concerning the 
need for an awareness-raising campaign on the application of the law on female 
genital mutilation.” 222  Senegal also made a concluding remark regarding 
FGM/C and stated: “Concerning female genital mutilation, some individuals 
had recently been sentenced in that regard despite public opposition, in 
addition to sensitization activities. This should be seen in relation to other 
activities related to the protection of women and to child education.”223 
 
8.3 Second review in October 2013   
 
The UPR Working Group reviewed Senegal for the second time on 21 October 
2013. During this session, there was a lot of attention for FGM/C. In contrast to 
the first round, the National Report of Senegal included information in relation 
to FGM/C. Not surprisingly, many UN Member States made 
comments/recommendations, raised concerns and posed questions in relation 
to FGM/C during the interactive dialogue.  
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8.3.1 FGM/C in national report Senegal224 
In their national report, Senegal specifically replied to the recommendations in 
relation to FGM/C of UN Member States that they accepted during the 
interactive dialogue in the first round in February 2009. In relation to the 
implementation and more effective application of Act No. 99-05 criminalizing 
FGM/C, Senegal explained that it has introduced harsher penalties for FGM/C 
by means of Act No. 1999-05 of 29 January 1999.225 They wrote in their report 
that as far as VAW is concerned, FGM/C is among the “most severely 
penalized offences.”226 The Government also wrote in their National Report that 
they encouraged citizens to report FGM/C cases. Article 32 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure provides that officials must inform the judicial authority if, 
during the performance of their duties, they become aware of criminal acts. 
Citizens and groups of individuals have the right to avail themselves of legal 
remedies to protect their rights and freedoms. In such cases, the courts 
rigorously apply the laws designed to eliminate all forms of violence against 
women.227 The Government had also commissioned a study in 2010 to evaluate 
the implementation status of Act No. 1999-05. This study “highlighted the need 
for a new plan to hasten the end of female genital mutilation and generate 
awareness among the communities still practising it, with a view to totally 
eradicating it by 2015.” 228  Senegal also reported that the second NAP to 
eliminate FGM/C provided for the establishment of a National Council, chaired 
by the Prime Minister, and a steering committee. Twelve monitoring 
committees were set up in 2011 in areas of high prevalence, chaired by regional 
governors, in areas of high prevalence. 229  A human rights capacity-
strengthening programme was designed to help them improve the effectiveness 
of their interventions. Similarly, women who perform excisions have been 
encouraged to perform other lines of business 230  and an empowerment 
programme has been established for them. 231  In relation to undertaking 
measures to raise awareness to eliminate FGM/C, Senegal reported that 
awareness-raising campaigns on the consequences of FGM/C were run in the 
media and other campaigns have targeted religious and social leaders. Legal 
advice centres use television programmes to inform the most vulnerable 
populations of their rights, while NGOs and women’s associations use law 
shops to guide and assist women victims of violence with administrative, 
judicial, psychological, and social and health formalities, using various 
mechanisms and strategies.232 In 2012, a joint programme to combat gender-
based violence and promote human rights was adopted.233 Overall, Senegal 
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explained that “significant results have been achieved”234 and that trends show 
a marked decrease of FGM/C in the country “with thousands of communities 
having publicly renounced it.”235 According to the National Report, data from 
the Demographic and Health Survey and Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey for 
2010–2011 revealed  “a 25.7 per cent reduction in the national female genital 
mutilation prevalence rate.”236  
 
8.3.2 Positive comments by UN Member States 
Positive achievements were noted by many delegations: Australia, 237 
Argentina, 238  Bangladesh, 239  Benin, 240  Burkina Faso, 241  Cote d’Ivoire, 242 
Ecuador, 243  Germany, 244 Maldives, 245 The Netherlands, 246 Philippines, 247 South 
Sudan 248 and Vietnam. 249 They welcomed the efforts and determination of 
Senegal towards the elimination of FGM/C. These delegations noted with 
satisfaction the steps and measures that had been taken to combat FGM/C and 
the progress made so far.250 More specifically, South Sudan commended the 
establishment of institutional frameworks strengthening human rights and 
noted the progress in implementing recommendations from the previous 
UPR. 251  Madagascar commended Senegal for combating FGM/C through 
strengthened awareness campaigns and legislation against FGM/C.252 Burkina 
Faso welcomed the ongoing commitment of Senegal to creating a human rights 
culture.253 China welcomed the implementation of recommendations accepted 
during the previous review on the reduction of FGM/C and health 
development.254 Uruguay commended legislation on outlawing FGM/C255 and 
Cape Verde commended the adoption of the second National Action Plan on 
FGM/C.256  
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8.3.3 Concerns and recommendations of UN Member States 
States participating in the dialogue had a series of recommendations to Senegal 
in relation to FGM/C. In general, Côte d’Ivoire recommended Senegal to 
strengthen actions against harmful cultural practices.257 Argentina and Ecuador 
recommended Senegal to continue its efforts to eradicate FGM/C.258 Brazil 
recommended Senegal to maintain and reinforce all measures aimed at 
eradicating FGM/C, “which is often related to other forms of aggression 
against women.”259 In relation to legislative efforts of Senegal, the Netherlands 
noted that FGM/C often remained unpunished.260 Burkina Faso recommended 
Senegal to prosecute and punish persons who, despite awareness campaigns, 
continue to be perpetrators or accomplices of FGM/C, according to the law of 
22 January 1999.261 Cape Verde encouraged the continued implementation of 
existing instruments and policies to ensure sustainable solutions.262 In relation 
to policymaking, Paraguay recommended Senegal to continue to strengthen all 
public policies with a view to eliminating FGM/C.263 Algeria recommended 
Senegal to continue its efforts to achieve the goals of the second NAP to 
eliminate FGM/C. 264  Angola recommended Senegal to continue, in the 
framework of the fight against FGM/C, its action in the implementation of the 
second NAP for accelerating the abandonment of FGM/C until 2015.265 Rwanda 
recommended Senegal to continue its positive engagement toward the total 
eradication of FGM/C by 2015 as indicated in the NAP.266 In relation to 
awareness-raising, Burkina Faso urged efforts to raise awareness and share 
information on FGM/C.267 Gabon recommended Senegal to continue its efforts 
to increase awareness and repression of all forms of violence against women, 
particularly FGM/C.268 Cote d’Ivoire269 and Benin270 called on the international 
community to provide further support. All recommendations have been 
accepted by the Senegalese delegation.271  
 
8.3.4 Questions of UN Member States 
The United Kingdom submitted the following question in advance: “What is 
Senegal doing to ensure that programmes on gender violence and the 
elimination of female genital mutilation also include access to medical facilities, 
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shelter, psychological assistance and reintegration programmes?”272 Italy asked 
Senegal for further information on the plan to eliminate FGM/C (especially 
monitoring initiatives and implementation resources).273 Luxembourg asked 
whether a monitoring mechanism had been implemented on FGM/C. 274 
Montenegro requested more information on prosecutions brought and 
convictions handed down in FGM/C cases. 275  The delegation of Senegal 
explained that new multisectoral policies had been implemented to combat 
FGM/C other forms of violence against women and girls.276  
 
8.3.5 Concluding remarks 
The Senegalese delegation concluded that they had taken a three-pronged 
approach to combating FGM/C: “The practice was punished, awareness of it 
was being raised among the population, and women who performed it were 
offered alternative occupations so that they could stop.”277 The Senegalese 
delegation stated that several regions had renounced the practice; “of around 
5,000 communities, more than 4,500 had announced that they had abandoned 
excision.”278 Efforts were now focused on the remaining 500 communities, using 
the three-pronged approach. Furthermore, the Senegalese authorities had noted 
the need to develop regional cooperation in order to render their approach 
more effective.279  
 
9 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 
 
The Senegalese authorities have established an institutional framework 
consisting of several National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs). The NHRIs 
are involved in the promotion and protection of human rights and deal with 
matters concerning the implementation of international and regional human 
rights law. Among them is the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
Promotion of Peace, the Senegalese Human Rights Committee, the Inter-
Ministerial Committee on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 
the National Human Rights Advisory Council and the Office of the 
Ombudsman. These institutions will be briefly discussed below in order to 
provide an overview of the Senegalese national human rights structure. 
However, in the context of FGM/C, the NHRIs do not play a considerable role. 
 
9.1 High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Promotion of Peace 
 
The High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Promotion of Peace (Haut 
                                                        
272 Advance Questions to Senegal, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/SNSession17.aspx [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015].   
273 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review on 
Senegal, A/HRC/25/4, 11 December 2013, para. 71.  
274 Ibid, para. 74.  
275 Ibid, para. 81.  
276 Ibid, para. 7 and para. 30.  
277 Ibid, para. 57.  
278 Ibid.  
279 Ibid.  
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Commissariat aux Droits de l’Homme et à la Promotion de la Paix) was established in 
June 2004 by Decree No. 2004-657. The Office of the High Commissioner is 
attached to the Office of the President of the Republic and is mainly responsible 
for monitoring all matters relating to the promotion and protection of human 
rights, the implementation of international humanitarian law and the 
development of the culture of peace.280 The Office includes in the first place a 
human rights desk (guichet des droits de l'homme) that is in charge of receiving 
complaints from individuals, corporate bodies or from organizations working 
in the field of human rights and international humanitarian law. The human 
rights desk also makes suggestions to the President of the Republic on 
subsequent responses. In the second place, the Commission comprises a follow-
up unit, which is in charge of following the implementation of observations and 
recommendations made by the Senegalese Human Rights Committee.281 This 
unit is tasked with the coordination and preparation of national periodic 
reports on the human rights situation and of replies to communications and 
questions addressed to Senegal by regional and international bodies responsible 
for monitoring the situation with respect to human rights and international 
humanitarian law. Lastly, the Commission also includes a unit for coordinating 
efforts to combat human trafficking and related practices.282 
 
9.2 Senegalese Human Rights Committee 
 
The National Human Rights Commission was created by decree in April 1970 
with a general mandate to promote and protect human rights. 283 Senegal 
became one of the first states to create such an institution.284 The purpose of the 
Commission was mainly promotional to create greater human rights 
awareness.285 It was charged with organizing the celebration of UN designated 
events, such as the Human Rights Day on December 10. The performance after 
the establishment of the Commission was variable and “influenced by political 
circumstances and the energies of successive directors.”286 When Youssoupha 
Ndiaye (President of the Constitutional Court) became the new director in 1994, 
he actively sought to revive the Commission and proposed that the committee 
should be organized and established in law. Consequently a new law (Act No. 
97-04) was promulgated on March 10, 1997 to establish the Senegalese Human 
                                                        
280 Article 1 and 2 of Decree No. 2004-657 of 2 June 2004 on the Establishment, Organization and 
Functioning of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Promotion of Peace. 
281 Article 5 of Presidential Decree No. 5691 of 6 July 2004.  
282 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Third Periodic Report of Senegal, CAT/C/SEN/3, 5 
October 2011, p. 10, para. 38.  
283 United Nations General Assembly, National Report of Senegal, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/WG.6/17/SEN/1, 23 July 2013, p. 3, para. 9.  
284 C.H. Heyns and F. Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic 
Level, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, p. 536.  
285 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Fifteenth Periodic Report, 
Senegal, CERD/C/408/Add.2, 19 November 2001, p. 12, para. 57; B. Nowrojee, Protectors Or 
Pretenders? Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa, Human Rights Watch Africa, 2001, p. 
261.  
286 Ibid. 
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Rights Committee (Comité Sénégalais des Droits de l’Homme - CSDH).287 This law 
strengthened the Committee and enlarged its functions.288 The CSDH was 
defined to be an independent institution to promote matters of human rights 
through “consultation, observation, evaluation, dialogue, [and] concertation.”289 
The Committee consists of representatives of NGOs, the Parliament, Economic 
and Social Council, Supreme Courts, Bar (advocates) and the University.290 
Representatives of the State sit on the Committee in a consultative capacity. The 
main responsibility of the CSDH is to represent the various trends in public 
opinion on human rights in Senegal.291 The main tasks of this Committee are as 
follows: (i) promoting human rights through information campaigns, advocacy 
activities and the collecting of all documentation concerning human rights;292 (ii) 
attracting the attention of the authorities to human rights violations and, where 
appropriate, to propose measures to end them; (iii) monitoring implementation 
and observance of the human rights conventions;293 (iv) issue opinions or 
recommendations in all matters related to human rights at the request of 
Government, Parliament or even on its own initiative;294 (v) submit an annual 
report to the President on the human rights situation in Senegal. The Senegalese 
Human Rights Committee makes public its opinions and recommendations.  
 In December 2012, the CSDH lost its “A” status from the International 
Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights (ICC) Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) for 
non-compliance with the ‘Paris Principles’.295 The CSDH was downgraded to “B” 
status (not fully in compliance with the Paris Principles), mainly because the 
independence of the institution was at stake. According to the Paris Principles, 
the national institution needs to be independent of the Government and this 
independence must be guaranteed either by statutory law or constitutional 
provisions. However, the CSDH is part of the Ministry of Justice and there is no 
law or constitutional provision guaranteeing the independence of the 
Committee. Other reasons why the SCA decided to downgrade the CSDH to “B” 
                                                        
287 United Nations General Assembly, National Report of Senegal, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/WG.6/17/SEN/1, 23 July 2013, p. 3, para. 9.  
288 Originally, the National Human Rights Commission acted as a representative of trade unions, 
youth and women’s movement, see Decree No. 70-453 of 22 April 1970 establishing a Senegalese 
Human Rights Committee. 
289 B. Nowrojee, Protectors Or Pretenders? Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa, Human 
Rights Watch Africa, 2001, p. 262.  
290 Act No. 97/4 of 10 March 1997, Founding Act of National Human Rights Institution in Senegal, 
Preamble, see also http://www.nhri.net/Ni/Files/52/SN%20Act%2097-
4%20of%201997%20Senegalese%20Committee%20for%20Human%20Rights.pdf [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
291 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Fifteenth Periodic Report, 
Senegal, CERD/C/408/Add.2, 19 November 2001, p. 12, para. 60.  
292 Act No. 97/4 of 10 March 1997, Founding Act of National Human Rights Institution in Senegal, 
Article 2.  
293 Ibid, Article 3.  
294 Act No. 97/4 of 10 March 1997, Founding Act of National Human Rights Institution in Senegal, 
Article 2 and preamble.  
295 The Paris Principles are a set of core minimum recommendations relating to the status and 
functioning of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights. The Paris 
Principles are set out in United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 48/134 on National Institutions 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, A/RES/48/134, 20 December 1993.   
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status were the funding levels of the Committee, 296  the procedures for 
nominating and appointing members,297 the appointment of members on a part-
time basis and the Committee's ability to choose its own members. The 
Senegalese authorities subsequently appointed a new Director and 
strengthened the Committee’s capacity “to ensure it was fully operational and 
able to regain its former status.”298 Although questions were not asked during 
the interview about NHRI, one respondent (a representative of an international 
organization) referred to the decision of the SCA when answering the question 
about the TMB. The respondent argued: “The Comité Sénégalais has finally lost 
its A-status. It has never been in compliance with international human rights 
standards. The B-status or C-status is more adequate to what they do. […] It 
was actually a big fraud that the Comité Sénégalais was classified for the past ten 
years as an A-status.” 
 
9.3 Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law 
 
The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law (Comité Inter-Ministériel des Droits de l'Homme et du Droit 
International Humanitaire) was created by Decree No. 97-674 of 2 July 1997. The 
principal task of this internal government body is to provide a framework for 
government coordination, where ministerial departments will be able to 
harmonize their views on human rights issues. It coordinates the discussion 
and follow-up by the competent ministries of opinions and recommendations 
from competent human rights or humanitarian associations, as well as from the 
Senegalese Human Rights Committee. The Inter-Ministerial Committee on 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law is the main “interlocutor” 
for human rights organizations within the administration.299 It provides for the 
examination, by the competent Ministries, of claims or allegations of human 
rights violations brought before them. It ensures the coordination of responses 
to such claims or allegations.300 The Inter-Ministerial Committee also advises 
and assists the government in the promotion and application of international 
(humanitarian) law and ensures that Senegal’s legislation is in line with the 
provisions of the international human rights instruments to which Senegal is a 
party.301 It complements the work of the Senegalese Human Rights Committee 
and ensures the preparation, submission and presentation of Senegal’s various 
                                                        
296 The CSDH stated that they are underfunded and have inadequate financial, material and human 
resources to allow the national human rights institution to fulfil its mandate. The Senegalese 
authorities decided therefore in 2013 to provide it with proper premises and doubled its budget to 
70 million CFA francs.  
297 The Senegalese President appoints the president of the CSDH, which is not in line with the Paris 
Principles.  
298 United Nations General Assembly, National Report of Senegal, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/WG.6/17/SEN/1, 23 July 2013, p. 3, para. 10.  
299 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Second Periodic Report, Senegal, E/1990/6/Add.25, 
31 August 2000, p. 5, para. 23. 
300 Ibid. 
301 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Fifteenth Periodic Report, 
Senegal, CERD/C/408/Add.2, 19 November 2001, p. 12, para. 64.  
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periodic reports, in accordance with the various international human rights 
instruments. 302  The Inter-Ministerial Committee represents Senegal in 
international human rights bodies.303  
 
9.4 National Human Rights Advisory Council304 
 
The National Human Rights Advisory Council (Conseil Consultatif National des 
Droits de l’Homme) is composed of members from all relevant ministries and 
civil society organizations that work to promote and protect human rights. The 
National Human Rights Advisory Council assists the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and the Promotion of Peace and is placed under the supervision 
of the Human Rights Directorate. 305  It is responsible for coordinating the 
preparation of periodic reports of Senegal and monitoring the 
recommendations of the TMBs. Its mission is to ensure the implementation of 
the regional and international conventions on human rights, which Senegal is a 
signatory. Although questions were not asked during the interview about 
NHRI, one respondent (a representative of an international organization) 
argued: “the Conseil Consultatif National des Droits de l’Homme has never 
properly worked.” In July 2013, the National Human Rights Advisory Council  
was given a new lease of life and the new members were re-installed. At the 
end of 2013, the Human Rights Directorate organized a three-day training for 
the new members of the Council to initiate them to the main instruments for the 
protection of human rights so as to better equip them of technical development 
and drafting of periodic reports. 
 
9.5 Office of the Ombudsman306  
 
The Office of the Ombudsman (Médiateur) is an independent administrative 
authority, which was established by Act No. 91-14 of 11 February 1991, as 
amended by Act No. 99-04 of 29 January 1999. Its task is, among others, to 
ensure respect for the rights of Senegalese citizens and to provide additional 
guarantees to safeguard their interests. Any natural person or legal entity that 
considers that an organization307 has failed to act in accordance with its mission 
of public service, may submit a complaint to the Office.308 The Office of the 
                                                        
302 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Fifteenth Periodic Report, 
Senegal, CERD/C/408/Add.2, 19 November 2001, p. 12, para. 63.  
303 Decree No. 97-674 of 2 July 1997. 
304 Unless otherwise cited, the information in this paragraph is cited from United Nations General 
Assembly, National Report of Senegal, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/WG.6/17/SEN/1, 23 July 
2013, p. 4, para. 19.  
305 The Human Rights Directorate is set up within the Ministry of Justice in 2011. The directorate is 
in particular responsible for monitoring the fulfilment of international human rights obligations 
undertaken by Senegal and for publicizing, protecting and promoting human rights. See also 
United Nations General Assembly, National Report of Senegal, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/WG.6/17/SEN/1, 23 July 2013, p. 4, para. 18. 
306 This paragraph is cited from United Nations Committee Against Torture, Third Periodic Report of 
Senegal, CAT/C/SEN/3, 5 October 2011, p. 10, para. 40.  
307 An organization referred to under Article 1 of Act No. 99-04 of 29 January 1999. 
308 Article 8 of Act No. 99-04 of 29 January 1999.  
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Ombudsman may also conduct investigations on his own initiative, concerning 
any matter falling within his area of responsibility, whenever he has reasons to 
believe that a person or a group of persons has been wronged by the poor 
functioning of a public service.309 The Office of the Ombudsman plays an 
important role as a liaison between the Administration and citizens who feel 
that their rights have not been upheld or that their interests have been harmed. 
 
10 CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 
 
Senegal’s constitution was first drafted in 1959, and modified in 1960, 1963 and 
most recently in 2001. Senegalese law is marked by the constitutional guarantee 
of human rights, both in the preamble and in the body of the Constitution of 22 
January 2001.310  In this regard, the preamble explicitly affirms the State’s 
adherence to several international human rights treaties, notably the UDHR, the 
CEDAW, CRC and the ACHPR: “The people of the sovereign nation of Senegal 
[...] affirm their adherence to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen of 1789 and to the international instruments adopted by the United 
Nations and the Organization of African Unity [now the African Union], 
notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women of 18 
December 1979, the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981.”  
 
10.1 Primacy of international law 
 
Senegal has a so-called “monist” system311 and the Constitution of Senegal 
establishes supremacy of international law in the national legal system. Article 
98 expressly states that: “treaties or agreements that have been duly ratified or 
approved shall, upon publication, take precedence over other laws, subject to 
their application, in the case of each agreement or treaty, by the other party.” A 
question may arise as to whether or not ‘other laws’ referred to in Article 98 
include the Senegalese Constitution itself. Article 97 of the Constitution clarifies 
this by providing that when an international agreement contains a provision 
contrary to the Constitution, ratification may only occur after the Constitution is 
revised. Consequently, international human rights treaties ratified by Senegal 
(and published in the Journal Officiel) are incorporated into the domestic legal 
system. International law becomes directly applicable within the Senegalese 
legal order and can accordingly be invoked directly before the national courts. 
However, in reality this is done very rare and does not seem to be explicit in 
                                                        
309 Article 30 of Act No. 99-04 of 29 January 1999.  
310 As adopted on 22 January 2001 and amended in 2003, 2006 and 2007. For the Constitution 
including the five subsequent amendments, see Constitution de la République du Sénégal du 22 janvier 
2001, available at http://www.gouv.sn/-Constitution-du-Senegal-.html [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015]. 
311 In a monist state, international law does not need to be translated into national law, but it has 
automatic effect in national laws.  
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judicial practice in Senegal.312  
 
10.2 Equality and non-discrimination 
 
The Senegalese Constitution establishes the enjoyment of rights without 
discrimination. The preamble of the Constitution includes a denunciation of all 
forms of injustice, inequality and discrimination. Specific provisions of the 
Constitution explicitly condemn and seek to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination. Article 1 states: “Senegal is a secular, democratic and social 
republic which guarantees the equality of all citizens before the law, without 
distinction as to origin, race, sex or religion, and respects all faiths.” In Article 5, 
the Constitution declares punishable by law “any act of racial, ethnic, or 
religious discrimination, as well as any regionalist propaganda infringing the 
internal security of the State or the territorial integrity of the Republic.” 
Furthermore, equality of men and women is explicitly guaranteed in Article 7 of 
the Senegalese Constitution: “All human beings are equal before the law. Men 
and Women are equal.” A number of provisions in the Constitution expressly 
establish the right of women to equal treatment before the law, in areas as 
access to public services (preamble), access to land and property (Article 15), 
access to health services (Article 17), employment, wages and taxation (Article 
25). Parity for men and women in access to elective and political posts has been 
guaranteed ever since article 7 of the Constitution was amended in November 
2007. 
The Senegalese Constitution does not prohibit “harmful practices” (as is the 
case in for example Ghana and Ethiopia), 313 although it explicitly forbids 
“physical mutilations” in Article 7. This article provides that the human person 
is sacred and inviolable and that the State has the obligation to respect and 
protect it. The individual is entitled to the right to life and physical integrity, 
and particularly to protection against all physical mutilations. 
 
10.3 Protection of other human rights 
 
Apart from the rights that guarantee equality and non-discrimination, the 
Constitution protects also various other human rights, which are enshrined 
under Title II of the Constitution, entitled “Civil Liberties and the Human 
Person: Economic, Social and Collective Rights.” Article 7 to 25 of the 
Constitution include, among others, the civil and political freedoms (freedom of 
opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association, 
freedom of assembly, freedom of movement and freedom of manifestation), the 
cultural freedoms, the religious freedoms, freedom of ideology, trade-union 
                                                        
312 One important example in this regard is the case of Suleymane Guengueng and Others v Hissène 
Habré (2002) AHRLR 183, where the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment was refused applicability.  
313 Article 39(2) of Ghana’s Constitution provides that traditional practices that are injurious to a 
person’s health and well-being are abolished. Article 35(4) of Ethiopia’s Constitution proclaims that 
the State has the duty to guarantee the right of women to be free from the influence of harmful 
customary practices. All laws, stereotyped ideas and customs which oppress women or otherwise 
adversely affect their physical and mental well-being are prohibited.  
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freedoms, freedom of enterprise, the right to education, the right to know how 
to read and write, the right to own property, the right to work, the right to 
health, the right to a healthy environment, the right to have access to multiple 
sources of information, freedom of expression and the right to demonstrate. The 
Senegalese constitution is very progressive and includes provisions on many 
human rights. Although no specific questions about the Constitution were 
asked during the interviews, some respondents referred to the Constitution as a 
“copy-paste of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Indeed, the 
Senegalese Constitution is very comprehensive and state that the Senegalese 
people recognize the existence of inviolable and inalienable human rights as the 
basis of every community, of peace and justice in the world (Article 7 of the 
Constitution). However, there are major vacuums and gaps in the national laws 
when the Constitution is applied. Several TMBs expressed its concern about the 
de jure and de facto inequality that exists between men and women in Senegalese 
society.314 Some national laws in Senegal remain deeply discriminatory against 
women, in particular in matters relating to the family. Provisions of the Family 
Code concerning marital authority, parental authority,315 choice of residence,316 
property, 317  divorce, minimum age for marriage, 318  levirate and sororate 319 
(traditional practices where a man may marry his dead brother’s widow or his 
dead wife’s sister) are not only unconstitutional, but also in violation with the 
ratified international human rights treaties such as the CEDAW.320 
 
                                                        
314 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, E/C.12/1/Add.62, 24 September 2001, p. 3, para. 15 and p. 5 para. 38 and p. 11, para. 74; 
United Nations General Assembly, Compilation Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner of 
Human Rights, A/HRC/WG.6/4/SEN/2, 18 December 2008, p. 5, para. 13.  
315 According to article 152 of the Family Code, the husband is head of the family with authority 
over the household and children. Article 277 states, “During the marriage [parental authority] is 
exercised by the father as head of the family.” Moreover, article 3 provides: “Any legitimate child 
carries the father’s name. Where a child is disowned, he takes the mother’s name”. According to 
article 4, “A child born outside marriage takes the mother’s name. Where a child is recognised by 
the father, he takes the latter’s name”.  
316 The husband has the choice of family residence; the wife is obliged to live there with him and he 
is obliged to take her in (Article 153 of the Family Code).  
317 According to Article 375, household expenses are the responsibility of the husband. Where the 
dowry system of marriage applies, under the terms of Article 385, any property given to a woman 
when she marries by persons other than her husband and that are subject to the rules of dowry 
(property, assets deposited at the bank and animals) are handed over to the husband. For as long as 
the marriage lasts, he manages these as a “good husband and father”. 
318 The minimum legal age for marriage is 18 years for men and 16 years for women (Article 111). 
Women may not remarry until a period of 300 days has elapsed from the date the previous 
marriage was dissolved (Article 112). The authorisation of payment of a dowry by the husband 
(Article 132) promotes the perception of the wife as the property of the husband. 
319 Although Article 110 provides that marriage between a brother-in-law and sister-in-law is 
forbidden, it permits levirate and sororate where the marital union that led to the alliance was 
dissolved as a result of death. 
320 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations, Senegal, CEDAW/C/SEN/CO/3-7, 28 July 2015, para. 8-9.  
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11 CRIMINALIZING FGM/C IN SENEGAL 
 
11.1 Political commitment 
 
From an historical perspective, efforts in Senegal to abandon FGM/C began in 
the 1970s.321 Political commitment grew over time. In February 1984, Senegal 
hosted an UN-sponsored conference322 that aimed to consider anti-FGM/C 
policy programmes and actions to stop FGM/C in the African region. 323 
Delegates from more than 20 African countries attended the conference. A 
fundamental outcome was the formation of the IAC. According to the IAC, 
“there was a critical need for an African regional voice in an international 
campaign against FGM.”324 One of the primary mandates of the IAC was to call 
for governments to use existing national legislation to criminalize FGM/C, and 
to implement legislation specifically banning the practice.325 On 5 April 1984, 
President Abdou Diouf declared at the opening of a seminar in Dakar on 
traditional practices affecting the health of mothers and children, that the 
“decline of the survival of excision should be accelerated through education, 
not anathema.”326 In 1996, a conference on traditional practices harmful to 
women’s health was held in Casamance (Southern part of Senegal). Eight West-
African States and CSOs from these countries were present to exchange 
experiences and strengthen strategies and programs to fight FGM/C. Following 
this conference, the Senegalese Minister of Health launched a prevention 
campaign against FGM/C, on 22 April 1997.327 On 20 November 1997, during 
the 33rd Congress of the International Federation for Human Rights held in 
Dakar, President Abdou Diouf, openly took a stand against FGM/C. In his 
speech, he said the following:328 
 
                                                        
321 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change (2008-2012) 
– Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF sur les 
Mutilations Génitales Féminines/Excision: Accélérer le Changement (2008-2012) – Sénégal), New York, 
July 2013, p. 10.  
322 The Conference was organized by the Working Group on Traditional Practices based in Geneva, 
with the support of UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO and the Ministry of Health of Senegal. 
323 B. Shell-Duncan et al., Legislating Change? Responses to Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting in 
Senegal, Law & Society Review, Volume 47, No. 4, 2013, p. 817. 
324 See the website of the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of 
Women and Children, available at http://www.iac-
ciaf.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10&Itemid=3 [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015]. 
325 B. Shell-Duncan et al., Legislating Change? Responses to Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting in 
Senegal, Law & Society Review, Volume 47, No. 4, 2013, p. 817.  
326 Statement by the President of Senegal, Abdou Diouf on sexual mutilation: “Accélérer le 
dépérissement de cette survivance qu'est l'excision par l'éducation et non par l'anathème,” see bulletin of 
the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, 
No. 2, July 1986, p.15. 
327 C.M.E. Nchama, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) in Africa and Around the World, Republique et 
Canton de Geneve, Département des Institutions, Bureau de l'Intégration des Etrangers, 
CMEN/MKA/05.10.07, p. 15, available at https://www.ge.ch/integration/doc/publications/mgf-
monde-05-10-07-en.pdf, [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
328 President Abdou Diouf’s speech, published in the newspaper Le Soleil.  
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“Whoever speaks of Human Rights must necessarily include Women’s Rights. I am 
convinced that in this area, we can equally make progress. The Minister of Women, 
Children and the Family has developed a Plan of Action that we must enact with 
much willingness. A group of women legislators has also proposed the need to 
modify our laws to reinforce equality between the sexes in the areas of tax law, 
social protection, labor laws and the Family Code. Finally, let us fight vigorously 
against excision. A law is without doubt necessary to mark the government’s 
commitment in this domain. But above all we need to convince the populations that 
this practice constitutes a threat for women’s health – governmental and non- 
governmental organisations included. Excision frequently causes haemorrhages, 
infections and deaths during child-birth. Today this custom is no longer justified. In 
this respect, the example of Malicounda deserves being cited here. In this 
Senegalese village the women have become aware of the dangers of the practice and 
engaged in a dialogue with their husbands, the imam and the village chief. Through 
a collective decision the community decided that excision will never again be 
practised in their village. Today I formally appeal that this ‘oath of Malicounda’ 
propagates through the whole of Senegal. I request that a great debate about 
excision should be organised in each village so that everyone becomes aware that 
the time has come to change these ancient practices.”  
 
On 3 February 1998, President Abdou Diouf called for a law to criminalize 
FGM/C in Senegal at his Council of Ministers.  
 
11.2 Adoption of the law against FGM/C 
 
In June 1998, the Government submitted the draft of a specific law prohibiting 
FGM/C in Parliament. The official proposal for modifying the Penal Code gave 
the following motivation for criminalizing FGM/C: “Female Genital 
Mutilations, although part of traditional practices and customs, constitute 
intolerable violations of the physical and psychological integrity as well as the 
health of many women and young girls. These practices are no longer relevant 
in the new socio-cultural dynamic of Senegal. Their legal abolition as indicated 
in Article 299 of the penal code takes this into account and also the respect of 
international conventions ratified by Senegal, especially the convention of 1979 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination towards Women and the 
convention of 1990 regarding Children’s Rights.”329 Thus, in this proposal for 
the law criminalizing FGM/C, reference is made to the right to physical and 
psychological integrity and the right to health, as well as the CEDAW and CRC.  
During the debate of this draft law, some Marabouts urged the Muslim 
deputies to vote against the bill. Parliamentarian Jean Paul Diaz opposed the 
passage of the law criminalizing FGM/C as saying: “My religion forbids me 
from voting against this law; excision is a religious problem. Prohibiting it 
challenges Article 19 of the Constitution, which gives citizens the right to 
exercise religion.” 330  Other Parliamentarians argued that the law is 
unconstitutional, because “it contradicts the first paragraph of Senegal's 
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constitution, which states that the government must respect all the beliefs of its 
citizens.”331 Another Parliamentarian argued: "We should have laws stopping 
anyone harming a woman's health, but the government has no right to 
criminalize a cultural practice that people have believed in for more than a 
thousand years."332 While the male Parliamentarians were hesitant to vote in 
favor of the law, the female parliamentarians (being from ethnic groups that 
practice of FGM/C) were the greatest defenders of the law during the debate. 
Nevertheless, despite the contradictory views, the National Assembly passed 
the law – after almost 7 hours of debate – on 13 January 1999 at 11.20pm.333 Law 
No. 99-05 modified the Penal Code not only to criminalize FGM/C in all its 
forms, but also sexual harassment, paedophilia and sexual assault, sexual 
violence and corruption of minors.  
 
Art. 299bis of the Penal Code reads as follows:  
 
“Those who have carried out or tried to carry out an attack on the 
integrity of the female genital organ by partial or total removal of 
one or more of its parts, by infibulation, by desentization or by any 
other means will be punished with six months to five years 
imprisonment. The maximum penalty will be applied if the sexual 
mutilations are carried out or promoted by a person in the medical 
or paramedical field. When the operation leads to death, the 
penalty will be hard work for life. The same punishment will be 
given to any person who gives instructions to commit these sexual 
mutilations or causes them by gifts, promises, enticements, threats, 
intimidation, abuse of authority or of power.”334 
 
Senegal became the sixth African country to outlaw FGM/C, after Burkina Faso, 
the Central African Republic, Djibouti, Ghana and Togo. To popularize the new 
law, the CSO Enda-Tiers Monde, in collaboration with the Free Clinic and the 
Belgian cooperation section in Dakar, published a comic booklet called Bintou’s 
Choice. This comic book explained the harmful effects of FGM/C on women’s 
health, the medical risks, and the conflicts it engenders within a couple. The 
booklet ended with a quiz that reminds readers that there is a law condemning 
the practice.335 The questions that are asked encourage young people to think 
about FGM/C while inserting it into the Senegalese cultural context.  
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11.3 Why the law was adopted  
 
During the interviews, I explored the views of the respondents regarding, 
amongst others, why the law against FGM/C (Law No. 99-05 of 29 January 1999) 
has been adopted in Senegal. The respondents explained that there are many 
different reasons behind the adoption of the law, which are described below.  
 
11.3.1 More knowledge about FGM/C 
Some respondents, (including representatives from the government, civil 
society and international organizations) explained that the starting point of the 
development of a national law against FGM/C was in the 1990s when the 
Senegalese people were informed about the practice. The largest ethnic group of 
Senegal (Wolof) does not practice FGM/C (see also section 5.4.). Three-quarter 
of Senegalese women have not been subjected to FGM/C in Senegal. Therefore, 
many Senegalese were not aware of this practice and did not know what it 
exactly entailed, respondents explained. A representative of civil society said: 
“before the 1990s FGM was not very well known by all Senegalese people.” 
However, this changed due to the work of CSOs in the field. These CSOs were 
mainly working in the health sector and they discovered that FGM/C was 
widely practiced in some communities. A civil society representative explained 
that “When Senegalese NGOs went to the field, they saw catastrophic events 
happening.” These CSOs brought to the attention of the ‘general public’ in 
Senegal what the practice of FGM/C entails, what the health consequences of 
the practice were and how FGM/C undermined women’s reproductive health. 
These CSOs also explained that young girls and women were dying because of 
the practice. According to some respondents, thanks to the work of CSOs 
“people discovered in the mid 1990s what FGM means.” At that moment, the 
Senegalese population “realized they needed to do something against it.” This 
understanding that FGM/C was happening in Senegal was, according to some 
respondents, the starting point for the development of a law against the practice.  
 
11.3.2 More media attention for victims of VAW 
Representatives of civil society and the government (representatives of 
international organizations did not mention this problem) explained that in the 
1990s, some severe cases of violence against women and girls gained a lot of 
media attention in Senegal. This created, according to the respondents, an 
“enabling environment” in which the voices of victims of VAW were heard. A 
representative of civil society explained: “There was a woman from Kaolack 
and a woman from Diourbel. Both ladies had a problem with their husbands, 
because their husbands beat them and did many bad things with their wives for 
a long time. But the women did not engage to talk about it. They shut their 
mouth and cried a lot. And when they cried, their husbands would beat them 
again. In the end, after several years, both women died because of the 
beatings.” Both cases received a lot of media attention. In the following years, 
more and more cases of women who suffered from sexual violence, abuse, rape, 
domestic violence and FGM/C were in the news. Because of this media 
attention, action was taken against VAW in general and FGM/C specifically. As 
a result, respondents explained that female parliamentarians “engaged 
themselves to make that law being adopted.”  
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11.3.3 Advocacy efforts of Senegalese women’s organizations 
Almost all respondents (including representatives from civil society 
organizations, international organizations and the government) referred to the 
long fight and advocacy efforts of Senegalese women’s groups and civil society 
organizations. Passing of the law was, according to the respondents, a result of 
many years of activism for women’s rights in Senegal. Senegalese activists had 
been at the forefront of both local and global campaigns aimed at abandoning 
VAW in general and FGM/C specifically.336 Respondents explained that these 
activists were very intelligent, strong, influential Senegalese women who were 
very engaged about women’s rights issues. They were part of the feminist 
movement in Senegal and brought FGM/C to the attention of the public as part 
of a movement to change the social status of women in Senegal.337 These CSOs, 
women’s associations and intellectuals were convinced that FGM/C should be 
abandoned. Some of these women were legal scholars at the Institute for 
Human Rights and Peace at the Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar. They 
travelled a lot, were inspired by the international feminist movement and 
participated at the UN World Conferences on Women, for example in 1995 in 
Beijing, where FGM/C was debated. These women were referred to during the 
interviews as “intellectuals with big ideas.” The women’s organizations worked 
closely together and were able to effectively mobilise the Collective of Women 
Parliamentarians. The female presence in the Senegalese government, as well as 
women’s activism, created a favourable climate for passing a law against 
FGM/C.338 A study on the implementation of the law points in the same 
direction and concluded that the law against FGM/C “was adopted due to the 
determined mobilization of women's organizations including the Group of 
Women Parliamentarians.”339  
 
11.3.4 Role of President Abdou Diouf  
Many respondents (including representatives from civil society organizations, 
international organizations and the government) referred to the efforts of 
President Abdou Diouf (1981 – 2000) as a reason for the adoption of the law 
against FGM/C. They argued that the President Diouf was a vocal supporter of 
efforts to stop FGM/C.  His speech at the Congress of the International 
Federation for Human Rights in 1997 where he openly took stand against 
FGM/C was frequently mentioned during the interviews. Respondents 
characterized the President as being “very open-minded”, “hardworking” 
“engaged” and “sensitive to the issue of VAW.” He was referred to as an 
“advocate for human rights” who was “taking the lead to end FGM/C in 
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Senegal.” A civil society representative said in this regard: “He really agreed 
with the idea that FGMC should stop. It should no longer be happening in 
Senegal.” Another civil society representative argued: “At that period, Abdou 
Diouf was the president, the second president of this country. He was the one 
who was fighting and helping the women to get their rights.” However, as a 
representative from civil society reminded, “it takes political leadership to 
adopt that kind of law.” Indeed, FGM/C had been a subject long avoided by 
Senegalese politicians out of fear of losing the support of their constituents. It 
was a brave step to publicly state his opposition to FGM/C and to call for 
legislation outlawing it in 1998. Unfortunately, just after the adoption of the law 
President Diouf pulled back and claimed that the law was intended to be 
symbolic in nature.340 The President argued that the law would be applied 
“intelligently” which some authors understood to mean that it won't be applied 
at all. 341 According to some respondents, it was because of the “political 
pressure” and the “influence of the religious leaders” that he made this decision. 
Furthermore, Momar Lo, the ruling party Parliamentarian who introduced the 
bill to parliament, argued: “No one is really going to go to jail. […] The 
government will ensure the courts don't apply the law.”342 However, there were 
no provisions in place to ensure the purely symbolic nature of the law.343 As a 
result, some people criticized the decision to criminalize FGM/C, arguing that 
the Senegalese government has little intention of enforcing the law, promoting 
women’s equality, or protecting human rights.344  
 
11.3.5 Malicounda Bambara Public Declaration 
Some respondents (including representatives from civil society organizations, 
international organizations and the government) mentioned the first public 
declaration of the CSO Tostan in Malicounda Bambara (a village near the city of 
Mbour) as a reason for the adoption of the law against FGM/C. They explained 
that this Public Declaration was an important event and a precursor to the law. 
A representative of civil society stated: “In 1997 the community of Malicounda 
Bambara decided to abandon FGM. It went from there.” A representative of an 
international organization argued that “It was from the beginning the women 
from Malicounda Bambara. They started the movement. They decided to 
abandon. Then the women at the Parliament and the women from the Ministry, 
the government, brought it to the Council of Ministers and prepared the law.”  
On 31 July 1997, after having followed a community education program by 
Tostan, a group of 40 women in the village of Malicounda Bambara held a press 
conference and announced to journalists that they, their husbands, the village 
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chief and the religious leaders had made the decision to abandon FGM/C in 
their community.345 Most of these women underwent the most severe type of 
the practice, and they realized that many of their health problems could be 
traced to FGM/C.346 They cited human rights and talked of the negative 
consequences this practice can have on the health of girls and women.347 They 
told the reporters: “We are not attacking our traditions, we are trying to change 
a practice that has dangerous health consequences for our daughters.” 348 
Although it was not the immediate intention of the women to stop FGM/C all 
across Senegal, the Public Declaration became (inter)nationally important and 
other villages and groups of villages followed Malicounda Bambara’s example 
(including the villages of Nguerigne Bambara, Keur Simbara, Bagana, Medina 
Fajal, Soudiane, Sorabougou, Kobongoy, Fajal, Samba Diallo, Diabougou, 
Baboucar, Samba Dia).349 The Public Declaration was extensively publicised in 
newspapers (for example Le Soleil, Le Matin, Nouvel Horizon and Dakar Soir) and 
via television and radio broadcasts. The “mediatisation” of the Malicounda 
Bambara Declaration played a crucial role in the development towards a 
national public debate on FGM/C and the need for a national law criminalizing 
the practice. 350  According to Sarah O’Neill, the Public Declaration was 
“reproduced through the national media in a way that depicted Senegal as 
moving away from harmful traditions, changing in the ways prescribed by the 
UN, and abiding by the ‘international standards’ recommended by the WHO. 
The fact that Hillary Clinton also visited the women of Malicounda, to hear 
about their resolution and to congratulate them for having the courage to end 
the practice, underlined that this event was not just significant for the 
inhabitants of Malicounda but of interest across the whole world.”351  
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11.3.6 Political will  
Some respondents (including representatives from civil society organizations, 
international organizations, but mostly government representatives) mentioned 
the political will and the “institutional engagement” of the Senegalese 
government to criminalize the practice as the reason why the law against 
FGM/C was adopted in 1999. A representative of an international organization 
explained: “I think it was also the willingness from the government to move, to 
go ahead.” A representative of the government said: “We were engaged to 
respond to the call of women.”  Another representative of the government 
explained: “The law of 1999 was mostly adopted because the government 
decided to make the law, there was political will, because the government 
wanted to do it.”  
 
11.3.7 Western influence 
Some representatives from civil society organizations and international 
organizations explained that “the West” influenced the adoption of the law 
criminalizing FGM/C. However, government representatives did not mention 
this reason. A representative of civil society argued: “The other countries in the 
world asked our country to ratify conventions, but also asked the government 
to implement this law. And they really decided to adopt that law because of the 
pressure of the international countries.” A representative of an international 
organization argued: “The international pressure is the reason. There was too 
much pressure at the international level to make countries implementing it in a 
national law regarding FGM. 
Interestingly, some respondents referred to the fact that Law No. 99-05 
criminalizing FGM/C was passed just one month before the US State 
Department’s annual report on human rights was to be released.352 This report 
includes a list of African States that have criminalized FGM/C and those that 
have not. It is used as a guide for Congress and US agencies on how to allocate 
military and financial aid.353 Critics therefore say that the government, which 
receives substantial aid from the US, adopted the law “to please American 
sensitivities.”354 US organizations were not the only foreign actors that might 
have influenced the enactment of the law criminalizing FGM/C. UNICEF might 
also have indirectly influenced it, because they financed a study that was 
commissioned by the Ministry of Women, Family and Children and undertaken 
by Fall Sow, a Senegalese legal consultant. It was a study on ways the 
government should harmonize national laws in accordance with the provisions 
of the CEDAW.355 The study suggested legislative changes and included a draft 
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for a proposed law on FGM/C. Furthermore, Fall Sow became later the head of 
the team that eventually drafted Law No. 99-05.356 Drafts of this law have been 
circulated for almost a year to western aid organisations (particularly to 
USAID), but also to the representatives of the US, France, and UN development 
organizations based in Dakar.357 However, Augusto Paganini, UNICEF's local 
resident representative stated: "The passage of the law was not an explicit 
policy of UNICEF, nor were we aiming at the law.”358 He further argues that it 
was a sovereign decision of the Senegalese government to adopt the law.359 It is 
therefore quite understandable that at the time, a significant portion of the 
population thought that (foreign) donors and international partners had 
imposed this law on the Senegalese population.360   
 
11.3.8 Influence of the human rights framework 
The draft law of June 1998 that the Government submitted in Parliament 
includes a reference to several human rights and the CEDAW and CRC. This is 
an indication that the human rights framework had some influence on the 
adoption of the law criminalizing FGM/C. During the interviews, I also 
explored the views of my respondents, amongst others, whether the 
international (UN) and regional (AU) human rights framework had any 
influence on the adoption of the law criminalizing FGM/C.  
 The respondents gave a rather mixed picture during the interviews. Some 
respondents (including representatives from the government, civil society and 
international organizations) argued that the human rights framework did not 
have much influence on the adoption of the national law. When answering this 
question, a representative of an international organization argued: “No, no, no, 
no, no! For this law, all the Senegalese women’s associations fought hardly to 
get the law. There is no influence of the international human rights movement.” 
A representative of in international organization said: “No, it was just from 
within.” A representative of civil society argued: “It was just the engagement at 
the internal level, the level of the country. It were the women, because the 
violence against women was very important at that moment, because some 
women found out that some women even died because of the violence. That 
motivated the women to fight against it and to fight for a law. It was not the 
international order to make that pressure: no. […] It is not really something 
international, but it’s something really national.” Another representative of civil 
society argued: “No, because we don’t have a systematic system of 
implementing the conventions that we ratified. So, since there’s not a rule that 
as soon as you ratify you have to change the laws in order to make them in 
harmony with the conventions, I can’t say that the law is adopted in order to be 
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in accordance with the conventions.”  
 However, the majority of respondents (including representatives from the 
government, civil society and international organizations) argued the opposite. 
They were of the opinion that there is a link between the adoption of the 
national law and the human rights framework. A representative of civil society 
explained: “the law is adopted to implement CEDAW.” Another representative 
of civil society said: “for me it is a step in the implementation of those women’s 
rights protocols.” A representative of civil society argued: “The CEDAW 
framework was an enabling factor why the law was adopted. It created the 
environment in which the adoption of the law took place.” A representative of 
an international organization said: “There is a linkage between the national law 
and the international framework, absolutely. The women, who advocated and 
called upon the government to adopt the law, had the CEDAW in their hands. 
They said: “You ratify this and you have to adopt laws in line with CEDAW.” 
So it was a big tool for women to push the agenda. It is very, very important.” 
A government representative explained that the law against FGM/C was 
adopted in 1999, “because a lot of people wanted the human rights to be 
implemented in this country, they wanted also to take care of the rights of 
women. One right of women is to ban FGM. We cannot talk about human 
rights, or talk about women’s rights, without banning problems like FGM. And 
this law was created because they want more to take care of human rights. They 
were talking a lot about human rights, and talking about human rights rather 
than taking care about banning FGM is not possible so the law was adopted to 
make the aspects possible and implemented.” 
A representative of an international organization argued: “The UN joint 
declaration was also a determining factor why many countries started their 
activities against FGM. Also, a new UN Resolution was adopted. This 
Resolution was specifically dealing with FGM, not generally with the health of 
women of children. This Resolution recommended governments to take actions 
against this practice. This movement at the international level made that several 
countries at the national level adopted laws and took other actions in the field 
of FGM.” A representative of civil society said: “The international framework 
influenced them. They influenced not the government, but the framework 
influenced the civil society, because the civil society knows the international 
body of treaties. They know all the conventions that our country ratified. And 
when the government refused to respect their engagement, so themselves, as 
they learned about the international conventions, so they understand 
everything and now they push the government to respect the obligation of the 
ratification. It is not the government who does the prevention most of the time 
in the region. It is the civil society. But sometimes, also, they need to 
understand that convention to make the government respect the obligation. 
Because otherwise, if they don't understand it, they cannot push the 
government, so when they understand, they say to the government: "you 
should respect that".  A government representative argued: “There is clearly a 
link between the international human rights instruments and the national law 
against FGM in Senegal. We had the international conference in Beijing in 1995 
and the conference in Mexico, in Nairobi, and many international conferences to 
ask to the country to increase human rights, women’s rights, and to promote 
human rights for all the human beings. And that's why after this conference, the 
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Senegalese government took some measures to increase human rights for 
women. But the government worked before also on human rights. However, 
the conferences are a possibility for the government to increase the level for 
promotion for human rights. […] You know, in our country, all Resolutions of 
the UN who concern our country, we must do our best to respect it. And our 
government does its best to ratify it, to accept the conventions. And always we 
explain the population that we are a member of the UN and that we must 
respect these conventions. It is not very easy, but always we try to explain that.” 
A representative of civil society argued: “The human rights bodies did a good 
job, lobbying for the law.” There are some indications that the 
recommendations of UN TMBs might have influenced the drafting of the law, 
since the letter from Senegal's prime minister calling on the ministry to draft the 
law begins by stating that a UN human rights committee had made a 
"recommendation."361  
 
11.4 Resistance against the adoption of the law 
 
Although the 1999 law has supporters among many women and among CSOs 
pursuing the abandonment of FGM/C, the passing of the law in Senegal met 
with some significant opposition as well, respondents explained during the 
interviews.  
 
11.4.1 Resistance of practicing communities 
Opposition against the enactment of the law came in the first place from the 
Senegalese communities who had a long-standing history of practicing FGM/C. 
They opposed the objectives of the law, because they believed that their local 
culture is being threatened. One example often referred to during the 
interviews was the following, rather shocking, event. During the debates on the 
law in December 1998, 120 girls aged 8 months to 10 years were forcibly cut in 
the Kédougou region (eastern part of Senegal). This time by a man, “as if to 
prove that the law does not accord with the local mentality.”362 This was 
considered to be “a masterful slap for all women, women's movements and 
activists who worked to pass such a law.”363 The mayor of Kédougou concluded: 
“We are not against the judgment of excision, but the decision of the Cabinet 
was made in haste. Our people are not prepared to accept this law.”364 With the 
adoption of the law, communities felt “a cultural attack on its norms and 
values”, a civil society representative said. 
Similarly, Shell-Duncan showed in her research that the legislative reform 
efforts in Senegal have been seen by some communities as “an attempt to 
“break culture” and to force assimilation with the dominant ethnic groups that 
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do not practice FGM/C (what some called “Wolofization”).”365 She further 
explains that in some of their study communities, “reactance simmered below 
the surface, and it took little to incite fervent vocal opposition to the law. In one 
conservative community, following a tense focus group discussion, participants 
stood and chanted phrases such as, “We will not let our culture be 
destroyed!”366 
 
11.4.2 Resistance of Marabouts 
Traditional leaders were even more irritated about the adoption of the law. The 
supreme Marabout of northern Senegal's Toucouleur people, Thierno Mountaga 
Tall,367 pronounced a fatwa368 in which he cited a Prophet’s Hadith from which 
he inferred that FGM/C “is a corollary to circumcision […] and both operations 
are intrinsic elements of human nature.” 369  He told his followers in this 
regard:370 "I will go to jail if need be. […] In fact, I will happily die, rather than 
be forced to renounce what I believe.”371 When the law was debated in the 
Parliament the 13th of January 1999, Thierno Mountaga Tall distributed a 
document in the Parliament called ‘striking proofs concerning the 
recommendable practice of excision of young girls’ (preuves éclatantes au sujet de 
la pratique recommandable de l’éxcision des jeunes filles).372 The document was 
carefully put together and contained information about the religious 
importance of FGM/C. It stated that Islam requires the practice and that all 
women should undergo the practice. The purpose of FGM/C is, according to 
Tall, to protect women from “excessive sensuality”373 that could tempt a woman 
to commit despicable acts.374 Tall further argued: “The wisdom of excision lies 
in the fact that the woman can abstain from sex for longer and thus guard her 
honour.” He reminded the Muslim Senegalese citizen that the teachings of the 
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Prophet as well as those of his wise followers should not be abandoned for 
foreign Western pretensions that are unfounded and false.375 Interestingly, Tall 
also referred in his document to human rights: “To prohibit Muslims from the 
practice of the recommendations of their religion and their customs is a sinful 
act and an injustice that retards human rights.” He reminds the reader that 
breaching human rights is condemned according to the constitution of the 
country – it is the right of every citizen to practice their religion and their beliefs 
without hindrance or harassment.376 Tall concludes his document with stating: 
“there is no doubt about the fact that these practices are harmful to people’s 
health, as has been proven by modern medicine.”377 In the name of religion he 
therefore pleaded for medicalisation of the practice instead of criminalization. 
Parliamentarians who adhered to the Tijaniyya brotherhood felt loyalty 
towards the most influential Marabout from Fouta Toro. These Parliamentarians 
were strongly influenced by the document378 and raised questions during the 
debate about FGM/C and religion. Some Parliamentarians said that they could 
not vote for the law because they did not want to criminalize their relatives for 
respecting tradition and religion.379  
 
11.4.3 Resistance of CSOs 
Resistance against the law has not come from FGM/C supporters alone, but – 
perhaps more unexpectedly – also from some civil society organizations. 
Although some CSOs were in favour of a law penalizing the practice (such as 
COSEPRAT), other CSOs were against the adoption of the law in 1999. Molly 
Melching, director of the CSO Tostan, explained that at first she also lobbied for 
the law: “I thought it was a wonderful idea. But, as I discussed it with the 
villagers, they felt it was too soon," she says.380 The day before the vote, 
Melching went with a delegation of villagers (including villagers from 
Malicounda Bambara) to the Parliament, trying to convince legislators to 
reconsider it.381 Tostan felt it was important for the government to take a firm 
stand against the practice by voting the law. But they requested a delay in the 
application of the law, because a wide sensitization campaign among the 
practicing communities was first needed.382 The villagers explained that if the 
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law is enforced before education, “criminalization would hinder their cause.”383 
Melching argued that the law could undermine their work and efforts in the 
field to stop FGM/C: "People in Europe and America think that the law means 
the end of FGC. What they don't realize is that it can actually do more harm 
than good."384 The Minister of Justice refused to allow for a delay in the 
application of the law stating, “It was useless to vote a law that would not be 
applied immediately.”385 After the law was passed, Tostan had to suspend 
activities. Melching claimed that the law has made Tostan’s work more difficult 
since it has increased defensiveness among the communities that practice 
FGM/C: “Village women did not want to participate in the programs, angry 
about the law that now made their friends and neighbours criminals. They felt 
betrayed by the group that had been saying it wanted to help them.”386 Indeed, 
more CSOs had concerns that the law could increase tensions between on the 
one hand the ethnic groups that practice FGM/C (Mandingue, Soninke, Poular 
and Diola) and the dominant ethnic group, the Wolof, who do not practice 
FGM/C.387  
 
11.5 Law came too early 
 
Many respondents (including representatives from the government, civil 
society and international organizations – but mostly civil society 
representatives) argued that the country was not ready for the law. They 
explained that in their view the law came too early because the population was 
not prepared to accept this law. A representative of civil society explained: “The 
law came too soon, it was too early to adopt this law in 1999.” Another 
representative of civil society argued: “It was too soon for the population to 
accept and adopt that law, because they were not really sensitized. And they 
did not know or understand why the law was adopted. They did not 
understand why FGM was all of a sudden forbidden.” Many respondents 
argued that a “mistake” the Senegalese government made was that they did not 
consult the communities that practice FGM/C in drafting the law. Most 
practitioners of FGM/C were not at all aware that the government planned to 
formally criminalize the practice. Although drafts of the law were circulated 
among international organisations and development agencies,388 the adoption of 
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the law came as a surprise for the Senegalese population. A civil society 
representative argued: “People have to be listened to, involved, and engaged 
from the very beginning.” A representative of civil society argued: “The 
approach of the law was not good, because it did not include the reality of the 
communities, they did not take them into account.” They were not consulted 
during the process and it seems that the government tried to minimise dissent 
by simply not informing the population that the practice would be made 
illegal.389 Because the law criminalizing FGM/C was not presented to the public 
for debate, Senegalese opposition parliamentarian Jean Paul Diaz argued that 
the law has “undermined our democratic process.” 390  A civil society 
representative further explained: “Only a small percentage of intelligent 
Senegalese women were fighting for the law, but they did not represent the 
majority of the country. It's not them who were practicing most of the time, but 
it is the community.” Similarly, another representative of civil society said: “It 
was a group of small educated westernized women adopting the law, but this is 
not the majority of our women.” A representative of an international 
organization argued: “In Senegal there was a very strong feminist movement 
who created a good environment for having a law. But this movement was 
more at the high intellectual level and not reflected in the community dynamics. 
Therefore, in the communities there was no readiness to accept the law.” For 
this reason, the Senegalese population did not understand why a practice they 
had been doing for thousands of years would be made illegal, respondents 
explained.  
The respondents further explained that apart from the fact that communities 
were not prepared to accept the law, an additional problem – and perhaps more 
important – was that the religious and traditional leaders were not consulted 
during the process of criminalizing FGM/C in Senegal. A civil society 
representative explained: “The process of the law against FGM/C was not an 
inclusive process. Religious and community leaders were not included in the 
discussions. It was only the elite who made sure the law was passed at the 
National Assembly. This is a problem; because what is important is that the 
process is inclusive, share information, get the support of the key players such 
as religious and cultural leaders, and the communities where the practice is 
done. When this support is build, then you should put in place a law. At the 
time of the adoption of the law in 1999, the country was not ready in terms of 
support.” Indeed, local leaders reported that they did not know about the law 
against FGM/C just before it passed. 391  A representative of civil society 
explained: “The law came too early because they should have sensitized 
communities and religious guides in order to get everybody together. So 
everybody is on the same page. Then the law would have passed easily without 
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much resistance.” A representative of an international organization explained: 
“Normally the law is, what is coming out of a social change. For example laws 
to allow abortion in Europe and so on and so forth, they came after that you 
have a social movement. This was not the case of the FGM law in Senegal.”  
However, not all respondents agreed with the argument that the law was 
adopted too early. A representative of an international organization argued: “A 
law was necessary in 1999 to start the movement against FGM, to make people 
going. The law made people think about their own traditions.” This respondent 
referred to the role and influence of religious leaders: “They don’t make their 
own choices, but they believe what Marabouts are telling them. They just accept 
it. Therefore, we need that law to change the views of the Marabouts and to 
change the public opinion. So therefore the law was good at that moment.” A 
representative of civil society argued “the law came at the time when it needed 
to come.” 
 
11.6 Translating the law in local languages 
 
Laws in Senegal are written in the French language and are published in the 
Journal officiel du Sénégal. Although French is the official language of the 
country, only a minority of the Senegalese population can read and 
communicate fluently in French. A representative of civil society said: “People 
in the communities did not know about the law, because the Senegalese laws 
are written in French.” Another representative of civil society explained: “And 
another thing, that law is in French. Its does not make any sense to have a law 
in French, when the people who you target and risk a prison sentence do not 
speak French. It is a little bit unfair.” Most people speak Wolof or one of the five 
other major national languages: Pulaar, Serer, Diola, Soninke, and Mandinka. A 
majority (65%) of the Senegalese population is illiterate (see also para. 5.3.1). 
Respondents explained that this was a major problem in the first years after the 
adoption of the law. A representative of civil society argued: “You have only 
around 37% educated people in this country. That means that around 63% is 
not educated and does not understand that law. You have to explain that law to 
them and educate them. If you don’t do it, it’s not going to work. So in the end, 
every time when you raise one problem in Africa, you raise ten more problems. 
However, in the end there is one big problem: e-du-ca-tion.” Many practicing 
communities did not know that the law existed. A representative of civil society 
explained: “The law against FGM was developed by the guys who are in the 
high level. But the people who are at the bottom practice FGM. They didn’t 
know that this law existed. It was important to give information about the 
content of the law to the communities.” A representative of civil society clearly 
indicated: “If you would really want to decrease harmful practices, especially 
FGM in Senegal, we need to open up to the majority of women, especially to 
those who have been victims of FGM. […] Those who really suffer from FGM 
should be put at the forefront. I think that is the only way for us. Otherwise it is 
going to be intellectual researches, intellectual communication, in French, in 
foreign languages. Ok, now what? There is national law and an Action Plan 
against FGM but my sister who lives in a village 1000 km away from Dakar did 
not know that this law and Action Plan existed. It is written in French. She is 
illiterate. You know, these kind of things.”  
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To overcome this problem, the law had to be effectively communicated to the 
communities. The CSO Tostan took the initiative in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Women, Family and Children to translate the national law against 
FGM/C into six local traditional languages to inform people in villages in their 
own language about the law. In this way they were able to reach out to 
communities and inform the practicing communities about the law in their own 
language. Some respondents recommended that it would be good to not only 
translate the law, but also other documents – for example the NAPs and other 
policy documents - in these local languages, to “bring the documents to the 
people.” At the same time the respondents explained that although the law is 
translated in local languages, it is important to keep in mind that Senegal is an 
“oral society” with which they meant that there are other means rather than 
written documents to transfer information, like interactive radio programmes, 
discussion groups under the Palabre tree, dancing and theater, that are 
sometimes even more effective in raising awareness.  
 
11.7 Knowledge of the law 
 
All respondents reported knowledge of Law No. 99-05 of 29 January 1999 
outlawing FGM/C. However, not all respondents were aware of the exact 
content of the legal provision. They did now know the exact penalty and who 
could be prosecuted. Some respondents thought that only parents could be 
prosecuted, but did not know that cutters could face trial as well. Other 
respondents thought that the penalty was much lower.  
In 2010, Prof. Ndiaye conducted a study with the aim to get a more accurate 
picture of the status of implementation of Law No. 99-05 of 29 January 1999. 
The objective of this study was to assess the real impact of the law. Interestingly 
enough, one of the research questions of this study concerned the knowledge of 
the law. 392  Prof. Ndiaye concluded that all respondents knew about the 
existence of the law that criminalizes FGM/C, but that the respondents “do not 
know the content, except for judges and judicial police officers.”393  
 During the interviews, I also explored the views of the respondents 
regarding the knowledge of the population in relation to the existence of the 
Law No. 99-05 of 29 January 1999. All respondents explained that by now, 
according to their experience, everyone in Senegal – including the people living 
in the communities – has knowledge of the existence of the law criminalizing 
FGM/C. The same conclusions follow from a study done in 2013 by Shell-
Duncan. She stated that: “In-depth interviews revealed that knowledge of the 
existence of a law banning FGM/C was widespread. Many informants reported 
hearing radio broadcasts informing the general public about the anti-FGM law, 
and others learned of the ban in bantabas (outdoor public meetings) organized 
by the elders, or through word of mouth. Most people, however, knew very few 
details about the content of the legal provision, including potential targets of 
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prosecution, the penalty for violation, or whether the statute contains an 
extraterritoriality clause banning FGM/C outside of Senegal’s national borders. 
Contrary to expectations, a vague understanding of the details of the ban did 
not reduce concerns about prosecution. Instead, it allowed people to imagine its 
application in a wide range of circumstances, including those beyond the true 
provision.”394 
 
11.8 Deterrent effect? 
 
During the interviews, I also explored the views of my respondents, amongst 
others, whether the law against FGM/C in Senegal has any deterrent effect. The 
Senegalese law is aimed at deterring not only family members of young girls, 
but also cutters.395 Almost all respondents (including representatives from the 
government, civil society and international organizations) argued that the law 
has no deterrent effect. They explained that although people are now aware of 
the existence of the law against FGM/C, they are not afraid of being sued. The 
knowledge of the law criminalizing FGM/C is not a motivation to abandon 
FGM/C.396 The law - and punishment of six months to five years imprisonment 
- does not prevent or discourage parents or cutters from practicing FGM/C. 
People in Senegal continued to practice FGM/C after the adoption of the law. A 
representative of civil society explained: “It is good to have the law, but before 
it has any deterrent effect, people need to be convinced that it is a bad practice.” 
Respondents explained that the reason for this is that people ascribe greater 
importance to religious and cultural norms. As long as people support the 
practice, a national law prohibiting FGM/C will not stop them. A 
representative of civil society claimed: “No, people are not afraid of the law. But 
we say in my country, that the reference of the people is religion. When the 
religious leaders say something, for example that FGM is a good practice and 
obliged by our religion, everybody does it. This argument for the religion is 
important. Another argument is the culture, that argument is also important. 
The cultural leader has as much influence. If they say that it should stop, it has 
more influence than the law. When you do advocacy for these leaders, and they 
accept it, nobody will do FGM any more. The law itself is not important, but it 
is important to inform the people. My reference point is therefore the religious 
and cultural leaders. If you are in a community, your religious or cultural 
leaders are your reference point, not the law. The people [CSOs red.] who come 
to the village and tell them that the law is in place, they will say: "That is not my 
problem. The government is not my problem." When this leader tells you that 
you should not do FGM, only then they will stop.” Another representative of 
civil society explained that the law could only have deterrent effect if people are 
convinced that the law is in accordance to their own norms and values: “No, the 
law has no deterrent effect. If the people in the communities are not convinced 
about why they should stop FGM… That is the issue… They will continue to do 
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it. The law would even work contra productive. They will hold on to their 
tradition.” Another representative of civil society explained: “I think that 
culture is something difficult to put out. So if somebody believes in something, 
it is better to understand why this person believes that, rather than just blaming 
the person. Because some people… Even if they know that there is a law, they 
will argue that their culture is more important than the law. Therefore we first 
have to do the promotion and prevention on that case. Because a person who 
believes in something… even if there is a law prohibiting the practice, they 
cannot believe in this law. They will refuse to respect the law.” Another 
representative of civil society argued: “I don’t think the answer is putting 
people in jail. It is not okay to say to good, upstanding citizens who are doing a 
practice because they believe it is good for their daughter, and good for the 
society, and good for their extended family and good in general, to tell them 
“No, this is bad” and you put them in jail for it. […] We are talking about 
changing social norms; we are talking about masses of people. That is why I 
say: it might work for a few, you might save a few people but we are talking 
about changing an entire society, an entire social network, with the whole social 
group. In that sense you can’t do it this way with a law, this is not how things 
change. […] But if a community gives their word and says “we are not going to 
do this” and they decide, “these are what our sanctions will be”, then it is ok for 
me. Then it is a community decision, that’s different. […] If you are in a society 
where a national law is not accepted, I don’t believe it should be enforced. I 
don’t think you should be put in prison because you accepted to live under 
those laws.”  
 A few representatives from the government and international organizations 
did not agree with the arguments given above. They were of the opinion that 
the law does have a deterrent effect. A government representative stated: 
“Many people in Senegal in the communities know that we have a law against 
FGM. The law is here for all of us. The law has deterrent effect, because people 
change.” A representative of an international organization explained: “Some 
persons do fear, they are afraid about the law. They will stop with the practice 
or do it differently.” A representative of an international organization said: 
“Yes, it does have deterrent effect. Communities are afraid of the law. Because 
now people who want to practice FGM go to another country to do the excision 
where there is no law against FGM, like Mali or Gambia. We also see in that 
women practice excision when their baby girl is 5 or 6 months. Or the women 
make excision at the day of birth. It is a new alternative practice.”  
 During the interviews, none of the respondents mentioned the possible 
deterrent effect of the law in relation to the cutters. However, interestingly 
enough, when Shell-Duncan interviewed some former cutters for her study, 
they revealed that they had stopped practicing following the passage of the law. 
In addition, Shell-Duncan writes: “while the skills of circumcisers were 
previously passed down from one generation to the next, most claimed that 
they did not train an apprentice before “putting down the knife.””397 
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11.9 Direct and indirect effects of the law  
 
Although the threat of legal sanctions does not result in the abandonment of 
FGM/C in Senegal, many respondents (including from the government, civil 
society and international organizations) explained that the adoption of the law 
has several direct and indirect effects, which are described below.  
 
11.9.1 Driving the practice underground 
Before the adoption of the law that prohibits FGM/C, girls underwent the 
practice during a traditional cutting ceremony. Typically, the ceremony takes 
place once a year and all eligible girls within a community are cut on the same 
day by traditional cutters. This ceremony was a big celebration in which many 
surrounding villages and relatives of the families came together. It was seen as 
a party where people spend a lot of money and sacrificed animals.398 Sister Fa, a 
famous Senegalese hip-hop star who uses her music to campaign for human 
rights and to bring an end to FGM/C testified: "I was with about 50 other girls 
in my village, and we were told this was a great celebration. We were laughing, 
dancing, playing - so free. This was the last time I ever again felt such freedom 
and trust. We were then taken into a room, one by one, where each of us was 
cut without anesthesia. I remember the blood and the pain even today.”399 
Many respondents explained (mostly representatives of civil society) that 
the increased awareness of the existence of the law made the practice go 
underground. Most people are nowadays not practicing FGM/C as openly as 
how they were used to in the past. People banned the traditional ceremonies 
and celebrations. Girls are cut in secrecy instead, because they are afraid that 
others would report the cutting to the police. One respondent stated: “People 
who still practice it, they do it in secret because they are afraid of the law. They 
are afraid to be punished.” Some respondents also noted that people do not talk 
about the procedure any more, in order to avoid to be punished by the law: 
“They refuse to talk about it, they refuse to tell the others that their daughters 
were mutilated or not.” Another respondent said: “This law does not make the 
practice disappear. It just makes it go underground.” Isabelle R. Gunning 
already predicted in 1992 in her research that: “if people support the practice, 
then the law will not actually prevent the surgeries from being performed: 
people will just hide the fact that they are doing it.”400 Shell-Duncan and other 
researchers also noted the same trend towards “moving beyond the shadow of 
the law” in relation to FGM/C in Senegal.401  
                                                        
398 B. Shell-Duncan et al., Contingency and Change in the Practice of Female Genital Cutting: Dynamics of 
Decision Making in Senegambia, Summary Report, 2010, p. 24.  
399 A.K. Ream, Senegalese Rapper Uses Powerful Voice to Fight FGM, WeNews, 8 June 2014 
http://womensenews.org/story/books/140607/senegalese-rapper-uses-powerful-voice-fight-
fgm#.U8O0CSiD6YQ [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
400 I.R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Traveling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of 
Female Genital Surgeries, Columbia Human Rights Law, Volume 23, 1992, p. 229.  
401 See for example B. Shell-Duncan et al., Contingency and Change in the Practice of Female Genital 
Cutting: Dynamics of Decision Making in Senegambia, Summary Report, 2010, p. 25. See also B. Shell-
Duncan et al., Legislating Change? Responses to Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting in Senegal, 
Law & Society Review, Volume 47, No. 4, 2013, p. 830. See also United Nations Children’s Fund, 
Legislative Reform to Support the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting, August 2010, p. 8.   
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11.9.2 Younger girls 
Additionally, some respondents (mostly representatives of civil society) 
explained that another effect of the law is that girls in Senegal are increasingly 
cut at younger ages. They indicated that FGM/C is performed on younger girls, 
often babies who are only a few days to a few months old. Several reasons were 
put forth during the interviews why women decide to have their girls cut at 
younger ages and why that relates to the adoption of the law.  
In the first place, some respondents explained that mothers who learn about the 
existence of the law against FGM/C rush to have their daughters cut, because 
they fear that the law will be more strictly enforced in the upcoming years. 
Since they don’t want to be subjected to prosecution, they decide to have their 
daughters cut very young, since it is uncertain whether that is still possible in 
the future without punishment. A representative of civil society explained: 
“Mothers do it as soon as they can, because they know there is a law.” 
In the second place, some respondents argued that other community members 
or family members won’t notice when a young baby underwent FGM/C, 
because “babies cry anyway” and community or family members wouldn’t 
notice whether this is due to the FGM/C that has been performed on the girl or 
something else: “They do it on young babies, new-borns, three months old 
babies. Who will know that you did that to a baby? Nobody is going to know.” 
Civil society representatives explained that girls usually were cut at an age 
when they were attending primary school. But one respondent emphasized: 
“After the girls are cut, they will stay home for a few weeks to let the wound 
heal. When the teacher knows that the girl is not coming to school, he will ask 
the parents why the girl is staying home.” This is a problem, because parents 
might fear that the teacher (or parents of friends of the girl) would find out the 
reason why the girl is not attending school. When girls are cut before they have 
to go to school, parents don’t have to face this problem, civil society 
representatives explained. Additionally, it was considered more difficult to find 
out that FGM/C is performed on babies than on older girls, as babies are not 
visibly absent from village activities during recovery. 
In the third place, some respondents explained that since babies cannot talk, 
they cannot inform other community members or the police about what 
happened to them. A representative of civil society explained: “Girls of 8 or 9 
years old have started to protest against the practice. They did not want to 
undergo the practice. They did not only protest, they also started to tell other 
people. The parents know that they cannot silence them, so they do it at a much 
younger age when they have no possibility to tell anyone else.” 
In the fourth place, some respondents explained that some parents are of the 
opinion that less harm is done when girls are cut at a very young age. A civil 
society representative explained that villagers are of the opinion that “babies 
don’t remember well.“ Another civil society representative testified the 
following: “When I had discussions with the women, they said to me: “When 
we cut our girls at age 14 it was very painful for them, so we thought we would 
spare them and we would do it younger, so we would do it at age 8 and then 
we were realizing, you know, it was even painful then, so we decided to do it 
when they are babies, because then it is not so painful.””  
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11.9.3 Crossing the borders 
Some respondents (mostly representatives of civil society) explained that due to 
the absence of a national law against FGM/C in Mali and Gambia, these 
neighbouring countries serve as a safe haven for communities that practice 
FGM/C. A representative of civil society argued: “Next door they don’t have a 
law against the practice, so people can just go to these countries to have their 
daughters cut.”  
Although Guinea Bissau passed legislation that specifically bans FGM/C, 
some respondents argued that Senegalese girls are increasingly brought to 
Guinea Bissau as well to be cut as well, since this law “is not a strong law.”402 
Senegalese mothers go with their girls across the border to cut them to escape 
punishment. Most of the time they visit friends and family who are living in 
these countries: “They are often the same family, or from the same community, 
the same ethnic group.” The respondents explained that they stay with their 
relatives one or two weeks after the girl had undergone the procedure, to let the 
girl recover and the wounds heal. When they come back, nobody will know 
what happened. At the same time some respondents expressed their concern 
about the relatively new phenomena of “travelling cutters.” They explained that 
FGM/C in Senegal is increasingly performed by Malian and Gambian cutters 
who come to Senegal to cut the girls and return to their home countries as soon 
as they have finished their job.  
 
11.10 Importance of the law 
 
During the interviews, I also explored the views of the respondents, amongst 
others, whether it is important to have a national law against FGM/C in 
Senegal. Almost all respondents were of the opinion that it is important to have 
a law criminalizing FGM/C in place. Only one representative of civil society 
argued that it is not important to have a law. This respondent explained: 
“People who practice FGM do not go to prison. The law is not implemented. 
People do not stop practicing FGM because of the law. Therefore, for me, the 
law is not important.” However, all other respondents argued that it is 
important to have a law. A representative of an international organization 
explained: “I believe we should have a law in order to get an end to violence 
against women and FGM.” A civil society representative stated: “There is no 
way to solve the problem FGM without having a law.” The reasons why all 
these respondents considered it important to have a national law against 
FGM/C are listed below.  
 
11.10.1 Need for a legal framework 
Some respondents (including representatives from the government and 
international organizations) explained that the law is important, because it 
provides a reference, a legal framework that is needed to abandon FGM/C. A 
representative of an international organization explained: “For sure it is 
important to have a national law against FGM/C, because we need to have 
                                                        
402 The national prevalence is according to the MICS 2010 in Mali 89%, in Gambia 75% and in 
Guinea Bissau 41%. 
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legal frameworks. Especially in this area, you need to have legal frameworks.” 
A representative of an international organization explained: “It is important to 
have the law, because the law works as a stick. You know, in French we have 
the expression ‘la carotte et le bâton’ [the carrot and the stick, red.]. For me the 
law is very, very important because it gives a framework, a legal framework 
that says that FGM is forbidden.” 
 
11.10.2 Engagement and responsibility of the government 
Some respondents (including representatives from the government, civil society 
and international organizations) explained that having a law against FGM/C is 
important, because it makes explicit that the government does not approve the 
practice and it shows the commitment of the government to end the practice. A 
representative of an international organization argued: “Yes, the law is 
important. The law has a big significance. The law explains the political position 
of the state and the law shows the community that the government is against 
the practice.” A civil society representative explained: “I think is important to 
have law. The government has a right to express its engagement in any form.” 
Some respondents (including representatives from the government, civil society 
and international organizations) also explained that it is the responsibility of the 
government to protect women and girls who are at risk of undergoing FGM/C 
in Senegal by means of legislative measures. They argued that the law is 
important because it is a decisive step towards greater protection of women. A 
government representative explained: “If you take a look at the percentage of 
people who practice FGM, there were too many girls and women suffering at 
that moment. So the law is there to protect these women and fight against 
FGM.”A representative of an international organization further explained: “The 
law is a way to recognize the rights of women.” A representative of civil society 
argued: “I believe the Government has an obligation to protect the citizens of 
our country.” A representative of an international organization explained: “It is 
very important also for the population, for the women who suffer from FGM, to 
have this law.” A government representative explained: “Yes, I think the law is 
important. I think that the law is a necessity. It is a necessity, because it is a 
means to struggle against this kind of tradition, FGM, and this kind of violence. 
And it is also a means for the government to improve their engagement and 
political will to protect all the members of the community in the same way. You 
know, FGM is a practice for young, very young women, girls, who have not the 
possibility to say that they don't want it. I truly believe that the law is a means 
to stop this practice." 
 
11.10.3 Law as a mechanism for prevention and protection 
Interestingly, many representatives of civil society and international 
organizations (government representatives did not give this argument) 
explained that the law is not an important tool in relation to prosecution, but 
rather for protection and prevention purposes. A representative of an 
international organization explained: “In case of FGM it is very sensitive to say 
that you need to punish and prosecute, because sometimes the exerciser is a 
mother who has lots of children. Then you are facing the dilemma: What is best? 
Is it in the interest of the children to put the mother in prison? That is why I 
think the law should be used as prevention, as a kind of warning mechanism at 
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the community level. And it can be also used as a way to regulate the disputes 
around the issue at the first level before going to the real justice procedures.” 
Another representative of an international organization argued: “I think the law 
is important for prevention and protection. Not to say: The law is here, if you 
do FGM/C, you go to jail. No! The law is an element of prevention and 
protection to the community and to the young people. It is not an element of 
prosecution. No, for me that is not important.” A civil society representative 
explained: “Yes, it is important to have a law. Not to denounce and to punish 
people, but I think mostly for prevention.” Another civil society representative 
explained: “I believe that the government has an obligation to project the 
citizens of a country, but I don’t believe it’s by putting people in prison. You 
might save a few girls, when you do that, but for me this is not the way to 
convince people. I always say renounce and not denounce. I don’t believe in 
denouncing people, because it risks creating dangerous divisions in 
communities and triggering backlash.”  
 
11.10.4 Law as a facilitator of the change process 
Some respondents (mainly representatives of civil society) explained that they 
see the law as a complementary tool that could accelerate the abandonment of 
the practice. They explained that the law could strengthen those in favour of 
ending the practice. The law sends out a message of support to those who have 
renounced FGM/C or want to renounce it. A representative of civil society 
explained: “The law can also contribute to convince the population which you 
are educating and sensitizing about FGM to stop it. It is like an extra argument 
to abandon FGM.” Similarly, in her study, Shell-Duncan found evidence for the 
assertion that “the law may facilitate the change process by giving additional 
leverage to those who have become persuaded about the need to abandon 
FGM/C.”403 
 
11.10.5 Limits of the law 
Some respondents (mostly representatives of civil society) explained that the 
criminalization of a cultural practice like FGM/C is very complex. They 
questioned whether legislation is an effective tool for ending FGM/C. A 
representative of civil society argued in this regard: “It’s very complicated. The 
law is useful, but at the same time it is very important to see the limits of the 
law, to determine them and to try to mitigate them.” A representative of an 
international organization explained: “I definitely think it’s important to have a 
law. It is important you, know. It’s not the only means and it’s not the only 
strategy, but I think you always need to have the law.” Another civil society 
representative argued: I believe that having law is important, but in the field of 
FGM having the law is not the most important thing.” A government 
representative also stated: “Having the law alone is not enough.” Some 
respondents (mostly representatives of civil society and international 
organizations) explained that although the law is important, the law is not the 
principal tool for ending FGM/C in Senegal. The law is, according to the 
                                                        
403 B. Shell-Duncan et al., Legislating Change? Responses to Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting in 
Senegal, Law & Society Review, Volume 47, No. 4, 2013, p. 829. 
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respondents, not the “only means” or the “only strategy” to end FGM/C in 
Senegal. A representative of civil society explained: “You need to see the law as 
an instrument among other possible instruments. My point is that no matter of 
the stage, before enacting a law to ban a cultural practice, you should ask 
yourself if a law is the only and the most effective way of banning that practice 
which involves behavioural change, or if there are other means or a 
combination of ways to reach this objective. In this case, the function of the law 
is dissuasive but anthropologists and sociologists know for years that you 
cannot change a society by decree. Cultural change involves, among other 
things, awareness raising and relying on change agents such role models, which 
could be community, group of people or individuals. It is critical to identify 
who these change agents are.” UNFPA and UNICEF also are of the opinion that 
the law has its limits and won’t end FGM/C alone: “In Senegal, the FGM/C law 
is just one piece in a mosaic of approaches that are enabling the country to 
totally abandon FGM/C.”404  
 
11.10.6 Need for education, awareness raising and empowerment 
Many respondents (mostly representatives of civil society and international 
organizations) explained that the law needs to be preceded and complemented 
by educational/advocacy/sensitization/awareness raising activities and 
campaigns. A representative of civil society argued: “It is important to have a 
law, but education and empowerment will bring results.” Respondents 
explained that it is crucial to inform practicing communities about the harmful 
physical, medical, psychological effects of this practice. According to the 
UNFPA: “When, through discussions about human rights, people begin to 
understand that the high rates of maternal mortality, illness and debility that 
women have experienced were due in part to the effects of FGM/C, over time 
many communities spontaneously decide to abandon the practice.”405 Another 
civil society representative said: “People need to know why the law is adopted 
and why people could face a prison sentence.” A civil society representative 
explained: “They prefer to be put in jail and that their family is happy.” A 
representative of civil society further explained: “You have to teach the people 
in the village about FGM. If you just put them in jail, you will lose your time. 
Because if they come out of jail, they haven’t changed their mind. The law alone 
cannot change their behaviour. You need to explain them, educate them.”  
A representative of civil society explained: “I strongly believe that change 
comes from the grass roots. Until grassroots have the education and the 
empowerment they need, it is very difficult for them to have the confidence to 
stand up and promote a change.” A government representative argued: “What 
is necessary is education, that is important.” Another government 
                                                        
404 See also United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Senegal: Human 
Rights Key to Ending FGM/C, Legislation is Just One Aspect of an Effective Campaign, p. 4, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/gender/docs/fgmc_kit/LawSenegal.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
[Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
405 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Senegal: Human Rights Key 
to Ending FGM/C, Legislation is Just One Aspect of an Effective Campaign, p. 1, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/gender/docs/fgmc_kit/LawSenegal.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
[Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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representative explained: “We have the law, but the best way is to increase the 
education level of the community.” A civil society representative explained: 
“We need to keep the law, but the most important thing is to do prevention and 
to do sensitization to the community, to the whole the population.” 
A representative of an international organization emphasized that there is a 
causal link between the education level of the mother and the percentage of 
daughters who underwent FGM/C. The respondent argued: “If the level of 
education grows a bit, so if the mother is a bit more educated, you have a little 
bit less FGM/C. This is for me a sign, that education is important. I see a 
relationship here. If we have girls going to school, things are changing.” The 
respondent referred to the DHS-Continue 2012-2013 statistics406 that reveal that 
the proportion of girls who underwent FGM/C decreases when the level of 
education of the mother increases: 21% among those whose mothers have no 
education against 4% when the mother has at least completed secondary 
education.  
 
11.11 Court cases  
 
During the interviews, I also explored the views of the respondents, amongst 
others, whether the amount of court cases is representative for the incidence of 
FGM/C in Senegal. All respondents argued that the law is not sufficiently 
enforced and that only a handful of individuals have been prosecuted since the 
adoption of the law in 1999.  
 
11.11.1 Number of court cases 
The first year following the passage of the law has seen some arrests. In July 
1999, the grandmother and mother of a five-year-old girl were arrested, 
following a complaint filed by the father of the girl alleging that the two women 
had ordered FGM/C performed on his daughter. The cutter was also charged. 
However, the cases were not pursued and no convictions resulted, because of 
“emotional public outcry in the region.”407 The study of Prof. Ndiaye of 2010 
investigated also the amount of court cases on FGM/C in Senegal since the 
adoption of the law in 1999. During their research, they found seven court cases 
between 1999 and 2010: one in Matam, one in Tambacounda and five in 
Kolda.408 However, it proved to be very difficult for the researchers to get access 
to these cases, even though they had visited the regional courts. They reported: 
“The state of documentation in regional courts did not allow us to gather all the 
copies of the decisions that were made.”409 Therefore, they failed to identify 
                                                        
406 Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie [Sénégal], et ICF International, Enquête 
Démographique et de Santé Continue (EDS-Continue 2012-2013), ANSD et ICF International, 2012, p. 
85-88.  
407 United States Department of State, Senegal: Report on Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) or Female 
Genital Cutting (FGC), 1 June 2001, available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/g/wi/rls/rep/crfgm/10107.htm [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
408 B. Ndiaye, State Application of the Law on Excision in Senegal (Original in French: L’Etat 
d’Application de la Loi sur l’Excision au Sénégal), Ministry of Family and Women’s Organizations, 
UNFPA and UNICEF, December 2010, p. 31, para. 88.  
409 Ibid.  
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how many persons have been prosecuted and punished. The researchers were 
only able to obtain a copy of the decision of the regional court in Matam. 
 
11.11.2 Exceptional court case in Matam 
During the interviews, many respondents (including representatives from the 
government, civil society and international organizations) referred to this rather 
exceptional court case in Matam. On 25 April 2009, the Senegalese human rights 
organization RADDHO tipped the police that a 16-month-old girl had been cut 
by a traditional cutter in the village of Ourossogui, close to Matam (eastern part 
of Senegal). The cutter, the child’s parents and her grandmother (who had hired 
the cutter) were arrested and prosecuted. During the trial it was revealed that 
the grandmother had frequently demanded and insisted that her 
granddaughter needed to be cut.410 The case prompted a great uproar and 
stirred controversy with around 200 local Marabouts defending FGM/C as part 
of their tradition. They spoke out in defense of the cutter and of FGM/C and 
declared that the law prohibiting FGM/C should be repealed.411 The religious 
leaders also demanded the liberation of the offenders. Demonstrators blocked 
the regional law courts with public transport buses to show their loyalty to the 
religious leaders. The trial took place under strong police surveillance and 
access to the law courts was denied to the public. Clashes broke out between 
the protesters and local police. The demonstrators threw stones at the police 
who used teargas to break up the protest. Shortly after the arrest of the cutter, 
the parents and grandmother a press statement was published by religious 
leaders, stating the following:  
 
“Since the cold war and the demise of the Sophiet Union ex USSR [sic], Westerners 
led by the United States of America have been fighting Islam with intelligent 
methods which consist of combating certain practices that are recommended by 
Islam, to efface Muslim culture, for society without culture will disappear. This 
conflict is taking place in various ambiguous forms [sic]. NGOs have been created 
and say that they are there to help citizens understand their rights and duties, but in 
reality they are there to make Islam disappear. They will never succeed. Today, the 
Senegalese state (95% Muslim) allows itself to outlaw practices that are 
recommended by Islam, such as: - Excision was practised by Arabs since the time of 
the Prophet (peace and greeting be with him) [sic] who came to us with Islam. Non-
Muslim African societies do not practise it. Our illustrious ancestors [sic] practised 
it without problems. Shame on those who voted for this satanic law! Shame on 
those who voted for this impractical [sic] law in Senegal!”412 
 
Both of the child’s parents were originally sentenced to three months in prison, 
but were later pardoned. The cutter and the grandmother were both sentenced 
                                                        
410 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Senegal: Human Rights Key 
to Ending FGM/C, Legislation is Just One Aspect of an Effective Campaign, p. 2, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/gender/docs/fgmc_kit/LawSenegal.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
[Last Accessed 1 October 2015].   
411 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Senegal: Human Rights Key 
to Ending FGM/C, Legislation is Just One Aspect of an Effective Campaign, p. 3, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/gender/docs/fgmc_kit/LawSenegal.pdf, [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
412 S. O’Neill, Defying the Law, Negotiating Change: The Futanke’s Opposition to the National Ban on FGM 
in Senegal, Doctoral Thesis, Goldsmits, University of London, 2012, p. 243, available at 
http://research.gold.ac.uk/8852/ [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].   
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to six months in jail, but were released after three months. One could argue that 
the sentences in this case seem very lenient, since the Senegalese law prescribes 
a penalty of up to five years imprisonment. However, taking into account the 
cultural context in Senegal, some people argued that the duration of the prison 
sentence is not that important, because “spending three months in prison 
amounts to a social death sentence,”413 they are disgraced for the rest of their 
lives. The UNFPA further explains in this regard: “The people in this region are 
very proud. Over and above the number of days these ladies spent in prison, 
what is important is the terrible shame – the mere fact of going to jail. This 
makes a big impression on people.” 
The court case in Matam received a lot of media attention (in papers, radio and 
television). According to UNFPA, the case made a great impression in Senegal. 
The whole country was talking about his case: “Before, people didn’t really pay 
much attention to this law. But now, because of all the media attention, they 
take the law more seriously. People used to say, ‘Oh, they’ll never put me in jail 
if I have my daughter cut.’ Now, they’ve seen that breaking the law actually has 
consequences.” 
However, more striking is the following. A Marabout came to the judge in 
Matam and said: “This will be your last case. You will never judge another 
person.” The day that the judge of Matam sentenced the parents and the cutter 
to jail, he indeed fell ill and got a heart attack. Many people in Senegal were 
afraid and interpret it as a sign of God that the judge did the wrong thing. A 
representative of an international organization explained: “The judge of Matam 
had gone against the laws of ancestors in Senegal. The poor man… These sub-
natural beliefs exist in Senegal.” At the time of this research, the judge was still 
prostrate in bed. One representative of civil society said: “He is at the hospital 
till now, he cannot even move his fingers.”  
The consequences of this case for the enforcement of the law in Senegal are 
enormous. A government representative said: “Since then, no one dares to go 
further or to take definitive sanctions against a FGM case, even till today.” 
Indeed, since this case in Matam in 2009, there haven’t been any other court 
cases. Many respondents (including representatives from the government, civil 
society and international organizations) explained that no prosecutor, no 
lawyer and no judge dared to burn their fingers on an FGM/C case. A 
government representative said: “The case of Matam shows that all the 
magistrates think: “If it bites or not, don't give your hand.”  
Since it proved to be very difficult to get access to the court cases, 
respondents were asked if they knew more details about the other six FGM/C 
court cases. The respondents revealed that most of the arrested cutters or family 
members have not served the full prison sentence. They were released early, 
mainly because the village went on strike. A civil society representative 
explained: “When the case was in court in Sédhiou, the people were fighting 
and demonstrating and then they dropped the case.”  The respondents also 
explained that in many instances, when family members and/or cutters got 
                                                        
413 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Senegal: Human Rights Key 
to Ending FGM/C, Legislation is Just One Aspect of an Effective Campaign, p. 4, available at 
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arrested, they were pardoned before the case could be judged. A representative 
of civil society explained: “The leaders of the community have much more 
power than the government. If the leaders threatened that they would go on 
strike again or protest with the whole community, cases were dropped.” 
 
11.11.3 Lack of reports 
During the interviews, I also explored the views of the respondents, amongst 
others, why the amount of court cases is not representative for the incidence of 
FGM/C in Senegal. Many respondents (including representatives from the 
government, civil society and international organizations) explained that the 
main problem is that people refuse to report FGM/C cases to the police. A 
representative of an international organization explained: “The law is not the 
problem. The law is there and the law is good. But the community does not 
report FGM cases to Justice. The lawyers do not have cases. Since 1999 we have, 
I think, only 7 court cases in Justice. And each and every case created big 
problems in Senegal.” Similarly, a representative of civil society said: “My 
question is always: Who is going to complain? Nobody is reporting cases to the 
police.”  
The study of Prof. Birahim Ndiaye of 2010 assessing the implementation of 
the law criminalizing FGM/C revealed the following interesting course of 
events. The researchers interviewed judges and said: “Why don’t you apply the 
law and condemn according to what the law says?” The judges said: “We don’t 
have any cases. No cases have been brought to us about FGM/C.” The 
researchers went to the police and they said to the police: “Why didn’t you 
bring any case to the judge?” The police responded: “We don’t hear of any case 
about FGM/C. No one comes to complain about FGM/C.”414 
The respondents (mainly civil society representatives) explained that people 
in Senegal often do not speak up about FGM/C, because it is considered a 
family matter. There is a sense of family and community solidarity. People are 
afraid they will be treated as social outcasts if they report FGM/C cases to the 
police. In addition, civil society representatives explained that young girls who 
underwent FGM/C do not have the capacity to put their parents in prison. 
They do not file a complaint and testify against their own neighbours, 
community members, friends, parents, grandparents, other family members or 
the cutters. In addition, the psychological effects on a young girl witnessing the 
arrest of her parents could be considerable. A representative of civil society 
said: “Who to sue and how and when? Knowing that you are living in the 
house with your grandmother, your mother. You’ve been a victim. Who are you 
going to take to jail? Who has the courage to do that? There is no green number, 
people will know that you did it.“ A representative of civil society further 
explained that it is important to take into account that they are often family 
members. If they have the courage to report a case and go to court, a problem 
might arise when the family members are released from prison: “How can you 
                                                        
414 B. Ndiaye, State Application of the Law on Excision in Senegal (Original in French: L’Etat 
d’Application de la Loi sur l’Excision au Sénégal), Ministry of Family and Women’s Organizations, 
UNFPA and UNICEF, December 2010. 
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expect these people living together afterwards? This is one of my main 
questions in relation to prosecution.” 
In relation to the court case in Matam, the Senegalese human rights 
organization RADDHO tipped the police, not people from the community or 
family members. Respondents suggested that if the Senegalese government or 
police could guarantee anonymity, something might change in the future with 
regard to the reporting behaviour. A civil society representative argued: “It has 
to be anonymous. But can Senegal provide anonymity? That’s debatable, I don’t 
know if they can.” In Senegal it is not possible to anonymously report cases to 
the police. There is no hotline that people can call anonymously to report 
cuttings that are about to happen or have recently taken place.415 
 
11.11.4 Training of professionals in the Justice sector 
Some respondents (mainly representatives of civil society) emphasized that 
police officers, magistrates and lawyers are often part of the same community. 
A representative of civil society therefore explained that sometimes the police is 
reluctant to arrest cutters or family members of young girls who underwent the 
procedure or at risk of undergoing FGM/C, because: “We should not forget 
that many of this government officials, especially the police, the gendarmerie, 
they are part of the community and they share the same values.”  
Some respondents explained that the police in Senegal are not ready to work 
on FGM/C cases. A representative of civil society said: “the police is not 
prepared to handle this kind of issues.” Another civil society representative 
explained: “Those people who are supposed to apply the law are sometimes 
very, very, resistant towards the topic. Sometimes they don’t even want to talk 
about excision. How are you then going to apply this law?” Several civil society 
representatives explained that as long as the police officer supports the practice 
and “when he wants to have his own daughter cut” he would not put effort in 
arresting “his friends and neighbours who believe in the same tradition.” 
Some respondents (mainly civil society representatives) argued therefore 
that it is important to put more emphasize on trainings that specifically target 
the justice sector. A representative of civil society explained: “So it is not just 
having a law, but you should also have a discussion with justice, the people 
working in the court, in order to make sure they have the real tools and 
knowledge how to apply the law. People working at the police department 
should learn how to handle these cases if someone comes to complain about 
FGM, because it is something new for them.”  
Some representatives of international organizations and civil society 
explained that in recognition of the challenge of enforcing the law against 
FGM/C, the UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme supported several activities 
focusing on capacity building of professionals in the justice sector. Indeed, the 
                                                        
415 The Government of Burkina Faso established in 1990 a national telephone hotline called the 
“Green Phone: SOS Excision” to encourage people to report cases of FGM/C. These reports serve as 
the basis in Burkina Faso for legal interventions and prosecutions in many FGM/C cases. In 
Burkina Faso 192 people were convicted between 2009 and 2013 for FGM/C. See United Nations 
Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Burkina Faso has a Strong Law against FGM/C, 
but Winning Hearts and Minds Remains Crucial, available at 
https://www.unfpa.org/gender/docs/fgmc_kit/burkinafaso.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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annual report of the UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme reveals that 250 people 
in Senegal were trained (including judges, prosecutors, lawyers, magistrates, 
local leaders and members of civil society organizations) in 2012 to effectively 
implement and enforce legal provisions against FGM/C. 416  Furthermore, 
according to UNICEF and UNFPA, the Ministry of Women, Family and 
Children organized workshops across Senegal to encourage the application of 
the law, attended by administrative authorities, local elected officials, and 
representatives of community-based organizations.417  
 
11.11.5 Time to enforce the law? 
Interestingly enough, during this research, a new trend was observed. 
Although the majority of respondents (including representatives of the 
government, civil society and international organizations) were in favour of an 
approach to focus on awareness-raising and argued that change could only 
come through education, it was remarkable that more and more respondents 
seemed to become in favour of punishing and prosecuting parents and cutters. 
Although people in the village do what they believe is right, as soon as they are 
aware of the harmful consequences of the practice, but still decide to continue 
practicing it, they should face a prison sentence, respondents claimed.  
A representative of civil society said: “We have done enough sensitization 
the past twenty years, now it is time to put people in prison.” Another 
representative of civil society explained that after many years of experience in 
the field, sensitizing communities about FGM/C for a long time, the respondent 
argued: “I do sensitization already for a long time. But every time I talk about 
human rights, I organize a meeting for the women… Sometimes I feel like I am 
wasting my time. How many times do I need to do this? FGM is still there.” 
Another representative of civil society argued: “There have been enough public 
declarations, now it is time to start prosecuting. Now it’s time to put people in 
prison.” Even respondents, who protested in front of the parliament in 1999 
against the enactment of the law, now declared that the law should be better 
enforced and people “should be arrested, thrown in jail, or subjected to corporal 
punishment.” When these respondents were asked why it is necessary to put 
more people in prison, they replied: “Although the court case in Matam had 
some deterrent effect, people are not really afraid to get prosecuted.” A 
representatives of civil society explained: “It is important to have some 
examples, so more people will say: “Oh, if I do FGM, I am going to prison.” 
Another civil society representative explained: “Sometimes it is good to have 
more court cases, because if there are only a few cases, some people think that: 
“Oh, I won’t have any problem because nobody was put into jail” or “If you put 
me in jail, tomorrow my parents will go on strike and I will be out in just 2 days 
or 1 hour. This needs to change” A representative of an international 
organization raised the issue of the integrity of the government when 
                                                        
416 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Annual Report 2012, p. 12, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNICEF-
UNFPA%20Joint%20Programme%20AR_final_v14.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].   
417 Ibid.   
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answering the question why it is necessary to focus more on prosecution. The 
respondent explained that it is important to raise the amount of FGM/C court 
cases for this reason: “It is important. I think it is also an issue of credibility for 
the government. They have a law, but when it’s not enforced, the communities 
just continue.” 
 
11.12 Modifying the penal code 
 
At the time of this research, the Senegalese government was undergoing a 
process of revision of the Penal Code and the Code of Penal Procedures. 
Interestingly, there was also a discussion at the Ministry of Justice to review the 
FGM/C legislation with the aim to increase the amount of court cases. The 
Ministry of Justice proposed that health professionals should be obliged to 
report FGM/C cases to the police. When questions were asked about this 
proposal during the interviews, it proved to be a very controversial issue in 
Senegal. The majority of the respondents (mostly representatives of civil society) 
were against this proposal. They were concerned that women will not come for 
help with their girls to health clinics or hospitals any more, if they run the risk 
of prosecution. One representative of civil society stated: “Can you expect 
someone at the local health post, who knows the community, to report the 
community? Are they really going to do that? Really? Would you report your 
friends? Of course you are not going to report your friends. I mean, yeah, 
maybe at the regional level it might be done, a doctor might report. But then, 
you are not going to have people going into the hospitals to get the health 
services that they need. So you will have a detrimental effect if you are scaring 
people off like that. Because then they will not go to the hospitals. That is 
something they need to think about.” Similarly, another civil society 
representative argued: “Do you think that if you denounce a family they will 
come into your office again? Even if the girl is bleeding?” Although most 
government representatives were in favour of this proposal, some were firm 
opponents of this proposal. They argued: “our mission is to make sure that 
women have access to health and we need to make sure that their right of 
reproductive health is implemented.” In addition, they referred to the possible 
breach of the medical secrecy of health professionals, when they would refer 
cases to the police. An often-hear counter-argument was: “How do you 
reconcile a little girl, who has been cut, with her right to health? We need to 
tackle that.” 
Apart from the proposed adjustment of the Penal Code regarding the 
medical professionals, three other proposals were made by the Ministry of 
Justice to change the current Penal Code. First of all, the Ministry of Justice 
proposed to introduce an “obligation to report.” This means that anyone who 
had knowledge that a girl is about to undergo FGM/C, but does not notify the 
administrative or judicial authorities, while this person was in the position to 
prevent or limit the effects, this person will be punishable (proposed in Article 
55 of the Penal Code). In the second place, anyone who abuses its authority 
intimidates or who influences the decision (for example by gifts and promises) 
to undergo FGM/C or who gives instructions to undergo the procedure, will be 
punishable (Article 441 of the Penal Code). Thirdly, the Ministry of Justice 
proposed that in cases of FGM/C there would not be any limitation periods. 
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This means that girls can sue their parents, grandparents and cutters when they 
are grown-up, no matter how long ago the procedure was performed on them.  
 
12 POLICIES AND NATIONAL ACTION PLANS   
 
Besides passing a law criminalizing FGM/C, the Republic of Senegal started to 
develop policies regarding VAW and more specifically FGM/C in the 1990s. It 
has incorporated provisions to end FGM/C within a broader national policy 
framework that includes the National Reproductive Health Program (1997-
2001),418 the National Health and Social Development Programme (1998-2007), 
the National Plan of Action for Women (1997-2001) and the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (2006-2010).419 In 1999, soon after the adoption of the national 
law criminalizing FGM/C, the government developed the first National Action 
Plan (NAP) specifically dealing with FGM/C for the period 2000-2005. This 
NAP was evaluated in 2008 and a new NAP to accelerate the abandonment of 
FGM/C was adopted in 2010 for the period 2010-2015. Furthermore, a medical 
policy was adopted in 2011 and a religious policy in 2013. Below, a short 
overview is given of the main objectives of these national policies.  
 
12.1 National policy framework in relation to FGM/C 
 
12.1.1 National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation 
The aim of the ‘National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital 
Mutilation’ (Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des Mutilations 
Genitales Feminines) was to create a strategic framework to coordinate actors 
working in this field in Senegal to facilitate the end of the practice. The NAP 
was designed to promote and protect the rights of girls and women and to 
support the collective abandonment of all forms of FGM/C. The general 
objective of the NAP was the definitive abandonment of FGM/C across Senegal 
by the year 2005.420 The Senegalese government mandated the Direction of the 
Family (Direction de la Famille) of the Ministry of Women, Family and Children 
(Ministre de la Femme, de la Famille et de l’Enfance)421 to be the coordinating body 
for the implementation of the NAP.  
                                                        
418 The National Reproductive Health Program contains a sub-program on FGM/C and VAW, 
Adolescents and Girls. The general objectives of the program are to “support the struggle to abolish 
FGM/C and other forms of VAW in order to protect their reproductive health, promote and respect 
for their fundamental rights and improve their social and economic status.” The specific objectives 
of the program are to reduce FGM/C with 50% in 2001 and to eliminate it altogether.  
419 A. Deme, Evaluation of Senegal’s Implementation of the Regional Plan of Action to Accelerate the 
Elimination of FGM/C in Africa (Original in French: Evaluation de la Mise en Œuvre au Sénégal du Plan 
d’Action Régional pour Accélérer l’Elimination des Mutilations Sexuelles Féminines en Afrique), WHO 
Senegal, 22 September 2003, p. 15-16. 
420 National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of 
the Family and National Solidarity, March 2001, p. 24.  
421 This Ministry was the time of the adoption of the first National Plan of Action referred to as the 
Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship (Ministère de la Famille, de 
la Solidarité Nationale de L’Entreprenariat Féminin). 
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The main objectives of the NAP were to improve networking and coordination 
among actors involved in efforts to combat the practice, explaining the legal 
framework to them and integrating the issue into formal and non-formal 
education. The NAP included four main components: (i) ‘communication and 
social mobilization’ which aimed to raise awareness of the health and sexual 
consequences of FGM/C on women and girls, to get people involved to 
eliminate the practice of FGM/C and to recognize the rights women and girls to 
physical and moral integrity; (ii) ‘formal and non-formal education’ to support 
the integration of FGM/C and the rights of women and girls in health programs 
and social education in the curricula of elementary, secondary and university 
education, and in the training programs of the structures involved in the 
implementation of the law against violence against women and girls; (iii) 
‘accompanying measures’ through which actions would be developed to 
strengthen the management of psycho-social and medical care for people 
suffering from the effects of FGM/C and conversion of former practitioners in 
other income-generating activities to offset income from FGM/C; (iv) 
‘institutional framework’ which aimed to establish frameworks and 
institutional mechanisms necessary for coordinating and monitoring the 
implementation of the NAP at all levels.422 To ensure the achievement of its 
objectives, the intervention strategy of NAP was based on an approach that 
focuses on research, community outreach, education, training and structural 
changes. The strategy was, first, to make communities aware, through 
information, education and communication, the consequences of FGM/C on the 
health and physical well-being, mental and social development of girls and 
women who suffer; and secondly, to bring communities to adopt by consensus 
a dynamic structural change in favour of abandoning the practice.  
The overall budget for the implementation of the NAP amounted to 
2.504.970.000 CFA (around 3.818.801 euro). Partners in the international 
community (WHO, UNIFEM, 423  UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNFPA, USAID, and 
GTZ,424 among others)425 provided technical and financial support to the State 
and NGOs involved.426  
                                                        
422 National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of 
the Family and National Solidarity, March 2001, p. 26-73; A. Diop-Diagne, Evaluation of the National 
Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation (Original in French: Evaluation du Plan 
d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of the 
Family, National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship, September 2008, p. 13.  
423 In 2011, United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) was merged into the United 
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, also known as UN Women. 
424 In 2011, the German organization Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) changed 
its name to Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).  
425 National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of 
the Family and National Solidarity, March 2001, p. 74-76 
426 A. Diop-Diagne, Evaluation of the National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital 
Mutilation (Original in French: Evaluation du Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des 
Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and Female 
Entrepreneurship, September 2008, p. 5.  
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12.1.2 Evaluation of the National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female 
Genital Mutilation 
The National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation 
(2000-2005) was evaluated in 2008 in order to identify strengths and weaknesses 
of the implementation of the NAP.427 Ms. Astou Diop Diagne carried out the 
evaluation under the supervision of the Ministry of Women, Family and 
Children. According to the evaluation, "Most of the objectives started to be 
implemented, although the degree of implementation is not the same for every 
component."428 There had been “significant results” at the output level with 
regard to the ‘communication and social mobilization’ components and ‘non-
formal education’ component.429 There were “positive effects” on the behaviour 
and attitudes of communities that were now more favourable to the rights of 
women, the abandonment of FGM/C and improved the social position of 
women. According to the evaluators, FGM/C was no longer ignored by the 
population, but had become more visible through awareness raising and 
training. It was no longer a taboo and it has been discussed among community 
members. Even people who practice FGM/C recognized its adverse 
consequences and, increasingly, they publicly declared their intention not to 
practice on their children. According to the evaluation, women, men, youth, 
religious and traditional leaders were all united for the abandonment of 
FGM/C. Of the 5,000 villages previously practicing FGM/C, a total of 3,140 had 
publicly declared to abandon FGM/C in March 2008.430 Although this sounded 
very promising, the evaluators also reported at the same time that there were 
still many areas (especially in the North of Senegal and in Vélingara) where 
FGM/C is still strongly defended. These areas are referred to as “pockets of 
resistance” causing difficulty for some actors to develop their programs. This 
resulted in a concentration of actors in the South and an “uneven coverage 
areas by actors and a difference in the extent of their involvement in the areas 
covered.”431 Therefore, the objective of increasing the level of knowledge on 
FGM/C in Senegal was only partially achieved.  
The results achieved related to the ‘formal education’ component and the 
‘institutional framework’ component were weaker. The issue of FGM/C was 
not (yet) integrated in the curricula of primary and secondary education and 
those of health training schools. In addition, one of the major constraints was 
the lack of ownership of the government, including the poor coordination of 
actors in the implementation of the NAP. The evaluation articulated “The 
Government, beyond the willingness to accelerate the final abandonment of 
FGM, must take greater ownership of the implementation of the Action Plan by 
setting place the institutional mechanisms that will allow it to fully play its role 
                                                        
427 A. Diop-Diagne, Evaluation of the National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital 
Mutilation (Original in French: Evaluation du Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des 
Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and Female 
Entrepreneurship, September 2008, p. 16.  
428 Ibid, p. 35. 
429 Ibid, p. 5 and p. 35.  
430 Ibid, p. 16 and p. 48. 
431 Ibid, p. 6 and p. 21.  
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of coordination, monitoring and evaluation.”432 The weak capacity and the 
institutional changes within the government during the period of 
implementation contributed to the non-implementation of the NAP. Inadequate 
resource mobilization (human and financial) for the implementation of the NAP 
was cited as an additional problem. The evaluators made some 
recommendations for the State, including the following: (i) to create a National 
Coordination Committee and regional and departmental committees; (ii) to 
allocate a budget for the implementation of the NAP to finance the activities of 
the NAP (iii) to reinforce the authorities' commitment to support the permanent 
abandonment of FGM/C.433 The evaluation also recognized the crucial role of 
CSOs in the implementation of the NAP: “They took over from the government 
and allowed to have significant results in terms of behavioural change.”434 The 
strategy of the CSO Tostan – to promote women’s rights – was referred to as a 
good and promising practice: “Tostan was now the only CSO working on the 
ground broadly with potential and strong technical ability with the 
development of a community education package based on the rights-based 
approach.”435 The evaluation stated that the different categories of stakeholders 
(government, CSOs and communities) recognized that the achievements and 
results in the field of FGM/C are “largely due to the strategy of Tostan.” They 
suggested that the Government should capitalize the Tostan program as a 
national program that will be accessible and usable by all stakeholders to 
accelerate the abandonment of FGM/C in Senegal.436 With the evaluation, 
several ‘lessons learned’ were identified. Two important lessons worth 
mentioning were that (i) the adoption of a law alone and the Public 
Declarations are not sufficient to deter people permanently to practice 
FGM/C;437 (ii) improving the socio-economic situation of the population could 
also help in changing behaviour to abandon the practice of FGM/C.438 The 
evaluators concluded by saying that although many aspects of the NAP had not 
been realized as planned and many of the goals developed in the NAP were not 
achieved, the NAP has improved the situation of FGM/C in Senegal. 
 
12.1.3 National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of FGM/C (2010-2015) 
Drawing lessons from the evaluation in 2008 and the findings of a national and 
regional workshop in October 2008 on FGM/C,439 the National Plan of Action to 
Accelerate the Abandonment of Excision (Plan d’Action National pour 
l’Acceleration de l’Abandon de l’Excision) was adopted in February 2010. The 
                                                        
432 A. Diop-Diagne, Evaluation of the National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital 
Mutilation (Original in French: Evaluation du Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des 
Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and Female 
Entrepreneurship, September 2008, p. 8.  
433 Ibid, p. 9. 
434 Ibid, p. 42. 
435 Ibid, p. 8.  
436 Ibid.  
437 Ibid.  
438 Ibid.  
439 National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of Excision 2010-2015 (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Acceleration de l’Abandon de l’Excision 2010-2015), Ministry of the Family, 
National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship, February 2010, p. 26, para. 3.5.  
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objective of this NAP is to step up action against FGM/C in Senegal with the 
goal to achieve total abandonment by 2015.440 The strategy in this NAP focuses 
on human rights education, community empowerment and capacity building, 
awareness raising and advocacy, the harmonization of policies and strategies 
and resource mobilization. 441  The NAP is structured around four main 
components, including (i) ‘extension and national coverage’ (ii) ‘sub-regional 
cooperation and diaspora’ (iii) ‘coordination, monitoring and evaluation’ (iv) 
‘accompanying measures’. 442  In the NAP, activities are listed for every 
component to further elaborate on what actions are necessary for the total 
abandonment of FGM/C in Senegal.443  
This NAP provides also a comprehensive framework for coordination at the 
national, regional and community level and to establish a monitoring 
mechanism. The Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and Female 
Entrepreneurship, (Ministère de la Famille, de la Solidarité Nationale, de 
l’Entreprenariat Féminin) is still responsible for the implementation of the NAP 
and must coordinate activities at the strategic and technical level.444 At the State 
level, the National Council for Promoting the Abandonment of FGM/C (Conseil 
National Promotion Abandon de l’Excision) will be established, as the political 
body of guidance and decision. The National Council will be chaired by the 
Prime Minister and it’s mission is to guide government actions, validate annual 
action plans, monitor and evaluate the performance of annual and NAPs and 
provide advocacy, resource mobilization and partnership at the highest level 
for the total abandonment of FGM/C.445 The members of this Council are all 
actors that are important in the abandonment of FGM/C in Senegal, including 
the different Ministries, NGOs, women’s organizations, religious and 
customary leaders, communication and press, parliamentarians, technical and 
financial partners.446 In addition, a National Technical Coordination Committee 
will be established (Comité Technique National de Coordination) whose task is to 
assist the coordination unit in its mission, including providing them with the 
necessary technical assistance.447 At the regional level, a Regional Committee for 
the abandonment of excision (Comité régional pour l’abandon de l’excision) and a 
Departmental Committee for the abandonment of FGM (Comité départemental 
pour l’abandon de l’excision) will be established. The missions of the regional and 
district committees are: (i) to ensure the responsibility for monitoring and 
supervision of field activities; (ii) interface with international and national 
financial partners in their region; (iii) promote advocacy on the financial, 
political, religious and community; (iv) develop performance reports and 
capitalize on experience.448 At the community level, there are Community 
                                                        
440 National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of Excision 2010-2015 (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Acceleration de l’Abandon de l’Excision 2010-2015), Ministry of the Family, 
National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship, February 2010, p. 15, para. 2.4. 
441 Ibid, p. 15, para. 2.6. 
442 Ibid.  
443 Ibid, p. 16-17, para. 2.7.  
444 Ibid, p. 19, para. 3.1.1. 
445 Ibid, p. 20, para. 3.2.1. 
446 Ibid, p. 21, para. 3.2.1.  
447 Ibid, p. 22, para. 3.2.2.  
448 Ibid, p. 22, para. 3.2.3.  
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Management Committees (Comités de gestion communautaire) whose mission is to 
ensure the protection of girls and women in the community for the effective 
abandonment of FGM/C.449 The overall budget for the implementation of the 
2nd phase of the NAP amounted to 7.613.613.000 CFA (around 11.606.849 euro). 
An external evaluation of the NAP will be carried out in 2015 by independent 
consultants at the end of the program. It will aim to analyze the results and 
make recommendations for the future of the program.450  
 
12.1.4 The "Medical Argument"  
Although the latest DHS survey shows that the proportion of Senegalese 
women who reported knowledge about FGM/C is high (91.3%), the practicing 
communities are often not aware of the harmful consequences and the impact 
of the practice on the health of women and children. Many Senegalese women 
don’t know exactly what happens when they (or their daughters) undergo 
FGM/C. Molly Melching, director of Tostan, explains that she interviewed, 
together with five Senegalese staff members, thousands of women throughout 
rural Senegal in the 1990. During these interviews, they found out how little 
these women understood about the workings of their bodies, especially when it 
came to reproductive health: “They didn’t know about family planning or 
menstruation – when it started and when it stopped. […] The women had never 
been taught about healthy sexuality, didn’t understand anatomy, and had never 
seen pictures of sexual organs. Many admitted they wanted to be able to better 
educate their daughters about these issues, but how could hey when they didn’t 
understand their own bodies, when they knew so little themselves?” 451 
Furthermore, during the interviews the researchers also discovered that women 
did not link the pain, hemmorrhaging, infection, and problems during 
childbirth to FGM/C. Rather, they assigned these problems to another cause: 
the work of evil spirits, a punishment for some unknown transgression of the 
family or the will of God.452 As most girls in Senegal are cut at very young ages. 
Therefore, girls and women spend their entire lives thinking that the problems 
they suffer are normal and expected, part of what it means to have a female 
body. However, some women slowly start to realize that “the pain, 
hemmorrhaging, infection, and problems during childbirth were not the result 
of bad spirits, as they had thought, but rather of being cut with an unsterile 
razor blade or knife by an elderly women with no medical training.”453 An 
additional problem in this regard is that women often do not show pain nor talk 
about the practice, because doing so would only make them appear weak and 
bring shame to their families. 454  For the rest of their lives it was their 
responsibility to hold what happens to them in silence, lest they suffer 
                                                        
449 National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of Excision 2010-2015 (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Acceleration de l’Abandon de l’Excision 2010-2015), Ministry of the Family, 
National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship, February 2010, p. 23, para. 3.2.4.  
450 Ibid, p. 26, para. 3.3. 
451 A. Molloy, However Long the Night: Molly Melching's Journey to Help Millions of African Women and 
Girls Triumph, HarperOne, 2013, p. 115-116.  
452 Ibid, p. 4.   
453 Ibid, p. 19. 
454 Ibid, p. 65. 
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punishment. The consequences of talking about the tradition could be quite 
serious: “It could mean mental illness or paralysis. It might even bring death. 
This is why women never dared to speak about it.”455 
Although more and more women started to find the courage to speak about 
the tradition for the first time through the education programmes of CSOs, 
there is still a lack of knowledge. To tackle this problem in relation to the lack of 
knowledge, the Ministry of Health and Social Action (Ministère de la Santé et de 
l'Action Sociale) and the Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and Female 
Entrepreneurship (Ministère de la Famille, de la Solidarité Nationale, de 
l’Entreprenariat Féminin) adopted the ‘Medical Argument about Excision’ 
(Argumentaire Medical sur l’Excision) in 2011. The preface of this document states: 
“It proves essential if we really want to accelerate and sustain the abandonment 
of excision, it is necessary to share the health consequences of this practice with 
the communities.” This policy document is designed with the aim to facilitate 
changes in attitudes and expected behaviour.456 The document is developed in 
cooperation with different experts and distributed in areas where the 
prevalence of FGM/C is high. With pictures and drawings, this policy 
document explains what actually happens when young girls undergo FGM/C. 
It explains the functions of the female genitals when they are ‘normal’, the 
different types of FGM/C and the harmful immediate and subsequent medical 
and sexual consequences of the procedure.  
 
12.1.5 The "Islamic Argument"  
The latest DHS survey in Senegal reveals that 17% of women consider FGM/C 
as an endorsement of Islam and among women who had undergone FGM/C, 
50.6% reported that they believe FGM/C is a religious obligation (see also para. 
5.4.9). Despite the fact that FGM/C is an ancient cultural practice that existed 
before Islam, Christianity and Judaism (see also Chapter II of this thesis), the 
belief that it is a religious requirement contributes to the continuation of the 
practice in Senegal.457 Practicing communities believe that FGM/C provides the 
cleanliness and purification required for religious participation and prayer. 
They also put emphasis on its moral merits such as promoting chastity prior to 
marriage, and having controlled sexuality and fidelity once married.458  
In November 2013,459 Senegal’s Network of Islam and Population (Réseau 
Islam & Population) issued the ‘Islamic Argument for the abandonment of 
excision in Senegal’ (Argumentaire Islamique pour l’abandon de l’excision au 
Sénégal). The Network of Islam and Population is a CSO that brings together a 
number of experts in the field of Islamic religious doctrine, imams, academic 
                                                        
455 A. Molloy, However Long the Night: Molly Melching's Journey to Help Millions of African Women and 
Girls Triumph, HarperOne, 2013, p. 115-116, p. 145. 
456 Ministry of Health and Social Action and the Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and 
Female Entrepreneurship, Medical Argument about Excision (Original in French: Argumentaire 
Medical sur l’Excision), 2011, p. 5.  
457 United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change, UNICEF, New York, July 2013, p. 69.  
458 B. Shell-Duncan et al., Legislating Change? Responses to Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting in 
Senegal, Law & Society Review, Volume 47, No. 4, 2013, p. 816.  
459 Since the “Islamic Argument” was very new at the time of this research, it was not possible to 
include questions in the interview guide about the implementation of this document. 
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researchers and representatives of the major fraternities and Marabout families. 
The Network works closely together with Ministries and other CSOs and is 
concerned with issues relating to family planning and birth control. They are 
deeply committed to abandon FGM/C because “it is one of the causes of 
maternal and infant mortality in our country.” It is for this reason that they 
want to equip members through knowledge of Islamic law on FGM/C.  
This “Islamic Argument” for the abandonment of FGM/C in Senegal 
provides a tool for actors in the field who are confronted with opposition based 
on the religious arguments. This document – a small green booklet – gives a 
response to those arguments and explains that FGM/C is not a practice 
recommended by Islam. With excerpts from the Qur’an, the document clarifies 
that FGM/C has never been mentioned in the Holy Qur'an and there are no 
citations in Prophet Muhammad's Hadith.460 The Hadith that is often cited by 
proponents to justify FGM/C, is known as Umm Attiyah’s Hadith. It reported 
that Prophet Muhammad addressed her saying: "ه￿ك￿ي٬، ْ￿ن ￿تَ ￿و￿ا￿لِ ّ￿م￿ى ِ￿ش ٴٔ￿ا :￿ع￿ط￿ي￿ة ٴٔ￿ا￿م ￿ي￿ا￿ َ
 O Umm ‘Attiyah, when you do") ￿د￿ا￿و￿د ٴٔ￿ا￿ب￿و ٴٔ￿ا￿خ￿ر￿ج￿ه "￿ا￿ل￿ز￿و￿ج ￿ع￿ن￿د ￿ؤ￿ا￿ح￿ظ￿ى ￿ل￿ل￿و￿ج￿ه ٴٔ￿ا￿س￿ر￿ى ￿فٕ￿ا￿ن￿ه
circumcise, restrict yourself to cut a minute part and do not excise. That will be far 
more pleasant for the wife and satisfying for the husband.") According to another 
Hadith that is often used in debates about Islam and FGM/C, it is reported that 
Prophet Muhammad said: "ل￿ل￿ن￿س￿اء ￿م￿ك￿ر￿م￿ة ￿ل￿ل￿ر￿ج￿ا￿ل ￿س￿ن￿ة ￿ا￿ل￿خ￿ت￿ا￿ن￿" ("circumcision is 
Sunnah for men and Makramah [virtuous deed] for women".) However, in this 
policy document, the Network explains why these – and other Hadiths 
referring to FGM/C – are weak and not reliable as evidence for FGM/C.461 In 
the second part of the document, the Network relies on medical arguments to 
explain why the practice is harmful. The Network argues that because of the 
medical complications, it affects the quality of life of women and as a 
consequence of the couple.462 On the contrary, Islamic law protects a women’s 
right to health and that FGM/C violates those rights. Therefore, the Network 
concludes that there is no text that can serve as a reliable basis to justify FGM/C 
in the Islam. The practice should therefore be prohibited.463 The technical and 
financial support of the UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme made the 
development of this policy document possible. 
                                                        
460 See also International Islamic Center for Population Studies & Research of Al Azhar University 
and UNICEF Egypt, Female Circumcision: Between the Incorrect Use of Science and the Misunderstood 
Doctrine, Executive Summary (original published in Arabic), 2013, p. 6, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/egypt/Final_English_FGM_summary(1).pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015]. See also M. Selim Al-Awa, FGM In the Context of Islam, International Federation of Islamic 
Scholars, The National Council for Childhood and Motherhood, May 2012, available at 
http://egypt.unfpa.org/Images/Publication/2012_05/d9174a63-2960-459b-9f78-b33ad795445e.pdf 
[Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
461 International Islamic Center for Population Studies & Research of Al Azhar University and 
UNICEF Egypt, Female Circumcision: Between the Incorrect Use of Science and the Misunderstood 
Doctrine, Executive Summary (Original Published in Arabic), 2013, p. 8-10, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/egypt/Final_English_FGM_summary(1).pdf. 
462 Network of Islam and Population, Islamic Argument for the Abandonment of Excision in Senegal 
(Argumentaire Islamique pour l’Abandon de l’Excision au Sénégal), November 2013, p. 17-18.  
463 Ibid, p. 28.  
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12.1.6 Youth policy in progress 
At the time of this research, the Ministry of Women, Family and Children was 
in the process of developing a policy document focusing on the youth. A 
representative of the government explained “the youth are not used to be 
involved in the fight against FGM in this country, but they requested to be 
involved and to take part in the process. We think that they can play an 
important role.” Indeed, there are several studies464 that suggest that the youth 
can help to contribute to the acceleration of the abandonment of FGM/C.  
 
12.2 Respondents’ views on policy development 
 
During the interviews, I asked the respondents, amongst others, their opinion 
about the adopted national policies in the field of FGM/C in Senegal. Many 
respondents (including representatives of the government, civil society and 
international organizations) were very critical in relation to the first NAP and 
they referred to this policy as being “incomplete”, “not successful” and “not 
well done.” In addition, many respondents explained that only a few people 
were aware about the adoption and the existence of the first NAP. A 
representative of civil society said: “It was not very well known by people. 
Some CSOs never knew about national plan, even if they are working on FGM, 
even if they are working on gender.” Another representative of civil society 
said: “Who knows about the National Action Plans? Very few. You know, even 
myself, I think that when I started working on the concept note, that’s when I 
discovered that there was a National Plan.”  
Many respondents (including representatives of the government, civil 
society and international organizations) were much more positive about the 
second NAP. They said that this NAP is “much better” than the first NAP. They 
referred to the second NAP as “very comprehensive”, “ambitious” and 
sometimes even “overambitious.” Although it is according to the respondents a 
very well thought, well-written and comprehensive NAP, that provides a clear 
framework and structure to tackle FGM/C in the country, many respondents 
expressed their concern that this second NAP is not implemented. A 
representative of civil society argued: “It is a well-thought, good and excellent 
National Action Plan, but the problem is the application.” 
The respondents had mixed feelings in relation to the “Medical 
Argumentaire.” Some respondents (especially government representatives) said 
this was a very good policy, while others (mainly representatives of civil society 
and international organizations) did not like the approach taken in this policy 
document. A representative of an international organization said: “I think it is 
better to leave the medical Argumentaire where it is, you know. I am not sure 
whether all the pictures that are present in this Argumentaire aren’t hurting 
people.” Some representatives of civil society explained that it is “not respectful” 
to adopt a policy like this. They explained that it is against “the Senegalese 
culture” to portray the female genitals as they did in this document.  
                                                        
464 See for example M. Mottin-Sylla and J. Palmieri, Confronting Female Genital Mutilation: The Role of 
Youth and ICTs in Changing Africa, (Original in French: Excision: les Jeunes Changent l'Afrique par les 
TIC) Pambazuka Press, 2011. 
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There was also some discussion about the target group of the policy document. 
Although it is written for the people at the community level, some respondents 
argued that this policy document would be a good document for the medical 
sector to inform medical professionals about the consequences of FGM/C 
(because they often don’t know about the practice due to a lack of training on 
the practice) but not for people at the community level, because of two reasons. 
The first reason is that it might be a disrespectful policy and the second reason 
is that “many people won’t understand this medical argumentaire.” The 
language used and the wordings would be too complicated, according to some 
experts (for a similar argument with regard to the law, see also section 10.6).  
 
12.3 Why policies were adopted  
 
During the interviews, I explored the views of the respondents, amongst others, 
why policies in the field of FGM/C have been adopted in Senegal. For some 
respondents, it was a “logical step” after the adoption of the law. A civil society 
representative explained: “When you have a law, you also need to have a 
National Action Plan to apply what you have in the law. Because a law is like a 
way of making people understand but in practice you need to operate that. That 
is why we have the National Action Plan.” The respondents explained that 
there are several reasons behind the adoption of the law, which are described in 
the sections below.  
 
12.3.1 Political will 
Some respondents (including representatives of the government, civil society 
and international organizations) mentioned the political will of the Senegalese 
government to take further action. A government representative explained: “It 
was the will of the government to fight against violence against women and to 
take action against FGM. That is why the policies are adopted.” A 
representative of an international organization explained: “There was first the 
law and with the law there was a commitment to take more action.” A civil 
society representative explained: “The adoption of the National Action Plan 
was a way for the government of Senegal to show its commitment.”  
 
12.3.2 Support of UN agencies 
Many respondents (including representatives of the government, civil society 
and international organizations) argued that the adoption of the policies was 
linked to “donor willingness to fund the issue.” A representative of civil society 
explained in this regard: “I must say we have very active UNICEF and UNFPA 
here in Senegal.” Another civil society representative said: “It was pressure 
from the donors.” Respondents explained that several UN organizations were 
actively involved in policy development and pushed for the NAP, especially 
UNIFEM 465  at that time and the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme. A 
government representative acknowledged: “The Joint Programme helped us a 
lot in realizing this National Action Plan and to make it a success.” A 
representative of an international organization took it a step further and argued: 
                                                        
465 At the time of the adoption of the NAP, the organization was still referred to as UNIFEM.  
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“It should be a government document, but that is not the case now. This Action 
Plan was an effort of the UN partners.” 
 
12.3.3 Meeting of the Inter-African Committee  
Some respondents (representatives of civil society and the government) also 
referred to a meeting about FGM/C in 2001 organized by the IAC in Dar-es-
Salaam, Tanzania as one of the triggers for the Senegalese government to 
develop a NAP on FGM/C. A government representative explained: “When 
they came back, they said that we need to develop a National Action Plan on 
FGM.” 
 
12.3.4 Support of CSOs 
Many respondents (including representatives of the government, civil society 
and international organizations) argued that the policies were adopted because 
of the work of CSOs466 that put effort in developing the policies (in cooperation 
with the UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme and the Ministry of Women, 
Family and Children). This also relates to the fact that the second NAP has 
clearly a more human rights-based approach compared to the first NAP. After 
the evaluation, the work and experience of CSOs in the field was taken into 
account, especially when the second NAP was developed.  
I also explored during the interviews, the views of the respondents, amongst 
others, what the reasons are for more emphasis on the human rights-based 
approach in the second NAP. Respondents (including representatives from the 
government, civil society and international organizations) explained that this 
human rights-based approach is mainly nourished by the experiences in the 
communities of the CSO Tostan and the recommendation that followed from 
the 2008 evaluation to adopt the Tostan approach towards abandoning FGM/C 
as a national strategy. One can clearly see that for example in the guiding 
principles of the NAP, where reference is made to the social convention theory 
and the “organized diffusion” model of Schelling – the theory behind the 
Tostan program (see also Chapter III).467 The vocabulary used to refer to the 
practice in the second NAP also hint in the direction of the non-judgmental 
Tostan approach.468 In the first NAP, the term “Mutilations Genitals Feminines” 
(Female Genital Mutilation) was used throughout the document, while in the 
second NAP the term “Excision” (Excision) was utilized. In the introduction of 
the second NAP, the Ministry of Women, Family and Children stated: “Senegal 
                                                        
466 Among them are COSEPRAT, TOSTAN, Enda Action en Casamance, branche d’ENDA SYNFEV, 
le Réseau des Parlementaires en Population et Développement, le Réseau des Journalistes en 
Population et Développement, le Réseau des Communicateurs Traditionnels, l’Association 
Sénégalaise pour le Bien-Etre Familial (ASBEF). 
467 National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of Excision 2010-2015 (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Acceleration de l’Abandon de l’Excision 2010-2015), Ministry of the Family, 
National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship, February 2010, p. 14, para 2.2.  
468 According to Molly Melching, the director of the CSO Tostan, they refer to the practice as Female 
Genital Cutting (FGC) and not Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), because “You want to open doors 
to dialogue, not close them. You want to be humble in this, you want to learn from people, you 
want to listen people and you want to say things that will not make them angry and defensive. If 
you want to dialogue on change, you have to approach people in a way that is respectful an non-
judgmental.”  
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does not consider this phenomena as a mutilation, but rather as a social norm 
adopted by communities that should now stop. The accepted term in the action 
plan will be ‘excision’.469” Reference to the ‘social norm’ also indicates the 
influence of Tostan in developing this NAP. Respondents confirmed that the 
experiences from the field rather than the international and regional human 
rights instruments directly resulted in a more human rights approach in the 
second NAP. A representative of the government explained: “When we 
evaluated the first NAP, we found out that the human-rights approach, like the 
Tostan approach, is a very good approach. They gave a lot of information and 
had a lot of result. And that’s why government adopted the human rights 
approach.” A representative of civil society said: “When I went to the village, in 
regions where the prevalence is high, I saw that the human rights approach is a 
good approach. […] I saw the work of Tostan, and I found it a good approach.” 
A representative of an international organization said: “I saw the approach of 
Tostan during my research in the field. It is a good approach and I said that we 
should also adopt it in the National Action Plan to fight FGM.” A representative 
of civil society explained: “They realized that you cannot force people to change 
their habits. Unless they understand it is fair, that it is the way it should be. 
That is nice about the human rights approach. It allows people to put 
themselves in a position of thinking: Is this right? Is this fair? Is this useful? 
They are in charge.” However, some respondents emphasized that the human 
rights-based approach was not only adopted by Tostan, but also by other CSOs 
like COSEPRAT, Enda Action, ASBEF and FAWE. Their experiences were taken 
into account as well, when the second NAP was developed, according to these 
respondents. A representative of civil society added to that: “You can only have 
a good policy with a good result, if you have gathered information from the 
field: the bottom-up approach. These are always the success stories. Go to 
communities; take a look at the perceptions of the people living in these 
communities, what they think, work out solutions with them. That is the key for 
a good policy." For this reason many respondents were of the opinion that this 
NAP is a much better policy document compared to the first NAP. When the 
first NAP was developed, there was more a top-down approach while when 
developing the second NAP the government listened better to the experiences 
of CSOs in the field. 
 
12.3.5 Influence of the Human Rights Framework 
The fist NAP made a clear reference to the international human rights 
framework and refers to FGM/C as a form of violence against women and a 
violation of human rights. In the NAP is written: “A large number of 
declarations and conventions at the international level clearly condemn 
FGM/C.”470 Subsequently, the following instruments are mentioned: CEDAW, 
CRC, Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children 
                                                        
469 National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of Excision 2010-2015 (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Acceleration de l’Abandon de l’Excision 2010-2015), Ministry of the Family, 
National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship, February 2010, p. 7.  
470 National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of 
the Family and National Solidarity, March 2001, p. 13.  
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(World Summit for Children 29-30 September 1990), Resolution 1992/251 of the 
Economic and Social Council on Traditional Practices Effecting the Health of 
Women and Children (E/1992/103), Declaration and Programme of Action of 
the World Summit for Social Development, Cairo Declaration and Programme 
of Action, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU 
Declaration on the African Plan of Action concerning the Situation of Women in 
Africa, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. The 1997 Joint Statement 
against FGM/C by the WHO, UNICEF and the UNFPA471 is also mentioned in 
the NAP.472  In the second NAP, there is no direct reference to international or 
regional treaties, but it states that FGM/C is a violation of the rights of girls and 
women. 473  Interestingly, this second NAP refers to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and explains: “this NAP is fully in line with the 
objectives of the MDGs […] to ensure that girls and women are protected 
against abuse, violence harmful practices.”474 This is the only reference to the 
human rights framework (CEDAW, CRC nor the Maputo Protocol are being 
mentioned – as was the case in the first NAP).  
Although this explicit reference to the human rights framework in the NAPs 
indicates that there is a link between the adoption of the NAPs and the human 
rights framework, I explored during the interviews the views of the 
respondents, amongst others, if the human rights framework had any influence 
on the adoption of national policies in the field of FGM/C in Senegal. The 
respondents gave a rather mixed picture during the interviews. Some 
respondents (including representatives from the government, civil society and 
international organizations) argued that the human rights framework did not 
have much influence on the adoption of the national policies. When answering 
this question, a representative of an international organization explained: “No, 
no, no, the international laws had no influence on developing our action plans. 
It was just the development in Senegal. I don’t believe it was influenced by the 
international laws.” Similarly, a government representative argued: “It was 
coming from the inside.”  
However, the majority of respondents (including representatives from the 
government, civil society and international organizations) argued the opposite. 
They were of the opinion that there is a clear link between the adoption of the 
national policies and the human rights framework. They explained that 
according to them, the national policies must be seen as a way of implementing 
the human rights framework. A government representative argued: “There is a 
link, a very clear link between the policy actions in Senegal and the UN 
conferences to increase the promotion of human rights. It will be very difficult 
to fight for human rights nationally, if we don't have a global action in the 
                                                        
471 World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation: A Joint WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA Statement, 
WHO Library, 1997.  
472 National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of 
the Family and National Solidarity, March 2001, p. 14.    
473 National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of Excision 2010-2015 (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Acceleration de l’Abandon de l’Excision 2010-2015), Ministry of the Family, 
National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship, February 2010, p. 4. 
474 Ibid, and p. 14, para. 2.1.  
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world. It would be very difficult. Because now we have a Resolution of the UN 
who ask to the country to make a National Action Plan. And that’s why we 
have a national movement.” A representative of civil society explained: 
“Definitely the human rights framework has influenced the adoption of 
national policies. Because as I told you, the Senegalese government is very keen 
to obey to international human rights standards.” Another representative of 
civil society said: “When you ratify an international law, you are obliged to 
respect the international law. When you respect the international law, you need 
to applicate it, you need to make policies.” A representative of civil society 
argued: “It is the UN and it is also the African Commission for Women’s Rights 
of the African Union that is monitoring the Women’s Rights Protocol. Senegal is 
getting into conformity with their human rights engagement and with the 
documents that we signed.” 
 
12.4 Implementation of policies 
 
During the interviews, I explored the views of the respondents, amongst others, 
whether the national policies against FGM/C are well implemented. 
Unfortunately, all respondents – including representatives of the government – 
answered “no” to this question. Although the policies (especially the NAPs) 
have much potential in relation to coordination of actions in the field of FGM/C 
in Senegal, they are – according to all respondents – not well implemented.  
A civil society representative said: “It is very good to write documents and 
plans, but it is better to act in reality. I am disappointed with this plans without 
real results in reality.” A representative of an international organization said: 
“In general, the Senegalese government has a Plan of Action on anything 
possible. On child abuse, on sexual exploitation, on commercial exploitation, 
everything has a National Action Plan. Very well done and comprehensive, but 
zero implementation most of the time.” Although the new structure described 
in the second NAP sounded very promising in theory, in reality there are many 
problems with regard to the implementation of this structure at different levels. 
At the time of this fieldwork, the National Council nor the National Technical 
Committee was operative and their first meetings did not take place. A 
representative of civil society argued: “Yes, the legal paper to establish the 
Council has been signed. But they never had the first meeting.” A 
representative of an international organization said in this regard: “the main 
improvements could be made be on coordinating the efforts. That’s for sure. 
Everyone is working in his or her own church. We tried to put together this 
National Coordination Committee, but it never worked, it never worked.” At 
the department level, only few departments have established a monitoring 
committee, but these departmental committees “have been dysfunctional for 
many years” or “have disappeared,” according to some representatives of civil 
society and international organizations. When I asked why that was the case, 
they referred to the limited capacity and the problem of leadership at the 
national level. According to some respondents (mostly representatives of 
international organizations), this National Coordination Committee should 
“rear and prioritize.” 
The Government does not allocate a budget for the implementation of the 
national policies, which is, according to the respondents a “another major 
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problem” and seen as “a lack of government commitment.” A representative of 
an international organization explained: “When you work with the 
government, you need to have some policy and some framework within which 
you are working. So it's a beginning, but it's not the end. And unfortunately 
sometimes they put so much effort in making the policy, writing the policy that 
in the end there is no money to implement the policy. I think that this is more 
the issue.” A representative of an international organization explained: “We just 
hope that government will be more involved by putting funds for 
implementing this plan because that is very very needed.” A representative of 
civil society said: “The government of Senegal needs to put more money in it, 
because most of the activities are funded by partners of the Senegalese State and 
for me that's not good.”  
Although there was lots of criticism on the lack of implementation of the 
NAP, some of the respondents also saw the NAP as a useful tool in terms of 
potential for coordination and in terms of identifying priority strategies and 
action: “You cannot work just like that. You need to have a policy and some 
framework within you are working.” A representative of an international 
organization said: “I think it was a big step for Senegal to have this NAP.” 
Another representative of an international organization said: “We note a lack of 
implementation, but we cannot say that it is not useful. It is always useful to 
have a framework. It is like a guide to show the way. It is important.”  
 
13 ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT    
 
During the interviews, I explored the views of my respondents regarding, 
amongst others, the role of the Senegalese government in the abandonment of 
FGM/C in Senegal.  
 
13.1 Government commitment  
 
The Senegalese government stated in many documents (in the reports to the 
TMBs, during the UPR rounds, in the NAPs, etc.) that tackling FGM/C in the 
country is a major priority and that the Government is very committed to end 
the practice. In the second NAP for example, they articulated: “The State of 
Senegal strongly expressed its will to protect girls and women against all 
abuses and violence of any kind through the ratification of international 
conventions and instruments.”475 The Senegalese government often refers to the 
adoption of Law No. 99-05 of 13 January 1999, the adoption of the NAPs and 
other policy documents to show that they have translated this commitment into 
concrete action. The evaluation of the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme stated 
the following: “the Senegalese government has played an active role in the 
activities for the abandonment of FGM/C, especially at the Ministry of Women, 
                                                        
475 National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of Excision 2010-2015 (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Acceleration de l’Abandon de l’Excision 2010-2015), Ministry of the Family, 
National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship, February 2010, summary p. 2.  
 
 
 
Chapter V 
316 
Children Female Entrepreneurship, particularly within the Department of the 
Family.”476  
During the interviews, I explored the views of my respondents regarding, 
amongst others, whether FGM/C is a priority for the Senegalese government. 
Some respondents (mostly government representatives) explained that there is 
political will at the national level to promote women’s rights and to abandon 
FGM/C. A government representative said: “Although FGM is not our most 
important priority, it is a priority. It is a priority because we can’t have 
sustainable development in Senegal if 26% of the female population lives with 
this kind of practice. The government want to resolve this problem. Therefore 
we have a law against FGM, we have the National Action Plan, and we have 
many actions. We organize workshops, we support NGOs, and we coordinate 
all the actions of the NGOs and civil society.” 
However, at the same time, the majority of respondents (mostly 
representatives of international organizations and civil society, but also some 
representatives of the government) stated that they do not see the commitment 
of the Senegalese government to act against FGM/C in reality. A representative 
of civil society said: “adopting the law and developing policy documents is not 
enough, the government should do more.” Another representative of civil 
society argued: “The government say that they work hard, and every time they 
say: We do this, we do that, but I don't see the result. I really don't see a result 
that tells me that the government did an activity with a result.” Many 
respondents indicated that it is good to have a social movement, CSOs who are 
doing a lot of capacity building, awareness raising, sensitization, but at the 
same time they argued: “you need also to have an institution, the Ministry, that 
takes responsibility.” According to many respondents, the Ministry of Women, 
Family and Children is not taking this responsibility. Interestingly enough, not 
all government representatives were of the opinion that FGM/C is a priority for 
the Senegalese government at this moment. One government representative 
said: “No, no, no, I don't think so. Violence and the rights of women is a 
priority, but FGM is not. Another government representative stated: “FGM is 
not a priority for our government at this moment. We didn’t make a budget in 
our plans for next year for FGM.” 
 
13.2 Lack of capacity at the Ministry of Women, Family and Children  
 
As was also highlighted in the 2008 evaluation of the NAP, there is a lack of 
leadership at the national level with regard to the abandonment of FGM/C in 
Senegal. The Ministry of Women, Family and Children does not fully play its 
role with regard to coordination, monitoring and evaluation of interventions for 
the abandonment of FGM/C in Senegal. Why is there no framework for 
coordination yet and why is the Ministry not properly functioning? The main 
                                                        
476 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change (2008-2012) 
– Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF sur les 
Mutilations Génitales Féminines/Excision: Accélérer le Changement (2008-2012) – Sénégal), New York, 
July 2013, p. 12.  
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answer to this question is the lack of capacity at the level of the Ministry of 
Women, Family and Children. During the interviews, this Ministry was often 
referred to as being very weak. A representative of civil society said: “It’s 
probably one of the weakest ministries we have in Senegal” another 
representative of civil society stated more firmly: “they are just a mess, no one 
has any faith in them.”   
 
13.2.1 Lack of human resources 
Many respondents (including representatives of civil society and international 
organizations) argued that there is a lack of human resources. The Department 
of the Family is within the Ministry of Women, Family and Children 
responsible for the FGM/C agenda. However, there is only one person at the 
Department of the Family appointed for FGM/C, but this person has a lot of 
additional tasks. One representative of an international organization said: “One 
person is responsible for the monitoring committee on FGM/C, the monitoring 
committee on child protection and the monitoring committee for women’s issue 
and mobilization, which is just crazy because it’s the same person.” According 
to some respondents, there is not enough time and not enough people at the 
Ministry of Women, Family and Children to work on the issue of FGM/C. To 
tackle this problem, UNICEF decided in the summer of 2013 to reinforce the 
capacity of the Department of the Family by offering one UNICEF employee to 
work fulltime at the Department of the Family to push the agenda on FGM/C 
forward. However, this is only a temporary measure. A representative of an 
international organization explained: “Since she is there, things are moving 
forward.” However, a representative of civil society took this measure of 
UNICEF as an example to show that FGM/C is not a priority for the Senegalese 
government: “As the government, you should not have a consultant. You 
should have staff at the Ministry taking care of the topic. For me, it shows that 
FGM is not a priority for our government at this moment. But because FGM is a 
priority for UNICEF, they pay the consultant and support this person, they 
reinforce the capacity of the Ministry, but the money comes from UNICEF.” 
The head of the Department of the Family (Directrice de la Famille) is 
ultimately responsible for the FGM/C agenda at the government level. During 
the interviews, respondents often referred to Ms Ndèye Soukèye Gueye, who 
was the head of the Department of the Family for a long time. Many 
representatives of civil society and international organizations praised her for 
the role she played during her term at the Ministry. A representative of civil 
society said: “She was an advocate and activist. She speaks with the women as a 
mother. She was an extraordinary person, very engaged.” Another 
representative of civil society said: “She was highly supportive. She came to all 
the Declarations since the first one in Malicounda Bambara. 477  It was 
unbelievable.”  
Unfortunately, since Ms Ndèye Soukèye Gueye left, there is a lot of 
instability at the Ministry of Women, Family and Children. Also at the time of 
this research, someone took over the position of the Directrice (who was in that 
position for less than a year). A problem indicated by the representatives of civil 
                                                        
477 See also section 11.3.5 of this Chapter. 
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society was that because of the institutional instability, they “cannot really work 
and make progress.” A representative of civil society explained: “Every new 
Directrice takes her time to get acquainted with the different programmes at the 
Ministry.” Apart from the changes in this position, an additional problem that 
many respondents directed to is the skills, expertise and knowledge of the 
current head of the department. A representative of civil society said: “This 
Directrice does not have experience. That is an extremely important problem.” A 
representative of an international organization said: “They have just maybe 
sometimes lack of skills sometimes of expertise because we have to be honest 
and to say also if we see in terms of personnel in place, people appointed in the 
Ministry, sometimes they have not the skills needed to implement this kind of 
strategy or plan. That is also the problem. That is one of the reasons.” A 
representative of civil society said: “I think that the current Directrice was a 
dentist or whatever. For me, you know, she doesn’t know much about women’s 
rights. […] I think they have been selected just because the President thinks that 
they can bring votes. I don’t feel that they are really interested in women’s 
issues.” The Ministry of Women, Family and Children was during the 
interviews often referred to as a very political Ministry. A representative of civil 
society explained: “There is a lot of nepotism at the Family Ministry. When the 
government changes, then they named someone that they are friends with.” 
Some respondents explained that there are at the same time highly 
knowledgeable, engaged and professional persons working at the Ministry of 
Women, Family and Children, but they are often not at the key positions. A 
representative of civil society explained: “People who are working at important 
positions at the Ministry of the Family are not chosen because of their qualities. 
They are chosen because they have the right surname or political colour. They 
know the right people.” Several respondents (including representatives of civil 
society and international organizations) expressed their will that this needs to 
change urgently: “We need to put the best persons at the right place.” 
 
13.2.2 Lack of financial resources 
Many respondents (representatives of civil society and international 
organizations) explained that there is a lack of government commitment in 
terms of financial resources. The National Plans of Action are for example 
totally unfunded by the Senegalese government, which show (according to 
some representatives of civil society and international organizations) that the 
issue of FGM/C is not really a priority. A representative of an international 
organization said: “They haven’t put one cent in this National Action Plan.” The 
2008 evaluation of the NAP also recommended the State to allocate a budget for 
the implementation of the NAP to finance the activities of the NAP.478 However, 
at the time of this research there was still no budget of the government 
allocated to FGM/C.479 A representative of civil society said: “There are no 
                                                        
478 A. Diop-Diagne, Evaluation of the National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital 
Mutilation (Original in French: Evaluation du Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des 
Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and Female 
Entrepreneurship, September 2008, p. 9. 
479 Although there were some indicators that the Senegalese Government would be more involved 
in terms of funds in 2014.  
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funds or financial resources going from the government to programmes on 
FGM.” Another representative of civil society said: “The Ministry does not give 
any money to FGM. The government should do more and add money to the 
Joint Programme. I do advocacy for this every year. […] But every time when I 
do advocacy in the Assembly, to the Deputy, to have a budget for FGM, they 
say to me that FGM is not a priority.” Another representative of civil society 
said: “It’s UNICEF and UNFPA who are pushing the FGM agenda. They give 
them [CSOs, red.] funding to do the campaign, but I am not sure that if they 
[UNICEF and UNFPA, red.] weren’t giving the funding, they [the Senegalese 
government, red.] would care about that campaign.”  
 
13.2.3 Need to restructure the Ministry of Women, Family and Children  
Some respondents suggested that it would be necessary to restructure the 
Ministry of Women, Family and Children completely. To illustrate why this 
would be necessary, these respondents gave the following example. Within the 
Ministry of Women, Family and Children, there is the Department of Gender 
(Direction de l’Equité et de l’Egalité du Genre), and the Department of the Family 
(Direction de la Famille). The department of Gender is responsible for the VAW 
agenda, while the department of the Family is responsible for the FGM/C 
agenda. One representative of an international organization said: “This is 
nonsense, you cannot have two separate departments responsible for two issues 
that are so linked to each other. FGM/C is a form of violence against women!” 
A representative of civil society added to that: “They are doing the best they 
can, but you see, the problem is that a lot of people forget that Female Genital 
Cutting is a form of violence against women. And the Ministry of Family is in 
charge of Female Genital Cutting. The fight against women's violence is spread 
among other Ministries. That's a problem. There is a Direction also who takes 
care of gender issues. It's another Direction. So I believe that if all the resources 
were put together. What I mean by resources is human resources; financial 
resources; strategic orientations were put together, we would be more 
efficient.”  
 
13.2.4 Need for more outreach to communities 
Another often-heard criticism during the interviews regarding the role of the 
government was that government representatives do not frequently go to the 
communities in rural area’s where FGM/C is practiced. Although some 
parliamentarians visited areas where there is a high prevalence of FGM/C to 
talk to the communities, and representatives of the Ministry of Women, Family 
and Children attend Public Declarations organized by Tostan, many 
respondents (mostly representatives of civil society) felt that government action 
should focus more on the community level. Representatives of civil society 
referred often – quite frustrated – to meetings or workshops organized by the 
government to talk about FGM/C “in wonderful hotels in Dakar or Saly,” while 
they could not see how this would directly help the communities on the ground. 
A representative of civil society said: “I am sorry to tell you that, when I look at 
these one, two, three day meetings in Saly in a very comfortable place or hotel, 
to talk about FGM… For me it’s nonsense. They better take this money and try 
to do something good with it. But really, these meetings are nonsense.” Another 
representative of civil society said: “The government sometimes do some 
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training, organize some meeting in nice and expensive hotels in Dakar […] but 
why to stay in Dakar? They must do more prevention in the rural area.” 
Another representative of civil society said: “I was for 6 years in the field. I 
haven’t seen the Ministry coming with the Action Plan and saying: ”Hey guys, 
this is what we have to do.” They are sitting in their offices and asking people 
to send them data.” A representative of civil society stated: “When I was 
writing the report of CEDAW, they [the Ministry of the Family, red.] informed 
me that they have visited this village: "I have visited that community, I have 
travelled in the country, it is good." No, it is not. They have to do more and 
work hard now for the NAP. And if you don't work hard, you don't have 
result.” More representatives of civil society referred to the visits of the 
government representatives in the field ‘for the record’, without being really 
engaged. One representative of civil society explained: “They just came and 
they just make a record, like: “Okay we came for this one day and its fine” and 
they keep their things and they go out and move.” However, government 
representatives did not agree with this critique and explained: “We are working 
a lot in the field, we help NGOs. We work together.” 
 
13.3 Cooperation with other Ministries 
 
Although the Ministry of Women, Family and Children is designated to be 
responsible for the issue of FGM/C at the State level, and must coordinate 
activities at the strategic and technical level, some respondents (including 
representatives of the government, civil society and international organizations) 
explained that other Ministries can also play an important role in abandoning 
FGM/C in Senegal. In the preface of the second NAP, Ndeye Khady Diop 
writes that “The road to success is through concerted intersectional action of 
various Ministerial departments involved in the scourge.”480 However, in the 
NAPs no real attention is given to the responsibilities of other ministries and 
their role in the abandonment of FGM/C in Senegal. Although the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Education are sometimes organizing activities for 
promoting the abandonment of FGM/C, their actions are not coordinated and 
they do not work in partnership. A representative of an international 
organization said: “They should collaborate more, have joint programs together 
and exchange knowledge.” A representative of civil society explained: “I am 
not sure that you can decide to just put it in one place, in one Ministry and say: 
that's it. I think it really has to be on top of priorities of a couple of Ministries at 
least.” Certainly, the practice of FGM/C has implications on many Ministries. 
According to the respondents, the following ministries could also be relevant in 
the abandonment of FGM/C:  
 
• Ministry of Health and Prevention (Ministère de la Santé et de la Prévention) 
• Ministry of National Education (Ministère de l’Education Nationale) 
• Department of Justice Department of Criminal Affairs and Grace 
                                                        
480 National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of Excision 2010-2015 (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Acceleration de l’Abandon de l’Excision 2010-2015), Ministry of the Family, 
National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship, February 2010, p. 5.  
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(Ministère de la Justice/Direction des Affaires criminelles et de la Grâce) 
• Ministry of Interior / Governors of target regions (Ministère de l’Intérieur 
/Gouverneurs des régions cibles) 
• Ministry of Youth, Sports and Recreation (Ministère de la Jeunesse, des 
Sports et des Loisirs) 
• Ministry of Economy and Finance / Budget Department (Ministère de 
l’Economie et des Finances/Direction du Budget) 
• Ministry of Information and Communication (Ministère de l’Information et 
de la Communication) 
 
Since the coordination of the different actors (at the government level, but also 
at the regional and community level) proves to be very problematic, several 
representatives of international organizations and civil society explained that 
they were pushing for the establishment of the National Council for Promoting 
the Abandonment of FGM/C (Conseil National Promotion Abandon de l’Excision). 
One representative of an international organization said: “Perhaps this Council 
can in the future rear and prioritise and determine stronger government 
commitment.” A representative of civil society said: “The National Council on 
HIV in Senegal that was established earlier is doing a wonderful job in terms of 
coordinating all activities regarding HIV. This Council can have the same 
promising results.” The current Prime Minister, Aminata Touré, will be the 
chair of this Council, which could be a contributing factor, since many 
respondents were positive about her. A representative of civil society said: “We 
have great hopes with her.” Another representative of civil society said: “She 
was in the Gender Department in the United Nation structure. So, she knows 
the link between human rights, women rights and development. She’s really 
pushing the human rights agenda. She did that when she was in the Ministry of 
Justice and now as the Prime-Minister.” 
 
14 ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS    
 
During the interviews, I explored the views of my respondents regarding, 
amongst others, the role of CSOs in the abandonment of FGM/C in Senegal. I 
also explored how their work in the field of FGM/C relates to the role of the 
government. Respondents explained that the role of the government is 
“supervision and coordination.” Since CSOs are the “ones who work in the field” 
their role is “to sensitize the community, to help the communities, to give 
information to the communities.”  
 
14.1 CSOs do most of the work 
 
All respondents (including representatives of the government, civil society and 
international organizations) explained that they consider the work of CSOs in 
the communities important. A representative of civil society said: “Generally, I 
think, civil society organizations are very, very important.” A representative of 
the government said: “Civil society do a lot of important work in the field of 
FGM.”A representative of an international organization said: “NGOs are next to 
the communities, they are very important.” Another representative of an 
international organization said: “I think civil society organizations have an 
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important role to play. If we are talking about the awareness campaign, 
sensitization on FGM, civil society has a big role. Our government does not do 
these kind of things.” A civil society representative explained: “Without the 
NGOs, the government cannot do anything.” Another representative of civil 
society said: “ Most of the work is done by NGO’s and associations. They go in 
the field, in the village, and do the job. I never saw somebody working for the 
government going in the villages, sensitizing and talking to the population. It’s 
only the NGOs and associations who work in the field.” Many respondents 
(including representatives of the government, civil society and international 
organizations) explained that CSOs do “most of the work” in the field of 
FGM/C in Senegal. A civil society representative explained: “In communities, 
NGOs are doing the implementation, instead of the State.” A representative of 
an international organization explained: “The Ministry of the Family is in the 
lead to coordinating the NAPs, but it is all the NGOs who work hard.” A 
representative of civil society said: “The work of civil society organizations 
reflects actually the work of the government, which is trying to eradicate the 
practice FGM.” A representative of the government explained: “Civil society 
does a very good job on FGM. People who abandon FGM in the village, it is not 
because of the government, but because of the civil society who worked a lot in 
the field. They make the result.”  
 
14.2 No recognition or support from the Government 
 
The majority of respondents (including representatives of civil society and 
international organizations) answered “no” to the question whether the 
government recognizes the role that CSOs play in the movement to eradicate 
FGM/C. They explained that the government does not give CSOs all necessary 
(financial) support and encouragement. Even a representative of the 
government said: “One of the roles of the government is to support civil society. 
But as we know in this country, the government does not do this. We don’t 
have enough money. The government does not support them.” However, 
another government representatives argued: “The role of the Ministry is to 
coordinate and to supervise, not to give money to NGOs. The NGOs have their 
own financial partners.”   
 
14.3 No cooperation between CSOs  
 
Although all respondents were positive about the work of CSOs in the field of 
FGM/C in Senegal, an often-heard critique (from representatives of the 
government, international organizations, but also from civil societies 
themselves) during the interviews was that CSOs do not work together. 
Although all CSOs have the same goal, namely abandoning FGM/C in Senegal, 
they do not cooperate with each other. This is, according to some respondents, 
not efficient and hampering their cause. A government representative also said: 
“Civil societies are not working together. That is a real problem.” A 
representative of civil society said: “Many organizations are working alone. But 
it is not profitable for anyone. It is better for them to work together.” Another 
representative of civil society explained: “The problem is that there is no 
collaboration between the civil society organizations. Sometimes they are… like 
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competitors. There is competition. And it should not be like this. They should 
work together, organize things together and try to find solutions together on 
their daily activities.” Some respondents answered on my question whether 
CSOs are working together in the field of FGM/C in Senegal: “No, no, no, of 
course not!” Especially the of course was striking to note. A representative of 
civil society explains: “The coordination with the other NGOs is a problem. 
There is no coordination among NGOs. Nobody is working together. People 
sort of… It’s like they are in competition rather than being working together for 
a common goal. Organizations are putting down other organizations. It was not 
possible to work together. It was very difficult, because everybody was so busy, 
into their own activities. It has been a shame really that all of the different 
organizations in the field of FGC spent more time on denouncing other 
organizations rather than working on solutions.” 
Another civil society representative further explains: “I think that in the 
beginning there were certain NGOs, who were at the forefront of the 
movement. And I think they were really possessive, they felt anxious of other 
NGOs who also came along in the FGM movement.” Another civil society 
representative explains that there is not so much cooperation between CSOs in 
the field of FGM/C, because each and every organization has a “specific 
approach that is different from the others.” Different organizations in the field 
have different approaches to end FGM/C. A civil society representative said: “I 
can only cooperate with people who share the same values of respect and 
giving information and who have the same approaches towards the practice. 
[…] It is hard for me to cooperate with someone who does just the opposite and 
does not believe in our approach.” However, it is very problematic that every 
organization is convinced that their approach is the best approach and they 
work next to each other. As a result, a civil society representative explained that 
in areas where the prevalence is high and several CSOs are working, the region 
is divided: “Each organization has its own area of intervention.” This means 
that there are “Tostan-villages” where the CSO Tostan is working on their 
programmes and other villages where other CSOs are working on theirs. A 
representative of civil society explained: “Jealousy is a problem. Organizations 
are jealous because some organizations receive a lot of funding and others 
don’t.” 
 
14.4 CSOs do not always play their role 
 
Another critique (from representatives of the government, international 
organizations, but also from civil societies themselves) during the interviews 
was that CSOs do not always play the role they need to play, but tend to act or 
behave like they are the government. A representative of civil society argued: 
“Civil society organizations are very important, but the thing I sometimes 
regret is that most of the time they are not playing their civil society role. You 
know. They don’t play their role as a civil society. […] You really need the civil 
society in Senegal, because here you have a very weak State structure. They are 
very complementary to State actions. But at the same time it is not good that 
they don’t play their civil society role, but sometimes the role of the State, of the 
governmental structure. There is a lack of capacities at the national level, but at 
the local level it is even worse. At these local levels you have these NGOs with 
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resources: human resources and financial resources. Sometimes they are even 
realizing infrastructure. You can imagine that they can be very influential at the 
local level. This is what I mean. And then it’s very difficult for a State and for 
the local government, to play very fairly its role. So this is an issue. It’s very 
complicated. Sometime they resolve problems that State should resolve.” 
Another civil society representative explained: “Civil society plays many roles, 
but they also have to know their place and stay on that place. Because civil 
society is not the government. Civil society needs to be patient, not impatient. 
Sometimes we see civil society who is thinking more like a government than 
civil society. They should know that they are not the government. Civil society 
is here for the society that why we say “civil society”, so they need to work for 
the community.” 
 
15 ROLE OF THE UNFPA-UNICEF JOINT PROGRAMME   
 
During the interviews, I explored the views of my respondents regarding, 
amongst others, the role of the UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme in the 
abandonment of FGM/C in Senegal. Before the views of the respondents are 
given, some background information is provided below on the UNFPA-
UNICEF Joint Programme.  
 
15.1 Establishment UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme  
 
15.1.1 Phase I: 2008-2013 
The Joint Programme was launched in 2008 at the country level. The 17 
countries 481  in the Programme are: Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, 
Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The Joint Programme aims to 
support and accelerate in these countries community and national efforts 
already being undertaken at country and regional levels “that have 
demonstrated their effectiveness in creating positive social change.”482 The Joint 
Programme is not a stand-alone initiative, but is working in partnership with 
national governments, civil society, religious leaders, communities and key 
stakeholders. The Joint Programme engages parliamentarians, media, 
traditional communicators, women lawyers, medical associations, religious 
leaders, scholars, women and youth to speak out against the practice.483 The 
                                                        
481 The Joint Programme was only implemented in 15 African countries from 2008 to 2013 due to 
budget shortfalls (the Joint Programme received approximately $40,7 million instead of the 
estimated $44 million) Therefore, the Joint Programme decided to reduce the overall number of 
countries. In 2008, the Joint Programme was implemented in Djibouti, Egypt Ethiopia, Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau Kenya, Senegal and Sudan. In 2009, the Joint Programme was implemented in 
Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Somalia and Uganda. In 2011, the Joint Programme was implmented in 
Eritrea, Mali and Mauritania.  
482 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Annual Report 2010, p. 5, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/2010_Annual_Report_2.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015].     
483 United Nations Population Fund, International Conference on Research, Health Care and Preventive 
Measures for Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting and The Strengthening of Leadership and Research in 
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Joint Programme has a holistic, cross-border approach that aims to “acts as a 
catalyst” for action at the national level.484  The Joint Programme brings the 
complementary expertise of the two UN agencies (in partnership with grass-
roots community organizations) together with the latest theoretical 
developments in social science research.485  
 The overall design of the Joint Programme is inspired by the “significant 
experiences”486 of the CSO Tostan in Senegal and the “groundbreaking social 
norms research”487 developed by Thomas Shelling and Gerry Mackie. The 
Tostan strategy for abandonment of FGM/C through community-based 
development is used as a model in several other participating countries: “The 
main strategic approach is to gain the support of an initial core group, which 
decides to abandon FGM/C and mobilises a sufficient number of people to 
facilitate a tipping point and thereby create a rapid social shift of the cutting 
social convention norm.”488 According to both UNICEF and UNFPA, the theory 
of self-enforcing social conventions has “provided insight into why such 
practices persist and has aided the development of community-based strategies 
for FGM/C abandonment.”489 Based on understanding FGM/C as a social norm, 
the Joint Programme focuses on accelerating collective, rather than individual, 
social change to achieve sustainable FGM/C abandonment.490 However, beyond 
approaching FGM/C as a social norm, the Programme also emphasizes 
commitment to a human rights-based approach to programming and cultural 
                                                        
Africa, Conference Report, Nairobi, Kenya, 17-19 October 2011, p. 3, available at: 
http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-
pdf/UNFPA%20Nairobi%20Conference%20Report_v11_1.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
484 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Annual Report 2010, p. 1, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/2010_Annual_Report_2.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
485 See the website of United Nations Population Fund, Joint Programme on Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting, available at http://www.unfpa.org/joint-programme-female-genital-
mutilationcutting. [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
486 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change 
(2008-2012) – Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-
UNICEF sur les Mutilations Génitales Féminines/Excision: Accélérer le Changement (2008-2012) – Sénégal), 
New York, July 2013, p. 3.  
487 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Annual Report 2012, p. 18, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNICEF-
UNFPA%20Joint%20Programme%20AR_final_v14.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].    
488 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Funding Proposal UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme, p. 5, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/fgm_proposal_donors.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015].  
489 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Annual Report 2012, p. 18, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNICEF-
UNFPA%20Joint%20Programme%20AR_final_v14.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].    
490 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Abandonment of Female 
Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Summary Report of Phase I 2008-2013, p. 2, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-
pdf/Joint%20Programme%20on%20FGMC%20Summary%20Report.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 
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sensitivity: “approaching FGM/C as a violation of the rights of girls and 
women (while recognizing that as FGM/C has a strong cultural value in many 
contexts), dialogue with communities must be framed in terms of preserving 
positive cultural values while eliminating harmful practices.”491 
 In 2012-2013, in its fifth year of implementation, an evaluation of the Joint 
Programme was undertaken. The purpose of the study was to evaluate the 
extent to which and under what circumstances the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Program has accelerated the abandonment of FGM/C in programme countries 
during the period 2008-2012. The evaluation revealed that the Joint Programme 
“has been contributing to moving change processes at global, national, and 
community levels into the desired direction.”492 More specifically, the following 
results have been achieved between 2008 and 2013: “(i) National policy or 
legislation adopted in 12 of the 15 programme countries, (ii) Protocols for FGM 
survivors integrated into ante- and post-natal care at 5,500 health facilities, (iii) 
Training of over 100,000 health practitioners on FGM prevention, response and 
care (iv) Public declarations of abandonment in over 12,700 communities, (v) 
Public declarations from 20,000 religious and traditional leaders disavowing 
any religious requirements for FGM.”493 However, one of the findings was that 
the time-bound overall objective of was “overly ambitious.”494  Therefore, one of 
the recommendations of the evaluation was to take the Joint Programme 
approach further and to “pursue a second phase of the joint programme to 
sustain the existing positive momentum for change towards FGM/C 
abandonment.”495  
 
15.1.2 Phase II: 2014-2017 
In 2014, the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme launched a second phase 
(January 2014 till December 2017), expanding its work from 15 to 17 countries 
(including Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Uganda, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, 
Somalia and Yemen). The aim of Phase II is to “contribute to the acceleration of 
the total abandonment of FGM/C in the next generation (i.e. next 20 years) in 
line with United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/67/146 to 
“Intensify global efforts to eliminate female genital mutilations”.” 496  More 
                                                        
491 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation Report  
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, 2008-2012, 
Volume I, New York, September 2013, p. 19, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/FGM-report_11_14_2013_Vol-I.pdf [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
492 Ibid, p. 44.   
493 See the website of United Nations Population Fund, Joint Programme on Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting, available at http://www.unfpa.org/joint-programme-female-genital-
mutilationcutting. [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
494 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation Report  
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, 2008-2012, 
Volume I, New York, September 2013, p. 63, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/FGM-report_11_14_2013_Vol-I.pdf [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
495 Ibid, p. 69.   
496 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Abandonment of Female 
Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Funding Proposal UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme 
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specifically, the goal is to achieve a 40% decrease in prevalence among girls 
aged 14 and younger in at least 5 of the 17 countries and at least one country 
declaring total abandonment of FGM/C by the end of 2017. The estimated 
budget is $54 million. The Joint Programme continues to use the holistic, 
culturally sensitive and human rights-based approach in the second phase, 
although UNICEF and UNFPA will also focus on the responsiveness of health 
and child protection systems to care for women and girls affected by FGM/C.497 
 
15.2 UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme in Senegal 
 
Senegal participated in the joint program since its launch on 9 September 2008. 
Senegal has been referred to by the Joint Programme as a “pioneer in the 
abandonment process”498 and was selected as one of the first countries499 for 
immediate acceleration. According to the Funding Proposal of the Joint 
Programme, “the abandonment process occurring in Senegal has reached a 
critical point in its development. Senegal’s progress indicates the likelihood of 
wide-spread abandonment to all regions where FGM/C is practiced, provided 
that adequate resources are devoted to allow for a scaling-up towards 
acceleration of the abandonment process.”500 According to the Joint Programme 
Annual Report of 2011, of the 15 countries active in the Joint Programme, 
“Senegal has made the most rapid progress toward the abandonment of 
FGM/C.”501  
 
15.2.1 Evaluation UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme in Senegal 
Senegal was selected as one of the four country case studies502 when the Joint 
Programme was evaluated in 2012-2013. The purpose of the country case 
studies was “to allow exploration and illustration of key issues, while taking 
into account specific national and local contexts in which the Programme was 
                                                        
Phase II, January 2014, p. 2, available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-
pdf/Funding%20Proposal%20for%20Phase%20II%20of%20the%20UNFPA-
UNICEF%20Joint%20Programme.PDF [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
497 See the website of United Nations Population Fund, Joint Programme on Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting, available at http://www.unfpa.org/joint-programme-female-genital-
mutilationcutting. [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
498 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change (2008-2012) 
– Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF sur les 
Mutilations Génitales Féminines/Excision: Accélérer le Changement (2008-2012) – Sénégal), New York, 
July 2013, p. 16.  
499 The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Mauritania. 
500 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Funding Proposal UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme, p. 13, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/fgm_proposal_donors.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015].  
501 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Annual Report 2011, p. 8, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Annual_report_on_FGM-
C_2011_low_res.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
502 The other three country case studies are Kenya, Burkina Faso and Sudan.  
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implemented.”503 The evaluation focused on the national and community level 
and their interconnections, but also looked at linkages with the regional and 
global levels.504 
 According to the evaluation, the Joint Programme is highly relevant to the 
commitments in Senegal and it “corresponds to a strong political will and a 
corresponding legal framework at the government level.”505 The results of the 
evaluation in Senegal are positive. The Joint Programme has provided “clear 
and significant contributions to the strengthening of an environment at the 
national level, suitable for the abandonment of FGM/C in Senegal.” In 
particular, it has contributed to: (i) strengthening the institutional and national 
policy framework through the development of the second NAP (2010-2015) and 
the establishment of the National Technical Committee responsible for its 
monitoring and coordination; ii) strengthening the coordination of stakeholders 
at national level by encouraging the involvement of various government 
entities towards the abandonment of FGM/C; iii) the extension of the law 99-05 
of 29 January 1999 prohibiting the practice of FGM/C among all actors involved 
in the work against FGM/C; iv) greater involvement of the Ministry of Health 
of Senegal in the movement to end FGM/C.”506 The study concluded that 
“undeniable progress has been made towards the aboandonment of FGM/C in 
Senegal,” although the sustainability of the Joint Programmes achievements 
remains uncertain.507 
 
15.3 Respondents’ views on the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme 
 
According to the respondents (including representatives of the government, 
civil society and international organizations), the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme has two main roles. In the first place, their role is to financially and 
technically support and assist the Senegalese Government. More specifically, 
the respondents explained that the Joint Programme’s role is to reinforce the 
capacity of the Direction of the Family. In the second place, respondents 
explained that the role of the Joint Programme is to financially support civil 
society organizations in order to contribute to the accelerated abandonment of 
FGM/C in Senegal.  
                                                        
503 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change (2008-2012) 
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15.3.1 Positive remarks about the UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme 
In general, many respondents (including representatives of the government, 
international organizations and civil society) were positive about the Joint 
Programme. A representative of an international organization said: “I think it is 
a great programme for different reasons. The Joint Program has been a key 
program, also in terms of mobilizing resources. However, the resources that the 
Joint Program mobilised are very little compared to with regard to what is 
needed.” A representative of civil society said: “The United Nations Institutions 
injected much money in this theme, in FGM.” A representative of civil society 
said: “Without UNICEF and UNFPA, the National Action Plan would not be as 
good as it is.” Another civil society representative explained: “They really 
pushed for the National Action Plan.” Another representative of civil society 
said: “The Joint Programme had a big influence on the policy making with 
regard to FGM in Senegal.” A government representative said: “The Joint 
Programme is one of the main funders for our National Action Plan, that is 
really good for us.” A representative of an international organization said: 
“When the programme started in 2008 it was able to accelerate the movement.” 
A representative of civil society explained: “People in the village were educated 
about FGM and now understand more, discovered more, because of the Joint 
Programme. Within the community, the sensibilisation is well done. The 
community understand more about the human rights approach. ” 
 
15.3.2 Critical remarks: exclusive focus on Tostan 
However, although many representatives were positive about the Joint 
Programme, a major concern of many respondents (including representatives of 
the government and international organizations, but mostly of civil society 
representatives) was that the main implementing partner of the Joint 
Programme was Tostan. Although the ‘Tostan experience’ inspired the overall 
design of the Joint Programme, respondents argued that they were not in favor 
of the decision of the Joint Programme to provide Tostan with the majority of 
the Joint Programme resources. A civil society representative said: “UNICEF 
and UNFPA work with the same people over and over again.” Another 
representative of civil society explained: “My problem with the Joint 
Programme is that they support only one NGO, which has already a lot of 
money, instead of working with all the NGOs. This is my personal view. I think 
that they should work with everybody.” A representative of an international 
organization explained: “All the money is earmarked for Tostan. Even though 
the people in Dakar working for UNICEF and UNFPA they want to give the 
money to other organizations, but they were not allowed to because in New 
York they decided that it's for Tostan.” A representative of civil society said: 
“Because all the Joint Programme money was for Tostan, some NGOs stopped 
working in the field of FGM, which is a problem. Because you cannot talk about 
a Joint programme with just one NGO. Senegal is not only Tostan. It is true that 
Tostan did something good, they did good things, but one NGO cannot realize 
everything. So you should also respect the approach of other NGOs. So in my 
view the Joint Programme should help Tostan, but they should also help the 
other NGOs who are working in the field of FGM. This is one of the problems 
of the Joint programme. They focus on Tostan and forget the others.” Another 
representative of civil society said: “The downside of working with only one 
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NGO is that you will lose other organizations, other people, with other 
competences and knowledge. It is not good to focus on one organization. The 
Joint Programme should support smaller NGOs as well.” Another 
representative of civil society explained: “Tostan is a very big NGO and had a 
lot of influence in the field. They did many good things with regard to FGM in 
the field: many public declarations and so on. That was mainly possible because 
of the money from UNICEF and later because of the money of the Joint 
Programme. But there are also smaller NGOs, who decided a few years ago not 
to really focus on FGM any more, because all the money was going to TOSTAN. 
I think that they also have a lot of knowledge and they also have a good 
approach to fight FGM, to change the cultural practice.”  
 When the Joint Programme was evaluated in Senegal in 2012-2013, the same 
issue was raised. The report reveals: “the Joint Programme has tended to make 
the Tostan model exclusive in Senegal, at the expense of other approaches and 
actors.” 508 In addition, the report concluded that the focus on the Tostan 
approach “leaves little space for innovation and diversification.”509 There was 
no real opportunity to “test the validity of other approaches” in order to 
“demonstrate whether these approaches would have had even more significant 
results and/or lower costs.” 510  Therefore, one of the recommendations 
following from the evaluation was that it would be beneficial to limit Tostan’s 
dominance by considering the integration of new strategies involving new 
actors.511 The Joint Programme was recommended to “analyze the relevance of 
diversifying approaches and partners to accelerate the abandonment of FGM/C 
in Senegal,”512  
 
15.3.3 Critical remarks: cooperation between UNFPA and UNICEF 
Some respondents (including representatives of the government, civil society 
and international organizations) were concerned about the cooperation between 
the two agencies. Although the added value of the Joint Programme lies in the 
distinct and complementary approaches and areas of expertise of each of the 
agencies involved in this partnership, respondents explained that there is a lack 
of coordination and collaboration between the two agencies. This weakness in 
coordination between the two agencies has led to inefficiencies in the 
implementation of the Programme and “hampers the way forward,” according 
to the respondents.   
A representative of an international organization said: “Collaboration is 
always difficult, especially between UN agencies.” Another representative of an 
international organization said: “Collaboration is not easy because every agency 
has its own priority.” A representative of civil society explained: “The Joint 
                                                        
508 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change (2008-2012) 
– Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF sur les 
Mutilations Génitales Féminines/Excision: Accélérer le Changement (2008-2012) – Sénégal), New York, 
July 2013, p. xi-xii.  
509 Ibid, p. xi. 
510 Ibid, p. 59-60.  
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512 Ibid, p. 62.  
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Programme is good, because they are fighting against FGM. But, the managing 
of the programme is a problem. UNICEF was the first who was fighting for 
FGM in Senegal. When the UNFPA joined, they focus on health. But the 
approach is having good health, vaccinate your child, HIV, etc. But UNICEF 
approach is sensitization and advocacy. It is not the same approach. And for me 
that is a problem. There are two partners, and one project. There is not one big 
leader and that is a problem of management. The coordination is a problem. 
There is no direction.” Another representative of civil society said: “I think that 
the Joined Programme is really trying to do something in the countries. But 
sitting in New York as a regional project and working in Africa without having 
an office in Africa, I find that very difficult. It is difficult for them to implement 
their strategy. With this kind of a big project, you should have staff. I would say 
they would be more effective if they would have an UNFPA-UNICEF Join 
Program office or Focal Point on FGM in Dakar.” 
A representative of an international organization said that both UNICEF and 
UNFPA are “running after the same funding” which makes them competitors, 
instead of joint partners: “They drive different horses at the moment, but they 
should be one horse.” 
When the Joint Programme was evaluated in Senegal in 2012-2013, the same 
issue was raised. The added value of the Joint Programme is “mitigated by the 
limits of coordination between the two agencies and real risk of divergence in 
terms of implementation.”513 One of the challenges that the Joint Programme 
should overcome is that both UNICEF and UNFPA “work on their own, 
without engaging in a real common strategic thinking.”514 Therefore, one of the 
recommendations of the evaluation was to strengthen the system of 
consultation between the two agencies that could “provide more coordinated 
implementation of field activities and thus ensure better cohesion of the 
message.”515  
 
16 DATA COLLECTION AND RESEARCH 
 
During the interviews, I explored the views of my respondents regarding, 
amongst others, whether basic data is collected and disseminated about the 
prevalence, trends, attitudes and behaviour regarding FGM/C in Senegal, as 
well as reported cases and enforcement of legislation. 
 
                                                        
513 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change (2008-2012) 
– Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF sur les 
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– Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF sur les 
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16.1 DHS and MICS surveys 
 
Many respondents (including representatives of the government, civil society 
and international organizations) referred in the first place to the Demographic 
and Health Surveys (DHS) developed by ICF International and in the second 
place to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), which are conducted 
with financial and technical assistance from UNICEF. Both surveys are 
household surveys that provide data and key statistics in the areas of 
population, health and nutrition, 516  including data and statistics in some 
countries on FGM/C. In 2005, a module with questions on FGM/C was added 
to the women’s questionnaire in Senegal for the first time. In 2010-2011, in 2012-
2013 and in 2014 a module on FGM/C was added to the surveys again. This 
module provided information about the prevalence of FGM/C, the types of 
FGM/C practiced, the girl’s age at the time of the procedure, the type of 
practitioner who performed the practice and the beliefs and opinions about 
FGM/C.  
 
16.1.2 Reliability of self-reporting 
Some respondents (mainly representatives of civil society) expressed their 
concern about the reliability of the results of the DHS and MICS surveys in 
relation to FGM/C. Self-reporting is the basis for determining FGM/C status 
and the assumption is that women respond truthfully when asked about 
FGM/C. However, there is, according to the respondents, a possibility that the 
validity of the survey responses are biased, especially because in Senegal 
legislation is in place criminalizing the practice.517 A representative of civil 
society said: “What I think is problematic, is that all those studies are based on 
the declaration of people themselves.” Another representative of civil society 
said: “There is nothing to prove that women and girls are not circumcised.” A 
representative of civil society said: “Regarding the prevalence of FGM, it's very 
very very hard to have 100% or even 50% sure statistics. Because do you know 
how they measure? They measure it according to what victims are saying. Self-
reporting. There is no real system of monitoring Female Genital Cutting in 
Senegal.” Another representative of civil society said: “There is no evidence for 
the DHS data.” Since genital inspections are not conducted as part of the 
surveys, the statements of women interviewed in the DHS-MICS survey are the 
only source of information. Although this methodological approach is 
standardized globally, some respondents had their doubts in relation to some of 
the results of the DHS-MICS in Senegal.   
There are a few studies518 that assessed the accuracy between self-reported 
                                                        
516 See the website of the DHS Programme, available at http://dhsprogram.com/What-We-
Do/Survey-Types/DHS.cfm [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
517 See also O. Bjälkander et al., Female Genital Mutilation in Sierra Leone: Forms, Reliability of 
Reported Status, and Accuracy of Related Demographic and Health Survey Questions, Obstetrics 
and Gynecology International, Volume 2013, Article ID 680926.  
518 R.C. Snow et al., Female Genital Cutting in Southern Urban and Peri-Urban Nigeria: Self-
Reported Validity, Social Determinants and Secular Decline, Tropical Medicine and International 
Health, Volume 7, No. 1, 2002, p. 91–100; L. Morison et al., The Long-Term Reproductive Health 
Consequences of Female Genital Cutting in Rural Gambia: A Community-Based Survey, Tropical 
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and clinically observed FGM/C.519 Some respondents (including representatives 
of civil society and international organizations) suggested medical assessments 
needs to be conducted in Senegal in order to make a reliable estimation of the 
FGM/C prevalence in the country. A representative of civil society suggested to 
check the genitals of young girls when they come to a medical centre for the 
vaccination programmes: “When girls are 0 to 5 years, they come for the 
vaccination programme. They can regularly check those girls while they are 
doing the vaccination, to see if they have been mutilated or not.” Another 
representative of civil society recommended to add FGM/C in the child health 
protocols: “When a child growths, we can measure his or her heights, the circle 
of his or her head, if he or she has been cut. This would be the only way for me 
to do research scientifically. But that will also mean that every Senegalese kid is 
followed by a physician or at least by a nurse. Then you can give a well-
founded statistics, which is not the case now.” 
 
16.2 Other Sources 
 
Some respondents also referred to several evaluations and studies that took 
place in Senegal in relation to FGM/C. In 2008, the National Plan of Action for 
the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation (2000-2005) was evaluated520 in 
order to identify strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of the NAP 
(see also section 12.1.2). In 2010, a study was conducted by Professor Ndiaye to 
get a more accurate picture of the status of implementation of Law No. 99-05 of 
29 January 1999 criminalizing FGM/C in Senegal. The objective of this study 
was to assess the real impact of the law, and its relevance to current strategies 
for its elimination in Senegal. 521  In 2012-2013, the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme was evaluated.522 The purpose of the study was to evaluate the 
                                                        
Medicine and International Health, Volume 6, No. 8, 2001, p. 643–653; H. Jones et al., Female Genital 
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Igbos, West African Journal of Medicine, Volume 16, No. 4, 1997, p. 227–231; S.E. Msuya et al, Female 
Genital Cutting in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania: Changing Attitudes? Tropical Medicine and International 
Health, Volume 7, No. 2, 2002, p. 159–165; E.F. Jackson et al., Inconsistent Reporting of Female 
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Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of the Family, National Solidarity and Female 
Entrepreneurship, September 2008. 
521 B. Ndiaye, State Application of the Law on Excision in Senegal (Original in French: L’Etat 
d’Application de la Loi sur l’Excision au Sénégal), Ministry of Family and Women’s Organizations, 
UNFPA and UNICEF, December 2010, p. 18, para. 1.3.1. 
522 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
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– Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF sur les 
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extent to which and under what circumstances the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Program has accelerated the abandonment of FGM/C in programme countries 
during the period 2008-2012.  
 
16.3 Need for more data collection  
 
The majority of respondents (including representatives of the government, civil 
society and international organizations) argued that there is a strong need for 
further research and data collection on FGM/C in Senegal. A representative of 
civil society said: “Previous studies only looked at if people abandoned FGM or 
not. Now we need research to see why they are not changing. You know. Why 
they think that they should go ahead with the practice.” Similarly, another 
representative of civil society said: “We need to do more research, because we 
need to know more about why people continue to do FGM to their family, to 
their kids.” A representative of an international organization said that FGM/C 
is very complicated: “We need qualitative research to understand the dynamics 
of the practice.” Some respondents explained that this kind of research is 
necessary, because data on attitudes towards FGM/C look promising, since 
79% of the women believe that FGM/C should be abandoned in Senegal (see 
also para. 5.4.9). However, the practice still continues. A representative of an 
international organization said: “The data on attitudes show that women are 
now against the practice. But they are still cut. Why is that? The answer to that 
question could probably be the key of change. I think the pressure is so strong 
that they are kind of forced. But this needs to be researched to find out how 
attitudes can change a practice and how long that process is.” A government 
representative said; “I think we need more research on FGM, why this practice 
persist.” Many respondents explained that they were quite disappointed with 
the 2.5% decline in prevalence between 2005 and 2010, because they expected a 
bigger drop. A representative of an international organization said: “In Senegal 
there has been a lot of effort to stop FGM, so people were expecting a higher 
decrease.” A representative of civil society said: “When I saw in the DHS-MICS 
the small result, I was surprised, because when we are in the village, people say 
that they stopped it.”  
The authors of the DHS-MICS 2010-2011 also explicitly highlighted the 
difficulty of collecting reliable data on FGM/C. They stated that the collection 
of data on FGM/C in Senegal “remains very necessary” to assess the progress 
reached towards to total abandonment of the practice and to define strategies. 
In addition, knowing girls and women’s FGM/C status is “important for 
research studies that examine prevalence trends, determinants of the practice, 
and for evaluating the effects of interventions to address the practice.”523 The 
                                                        
Mutilations Génitales Féminines/Excision: Accélérer le Changement (2008-2012) – Sénégal), New York, 
July 2013. 
523 O. Bjälkander et al., Female Genital Mutilation in Sierra Leone: Forms, Reliability of Reported 
Status, and Accuracy of Related Demographic and Health Survey Questions, Obstetrics and 
Gynecology International, Volume 2013, Article ID 680926; E. F. Jackson et al., Inconsistent Reporting 
of Female Genital Cutting Status in Northern Ghana: Explanatory Factors and Analytical 
Consequences, Studies in Family Planning, vol. 34, no. 3, 2003, p. 200–210.  
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authors of the DHS-MICS encouraged therefore the Senegalese government to 
establish an independent and thorough study on FGM/C.  
 
17 SUPPORT SERVICES 
 
During the interviews, I explored the views of my respondents if, amongst 
others, medical, social and psychological support services are available to assist 
and protect girls who have been subjected to FGM/C or those at risk of 
undergoing FGM/C. Many respondents (including representatives of the 
government and international organizations, but mostly representatives of civil 
society) indicated that adequate support services for girls and women who are 
(potential) victims of FGM/C do not exist in Senegal. According to many 
respondents, most efforts in Senegal focus on prevention of FGM/C, but little 
attention is given to providing support services for these women and girls. A 
representative of civil society said: “It is impossible to find this kind of support 
services in Senegal.” Another representative of civil society said: “Really, we 
don't have support services specifically for persons who are victims of FGM.” 
Another representative of civil society said: “There is no specific structure or 
service for FGM.” A representative of the government said: “There is no real 
support for girls who are excised.” It seems that the health care system in 
Senegal is not organized to meet health concerns of girls and women in relation 
to FGM/C. There are no FGM/C helplines, shelters or safe houses.524 There are 
no centres or organizations that specifically provide support services to girls 
and women who are (potential) victims of FGM/C.  Only general services are 
available in Senegal. A representative of civil society explained: “Right now, we 
don't have a center just for FGM. We don't have services for FGM. But what we 
have, in general, is services and centers for young people.” A representative of 
an international organization said: “Also the National Action Plans focus on 
aspects of prevention and not so much on support services. Right now, there is 
a gab and that is really a problem.[…] Women are in need and they are not 
supported well.” 
A complicating factor with regard to the support services might be that girls 
and women who underwent FGM/C often do not see themselves as victims. A 
representative of civil society explained: “The persons who underwent FGM, 
some people can look them as victims. But are we sure that themselves, they are 
looking at themselves as a victim? Just a few women really think that they 
victims.” More representatives of civil society explained that the majority of 
girls and women think that FGM/C is something normal and it is part of their 
life. Some representatives of civil society explained that even if women come to 
the hospital, they are there to discuss about “some disease they have,” but not 
about FGM/C that is often the cause of the problems they have.  
During the interviews, I also explored the views of my respondents why this 
lack of medical, social and psychological support services for girls who have 
                                                        
524 At the time of this research, there was one shelter under construction under the supervision of 
the CSO ‘La Palabre’. This shelter will in the future provide support to young girls and women who 
fled from FGM/C, forced/child marriage of the consequences of unwanted pregnancies, as well for 
youngsters in difficult situations.  
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been subjected to FGM/C or those at risk of undergoing FGM/C exists in 
Senegal. The main answer to this question was that this is not a priority of the 
government at this moment. A representative of civil society said: “These 
problems are by far not priority for the government. And it’s clear. It’s not their 
priority. […] They don’t have enough resources to take care of everything.” 
Another representative of civil society said: “What I know is that the 
Government does not see this as a priority, because they have so many other 
incredible problems on their plate that are causing death, for example child 
mortality and maternal mortality. But again, infant mortality and maternal 
mortality are related to FGC. But when they have to make a choice, the way 
they allocate their resources, they allocate it to malaria, diarrhea and those kind 
of things that are causing death.” Another representative of civil society 
explained: “There are other things the Senegalese government need to worry 
about.” 
 
17.1 Social and psychological support services 
 
There is one organization in Senegal that provides support services to victims of 
VAW and children in general. In some cases, they also provide social and 
psychological support services to women and girls in case of FGM/C. This 
organization is called the Committee for the Prevention of Violence Against 
Women and Children (Comité de Lutte Contre les Violences faites aux Femmes et 
aux Enfants). Created in 1996, the Committee’s main objective is to contribute to 
the eradication of all forms of violence against women and children.525 This 
organization supports women and children who are victims of violence through 
their own counselling centres that are spread all over the country. However, 
some representatives of civil society explained that women and girls who 
underwent FGM/C are very hesitant to ask for social and psychological help. A 
representatives of civil society explained: “Sometimes they call me that they 
want to see me, but I never see them.” These victims want help and that is why 
they call the centers, but they are in the end too afraid to indeed take action and 
go to the centers to receive counselling.  
In addition, respondents explained that there is one sexologist working at 
the Grand Yoff hospital in Dakar who is an expert on the psychosexual 
consequences of FGM/C. During her consultations and counselling sessions she 
is helping women (and their husbands) to overcome sexual problems resulting 
from the FGM/C. She also uses sexual therapy to help women deal with the 
psychological trauma associated with FGM/C.  
 
17.2 Reconstructive surgeries 
 
Since 2012, reconstructive surgeries are offered in Senegal to women who 
underwent FGM/C. Reconstructive surgery to repair the physical damage for 
victims of FGM/C has been around for a long time, but the technique of clitoral 
                                                        
525 See the website of the Committee for the Prevention of Violence Against Women and Children, 
Objectives of CLVF, available at http://clvf.courantsdefemmes.org/objectifs.html [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
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repair surgery to restore clitoral function is relatively new. In 2004, Dr. Pierre 
Foldès, a French urologist and surgeon discovered that it was possible to 
reconstruct the nerve network that allows the clitoris to regain sexual functions. 
The reconstructive surgery, also known as ‘clitoroplasty’, involves removing the 
scar tissue, pulling the remaining clitoris up to the surface, and then stitching it 
into the natural place. It reduces pain and increase sexual pleasure in women 
who had undergone FGM/C. With financial support of UN Women, seven 
Senegalese surgeons received certification after training from Dr. Foldès on the 
technique. The first 50 surgeries could be offered free of charge, because UN 
Women financed these operations as well as the necessary equipment in an 
effort to make the clitoral repair surgery readily available in Senegal. The 
Senegalese surgeons have been overwhelmed by demand for these 
reconstructive surgeries and performed these surgeries not only in Dakar, but 
all over the country. Unfortunately, the funding of UN Women stopped in 2013. 
Although the surgeons try to keep the operations as low-cost as possible, most 
women in Senegal cannot afford the surgery.  
 
17.3 Legal support services 
 
In 1974 a group of women lawyers formed the Senegalese Association of Jurists 
(Association des Juristes Sénégalais - AJS). They aim to promote, popularize and 
contribute to the development of law, but also conduct awareness and promote 
the empowerment of women and protection of human rights. In 2008, they 
opened a ‘law shop’ [La Boutique du Droit] in the Medina district in Dakar where 
women can come to seek advice and free legal assistance. The aim of the ‘law 
shop’ is to make law and justice financially and psychologically more accessible. 
Many of the women who came to AJS have been victims of rape and domestic 
violence. Due to poverty, most women don’t have the financial means to hire a 
lawyer and AJS receives these women at their ‘shop’. Most women do not 
understand the legal process or even how to file a police report, representatives 
of civil society explained. AJS accompanies these women throughout the entire 
process. In addition to the free consultations, the Department of Law has 
established a hotline for the most remote communities in Senegal in order for 
them to also benefit from legal advice. In theory, women can come to seek legal 
advice regarding FGM/C cases, but up to now no women came to the ‘shop’ to 
seek advice regarding FGM/C. AJS has also embarked upon educational 
programmes to sensitize women about their rights, including training 
programmes on the law that criminalizes FGM/C.  
 
18 TRAINING FOR STUDENTS AND PROFESSIONALS  
 
18.1 Curricula for students 
 
During the interviews, I explored the views of my respondents whether, 
amongst others, awareness of FGM/C is integrated in the curricula of (medical, 
legal, social work) students. Many respondents (including representatives of the 
government, international organizations, and civil society) explained that 
awareness of FGM/C is not integrated in the curricula of students. A 
representative of civil society said: “They don't have a specific course on FGM 
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now. They have a general course on nutrition, a general course on reproductive 
health, they can discuss a little bit about FGM during this courses, just an 
introduction of FGM, but they don't have courses that really focus on FGM, 
no.” A representative of an international organization said: “No, I don’t think it 
is in their curriculum.” Another representative of civil society said: “Students 
are not trained. They do not have FGM in their curriculum. We recently invited 
the nurse school in Dakar to talk about FGM, but it is not in their programme. 
There are no courses they cant take. They are not trained on FGM, although 
26% of the population underwent this practice. Only the NGOs are talking 
about FGM, not the universities.” Another representative of civil society 
argued: “They don’t teach about FGM in the university. They need to do 
courses on this, but at this moment I never hear about students who are doing a 
specific course of FGM. They have courses on human rights, on gender, but not 
on FGM.” 
However, an initiative taken by the CSO Group for Population Studies and 
Education (Le Groupe pour l’Étude et l’Enseignement de la Population – GEEP) 
deserves to be mentioned here. They developed in 2011 a curriculum on 
reproductive health and FGM/C, which was integrated into high school and 
college curriculums. According to the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme, this 
course on FGM/C is “probably the first of its kind anywhere.”526 The aim of the 
curriculum on reproductive health and FGM/C is to provide information on 
FGM/C in order to make sure that students can make informed choices and, if 
necessary, make use of available health services.527 The course targets students 
aged 10 to 19 years. The course covers the different forms of FGM/C, the health 
and psychological effects of the practice and the human rights that apply to 
girls’ physical integrity.528 It further includes: the elements of reproductive 
health and the link between development and reproductive health at the 
national, family and personal levels (i.e., perceptions and the role of cultural 
norms in reproductive health), the development of positive attitudes regarding 
relationships between the sexes and participation in community activities to 
improve reproductive health.529 
 
18.2 Training of professionals 
 
During the interviews, I also explored the views of my respondents whether, 
amongst others, health professionals (doctors, nurses, midwives, psychologists) 
were trained to detect, manage and counsel FGM/C and if trainings on FGM/C 
were provided for the following other sectors: family services and child 
protection services, teachers and other school staff, legal professionals (judges, 
                                                        
526 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Annual Report 2011, p. 17, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Annual_report_on_FGM-
C_2011_low_res.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
527 See the website of the Group for Population Studies and Education, available at 
http://www.geep.org/geep/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=68&Itemid=162 [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015].  
528 Ibid.  
529 Ibid.  
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magistrates, lawyers), immigration officers and law enforcement professionals. 
Many respondents (including representatives of the government, international 
organizations, and civil society) explained that this is not the case. A 
representative of civil society argued: “There is no training for professionals on 
FGM. Myself, I never saw it. Not for social workers, not for medical 
professionals, not for psychologists, there is nothing done.” Another 
representative of civil society explained: “Also the doctors who are in the local 
areas in our country, they are not trained on FGM.” A representative of an 
international organization explained: “There is not a public health course about 
FGM. They just learn a few small things on FGM, but we want to change that. 
We are working with the government to change the curricula for health 
professionals, to change the courses of the health sector, to make them 
understand what FGM is, how it works, what the consequences are, which 
health problems, etc. At this moment this does not exist.” A government 
representative explained: “We intend to include FGM in the training courses for 
all the medical staff all over Senegal. It is our plan, it will be done, but it is not 
done yet.”  
 
18.3 New initiative  
 
Marianne Sibide N’Diaye, the president of Senegal’s National Association of 
Midwives and a practicing midwife herself came to the same conclusion and 
explained: “Poor referral systems and geographic isolation keep women who 
have experienced circumcision from getting needed help. Even when they can 
travel to a hospital or clinic, women find that midwives, doctors, and nurses 
lack the training and coordination to serve their needs. The results of this 
systemic flaw are thousands of unnecessary injuries and hundreds of 
preventable deaths.”530 With support from the Senegalese CSO COSEPRAT, she 
has designed a new FGM/C training programme for health care providers in 
order to prepare midwifes and nurses to deal effectively with women who 
experienced FGM/C. She inserted a new module into the standard curriculum, 
devoted to FGM/C education and taught by a team of physicians and 
psychologists. In addition to training, she has also laid the foundation for 
support and counseling centers serving girls and women affected by FGM/C, 
partnering with midwives in rural areas to identify and serve affected 
women.531  
 
19 ALTERNATIVES    
 
During the interviews, I explored the views of my respondents regarding, 
amongst others, whether training programmes for the women who perform 
FGM/C are provided, in order for them to adopt an alternative profession. This 
‘alternative source of income approach’ entails that FGM/C must be seen as a 
(lucrative) business: the market of cutting depends on both supply and demand. 
                                                        
530 See the website of Ashoka Sahel, available at http://sahel.ashoka.org/fellow/marianne-sidibe-
ndiaye [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
531 Ibid.  
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Proponents of this approach argue that FGM/C should not be addressed 
through education and awareness raising alone, but also through the provision 
of alternative means of income to the cutters. According to this approach, 
cutters need to be specifically targeted, since they would only set aside their 
knives and razor blades if the economic incentives were eliminated. 
Programmes based on this approach provide cutters with resources, equipment 
and necessary training to run a small business in order to make it possible for 
the cutters to abandon FGM/C. For example, in Ghana, cutters were trained to 
become professional midwifes. In Ethiopia, cutters were provided instruction in 
sandal making and bread-baking. This economic aspect in relation to FGM/C is 
referred to as the “missing piece to the puzzle of eradication efforts.”532 Many 
respondents (including representatives of the government, civil society and 
international organizations) explained that training programmes for cutters are 
not (any more) provided in Senegal and the majority of respondents were not in 
favour of this ‘alternative source of income approach’. 
  
19.1 Position of the traditional practitioner 
 
First of all, to substantiate their claim, many respondents (including 
representatives of the government, civil society and international organizations) 
clarified that one should not underestimate the status and vested interests of 
cutters within communities where FGM/C is practiced. Usually, an older 
woman (often a midwife or an elder) performs the procedure (see also Chapter 
III). Respondents explained that these cutters play a crucial role, wield much 
power, enjoy great respect and have significant status within communities 
because of their work. Respondents referred to cutters during the interviews as 
“old”, “clever”, “well respected”, “knowledgeable”, “powerful” and as 
“someone who has traditional expertise” and “knowledge about rituals.”  
 
19.2 Alternative source of income approach 
 
A few representatives of civil society explained that they are in favour of the 
‘alternative source of income approach’ and regretted that training programmes 
for cutters were not provided in Senegal. They argued that special attention 
need to be provided for the cutters, since they will not stop performing FGM/C 
if they do not have an alternative source of income. One representative of civil 
society explained: “I know a cutter who supports with the cutting her family. 
Because she has a job, she has the money to help her family. […] She will never 
stop, because it is her income. If somebody asks her to stop her job, without 
having another job, it is not possible for her to take care of her family. They also 
need to eat.” Another civil society representatives argued: “Sensitization alone 
is not enough. It is important to reinforce the capacity of the cutters, to help 
them economically, to help them finding another job, other activities in which 
they can contribute in the community.” Although they were only a few, these 
                                                        
532 See the website of Womensenews, available at http://womensenews.org/story/genital-
mutilation/140825/curb-fgm-our-project-focuses-the-cutters#.VI1cICiQmYQ [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015].  
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civil society representatives explained that cutters make good money and are 
often the only providers of income for their families.  
 
19.3 Arguments against the alternative source of income approach 
 
However, the majority of respondents (including representatives of the 
government, civil society and international organizations) did not agree with 
the arguments in favour of this approach. They argued that according to their 
experience, the cutting does not provide a livelihood for those who do the 
actual cutting. Therefore, the respondents argued, cutters do not have to receive 
financial compensation or opportunities for other income-generating activities 
to induce them to give up the practice. They explained that according to them, 
practicing FGM/C “is not about the money.”  
19.3.1 Cutters do not earn a living  
Some respondents explained that most traditional cutters in Senegal receive a 
“modest fee” for performing FGM/C, i.e. between 3.000 to 5.000 CFA (between 
4,50 to 7,50 euro) per girl. These respondents explained that this amount of 
money could not be considered a significant source of income. In addition, 
cutters receive sometimes material for performing the procedure, such as soap 
and razor blades. A representative of civil society explained: “They do not 
receive much. It’s like a few vegetables, a bit of rise, and a little bit of money.” 
Another representative of civil society said: “The parents don’t give a lot of 
money for the cutting. The cutters receive some rice or perhaps some 
vegetables.” A representative of civil society argued: “I don’t think that 
economic reasons are one of the reasons for the cutters to decide to abandon it 
or not. The amount paid is very small. They receive maybe 5.000 CFA 
maximum. That’s not a big amount of money. So the economic reason is for me 
not one of the reasons behind the practice.” A representative of the government 
explained: “That approach is not a good approach, because giving money to 
cutters does not make sense. Because the cutters are not well paid. Sometimes 
they give them something for in the kitchen or cereals or a little bit of food, but 
they don't give them a lot. So it is not something that make them really leave 
the practice.” A representative of civil society claimed: “It is not her real job, 
nobody can live from cutting. It is not a job. Some organizations think that if 
you give them a reward, they stop cutting. But it does not work like that. It is 
not a supply chain, you know. You don’t produce so many young girls that you 
have to cut in a day or a year to make a living. It’s even funny.” A government 
representative explained: “My experience is that the cutters do not need 
support. They do not need an alternative source of income. They are not having 
a living out of that practice. They are not. Because it is a short time, a special 
time during the year that they are practicing it. This argument is false, it is not 
true.” A representative of civil society said: “The cutting takes place only once a 
year, during a certain period. They cannot live on that.” A representative of 
civil society explained: “It is not only about the money, it is not. Perhaps 
providing an alternative source of income might be an additional motivation for 
them to stop. But it is nothing more.” A government representative explained 
that perform FGM/C not because of the money, but because of the “symbolic 
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reward.” This government representative explained that cutters have other jobs 
next to the cutting: “How many girls do you need to cut per year to live on that, 
or every day? You don't cut every day. They do it from time to time, at a certain 
period. You cannot live on that. They have other sources of living.” Another 
representative of civil society said: “The demand is more important than the 
supply. Cutters are not what cause FGC. They aren’t!” Another representative 
of civil society said: “What people need to understand is that this cutters do not 
work for money. It is not for money, it is your traditional job. […] The power 
and proud is important, not money.”  
19.3.2 Power and respect  
Many respondents (including representatives of civil society and international 
organizations) explained that not so much the financial compensation, but the 
fact that cutting was a honourable profession conferring respect and prestige 
within the community533 is the problem. A representative of an international 
organization said: “It’s not the financial issue that is the problem. It’s the status 
issue that is the difficulty. This is the loss they fear the most.” Another 
representative of an international organization said: “When I was in the village, 
I found out that the power and the respect that these women have is much 
more important than the money they receive by doing the job. They are seen as 
people with knowledge, spiritual knowledge. They are very, very respected in 
the village, in the community in general. So that’s why it is not only about 
money. You know. Many of the village pay them in kind, for example with 
vegetables or a bag of rice. I think the trainings for them might be a good 
motivation, but it just has to been seen as a motivation. Not something else.” 
Another representative of an international organization explained: “Although 
FGM/C is a source of income for the cutter, it is not about the money. The 
power is important. The recognition in the community is important. When the 
cutters stop cutting, they are losing their power.” A representative of civil 
society explained: “They lose their leading role in the society. They lose their 
position and the benefits they have because of being a cutter.” 
 
19.4 Pilot project in Senegal 
 
Respondents explained that a Senegalese CSO who was in favour of this 
approach started a pilot project in cooperation with the Ministry of Women, 
Family and Children. The aim of this project was to orient cutters towards 
alternative sources of income and giving them resources, equipment and 
training to convert to an alternative profession or to start their own business. 
However, this ‘alternative source of income approach’ proved to be 
unsuccessful in Senegal because of several negative effects. In the first place, 
this micro-credit project and income generating activities attracted women who 
had never performed FGM/C. A representative of an international organization 
                                                        
533 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Senegal: Human Rights Key 
to Ending FGM/C, Legislation is Just One Aspect of an Effective Campaign, p. 4, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/gender/docs/fgmc_kit/LawSenegal.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
[Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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explained: “The programme stopped, because it had no effect. Each woman 
could come, to ask for financial support, and say that she was a cutter.” 
Similarly, a representative of civil society said: “We have had people who came 
to us and said that they were cutters, but in the end they were not.” A 
representative of civil society further explained: “If women know that they can 
get money from an NGO to start a business, of course they would come to you 
and say that there are a cutter who wants to stop the practice.” 
In the second place, this approach focused only on the supply of the cutters, 
but did not focus on the ‘demand side’ of the cutting. The project was for 
example not accompanied by awareness raising campaigns addressing the 
community as a whole to promote community consensus to abandon FGM/C. 
A civil society representative explained: “paying cutters to stop the practice did 
nothing to address the demand for the practice.” Another civil society 
representative explained that: “If we only focus on the cutters and not on the 
others, they will continue.” Further more, another representative of civil society 
said: “Even when the cutter received the money for an alternative profession 
and a woman of the community asks her to cut her daughter, she will do it.” 
One civil society representative clearly illustrated in this regard the problems 
that were faced on the ground during this pilot project. When she was working 
in a community in the northern part of Senegal, she noticed that a baby was 
crying a lot. After a few days she went to the house of the mother to find out 
what was happening. After she had spoken with the mother she discovered that 
the baby underwent FGM/C, but also that a ‘former cutter’ performed the 
procedure on her daughter. This ‘former cutter’ received training to become a 
professional midwife: “They gave her money, credit, trainings in the hospital, 
they gave her many things. They transformed this lady to become a midwife.” 
However, although this lady participated in the pilot project, received money 
and a training to adopt an alternative profession and was offered a job at the 
hospital, she continued to perform the FGM/C after working hours. When the 
civil society representative confronted the cutter with the fact that she was still 
performing FGM/C, while she was trained as a midwife and worked in the 
hospital now, the cutter explained: “The mothers come here to my house with 
their daughters, because the community choose me to do this. I cannot abandon 
this." In addition, the ‘former cutter’ told the civil society representative: 
“Because of my job in the hospital, in my house, I now have a table, a scissor, 
alcohol and many other things to make sure that now I do the cutting well.” 
Another representative of civil society said: “Cutters won’t stop if you give 
them money. They will only stop if they do not have any clients or customers 
any more. It is like a store. The store does not work if the customers do not 
come. How are you going to sell if you don’t have customers in your shop? You 
won’t be able to sell anything. This is the same. If the cutter does not have 
customers any more, she will do agriculture or other kinds of jobs, like all the 
other women. Then they will stop, because there is no new body to cut 
anymore.” A representative of civil society explained: “I think that we need to 
address all those women, not just a cutter. I don’t think that addressing 
specifically cutters will lead to people abandoning the practice at large scale.” 
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19.5 Cutters as part of the community 
 
Many respondents (including representatives of the government, civil society 
and international organizations) explained that cutters should not be seen in 
isolation, but as part of the community. A representative of an international 
organization explained: “This is not our approach, to target specifically the 
cutters. The cutter is considered part of the community.” A representative of 
civil society said: “You need to sensitize all the people, not only the cutters.” 
Another representative of civil society said; “In my opinion, it is not necessary 
to specifically target the cutters. You need to sensitize the whole community. 
When you give something, you have to give it to the whole community. When 
you do something, you should do it with the whole community.” A 
representative of the government said: “It is not a good thing, because they are 
a member of their society and the community. It is better to target the 
community as the whole, instead of one person. The cutter is one person, but 
the member of the community who go with her daughter to this person is 
another person. I think that it is more important to empower the whole 
community than empower one person.” For that reason, a holistic and 
participative approach was adopted in Senegal that reaches out to everyone in 
the community.534  
 
20 CONCLUSION 
 
Senegal signed and ratified all the human rights treaties that are important in 
relation to the practice of FGM/C. More specifically, Senegal has ratified the 
ICERD, ICESCR, ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT, CRC, ICRMW, CRPD, CED, ACHPR, 
Maputo Protocol, ACRWC and the AYC. Senegal has not made any 
reservations to these human rights treaties that attempt to limit or modify the 
scope of their obligations. This means that Senegal is under the obligation to 
comply with all the legal provisions set forth in these human rights treaties. The 
central question that guided the empirical study in Senegal is the following: To 
what extent is Senegal in compliance with the human rights framework in relation to 
FGM/C, and which factors explain compliance and non-compliance with this framework? 
An answer to the first part of this research question – the extent of compliance – 
will be addressed below. The second part of this research question – the factors 
explaining compliance and non-compliance – will be answered in the final 
chapter.   
First of all, Senegal is under the obligation to submit periodic reports to the 
respective TMBs on how the rights are being implemented, but the country is 
not fully in compliance with this obligation. The principal objective of the 
human rights TMB system is to monitor compliance with the human rights 
obligations set forth in the human rights treaties. The practice of FGM/C in 
Senegal has been discussed during sessions of the following TMBs: CERD, 
                                                        
534 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Senegal: Human Rights Key 
to Ending FGM/C, Legislation is Just One Aspect of an Effective Campaign, p. 4, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/gender/docs/fgmc_kit/LawSenegal.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015]. 
[Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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CESCR, HRC, CEDAWCee, CATCee, CRCee, ACmHPR and ACERWC. 
Although Senegal has been thanked for its “frank collaboration” 535  and 
“constructive dialogue” 536  by the TMBS, critical remarks about Senegal’s 
cooperation with the TMBs have been made as well. The Senegalese reports did 
not always contain enough information on the implementation of the 
provisions of the respective treaties, nor did the Senegalese reports always 
follow the guidelines for the preparation of reports. The Senegalese government 
did not always provide written replies to the list of issues (in time) and the 
Senegalese delegation was sometimes absent during the dialogue. But more 
problematic are the outstanding and overdue reports. Although the third to 
fifth reports to the CRCee and the third to seventh reports to the CEDAWCee 
were submitted in 2013, there have been (and still are) many outstanding and 
overdue reports. However, when periodic reports were submitted to the TMBs, 
Senegal lived up to the recommendation to include in their reports information 
about the legislation in force against FGM/C, measures taken to eliminate 
FGM/C, statistics on the incidence of FGM/C in the country and the progress 
made in this respect. Furthermore, no complaints have been submitted to TMBs 
concerning the practice of FGM/C, Senegal was never invited to cooperate in 
any inquiry procedure and the inter-State complaint procedure has never been 
used.  
Senegal is in compliance with the obligation to embody the principle of 
equality of men and women in the national constitution. The Senegalese 
Constitution establishes the enjoyment of rights without discrimination. The 
preamble of the Constitution includes a denunciation of all forms of injustice, 
inequality and discrimination. Specific provisions of the Constitution explicitly 
condemn and seek to eliminate all forms of discrimination. In addition, the 
constitution also forbids “physical mutilations” in Article 7. This article 
provides that the human person is sacred and inviolable and that the State has 
the obligation to respect and protect it. However, there are major vacuums and 
gaps in the national laws when the Constitution is applied. Some national laws 
in Senegal remain deeply discriminatory against women, in particular in 
matters relating to the family. Several TMBs expressed its concern about the de 
jure and de facto inequality that exists between men and women in Senegalese 
society.537  
Senegal is in compliance with the obligation to prohibit FGM/C. In 1999, the 
National Assembly passed law No. 99-05 modifying the Penal Code. Art. 299bis 
of the Penal Code criminalizes all forms of FGM/C, including the 
medicalization of the practice. The penalty is six months to five years 
                                                        
535 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations, Senegal, Supplement No. 44, 
A/51/44, 1 May 1996, p. 19, para. 103; United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Concluding Observations, Senegal, CERD/C/SEN/CO/16-18, 24 October 2012, p. 1, 
para. 2.   
536 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations, Senegal, Supplement No. 44, 
A/51/44, 1 May 1996, p. 19, para. 103; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding Observations, Senegal, CRC/C/SEN/CO/2, 20 October 2006, p. 1, para. 2.  
537 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, E/C.12/1/Add.62, 24 September 2001, p. 3, para. 15 and p. 5 para. 38 and p. 11, para. 74; 
United Nations General Assembly, Compilation Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner of 
Human Rights, A/HRC/WG.6/4/SEN/2, 18 December 2008, p. 5, para. 13.  
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imprisonment. The maximum penalty will be applied if FGM/C is “carried out 
or promoted by a person in the medical or paramedical field.” When FGM/C 
leads to death, the penalty will be “hard work for life.” The same punishment 
will be given to any person who gives instructions to FGM/C or causes FGM/C 
by “gifts, promises, enticements, threats, intimidation, abuse of authority or of 
power.” However, Senegal is not in compliance with the recommendation to 
ensure the effective enforcement and implementation of this law. Despite the 
existence of legislation criminalizing the practice, FGM/C is still practiced in 
Senegal with impunity. Since the adoption of the law in 1999, only a handful of 
individuals have been prosecuted for FGM/C. Cutters or family members that 
have been prosecuted did not serve the full prison sentence and were released 
early. Respondents (including representatives from the government, civil 
society and international organizations) explained that the amount of court 
cases is not representative for the incidence of FGM/C in Senegal, because 
people refuse to report FGM/C cases to the police. A representative of an 
international organization explained: “The law is not the problem. The law is 
there and the law is good. But the community does not report FGM cases to 
Justice.” Senegal did not establish a national mechanism for the implementation 
and monitoring of legislation and law enforcement, nor were ‘adequate 
resources’ made available for the implementation of legislative frameworks 
aimed at eliminating FGM/C.  
Senegal is in compliance with the recommendation to develop appropriate 
measures, including NAPs, strategies, policies, rules and regulations aimed at 
preventing and eliminating FGM/C. Soon after the adoption of the national law 
criminalizing FGM/C, the Senegalese government developed a ‘National Plan 
of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation’ for the period 
2000-2005. This NAP was evaluated in 2008 and a new ‘National Plan of Action 
to Accelerate the Abandonment of FGM/C’ was adopted in 2010 for the period 
2010-2015. Furthermore, a medical policy was adopted in 2011 and a religious 
policy in 2013. Except for the first NAP, all policies are very comprehensive in 
nature and also multidisciplinary in scope. Although these policies (especially 
the NAPs) have much potential in relation to coordination of actions in the field 
of FGM/C in Senegal, they are not well implemented. Senegal is not in 
compliance in relation to the implementation of the national legislative 
frameworks on FGM/C. Adequate accountability mechanisms at the national 
and local levels to monitor adherence to and implementation of these legislative 
frameworks are not in place. The National Council for Promoting the 
Abandonment of FGM/C (Conseil National Promotion Abandon de l’Excision) was 
to be established soon after the adoption of the NAP as the political body of 
guidance and decision at the highest level. In addition, a National Technical 
Coordination Committee, a Regional Committee and a Departmental 
Committee were to be established. However, at the time of this research, there 
were many problems with regard to the implementation of this structure at 
different levels and none of the Councils or Committees was operative. No 
resources were allocated to the implementation of policies and programmes by 
the Senegalese government: the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme allocated 
financial resources to the implementation of the NAPs instead.   
Senegal is partly in compliance with the recommendation to collect and 
disseminate basic data about prevalence, trends, attitudes and behaviour 
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regarding FGM/C. The DHS and MICS surveys collected data in Senegal on the 
prevalence of FGM/C, the types of FGM/C practiced, the girl’s age at the time 
of the procedure, the type of practitioner who performed the practice and the 
beliefs and opinions about FGM/C. The module with questions on FGM/C was 
added to the women’s questionnaire in Senegal for the first time in 2005, and 
again in 2010-2011, 2012-2013 and for the last time in 2014. Senegal also 
collected data on the cases and enforcement of legislation with a study of 
Professor Ndiaye to get a more accurate picture of the status of implementation 
of Law No. 99-05 of 29 January 1999 criminalizing FGM/C in Senegal. However, 
respondents argued that FGM/C remains poorly documented in Senegal and 
expressed the need for further research and data collection on FGM/C in 
Senegal. Some respondents (mainly representatives of civil society) expressed 
their concern about the reliability of the results of the DHS and MICS surveys in 
relation to FGM/C, since self-reporting is the basis for determining FGM/C 
status.  
Senegal is not in compliance with the obligation to provide necessary 
support to victims of FGM/C, nor with the obligation to protect women who 
are at risk of being subjected to FGM/C. In Senegal, there are no adequate 
social and/or psychological support services specifically designed for girls and 
women who have been subjected to FGM/C and those at risk. Respondents 
explained that there is a serious lack of support services for (potential) victims 
of FGM/C. More specifically, at the time of this research, there were no 
helplines, specialized shelter services or safe houses for women and girls at risk 
of, or escaping FGM/C. One Senegalese CSO provides emotional and 
psychological counselling to victims of VAW and children in general. In some 
cases, they also provide counselling to women and girls who are (potential) 
victims of FGM/C. Legal support services for women in general are offered by 
another CSO as well. Since 2012, reconstructive surgeries are offered in Senegal 
to women who underwent FGM/C. 
Senegal is not in compliance with the obligation to create public awareness 
in all sectors of society regarding FGM/C through information, formal and 
information education, and outreach programmes. Awareness raising in 
Senegal is mainly done by CSOs and respondents were critical on the role of the 
government in this regard. Representatives of civil society referred often – quite 
frustrated – to meetings or workshops organized by the government to talk 
about FGM/C “in wonderful hotels in Dakar or Saly” while they could not see 
how this would directly help the communities on the ground. Awareness about 
FGM/C at the community level is raised by CSOs and efforts of International 
Organizations, not by the Senegalese government. In addition, according to the 
respondents, the government does not recognize the role that CSOs play in the 
movement to eliminate FGM/C, nor does the government give CSOs all 
necessary (financial) support and encouragement. Many respondents (including 
representatives of the government, international organizations, and civil 
society) explained that awareness of FGM/C is not integrated in the curricula of 
(medical, legal, social work) students. There are no training programmes for 
health professionals (doctors, nurses, midwives, psychologists) to detect, 
manage and counsel FGM/C. Non-formal and informal educational activities 
and trainings on FGM/C are sporadically provided in the relevant sectors. The 
government does not promote gender-sensitive, empowering educational 
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processes. If initiatives are taken in this regard, the initiative is taken by UN 
agencies or CSOs.  
Senegal is partly in compliance with the recommendation to engage a wide 
range of stakeholders. Many actors are involved in the action taken against 
FGM/C. However, this is not because the government engages these 
stakeholders, but it is mostly because of the work of the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme and CSOs themselves. CSOs try to involve community leaders, 
religious leaders, men and boys in their advocacy and awareness-raising 
campaigns.  
Senegal complied with the recommendation to explore alternatives to 
FGM/C and to support and provide alternative training and education 
possibilities for cutters, in order to convert them to an alternative profession. In 
cooperation with the Ministry of Women, Family and Children, a Senegalese 
CSO started a pilot project. However, this ‘alternative source of income 
approach’ proved to be an unsuccessful strategy in Senegal. Therefore, training 
programmes or alternative livelihoods for local practitioners of FGM/C are not 
(any more) provided in Senegal. 
Taking into account the above, Senegal is only to a limited extent in 
compliance with the human rights framework that is designed to eliminate the 
practice of FGM/C.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This research addresses the practice of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting 
(FGM/C). Over the last decades, discourse on the elimination of FGM/C is 
positioned within the scope of international and regional human rights law. The 
practice is considered a form of Violence Against Women (VAW) and a human 
rights violation. FGM/C violates the right to be free from gender-
discrimination, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to 
life (when the procedure results in death), the right to freedom from torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the rights of the 
child. These human rights are enshrined in various human rights treaties that 
are legally binding upon States that have ratified them. Among others, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), also known as the “Banjul 
Charter,” the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa 
(“Maputo Protocol”)1 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (ACRWC) are important. These human rights instruments contain 
provisions under which FGM/C constitute a violation of human rights, and 
oblige States parties to take measures to prevent and eliminate the practice. In 
addition to these hard law instruments, the practice of FGM/C has been 
specifically addressed in many soft law instruments, including in Declarations, 
Programmes and Plans of Action, General Recommendations (GR) and General 
Comments (GC) of Treaty Monitoring Bodies, and non-binding resolutions. 
However, despite the various international and regional (quasi) legal norms 
addressing the practice of FGM/C, the prevalence rates have remained high in 
many of the countries where FGM/C occurs, and in some countries there is 
even an increase in prevalence rate. In Senegal, the prevalence rate has not 
decreased significantly either. This raises the question to what extent (and why) 
States comply, or in the case of FGM/C, appear not to comply, with the human 
rights framework. The central question of this research was the following: 
                                                        
1 Especially the ratification of the Maputo Protocol is important, since it is the only legally binding 
human rights instrument applicable in Africa in which FGM/C is specifically mentioned. Many 
African States (with a high FGM/C prevalence rate) have not ratified the Protocol, including 
Somalia (98%), Egypt (91%), Eritrea (89%), Sierra Leone (88%), Sudan (88%), Ethiopia (74%), Chad 
(44%), CAR (24%) and Niger (2%).  
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Which factors explain compliance and/or non-compliance with the human rights 
framework in relation to the practice of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Senegal? 
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. It starts with the commitment of 
the Senegalese government in relation to the human rights framework in 
general (section 2.1) and the practice of FGM/C in particular (section 2.2). 
Section 3 will elaborate on the elimination of the practice in Senegal. In section 4, 
a short analysis will follow about the extent of compliance. In section 5, an 
overview will be provided of the factors that explain the extent of compliance, 
shile linking the compliance theories described in the theoretical framework 
and the results of the empirical study in Senegal. Section 6 will elaborate on 
how the factors that influence compliance positively and/or negatively interact 
with each other and concluding remarks are spelled out in section 7.   
 
2 STRONG GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT 
 
2.1 Commitment to the human rights framework in general 
 
The Senegalese government stated at many occasions that they have a 
longstanding commitment to democracy and a tradition of promoting, 
protecting and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. According 
to the Senegalese government, there is a sincere desire and political will to 
protect their citizens against human rights violations and to improve the human 
rights condition on the ground. Senegal took active part in the international 
human rights movement and helped to codify international human rights law 
by participating in the drafting process of several human rights treaties, 
including the CRC and the ACHPR. Senegal ratified all international and 
regional human rights treaties (often as one of the first African countries) that 
are important in relation to the practice of FGM/C. The preamble of the 
Senegalese constitution explicitly affirms the State’s adherence to several 
international human rights treaties, notably the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), the CEDAW, CRC and the ACHPR. It was one of the 
founding members of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) and the capital 
city Dakar hosted important meetings in relation to human rights development. 
Senegalese nationals held prominent positions in international human rights 
work.  
Not only the State of Senegal itself, but also the Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
(TMBs) describe Senegal as a tolerant country that promotes human rights. 
Senegal has been commended for its efforts to establish a democratic State 
based on the rule of law and their “obvious commitment to human rights.”2 The 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) noted that the Government and people of 
Senegal were “deeply attached to the principle of respect for human rights.”3 
Similarly, during the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), several States 
                                                        
2 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, Supplement No. 18, A/49/18, 17 August 1994, p. 53, para. 335.  
3 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Senegal, A/42/40(para. 197-
238), 6 April 1987, p. 59, para. 220.  
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commended Senegal for the “ongoing commitment of Senegal to creating a 
human rights culture.”4  
Respondents were also well aware of the strong ratification record of 
Senegal and referred to Senegal as the “champion of ratification in Africa.” 
They argued that Senegal’s ratification behaviour bears witness to the political 
will of the Senegalese authorities to protect the citizens of their country against 
human rights violations. Respondents also described Senegal as “a country of 
human rights” and claimed that human rights were deeply rooted in the 
Senegalese culture since the independence of the country. A representative of 
civil society stated: “I believe that the State of Senegal has a mentality, a 
willingness to respect human rights.” 
 
2.2 Commitment to end the practice of FGM/C 
 
Political commitment in relation to national efforts to eliminate FGM/C in 
Senegal grew over time. In 1984, President Abdou Diouf of Senegal declared at 
the opening of a seminar in Dakar on traditional practices affecting the health of 
mothers and children, that the “decline of the survival of excision should be 
accelerated through education, not anathema.” 5  From the 1980s onwards, 
Senegal hosted many important conferences and seminars on harmful 
traditional practices in general and FGM/C specifically. During these meetings, 
different topics related to FGM/C were discussed, including strategies to 
eliminate FGM/C, Islam and FGM/C, medical consequences of the practice, the 
role of national Parliaments, cross-border approaches to tackle FGM/C, and 
lessons learned about FGM/C prevention. Representatives of many African 
countries attended these conferences. In 1997, the Senegalese Minister of Health 
launched a prevention campaign against FGM/C and a couple of months later 
President Abdou Diouf publicly proclaimed its commitment to end the practice 
of FGM/C and openly took a stand against it. Since then, the Senegalese 
government has stated in many occasions that it is very committed to end the 
practice. In the National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of FGM/C 
(2010-2015) the Senegalese government articulated for example: “The State of 
Senegal strongly expressed its will to protect girls and women against all 
abuses and violence of any kind through the ratification of international 
conventions and instruments.” 6  According to the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme in Senegal, there is a “strong commitment” and “strong political 
will” at the government level to take action in the field of FGM/C.7 Similarly, 
                                                        
4 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review on 
Senegal, A/HRC/25/4, 11 December 2013, para. 38.  
5 Statement by the President of Senegal, Abdou Diouf on sexual mutilation: “Accélérer le 
dépérissement de cette survivance qu'est l'excision par l'éducation et non par l'anathème,” see bulletin of 
the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, 
No. 2, July 1986, p.15. 
6 National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of Excision 2010-2015 (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Acceleration de l’Abandon de l’Excision 2010-2015), Ministry of the Family, 
National Solidarity and Female Entrepreneurship, February 2010, p. 2.  
7 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change (2008-2012) 
– Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF sur les 
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some respondents also mentioned that there is “institutional engagement,” 
“political will” and “commitment” of the Senegalese government to promote 
women’s rights and to take action against FGM/C. 
 
3 ELIMINATION OF FGM/C IN SENEGAL 
 
Senegal has often been referred to as a “promising practice” in relation to the 
elimination of FGM/C. The country has been earmarked as a “pioneer in West 
Africa”8 in relation to the elimination of the practice, mainly because Senegal 
was the first country in which a series of public declarations of FGM/C 
abandonment were made. 9  According to the 2011 Annual Report of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme: “Of the 15 countries active in the Joint 
Programme, Senegal has made the most rapid progress toward the 
abandonment of FGM/C.”10  
 The Senegalese government is very optimistic about the progress made in 
relation to the elimination of FGM/C in the country. In the first place, the 
government of Senegal claims in the national reports submitted to the TMBs 
and the UPR that “significant progress,”11  “giant steps”12 have been made and 
“significant results have been achieved”13 in relation to the elimination of 
FGM/C in Senegal. The State explained in their reports that sustained efforts at 
awareness-raising, training and support among the general public have 
resulted in abandonment of the practice in 75% of 5000 surveyed communities 
in Senegal.14 The Senegalese government claimed that trends show a marked 
decrease of FGM/C in the country “with thousands of communities having 
publicly renounced it.”15 This decline is, according to the government, “a result 
of the mobilization of women’s groups, NGOs, development partners and the 
                                                        
Mutilations Génitales Féminines/Excision: Accélérer le Changement (2008-2012) – Sénégal), New York, 
July 2013, p. ix.  
8 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Joint Evaluation of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change (2008-2012) 
– Senegal (Original in French: Évaluation Conjointe du Programme Conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF sur les 
Mutilations Génitales Féminines/Excision: Accélérer le Changement (2008-2012) – Sénégal), New York, 
July 2013, p. 16.  
9 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change, Annual Report 2011, p. 5, 
available at http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Annual_report_on_FGM-
C_2011_low_res.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
10 Ibid, p. 8.   
11 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Summary Record of the 1109th Meeting, 
CAT/C/SR.1109, 13 November 2012, p. 9, para. 69; United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, Written Replies by the Government of Senegal to the List of Issues Relating to the Consideration of the 
Second Periodic Report of Senegal, CRC/C/SEN/Q/2/Add.1, 10 August 2006, p. 22.  
12 African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Initial, First and Second 
Report of Senegal (1998-2009), 2009, p. 27. 
13 United Nations General Assembly, National Report of Senegal, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/WG.6/17/SEN/1, 23 July 2013, para. 24.  
14 United Nations General Assembly, National Report of Senegal, Addendum, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/11/24/Add.1, 8 June 2009, p. 3; United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review on Senegal, A/HRC/25/4, 11 December 2013, para. 57.  
15 United Nations General Assembly, National Report of Senegal, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/WG.6/17/SEN/1, 23 July 2013, para. 23.  
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Government to conduct awareness- raising, research and advocacy activities.”16 
The government wrote that this groundswell towards public renunciation of 
FGM/C in the country makes Senegal “a model country at the international 
level.”17 The Senegalese government at the same time acknowledged that there 
are still some “pockets of resistance” (especially in the North of Senegal and in 
Vélingara)18 where FGM/C is still strongly defended.19 In addition, Senegal 
made optimistic estimations in relation to when FGM/C would be eliminated 
in the country. In the first National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female 
Genital Mutilation (2000-2005), the general objective of the Senegalese 
government was the total elimination of FGM/C in the country by the year 
2005.20 In the second National Plan of Action to Accelerate the Abandonment of 
FGM/C (2010-2015), the Government reported the expectation that by 2015 
“total eradication of excision would have been achieved.”21 However, this 
proved to be overly optimistic.  
The human rights-based programme of the Civil Society Organization (CSO) 
Tostan has been praised and is often cited as a ‘best practice’22 and as one of the 
most effective programs for shifting community attitudes towards the 
elimination of FGM/C. The Population Reference Bureau has endorsed 
Tostan’s human rights-based model23 and the Government of Senegal and the 
Government of The Gambia recognized the Tostan model as the preferred 
approach for promoting the abandonment of FGM/C. The establishment of the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on FGM/C was also based on the 
experiences and the approach of Tostan. According to various reports of 
UNICEF, Tostan’s Community Empowerment Programme (CEP) has achieved 
“notable success” in the communities in which it has been implemented.24 In 
2007, UNICEF sponsored a study of communities where the Tostan program 
had been implemented. Researchers found, on average, a 77% abandonment 
                                                        
16 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined Third 
to Seventh Periodic Reports of Senegal, CEDAW/C/SEN/3-7, 13 December 2013, p. 61, para. 127. 
17 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Written Replies by the Government of Senegal 
to the List of Issues Relating to the Consideration of the Second Periodic Report of Senegal, 
CRC/C/SEN/Q/2/Add.1, 10 August 2006, p. 20.  
18 Vélingara is a town in the Southern part of Senegal (Kolda region).  
19 African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Initial, First and Second 
Report of Senegal (1998-2009), 2009, p. 27. 
20 National Plan of Action for the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation (Original in French: 
Plan d’Action National pour l’Abandon de la Pratique des Mutilations Genitales Feminines), Ministry of 
the Family and National Solidarity, March 2001, p. 24.  
21 African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Initial, First and Second 
Report of Senegal (1998-2009), 2009, p. 27. 
22 C. Feldman-Jacobs and S. Ryniak, Abandoning Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: An In-Depth Look 
at Promising Practices, Population Reference Bureau, USAID, December 2006, available at 
http://www.prb.org/pdf07/fgm-c_report.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
23 K. Gryboski et al., Working With the Community for Improved Health, Health Bulletin, No. 3, 
Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 2006, p. 16-19.    
24 United Nations Children’s Fund, Changing a Harmful Social Convention: Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2005, p. 23-24; N.J. Diop et al., Evaluation of 
the Long-term Impact of the TOSTAN Programme on the Abandonment of FGM/C and Early Marriage: 
Results from a Qualitative study in Senegal, Population Council, January 2008, p. 30.  
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rate of FGM/C in Tostan-trained communities.25 In the past decade, the Tostan 
approach is being replicated in other African countries. According to the 
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme, it has scaled up methodologies similar to 
the model developed by Tostan: “Based on the programme's good practice and 
demonstrated results, additional countries are adapting the model to their 
specific social, ethnic and cultural context to promote the abandonment of 
FGM/C.”26 To date, over 7.000 communities in Africa (including Djibouti, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia, and The Gambia) 
have publicly declared their decision to abandon FGM/C, according to 
Tostan.27 
However, careful analysis of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) regarding Senegal shows that 
the national prevalence of FGM/C is not declining as rapidly as the UNFPA-
UNICEF Joint Programme, the Senegalese government and Tostan might have 
hoped for. The national prevalence of FGM/C among girls and women of 
reproductive age (15 to 49 years) remained fairly constant in the past decade. 
Between 2005 and 2014 the national prevalence of FGM/C declined in Senegal 
with 3.5% (from 28.2% in 2005 to 24.7% in 2014). Since FGM/C is performed on 
very young girls in Senegal, recently the DHS has begun to collect data on the 
prevalence among girls younger than 15 years. According to the statistics of the 
DHS 2012-2013, 17.5% of all girls under 15 had – according to the statements of 
their mothers – undergone FGM/C. According to the Senegal DHS-2014, this 
proportion was 12.9%, which might indicate a decrease in the practice among 
young girls in Senegal. In the vast majority of cases (91.4%), a traditional 
practitioner performed FGM/C on girls and women, although there are 
increasing rumours of medicalization of the practice in Senegal. In relation to 
the type of FGM/C performed, the past years showed a trend towards less 
severe cutting and there is also a trend observable towards performing FGM/C 
at younger girls in Senegal.  
Overall, according to the statistics of the DHS and MICS surveys, FGM/C is 
today still commonly practiced in Senegal among the Mandingue, the Poular, 
the Diola, and the Soninké ethnic groups and remains widespread in the 
regions of Kédougou, Matam, Sédhiou, Tambacounda and Kolda.28 At the same 
time, it should be noted that the majority of Senegalese women (Serer and 
Wolof ethnic groups) did not undergo the practice of FGM/C.  
 
                                                        
25 Tostan, Tostan: Community-Led Development, Brochure, 2009, p. 17, available at 
http://www.tostan.org/sites/default/files/resources/tostan%20brochure.pdf [Last Accessed 1 
October 2015]. 
26 See United Nations Women Watch, UNFPA: Good Practice Example 1, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/ruralwomen/unfpa-good-practice.html [Last Accessed 
1 October 2015].  
27 See website Tostan, Cross-Cutting Issues, available at http://www.tostan.org/female-genital-
cutting [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
28 See Annex I for a map of Senegal.  
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4 THE EXTENT OF COMPLIANCE IS LIMITED 
 
In line with the statistics of the DHS and MICS in relation to the national 
prevalence of FGM/C, many TMBs also expressed their concern about the 
persistence of the practice in Senegal.29 The HRC noted for example that “the 
persistence of certain customs […] hinder Senegal's full compliance with its 
obligations under the Covenant.”30 The CESCR was concerned that FGM/C was 
still practiced with impunity,31 despite the existence of legislation banning 
FGM/C, and urged Senegal to enforce the existing legislation against FGM/C.32 
The CATCee recommended Senegal to continue to publicize Act No. 99-05 of 29 
January 1999 on the penalization of FGM/C and to run awareness and 
information campaigns for the general public and law-enforcement officers.33 
Also during the UPR, several UN Member States expressed their concern that 
legislation was not translated into concrete results for women and girls. They 
noted that FGM/C remains common in Senegal34 and recommended Senegal to 
enforce or implement more effectively the provisions of law 99-05 prohibiting 
FGM/C.  
 Along the same lines, an overwhelming majority of the respondents 
similarly expressed their concern during the interviews about the gap between 
Senegal’s propensity to join international and regional human rights treaties on 
the one hand, and to bring their human rights practice into compliance with 
those treaties on the other. Specifically in relation to FGM/C, the majority of 
respondents (mostly representatives of international organizations and civil 
society, but also some representatives of the government) argued that they do 
not see the commitment of the Senegalese government to take steps to eliminate 
FGM/C in reality. A representative of an international organization argued for 
example: “The fact that Senegal has been ratifying all these treaties and 
conventions doesn't mean that the human rights situation on the ground is 
much better compared to the human rights situation of other similar countries 
in the region.” A representative of civil society said: “We ratify a lot, but the 
implementation is very limited, sometimes even non-existent.” 
 Chapter V indeed showed that Senegal is only to a limited extent in 
compliance with the human rights framework in relation to the practice of 
                                                        
29 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations, Senegal, A/49/38(SUPP) para. 666-728, 12 April 1994, p. 127, para. 721; United Nations 
Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations, Senegal, CAT/C/SEN/CO/3, 17 January 2013, 
p. 5, para. 14; United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding 
Observations, Senegal, E/C.12/1/Add.62, 24 September 2001, p. 2, para. 11. Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, Concluding Observations, Senegal, CRC/C/SEN/CO/2, 20 October 2006, p. 3, para. 7 
and p. 11, para. 50.  
30 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Senegal, CCPR/C/79/Add.10, 
28 December 1992, p. 2, para. 4.  
31 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, 
Senegal, E/C.12/1/Add.62, 24 September 2001, p. 4, para. 24 
32 Ibid, p. 5, para. 39.  
33 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations, Senegal, 
CAT/C/SEN/CO/3, 17 January 2013, p. 5, para. 14.  
34 Advance Questions to Senegal – Addendum, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/SNQuestions.aspx [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015]. 
 
 
 
Chapter VI 
358 
FGM/C. At first glance, the extent of compliance might seem rather promising: 
the Senegalese Constitution establishes the enjoyment of rights without 
discrimination, an impressive institutional framework has been established 
consisting of many NHRI that are involved in the promotion and protection of 
human rights, a national law criminalizing FGM/C is adopted in 1999, National 
Action Plans (NAPs) and many other policies have been adopted aimed at 
preventing and eliminating FGM/C, and CSOs are actively involved as regards 
to awareness raising at the community level. However, FGM/C is still practiced 
in Senegal with impunity. Despite the existence of legislation criminalizing the 
practice, the law is not sufficiently implemented nor enforced. Only a handful 
of individuals have been prosecuted for FGM/C since the adoption of the law 
in 1999. Cutters or family members that have been prosecuted did not serve the 
full prison sentence and were released early. Although NAPs and other policies 
have much potential in relation to coordination of actions in the field of FGM/C, 
these policies are not well implemented. There is no national mechanism in 
place for the implementation and monitoring of legislation, law enforcement 
and policies, nor are government resources made available for the elimination 
of FGM/C. Adequate social and/or psychological support services are not 
available for girls and women who have been subjected to FGM/C and those at 
risk. Awareness of FGM/C is not integrated in the curricula of (medical, legal, 
social work) students. There are no training programmes for health 
professionals (doctors, nurses, midwives, psychologists) to detect, manage and 
counsel FGM/C. Non-formal and informal educational activities and trainings 
on FGM/C are sporadically provided in the relevant sectors.  
 Thus, there are major gaps between the de jure and de facto compliance in 
Senegal. Enacting laws and adopting policies is the beginning, but not the end. 
Although there is probably not a single country in the world that has a perfect 
human rights record, nor is in full compliance with the human rights 
framework in relation to FGM/C, the level of compliance in Senegal proved to 
be (disappointingly) limited. The next section will provide an answer to the 
central question. The factors described in the theoretical framework of this 
research (Chapter II) will be linked with the results of the empirical study in 
Senegal (Chapter V). Below, an analysis of the nine factors that explain 
compliance and/or non-compliance with the human rights framework in 
relation to FGM/C in Senegal will be provided.  
 
5. FACTORS EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE AND/OR NON-COMPLIANCE  
 
First of all, not all factors that follow from IL and IR theories were found in 
Senegal. Several IL theories pointed to ambiguity in treaty language as a factor 
that explains non-compliance. In Franck’s legitimacy theory, rule-clarity and 
textual determinacy is seen as the necessary first step towards compliance. 
According to Franck, indeterminate rules make it harder to know what is 
expected, but also make it easier to justify non-compliance.35 Similarly, Chayes 
                                                        
35 T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 54; T.M. 
Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, American Journal of International Law, Volume 82, 
1988, p. 714.  
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& Chayes argued that the language of international law is often “unable to 
capture meaning with precision,”36 which can create a “zone of ambiguity 
within which it is difficult to say with precision what is permitted and what 
forbidden.”37 According to Chayes & Chayes, States take advantage of the 
indeterminacy of treaty language to justify a broad interpretation of treaty 
provisions. In that way, many States seek to discover the limits of their treaty 
obligations. 38  Other scholars have equally stated that the human rights 
described in international treaties are “invariably vague and ambiguous.”39 
It is indeed true that provisions that are important in relation to the 
elimination of the practice of FGM/C in both the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) have considerable interpretive 
space. For example, Article 2(f) of the CEDAW obligates States Parties to “take 
all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women” and Article 5(a) of the CEDAW obliges States Parties to “take 
all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct 
of men and women.” Similarly, Article 24(3) of the CRC requires States Parties 
to “take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing 
traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.” Both the CEDAW and 
CRC do not define what “effective” or “appropriate” measures are, nor do both 
Conventions provide guidance as to what it exactly means to “modify” social 
and cultural “patterns of conduct.” However, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) sets forth the general rules of treaty interpretation. 
Article 31(1) establishes the guiding principle that a treaty shall be interpreted 
“in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”40 
The case study in Senegal showed, however, that the Senegalese government 
knows exactly what is expected from them in relation to the elimination of 
FGM/C. Although the treaty language in the provisions of the CEDAW and 
CRC are general, arguably a bit vague and imposes broad obligations upon 
States, it was for the Senegalese State clear what the object and purpose, or to 
use the words of Chayes & Chayes what the “spirit”41 of the legally binding 
treaty obligations (and non-binding recommendations following from soft-law 
instruments) contain. The respondents never mentioned that the ambiguity of 
treaty language is a problem in relation to the ‘compliance question’. In 
addition, the reports submitted to TMBs also provide evidence that Senegal 
knows precisely what is expected from them; since the State clearly reported 
                                                        
36 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 10.  
37 Ibid, p. 10-11.  
38 Ibid, p. 11-13.  
39 J. Tobin, Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty Interpretation, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, Volume 23, No. 1, 2010, p. 1.  
40 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, Volume 1155, p. 331, Article 31(1).  
41 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 13.  
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which “appropriate” measures were taken in relation to the elimination of the 
practice.  
 
Secondly, several IL and IR theories pointed to the lack of national capacity and 
resources as a factor that explains non-compliance. According to Henkin’s 
compliance theory, national institutions could hinder State compliance with 
international law. 42  Henkin explains that international law is sometimes 
violated when the governmental machinery is inadequate, when administration 
is ineffective, when departments responsible for carrying out undertakings are 
remiss in doing so.43 Similarly, the managerial theory of Chayes & Chayes 
explains that States (sometimes) unwillingly violate international law, because 
of existing deficits in domestic regulatory capacity.44 These deficits could be a 
lack of scientific, technical, bureaucratic, and financial resources to build 
effective domestic enforcement systems. For that reason, one of the elements of 
the managerial theory of Chayes & Chayes is building capacity (or “technical 
assistance”) to enable non-complying States to act in accordance with 
international law.45 The ‘renewed’ spiral model of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink also 
included the institutional (in)capacity as an explanation for (non-)compliance 
with human rights norms.46  
The lack of national capacity and resources is indeed an important factor 
hampering compliance with the human right framework in relation to FGM/C 
in Senegal. The Senegalese government has mandated the Department of the 
Family (Direction de la Famille) of the Ministry of Women, Family and Children 
(Ministre de la Femme, de la Famille et de l’Enfance) to be the coordinating body to 
take action in the field of FGM/C. They are responsible for the implementation 
of the National Action Plans and must coordinate activities at the strategic and 
technical level. However, there is a lack of human, financial and material 
resources at this Department. The weak capacity of the Department of the 
Family and the lack of ownership, coordination and cooperation at the national 
level (with other Ministries, but also with other actors in the field) contributes to 
non-compliance with the human rights framework. One of the explanations for 
the problems at the Department of the Family is the institutional instability and 
the lack of continuity, caused by the frequent change of the government. In 
addition, another major problem is inadequate resource mobilization. The 
Senegalese government did not allocate sufficient budgets for the 
implementation of policies on FGM/C; the National Action Plans on FGM/C 
are, for example, completely unfunded by the State (but the UNFPA-UNICEF 
Joint Programme, among others, provided financial support instead).  
Not only at the Ministerial level this lack of capacity proved to be a problem, 
but also in relation to the National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) at the 
                                                        
42 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 60. 
43 Ibid, p. 74-76. 
44 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 14-15. 
45 Ibid, p. 25.  
46 E.S. Bates, Sophisticated Constructivism in Human Rights Compliance Theory, The European 
Journal of International Law, Volume 25, No. 4, 2015, p. 1171.  
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national level. The Senegalese authorities have established an impressive 
institutional framework consisting of many NHRIs that are involved in the 
promotion and protection of human rights, including the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and the Promotion of Peace (Haut Commissariat aux Droits de 
l’Homme et à la Promotion de la Paix), the Senegalese Human Rights Committee 
(Comité Sénégalais des Droits de l’Homme), the Inter-Ministerial Committee on 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (Comité Inter-Ministériel des 
Droits de l'Homme et du Droit International Humanitaire), the National Human 
Rights Advisory Council (Conseil Consultatif National des Droits de l’Homme), and 
the Office of the Ombudsman (Médiateur). All NHRIs deal with matters 
concerning the implementation of international and regional human rights law. 
However, there is not a clear division of tasks or coordination between these 
institutions. Respondents expressed their doubts about the functioning of these 
NHRIs. Indeed, what matters is not the number of institutions, but the actions 
they take and the work they deliver. Unfortunately, the work of the NHRIs in 
Senegal leaves much to be desired, which was also confirmed when the 
Senegalese Human Rights Committee lost its “A” status for non-compliance 
with the ‘Paris Principles’.47 The Senegalese Human Rights Committee was 
downgraded to “B” status (not fully in compliance with the Paris Principles), 
mainly because the independence of the institution was at stake.   
According to Chayes & Chayes’ managerial theory, capacity building has a 
major function in enabling countries to comply with the requirements of a 
certain treaty. Capacity building is indeed an important factor that enhanced 
the process of compliance in Senegal. The technical and financial support of 
international organizations contributed greatly toward compliance. In the first 
place, UNICEF tried to reinforce the capacity of the Department of the Family 
by offering one UNICEF employee to work fulltime at the Department, with the 
aim to push the agenda on FGM/C forward. In the second place, the adoption 
of policies in relation to FGM/C in Senegal was mainly an effort of the UNFPA-
UNICEF Joint Programme and CSOs. One respondent argued for example: “It 
[the National Action Plan] should be a government document, but that is not 
the case now. This National Action Plan was an effort of the UN partners.” In 
the third place, the technical and financial support of the West Africa Regional 
Office of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) was important. The OHCHR provided a consultant to the 
Ministry of Women, Family and Children to support the drafting of periodic 
reports and to organize a validation workshop. Respondents argued that the 
support of the OHCHR contributed substantially in submitting the third to 
seventh reports to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAWCee) and the third to fifth reports to the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (CRCee) in 2013.  
 
                                                        
47 The Paris Principles are a set of core minimum recommendations relating to the status and 
functioning of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights. The Paris 
Principles are set out in United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 48/134 on National Institutions 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, A/RES/48/134, 20 December 1993. 
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In the third place, several IL and IR theories pointed to a lack of deterrence and 
the fear for punishment and sanctions as factors that explain compliance and non-
compliance. Henkin noted for example in his compliance theory that if the only 
response to violation of a treaty is termination of that specific clause or article, 
the State might not be likely to be deterred from violating that provision.48 
Franck also hints in that direction when he asks the question: “why do powerful 
nations obey powerless rules?”49 Franck also mentions the absence of a coercive 
authority, or in his words the absence of a “global sheriff” in his legitimacy 
theory. According to realists, the international system lacks an authoritative 
government or a central authority. There is, according to them, no common 
power that can enact and enforce rules of behaviour. However, institutionalists 
argue that international institutions do enhance compliance,50 mainly because 
States’ do care about the threat of sanctions.51 
The human rights TMB system is established to monitor compliance with 
human rights standards. Although periodic reporting to TMBs is a key legal 
obligation, late reporting and outright failure to submit reports to TMB have 
been persistent characteristics of the TMB system.52 Senegal is not in compliance 
with reporting obligations, since the last three decades have shown extreme 
delays in the submission of periodic reports. It took the Senegalese government 
for example 22 years to submit the third to seventh periodic report to the 
CEDAWCee and the fifth report to the HRC is overdue since 2000. This is not 
only the case for the UN TMB system, but also for the African Union (AU) 
monitoring system. However, Senegal is not an exception. Research has shown 
that only 16% of States parties report on time and when counted with a one-
year grace period after the established deadline, still only one-third of reports 
were submitted on time.53 Senegal has been requested by several TMBs to 
include in their reports information on the measures taken to eliminate FGM/C 
in the country. In addition, TMBs have offered recommendations and practical 
suggestions to this end. However, a weakness of the monitoring mechanism is 
the lack of incentive to report on one’s own wrongdoings. Senegal was overly 
optimistic in their reports to the TMBs and the UPR about the measures taken 
and the progress made in relation to the elimination of FGM/C. In quite a lot of 
national reports, the information provided by the Government of Senegal did 
not correspond with reality. For example, Senegal Stated in the second report to 
the UPR that important results have been achieved, more specifically “a 25.7 
                                                        
48 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 77. 
49 T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 3.  
50 O.A. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’, Yale Law Journal, Volume 112, 
2002, p. 1950.  
51 Ibid, p. 1951. 
52 M. O'Flaherty and C. O'Brien, Reform of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies: A Critique 
of the Concept Paper on the High Commissioner's Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body, 
Human Rights Law Review, Volume 7, No. 1, 2007, p. 141.  
53 N. Pillay, Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System, A Report by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 2012, p. 21, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/HRTD/docs/HCReportTBStrengthening.pdf [Last 
Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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per cent reduction in the national female genital mutilation prevalence rate.”54 
This is incorrect, since this percentage is the national prevalence rate, not a 
reduction in the national prevalence rate. TMBs have little power to force States 
to comply with the procedures and concerns have been expressed about the 
monitoring system’s effectiveness. The UN and AU monitoring mechanisms are, 
to a large extent, powerless to punish Senegal when it is not in compliance. 
There is indeed a lack of sufficient deterrence or coercive enforcement at the 
international and regional level. However, if deterrence or coercive enforcement 
will be present, this will not (automatically) lead to compliance.  
 
In the fourth place, several IL and IR theories pointed to reputation as a factor 
that explains compliance. Henkin explained in his compliance theory that States 
comply with international law, because of “foreign policy factors.” He argued 
that States desire their relations with other countries to be orderly and 
friendly.55 States do not like to be accused or criticized by other States and 
violations between two States will negatively influence their relations. 
According to Henkin, considerations regarding “honour,” “prestige,” 
“leadership,” “influence,” “stability,” “reliability” and “reputation” often 
weighs in favour of international law compliance. States desire a reputation for 
principled behaviour, for propriety and respectability.56 Henkin also noted that 
compliance with international law is dependent on the attitude of States 
towards international law. Some States are – according to Henkin – sensitive to 
stigma of violating international law. Guzman’s explains in his reputational 
theory that a State’s decision to comply with international law reflects a 
judgment that the costs of violation outweigh the benefits.57 According to 
Guzman, reputation plays a central role in this compliance ‘calculation’, and so 
do direct sanctions: “along with the possibility of direct sanctions, reputation 
provides an incentive for States to comply with their obligations.”58 The greater 
the costs incurred by loss of reputation or sanctions for violating international 
law, the greater the propensity of States to comply with international law. 
Unlike Chayes & Chayes, who argue that sanctions are never required or 
appropriate to ensure compliance, Downs Rocke & Barsoom argue in their 
enforcement theory that sanctions are needed.  
Senegal likes to be perceived as a country that is respectful in the promotion 
and protection of human rights and it has a fear to damage this reputation. 
Respondents explained that Senegal is in general a very proud country. More 
specifically, it is proud to be an exception in the region with regard to the level 
of democracy and the absence of a military coup. One of the respondents 
argued: “We are seen as a good model of African democracy.” Senegal wants to 
maintain its position and aims to be “ahead” of other countries. It wants to be 
                                                        
54 United Nations General Assembly, National Report of Senegal, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/WG.6/17/SEN/1, 23 July 2013, para. 24.  
55 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 52. 
56 Ibid. 
57 A.T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, California Law Review, Volume 
90, 2002, p. 1853.  
58 Ibid, p. 1886.  
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perceived as an example for other African countries and see itself as a “leader” 
in West Africa. Many respondents explained that Senegal cares a lot about this 
‘image’ of the country. One of the respondents argued: “It is just because they 
are afraid that their counterpart would look down at them.” Reputational 
concerns are indeed important in relation to the ‘compliance question’ in 
Senegal.  
 
In the fifth place, several IL and IR theories pointed to power and coercion as 
factors that explain compliance and non-compliance. Realists explain that 
‘power and coercion’ rather than ‘the rule of law’, is the answer to the question 
why States comply with international law. 59  Classical realists argue that 
international treaties exist only because powerful States benefit from their 
existence. They regard international law as an instrument for powerful States to 
achieve their objectives. Thus, international law is complied with only when it 
is in the interest of dominant and powerful States, which coerce less powerful 
States into accepting the international legal framework and complying with it.60 
According to realists, the level of compliance with international law will 
depend on the presence of the hegemon(s) and its use. In other words: States 
comply with international rules, because “someone else makes them.”61 This 
also means that States are not bound by international law, but remain free to 
violate international law whenever it is in their interest to do so. Koh also use 
the factor coercion in his transnational legal process theory. He refers to the 
realist values of power and coercion to explain instances of compliance with 
international law. He suggested that States never truly comply with 
international law, but only comply with it when sufficiently coerced.62  
In general, respondents explained that Senegal feels pressure from the 
international community to comply with the human rights framework. 
Respondents argued for example that President Leopold Senghor “wanted to 
please the West so much that he would accept everything.” Some respondents 
pointed to economic factors that play a role in treaty ratification and compliance. 
They argued that compliance with the human rights framework secures aid to 
Senegal; the distribution of foreign aid among recipient countries is, according 
to some respondents, an important factor why Senegal complies. A more 
specific example of the influence is the adoption of Law No. 99-05 criminalizing 
FGM/C in Senegal just one month before the US State Department’s annual 
report on human rights was to be released.63 This report includes a list of 
African States that have criminalized FGM/C and those that have not. It is used 
as a guide for Congress and US agencies on how to allocate military and 
                                                        
59 R.B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory: A Synthesis, Compliance Theory: A Synthesis, Review of 
European Community & International Environmental Law, Volume 2, No. 4, 1993, p. 327.  
60 O.A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Yale Law Journal, Volume 112, 
2002, pp. 1945.  
61 H.H. Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, Indiana Law Journal, Volume 74, 
1999, p. 1402. 
62 Ibid, p. 1401-1402. 
63 Hecht, D., When a Law Sweeps in, Tradition Lashes Back, 4 February 1999, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0204/p1s3.html/(page)/4 [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
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financial aid. 64  Critics therefore say that the government, which receives 
substantial aid from the US, adopted the law “to please American 
sensitivities”65 A significant portion of the population were of the opinion that 
(foreign) donors and international partners had imposed this law on the 
Senegalese population.66 However, this factor could also influence compliance 
negatively. One of the respondents explained for example, when elaborating on 
the problem of the extreme delays in the submission of periodic reports, that the 
Senegalese government “does not want to put effort in writing a report that is 
going to the West, to prove to them that we are good people.”  
 
In the sixth place, the compliance theory of Henkin also noted that political 
personalities (and their personal power and tenure) are a factor influencing 
compliance with international law. 67  According to Henkin, a special 
commitment of a president or politician to a rule or international agreement 
enhances the likelihood of compliance. 
The role and influence of political personalities is indeed a factor that 
positively influenced the process of compliance. Respondents mentioned 
President Léopold Sédar Senghor68 in relation to the human rights framework 
in general. He was committed to consolidate democracy and the rule of law as 
well as the respect for the protection of human rights.69 Respondents described 
him as very “open-minded” and “encouraging” in this regard. In relation to the 
practice of FGM/C specifically, respondents explained that President Abdou 
Diouf70 played an important role. FGM/C had been a subject long avoided by 
Senegalese politicians out of fear of losing the support of their constituents, but 
President Abdou Diouf was a vocal supporter of efforts to stop FGM/C. The 
respondents characterized him as an advocate for human rights and he was 
taking the lead to end FGM/C in Senegal. His speech in 1997 during the 33rd 
Congress of the International Federation for Human Rights in Dakar, where he 
openly took a stand against FGM/C, was frequently mentioned during the 
interviews as a decisive moment in Senegal. In addition, another person that 
was mentioned during the interviews was Ndèye Soukèye Gueye, who was for 
a long time the head of the Department of the Family. Respondents argued that 
when she was in power, things in relation to FGM/C were moving forward and 
the human rights framework was being implemented. She was praised for the 
                                                        
64 Hecht, D., Senegal: Ban on Female Circumcision Backfires, InterPress Third World News Agency, 
1999, available at http://www.panix.com/~squigle/dcp/fgmlaw.html [Last Accessed 1 October 
2015].  
65 The Economist, Female Genital Mutilation: Is it Crime or Culture? Banning the Practice May not be the 
Best Way of Ending it, 11 February 1999, available at http://www.economist.com/node/185966 
[Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
66 AWEPA, Senegalese Parliamentarians Mobilized Against Female Genital Mutilation: Dr. Omar Ndoye 
Interview, 11 October 2013, available at http://www.awepa.org/news/interview-with-dr-omar-
ndoye/ [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
67 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 64-66.  
68 President Léopold Sédar Senghor was the first President of the Republic of Senegal (1960-1980). 
69 See also C.H. Heyns and F. Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the 
Domestic Level, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, p. 518.  
70 President Abdou Diouf was the second President of the Republic of Senegal (1981-2000). 
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role she played during her term at the Ministry. However, this factor could also 
influence compliance negatively. Just after President Abdou Diouf called for a 
law to criminalize FGM/C in Senegal at his Council of Ministers, he tracked 
back and claimed that the law was intended to be symbolic in nature.71  
 
In the seventh place, several IL theories pointed to legitimacy and fairness as a 
factor that explains compliance and non-compliance. Franck explained in his 
legitimacy theory that legitimacy is the driving force behind State compliance. 
The (perceived) fairness of international rules themselves is – according to 
Franck – the key to compliance. Legitimacy exerts a “pull to compliance” and 
rules that are not fair exert little “compliance pull.” Koh similarly argued in his 
transnational legal process theory that rule-legitimacy is a factor that explains 
compliance. He assumed that States comply with international law, guided by a 
sense of moral obligation derived from considerations of fairness, democracy 
and legitimacy.72 The internalization process aims to “bind that other party to 
obey the interpretation as part of its internal value set.”73  
Considerations relating to legitimacy and fairness indeed play a major role 
in Senegal. Local customs clashed with human rights norms, which was for 
example clearly observable in relation to the adoption of Law No. 99-05 
criminalizing FGM/C in 1999. There was widespread resistance against the 
enactment of the law. This resistance came in the first place from communities, 
who had a long-standing history of practicing FGM/C. They felt that their local 
culture was being threatened. Second of all, resistance against the adoption of 
the law came from traditional spiritual leaders and – perhaps unexpectedly – 
also from Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Practicing communities 
considered FGM/C as a positive norm and therefore did not accept the law. 
They could not identify themselves with the “unfair” law. Since there is a lack 
of public legitimacy (or lack of ‘social internalization’ of the norm, according to 
the theory of Koh), there is also a lack of compliance. Practicing communities 
did not (and still do not) report cases to the police. When family members 
and/or cutters are nevertheless arrested (for example when CSOs tip the 
police), they are often pardoned before the case can be judged because 
communities go on strike and demonstrate in front of the courtroom. Most 
cutters or family members who have been sentenced to jail did not serve the full 
prison sentence. They were released early, because clashes broke out between 
practicing communities and local police. Respondents explained that as long 
people support the practice, a national law criminalizing FGM/C would not 
stop them. UNFPA explains that at the local level, social norms have usually 
“more influence over people’s everyday lives than do the actions of the national 
government. From the point of view of society, power resides at the community 
level. People pay much more attention to social norms –and to local leaders 
                                                        
71 B. Shell-Duncan et al., Legislating Change? Responses to Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting in 
Senegal, Law & Society Review, Volume 47, No. 4, 2013, p. 817. 
72 H.H. Koh, 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 
2102, 1998, p. 635.  
73 H.H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, Yale Law Journal, Volume 106, 1997, p. 2646. 
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who support them– than to a national law. They identify with social norms 
much more strongly, even if they know that a law exists.”74     
 
In the eighth place, the managerial theory of Chayes & Chayes pointed to the 
temporal dimension of the social, economic, and political changes contemplated 
by regulatory treaties as a factor that lies at the root of non-compliance with 
international law. This factor is closely related to the previous factor of 
legitimacy and fairness. Chayes & Chayes explain that significant changes in 
social systems with the means of treaties take time and that a period of 
transition is always necessary. They emphasized that the problem of a ‘time lag’ 
is more prominent in the field of human rights: “Human rights norms, despite 
their almost universal acceptance, are slow to establish themselves in places 
where they may clash with local customs, culture, and systems of 
government.”75  
 The ‘temporal dimension’ indeed played a role in Senegal. As the previous 
section showed, there was a lot of resistance against the enactment of the law. 
The CSO Tostan requested a delay in the implementation of the law, because 
they were of the opinion that a wide sensitization/education campaign among 
practicing communities was needed first. The Minister of Justice refused to 
allow for a delay in the application of the law. As a result, Tostan had to 
suspend activities, since it increased defensiveness among the communities that 
practice FGM/C: “Village women did not want to participate in the programs, 
angry about the law that now made their friends and neighbours criminals.”76 
Many respondents were of the opinion that the law came too early and argued 
that the country was not ready for the law. A representative of civil society 
argued: “It was too soon for the population to accept and adopt that law, 
because they were not really sensitized. And they did not know or understand 
why the law was adopted. They did not understand why FGM was all of a 
sudden forbidden.” The adoption of the law came as a surprise for the 
Senegalese population. The Senegalese government did not consult the 
communities that practice FGM/C, nor community leaders nor religious 
leaders, in the process of formally criminalizing the practice. The law came too 
early and a “period of transition” might have resulted in better compliance. 
Respondents recommended that it is important to take time before a law is 
enforced, to make sure that: (i) the process is inclusive; (ii) key players are 
involved; and (iii) communities are informed and have the time to be sensitized, 
in order to achieve compliance with the norm.  
 
In the ninth place, several IL and IR theories pointed to the pressure of influential 
parties and/or the pressure of domestic interest groups as factors that influences 
compliance positively and negatively. According to the compliance theory of 
                                                        
74 United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Children’s Fund, Senegal: Human Rights Key 
to Ending FGM/C, Legislation is Just One Aspect of an Effective Campaign, p. 4, available at 
http://www.unfpa.org/gender/docs/fgmc_kit/LawSenegal.pdf [Last Accessed 1 October 2015].  
75 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 16.  
76 M. Antonazzo, Problems with Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting, Peace Review, Volume 15, No. 
4, 2003, p. 474. 
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Henkin, this factor is a driving force of non-compliance with international law.77 
Alternatively, liberal theorists argue that compliance with international law is 
determined in large part by the domestic structure of a country: liberal States 
tend to comply more with international human rights law commitments than 
non-liberal States, mainly because domestic interest groups will put pressure on 
liberal States to comply with their international legal obligations. Similarly, Koh 
explains in his transnational legal process theory that not just States enforce 
international human rights law, but “people like us, by people with the courage 
and commitment to bring international human rights law home through a 
transnational legal process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization.”78  
The spiral model of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink also includes the important role of 
domestic opposition groups in mobilizing and effectuating change.79  
This factor plays a major role in Senegal in relation to the ‘compliance 
question’. First of all, the pressure and influence by Marabouts80 is an important 
factor in relation to the ‘compliance question’ in Senegal.  The population in 
Senegal is predominantly Muslim (94%) and Marabouts have a major influence 
in the Senegalese society. The Senegalese population (including amongst others, 
politicians, judges and police officers) are unwilling or unable to oppose the 
Marabouts. Respondents explained that the Marabouts spheres of influence reach 
to virtually all sectors of life. One respondent explained: “They [Muslims in 
Senegal] don’t make their own choices, but they believe what Marabouts are 
telling them. They just accept it.” Very often, the position of the Marabout is of 
greater significance than the Senegalese government or national law. Marabouts 
have also a big influence in relation to the practice of FGM/C, since they all are 
in favour of the practice and defend FGM/C as part of their religion and 
tradition. When Law No. 99-05 criminalizing FGM/C was debated in 
Parliament, the supreme Marabout of northern Senegal, Thierno Mountaga Tall, 
pronounced a fatwa81 in which he cited a Prophet’s Hadith82 from which he 
inferred that FGM/C “is a corollary to circumcision […] and both operations 
are intrinsic elements of human nature.”83 In addition, this supreme Marabout 
distributed a document in the Parliament called Striking proofs concerning the 
recommendable practice of excision of young girls 84  explaining the religious 
importance of FGM/C. Furthermore, Marabouts urged Muslim deputies to vote 
                                                        
77 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 74.  
78 H.H. Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, Indiana Law Journal, Volume 74, 
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79 T. Risse et al., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, p. 22.  
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81 A fatwa is a religious edict. 
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other founders of Islam said on any matter.  
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against the bill. Some Parliamentarians were strongly influenced by this 
pressure and raised questions during the debate about FGM/C and religion. 
Some deputies explained that they could not vote for the law, because they did 
not want to criminalize their relatives for respecting tradition and religion.85  
Not only in relation to the adoption of the law, but also during court cases, 
Marabouts have influenced the outcome of cases. During the trial of one of the 
(few) court cases, around 200 local Marabouts spoke out in defence of the cutter 
and of FGM/C and declared that the law prohibiting FGM/C should be 
repealed.86 The Marabouts demanded the liberation of the offenders, which 
eventually happened after three months imprisonment. Another problematic 
issue in relation to the influence of the Marabouts is the link between the 
Marabout and the belief in superstitious or sub-natural powers. When a judge in 
the region Matam who sentenced the parents and a cutter to jail – against the 
will of one of the Marabouts who threatened the judge – got a heart attack, many 
people in Senegal believed that the judge had gone against the laws of ancestors 
or the will of Allah. They interpreted the heart attack as a sign that the judge 
took the wrong decision and that he should have listened to the Marabout. The 
consequences of this case in Matam for the enforcement of the law prohibiting 
FGM/C were enormous, since no prosecutor, no lawyer and no judge dared to 
burn their fingers on an FGM/C case. In Senegal, the pressure of Marabouts 
hamper compliance with the human rights framework in relation to the practice 
of FGM/C. However, the pressure of religious leaders could also enhance 
compliance with the human rights framework in relation to the practice of 
FGM/C. For example, the fatwa issued by the Al-Azhar Supreme Council of 
Islamic Research in Egypt in 2007 has considerable influence in countries where 
FGM/C is a common practice. It is one of the first authoritative condemnations 
of FGM/C in Islam. The fatwa explains that FGM/C has no basis in Sharia or 
any of its partial provisions, and that it is an act that should be avoided. In 2013, 
the Senegalese Network of Islam and Population (Réseau Islam & Population) 
issued the ‘Islamic Argument for the abandonment of excision in Senegal’ 
(Argumentaire Islamique pour l’abandon de l’excision au Sénégal). This document 
clearly refers to the fatwa issued by the Al-Azhar Supreme Council and 
provides a response to actors in the field who are confronted with opposition 
based on religious arguments. Furthermore, the Network of Islam and 
Population bring together a number of experts and organize workshops and 
meetings in the field of Islamic religious doctrine, imams, academic researchers 
and representatives of the major fraternities and Marabout families. They are 
deeply committed to eliminate FGM/C in Senegal.  
Second of all, the pressure and influence of civil society is an important 
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factor in relation to the ‘compliance question’ in Senegal. Civil society in 
Senegal is very strong and CSOs have a powerful voice. CSOs in Senegal have 
put pressure on the government to ratify human rights treaties. Women’s 
groups were very much aware of the existence of international and regional 
human rights treaties and were engaged to push the government to sign and 
them. In addition, CSOs have put pressure on the government to comply with 
the human rights framework. One civil society representative said: “We have 
some organizations that are really playing their watchdog role about the 
violation of human rights and they even have ways to reporting at international 
level.” More specifically, activists and CSOs brought not only FGM/C to the 
attention of the ‘general public’ in Senegal in the 1990s, but they also pushed for 
the adoption of the national law criminalizing FGM/C. Respondents explained 
that these activists were very intelligent, strong, influential Senegalese women 
who were very committed to women’s rights issues. These CSOs, women’s 
associations and intellectuals were convinced that FGM/C should be eliminated. 
The women’s organizations worked closely together and were able to 
effectively mobilise the Collective of Women Parliamentarians. The female 
presence in the Senegalese government, as well as women’s activism and the 
fact that FGM/C was practiced among minority groups, made the law against 
FGM/C pass. Together with UN partners, CSOs actively put effort in 
developing the policies. The work and experience of CSOs in the field was 
taken into account, especially when the second NAP was developed. 
Respondents considered the work of CSOs in the communities crucial in 
relation to the ‘compliance question’. Many respondents (including 
representatives of the government, civil society and international organizations) 
explained that CSOs do “most of the work” in the field of FGM/C in Senegal. A 
civil society representative explained: “In communities, NGOs are doing the 
implementation, instead of the State.” A representative of an international 
organization explained: “The Ministry of the Family is in the lead to 
coordinating the NAPs, but it is all the NGOs who work hard.” A 
representative of civil society said: “The work of civil society organizations 
reflects actually the work of the government, which is trying to eradicate the 
practice FGM.”  
Thirdly, the pressure and influence of international organizations is an 
important factor in relation to the ‘compliance question’ in Senegal, but this has 
already been discussed in relation to ‘capacity building’.   
 
6. COMPLEX PUZZLE OF PUSH- AND PULL FACTORS 
 
From the above it becomes clear that there is no clear-cut answer to the 
‘compliance question’ in relation to the practice of FGM/C in Senegal. A 
complicated mix of actors interact, work together and clarify why Senegal is 
partly in compliance and partly not in compliance with the human rights 
framework in relation to the practice of FGM/C.  
After having addressed the factors that explain compliance and non-
compliance with the human rights framework in relation to the practice of 
FGM/C in Senegal, the next (and final) step of this research is to revert to the 
theoretical framework. Chapter II established a difference between two broad 
types of theories, namely interest-based (or rationalist) theories and norm-based 
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(or normative) theories. Both groups of theories provide insights into 
compliance-related behaviour. Norm-based theories focus more on cooperation, 
the normative power of rules to shape the conduct of States, the persuasive 
power of ideas and the influence of shared discourse. States comply because of 
their commitments and follow the “logic of appropriateness.” Interest-based 
theories focus more on deterrence and enforcement and regard States as 
rational, self-interested actors that calculate costs and benefits in an anarchic 
international system. States choose rationally to comply or not to comply and 
follow the “logic of (expected) consequences.” Although both types of theories 
appear at first glance to be mutually exclusive, the analysis in this research has 
shown that factors that follow from both norm-based theories (such as 
legitimacy, lack of capacity, time lags) as well as factors that follow from 
interest-based theories (such as reputational concerns, power and coercion, 
punishment and sanctions) explain te behaviour of the Senegalese State. There 
is thus no single theory (or type of theory) that is ‘right’, ‘more prominent’ or 
that explains for 100% why Senegal complies with or violates the human rights 
framework in relation to the practice of FGM/C. Norm-based theories are 
perhaps “too optimistic” and a bit “naive” about the compliance behaviour of 
States. In turn, interest-based theories are perhaps “too negative” and “too 
sceptical” about the compliance behaviour of States.87 Factors from both norm-
based theories and interest-based theories provide useful and complementary 
insights into Senegal’s behaviour. To use the words of Koh: “Each theory or 
factor gets a piece of the puzzle right, but none alone captures the entire 
picture.”88 A mix of all factors, or all pieces together, forms the answer to the 
‘compliance question’. Although sometimes there are strong forces pushing 
Senegal towards compliance (for example the fear of loss of reputation or the or 
the pressure of civil society), at the same time there are strong forces 
influencing compliance negatively (lack of national capacity and resources or 
the lack of deterrence). There is no single factor that has the power to force 
Senegal to comply with the human rights framework in relation to the practice 
of FGM/C. Compliance is an ongoing process of push and pull factors that 
influences the ‘compliance decision’ of Senegal. At the time of this research, 
some factors were more prominent than others. For example, the lack of 
national capacity and the influence of the Marabouts were more prominent than 
for example political personalities and concerns about reputation. However, as 
this research has shown, this was different in the past (President Abdou Diouf 
was a vocal supporter of efforts to stop FGM/C in the 1990s) and can (rapidly) 
change in the future, depending on the circumstances. 
In addition – perhaps more unexpectedly – there is no clear division 
between factors that explain compliance one the one hand and factors that 
explain non-compliance (as the IL and IR theorists often want us to believe) on 
the other. Instead, as demonstrated in the analysis in section 6, the same factors 
that contribute towards compliance, often also hamper compliance, and the 
other way around.  
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The ultimate goal of the human rights framework is to generate real change, 
more specifically to reduce and eventually eliminate the practice of FGM/C 
worldwide. However, the human rights framework itself does not guarantee 
automatic compliance behaviour. Becoming a party to a treaty is one step, but 
recognition of rights on paper is not sufficient. This research showed that a 
discrepancy exist between the commitments of Senegal to comply with the 
human rights framework on the one hand and the actual behaviour of Senegal 
on the other. Despite the efforts of the Senegalese government, which must be 
acknowledged, the extent of compliance with the human rights framework in 
relation to FGM/C in Senegal is limited. More than one million girls and 
women in Senegal are living with the consequences of FGM/C and hundreds of 
thousands of girls and women in Senegal run the risk of undergoing, and will 
undergo the practice in the (near) future. A lot of work remains to be done. 
There is a clear need to intensify, expand and improve efforts in relation to 
FGM/C in order to achieve greater compliance with the human rights 
framework. 
But does that mean that the commitments of Senegal in relation to the 
elimination of FGM/C should be regarded as “empty promises”? This research 
showed that Senegal’s promises are not empty. It is a complicated process to 
generate the real change that is necessary to modify the status quo. It is a rather 
ambitious task for the Senegalese government to narrow the gap between the 
aspirations and values embodied in the human rights instruments and 
documents on the one hand, and the reality that FGM/C persists in Senegal on 
the other. To a large extent, the level of compliance is dependent on the 
(un)willingness of the Senegalese government to take action against FGM/C. 
Political will and political leadership is crucial. At the same time, although to a 
more limited extent, the (in)ability of Senegal to take action against the practice 
of FGM/C should also be mentioned. The human rights framework requires 
States to take costly measures, while , in the words of one of the respondents, 
has “many other incredible problems on their plate.” The answer to the 
‘compliance question’ is not only a matter of (political) willingness, but also a 
matter of ability.  
In the end, the question about compliance is a question about behavioural 
motivations. The Government of Senegal is ultimately responsible to bring their 
behaviour into compliance with the human rights framework. Although the 
State has an obligation to respect and protect the human rights of girls and 
women, Senegal is not the only or principal actor in relation to the ‘compliance 
question’. The influence and importance of other key actors (including CSOs, 
and international organizations like UNFPA and UNICEF) proved to be very 
important. They have much influence in relation to realizing compliance with 
the human rights framework.  
Some respondents suggested that key towards eliminating FGM/C in 
Senegal is “a matter of education.” Not only education in relation to the 
harmful physical, medical, and psychological effects of the practice of FGM/C, 
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but to raise the level education in general. The illiteracy rate in Senegal is very 
high (65%) and the education level of the Senegalese population is low, 
especially among women.89 When analyzing the DHS and MICS in Senegal, the 
statistics show indeed that the prevalence of FGM/C among young girls 
decreases, when the education level of the mother increases.90 The DHS-2014 
showed that the prevalence among young girls is 14.7% when the mother has 
no education compared to 6.7% when the mother has at least completed 
secondary education. Similarly, when the level of education increases, the view 
that FGM/C should be abandoned is also more common.91  
The main difficulty with the practice of FGM/C is that cultural change is 
required. FGM/C remains a persistent and complex practice in Senegal, which 
is (for all actors, including the government, CSOs and international 
organizations) hard to change. The elimination of FGM/C has not, and will not 
be realized overnight,92 and most probably not in one generation. The reason is 
that cultural norms, practices and traditions need to change, as well as 
patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding the roles, 
responsibilities and identities of girls and women in the family and society.93 
However, if the factors that have been identified in this research will be 
addressed in the (near) future, Senegal will most probably be able to turn their 
promises into a lasting reality, and generate positive change to girls and women 
at risk of undergoing the practice of FGM/C.  
 
 
                                                        
89 Overall, 57% of Senegalese women aged 15-49 have no formal education, compared to 48% of 
men in the same age-category. By contrast, only 3.1% of the women and 3.2% of men have 
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Patterns under the Women’s Discrimination Treaty, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
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93 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
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This research addresses the practice of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting 
(FGM/C), also known as female circumcision. The practice is defined as “all 
procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or 
other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons.”1 Over the 
last decades, discourse in relation to the elimination of FGM/C is positioned 
within the scope of international and regional human rights law. The practice is 
considered a form of Violence Against Women (VAW) and a human rights 
violation. A comprehensive human rights framework exists at both the 
international and regional levels that addresses VAW and harmful practices in 
general, and FGM/C in particular. Despite the various international and 
regional (quasi) legal norms addressing the practice of FGM/C, the prevalence 
rates have remained high in many of the countries where FGM/C occurs. This 
raises the question to what extent (and why) States comply, or in the case of 
FGM/C, appear not to comply, with the human rights framework that is 
designed to eliminate the practice. Senegal is selected as a case study. The 
central question of this research was the following: Which factors explain 
compliance and/or non-compliance with the human rights framework in relation to the 
practice of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Senegal?  
 
This research is structured in four parts, namely (I) theoretical framework; (II) 
human rights framework; (III) empirical analysis; and (IV) conclusions.  
 
Part I of this research consisted of the theoretical framework (Chapter II). Since 
the 1950s, legal theorists and political scientists have had extensive debates on 
the importance of international law and developed theories on the question 
why States comply with (or violate) international law, with the aim to gain a 
deeper understanding of the role of international law in shaping state 
behaviour. Henkin’s famous claim “it is probably the case that almost all 
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time”2 set the stage for new compliance scholarship 
in the end of the 1970s. Since then, both International Law (IL) and International 
Relations (IR) scholars have developed a wide variety of theories, in an effort to 
explain State compliance with international law. In Chapter II, these compliance 
theories were analyzed by means of a literature review, with the aim to identify 
                                                        
1 World Health Organization, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, WHO 
Library, 2008, p. 4.  
2 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1979, p. 47. 
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the factors that these theories ascribe compliance or non-compliance with 
international law in general and the human rights framework in particular.  
First of all, four IL theories and four IR theories that are generally regarded 
as the “dominant strands” (or “leading schools”) in IL and IR literature were 
examined (see table 7.1). IL and IR theories are often based on contradictory 
premises. In general, traditional IL scholars believe or have faith that 
international law matters and have built their theories on an assumption of a 
general propensity of States to comply with international law. These 
assumptions are probably rooted in predominant positivism of the traditional 
IL discipline. IR scholars are far more sceptical and assume the ample opposite. 
They have pessimistic expectations on the role of international law to change 
behaviour of States. However, the chasm between the two disciplines has 
narrowed as IL and IR theorists have begun to share insights in the late 1990s. 
The research agendas in IL and IR have converged around the ‘compliance 
question’.   
 
Table 7.1 Dominant strands in compliance theory 
 
International Law (IL) International Relations (IR) 
 
Henkin’s compliance theory 
 
Realism 
Chayes and Chayes’ managerial theory Institutionalism 
Franck’s legitimacy theory Liberalism 
Koh’s transnational legal process theory Constructivism 
 
Second of all, in this period of new interdisciplinary scholarship, alternative 
compliance theories have been developed that shed new light on the 
‘compliance question’. A new generation of IL and IR scholars have advanced 
the traditional IL and IR theories and shared distinct perspectives on 
international law in general and the human rights framework in particular. 
Seven theories that are in the current IL and IR literature accepted as 
alternatives to the “dominant strands” were examined in Chapter II as well, 
including: (i) Guzman’s reputational theory; (ii) Downs, Rocke & Barsoom's 
enforcement theory; (iii) Goldsmith & Posner’s limit theory; (iv) Risse, Ropp & 
Sikkink’s spiral model; (v) Goodman & Jinks’ State socialization theory; (vi) 
Brunnée & Toope‘s interactional theory; and (vii) Moore’s signaling theory. 
After careful analysis of all these compliance theories, a distinction was 
made between two groups of theories: (i) theories based on interest; (ii) and 
theories based on norms. It was found that these new approaches are largely in 
consistence with the considerable body of existing work of IL and IR scholars. 
Recent scholars draw on, and their theory is often a derivative of the traditional 
IL and IR theories. Several factors have been identified that explain compliance 
and non-compliance with international (human rights) law, which are listed in 
table 7.2 below.  
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Table 7.2 Factors explaining compliance and non-compliance  
 
Compliance Non-Compliance 
 
Self-interest 
 
Self-interest 
Legitimacy and fairness Legitimacy and fairness 
Transparent treaty language Ambiguity in treaty language 
Reputation Lack of national capacity 
Power and coercion Lack of deterrence 
Punishment and sanctions Pressure of influential parties 
Political personalities Inadequate legal advice 
Pacta sunt servanda Outdated treaty norms 
Reduce transaction costs Failing treaty negotiation process 
Symbolic validation, ritual and pedigree Time lag between commitment and compliance 
Coherence Clash with local customs 
Communitarianism Unauthorized act 
Internalization of rules  
Pressure of domestic interest groups  
Imitation of others  
Signaling  
Acculturation  
Reciprocity  
 
Part II of this research consisted of the human rights framework (Chapter III 
and IV). Chapter III provided more background information on the practice 
FGM/C. It was essential to explain in depth what the practice of FGM/C 
exactly entails, in order to be able to link the phenomenon to the different 
human rights that are being violated and the applicable human rights 
framework.  
Chapter III showed that there are four different types of FGM/C. The most 
severe type is infibulation, which involves the narrowing of the vaginal opening 
through the creation of a covering seal. UNICEF estimates that 125 million girls 
and women have undergone FGM/C, and an estimated 30 million girls are at 
risk of undergoing FGM/C over the next decade if current trends persist. 
However, the practice might be much more common than the figures of 
UNICEF show, because small-scale local research has increasingly collected 
evidence, showing that FGM/C is practiced in countries in Asia,3 the Middle 
                                                        
3 Including Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Tajikistan and Thailand. 
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East4 and Latin America.5 The practice became also a concern among migrant 
communities in Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
The practice occurs at all ages, but FGM/C is mostly carried out on girls 
between birth and age of 15. According to UNICEF, in half of the countries with 
available data on FGM/C, the majority of girls underwent FGM/C before their 
fifth birthday. Occasionally, adult women are also subjected to FGM/C (for 
example a few days before marriage, after marriage, or after their first 
pregnancy). The age at which girls and women undergo FGM/C varies 
substantially from country to country, and even within countries, depending on 
local traditions and circumstances. Traditional practitioners mostly carry out 
FGM/C. The practice is often seen as a “women’s business”, because the cutting 
is done by older women, primarily organized by (grand)mothers and practiced 
on young girls. The ‘medicalization’ of FGM/C – the practice being performed 
by doctors or other members of the health profession – is increasing in some 
countries, although the WHO has consistently condemned it. FGM/C is usually 
performed in rural areas in the girl’s home, traditionally without (proper) 
anaesthesia. Non-sterile cutting devices are likely to be used (on several girls at 
once), including: scissors, razor blades, knives, sharpened rocks or broken glass. 
The practice of FGM/C does not have any health benefits and can cause serious 
adverse immediate and long-term effects on the girl’s and women’s physical, 
sexual and emotional health, since it involves removing and damaging healthy 
female genital tissue. There is no clear-cut answer to the question why people 
practice FGM/C, since the reasons and justifications for the practice of FGM/C 
are numerous, intertwined and related to each other. The most commonly cited 
for the continuation of the practice are ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’. FGM/C is often 
deeply rooted in local culture and has been passed from one generation to 
another. Communities want to preserve their cultural identity and therefore 
uphold traditions like FGM/C. Another common justification for FGM/C is 
related to women’s sexuality. It is believed that uncut women will not be able to 
control their sexuality. FGM/C therefore safeguards a woman’s morality, 
sexual “purity” and ensures a lack of desire. It prevents a woman from 
engaging in promiscuity and discourages her from sinful and deviant sexual 
behaviour. Since in many practicing communities family honour depends on a 
girl’s virginity or sexual restraint, an uncut girl will bring shame on herself and 
her family, and she will subsequently found difficulties in getting married. 
Although FGM/C is practiced across religions, it has required a particular 
religious dimension. Significant proportions of practicing communities 
(especially in Asia and the Middle East) believe that FGM/C is a Muslim 
obligation, although no reference to FGM/C can be found in the Quran. The 
practice of FGM/C is also justified on the grounds of hygiene and aesthetics. 
Some practicing communities are of the opinion that the female genitalia are 
dirty, bugly and unsightly. Uncut women are regarded as unclean. For that 
reason the female genitalia must be cut to enhance a women’s appearance and 
to facilitate cleanliness. Local terms used to refer to the practice are often 
                                                        
4 Including Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Palestinian Territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
United Arab Emirates and Qatar.  
5 Including in Colombia.  
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synonymous with purification or cleanliness. Finally, many myths and false 
beliefs are associated with the practice of FGM/C. A common explanation for 
the continuation of FGM/C is social pressure within communities. FGM/C is 
often referred to as a social norm and the social convention theory offers 
explanations why this practice is strongly resistant to change. Because of the 
social structures within the community, it is difficult for individuals to stop the 
practice of FGMC on their own, without the support from the whole 
community. Parents love their children and carry out FGM/C in order to 
ensure the marriageability of their daughters. Elimination of FGM/C requires, 
according to the social convention theory, a process of social change. After all, 
FGM/C is a very complex and multifaceted practice.  
Chapter IV showed that initially, the UN was reluctant to take action in the 
field of FGM/C and placed the practice outside the scope of international 
human rights law. However, this changed in the 1990s with the global 
movement against Violence Against Women (VAW). The legal analysis 
conducted in Chapter IV had the aim to describe which rights are being 
violated and to provide an overview of the obligations and recommendations 
for States in relation to the elimination of FGM/C. The Chapter showed that 
FGM/C violates a number of recognized human rights protected by 
international and regional human rights instruments, including the right to be 
free from gender-discrimination, the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health, the right to life (when the procedure results in death), the right to 
freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
and the rights of the child. These human rights are enshrined in various human 
rights treaties that are legally binding upon States that have ratified them. 
Among others, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), also 
known as the “Banjul Charter,” the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of 
Women in Africa (“Maputo Protocol”) and the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) are important. These human rights 
instruments contain provisions under which FGM/C constitute a violation of 
human rights, and oblige States parties to take measures to prevent and 
eliminate the practice. In addition to these hard law instruments, the practice of 
FGM/C has been specifically addressed in many soft law instruments, 
including in Declarations, Programmes and Plans of Action, General 
Recommendations (GR) and General Comments (GC) of Treaty Monitoring 
Bodies, and non-binding resolutions. Chapter IV also illustrated that conflicts 
between human rights can arise when supporters of FGM/C invoke the right to 
culture, minority rights and the right to religious freedom. However, these 
three human rights are not absolute and the human rights framework allows for 
limitations of these rights. States have a due diligence obligation to prevent, 
protect, investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible, including private 
individuals for human rights violations. Although private individuals practice 
FGM/C (rather than State officials), States are still responsible for these private 
acts, if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in 
accordance with national legislation, punish acts of VAW in general and 
FGM/C in particular. States have a duty to take action in order to eliminate 
FGM/C.  
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Part III of this research consisted of the empirical analysis (Chapter V). 
Although the human rights framework has been developed at the international 
level, the work on eliminating FGM/C must be done at the national level. A 
case study has been conducted at the national level in Senegal evaluating the 
extent of compliance with the human rights framework in relation to the 
practice of FGM/C. Senegal signed and ratified all the human rights treaties 
that are important in relation to the practice of FGM/C and has not made any 
reservations to these treaties. At first glance, the extent of compliance might 
seem rather promising: the Senegalese Constitution establishes the enjoyment 
of rights without discrimination, an impressive institutional framework has 
been established consisting of many National Human Rights Institutions 
(NHRIs) that are involved in the promotion and protection of human rights, a 
national law criminalizing FGM/C is adopted in 1999, National Action Plans 
(NAPs) and many other policies have been adopted aimed at preventing and 
eliminating FGM/C, and CSOs are actively involved as regards to awareness 
raising at the community level. However, further analysis showed that Senegal 
is only to a limited extent in compliance with the human rights framework that 
is designed to eliminate the practice of FGM/C.  
First of all, Senegal is under the obligation to submit periodic reports to the 
respective Treaty Monitoring Bodies (TMBs) on how the rights are being 
implemented, but the country is not fully in compliance with this obligation. 
Problematic are the considerable amount of outstanding and overdue reports. 
However, when periodic reports were submitted to the TMBs, Senegal was in 
compliance with the recommendation to include in their reports information 
about the legislation in force against FGM/C, measures taken to eliminate 
FGM/C, statistics on the incidence of FGM/C in the country and the progress 
made in this respect.  
Senegal is in compliance with the obligation to embody the principle of 
equality of men and women in the national constitution. The Senegalese 
Constitution establishes the enjoyment of rights without discrimination. 
However, there are major vacuums and gaps in the national laws when the 
Constitution is applied. Some national laws in Senegal remain deeply 
discriminatory against women, in particular in matters relating to the family.  
Senegal is in compliance with the obligation to prohibit FGM/C. In 1999, the 
National Assembly passed law No. 99-05 modifying the Penal Code. Art. 299bis 
of the Penal Code criminalizes all forms of FGM/C, including the 
medicalization of the practice. The penalty is six months to five years 
imprisonment. The maximum penalty will be applied if FGM/C is “carried out 
or promoted by a person in the medical or paramedical field.” However, 
Senegal is not in compliance with the recommendation to ensure the effective 
enforcement and implementation of this law, since FGM/C is still practiced in 
Senegal with impunity. The amount of court cases is not representative for the 
incidence of FGM/C in Senegal, because people refuse to report FGM/C cases 
to the police. Only a handful of individuals have been prosecuted for FGM/C 
since the adoption of the law. Senegal did not establish a national mechanism 
for the implementation and monitoring of legislation and law enforcement, nor 
were ‘adequate resources’ made available for the implementation of legislative 
frameworks aimed at eliminating FGM/C.  
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Senegal is in compliance with the recommendation to develop appropriate 
measures, including National Action Plans (NAPs), strategies, policies, rules 
and regulations aimed at preventing and eliminating FGM/C. The Senegalese 
government developed two NAPs, a medical policy and a religious policy in 
2013. Although these policies (especially the NAPs) have much potential in 
relation to coordination of actions in the field of FGM/C in Senegal, they are 
not well implemented. Senegal is not in compliance in relation to the 
implementation of the national legislative frameworks on FGM/C. Adequate 
accountability mechanisms at the national and local levels to monitor adherence 
to and implementation of these policy documents are not in place. No resources 
were allocated to the implementation of policies and programmes by the 
Senegalese government: the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme allocated 
financial resources to the implementation of the NAPs instead.   
Senegal is partly in compliance with the recommendation to collect and 
disseminate basic data about prevalence, trends, attitudes and behaviour 
regarding FGM/C. The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) collected data in Senegal on the prevalence of 
FGM/C, the types of FGM/C practiced, the girl’s age at the time of the 
procedure, the type of practitioner who performed the practice and the beliefs 
and opinions about FGM/C. Senegal also collected data on the cases and 
enforcement of legislation with a study of Professor Ndiaye to get a more 
accurate picture of the status of implementation of Law No. 99-05 of 29 January 
1999. However, FGM/C remains poorly documented in Senegal and expressed 
the need for further research and data collection on FGM/C in Senegal.  
Senegal is not in compliance with the obligation to provide necessary 
support to victims of FGM/C, nor with the obligation to protect women who 
are at risk of being subjected to FGM/C. There are no adequate social and/or 
psychological support services specifically designed for girls and women who 
have been subjected to FGM/C and those at risk. There is a serious lack of 
support services for (potential) victims of FGM/C.  
Senegal is not in compliance with the obligation to create public awareness 
in all sectors of society regarding FGM/C through information, formal and 
information education, and outreach programmes. Awareness about FGM/C at 
the community level is raised by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and efforts 
of International Organizations (IOs), not by the Senegalese government. 
Respondents were critical on the role of the government in this regard. 
Representatives of civil society referred often – quite frustrated – to meetings or 
workshops organized by the government to talk about FGM/C “in wonderful 
hotels in Dakar or Saly” while they could not see how this would directly help 
the communities on the ground.  In addition, according to the respondents, the 
government does not recognize the role that CSOs play in the movement to 
eliminate FGM/C, nor does the government give CSOs all necessary (financial) 
support and encouragement. Many respondents (including representatives of 
the government, international organizations, and civil society) explained that 
awareness of FGM/C is not integrated in the curricula of (medical, legal, social 
work) students. There are no training programmes for health professionals 
(doctors, nurses, midwives, psychologists) to detect, manage and counsel 
FGM/C. Non-formal and informal educational activities and trainings on 
FGM/C are sporadically provided in the relevant sectors. The government does 
 
 
 
Summary 
384 
not promote gender-sensitive, empowering educational processes. If initiatives 
are taken in this regard, the initiative is taken by UN agencies or CSOs.  
Senegal is partly in compliance with the recommendation to engage a wide 
range of stakeholders. Many actors are involved in the action taken against 
FGM/C. However, this is not because the government engages these 
stakeholders, but it is mostly because of the work of the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint 
Programme and CSOs themselves. CSOs try to involve community leaders, 
religious leaders, men and boys in their advocacy and awareness-raising 
campaigns.  
Senegal complied with the recommendation to explore alternatives to 
FGM/C and to support and provide alternative training and education 
possibilities for cutters, in order to convert them to an alternative profession. In 
cooperation with the Ministry of Women, Family and Children, a Senegalese 
CSO started a pilot project. However, this ‘alternative source of income 
approach’ proved to be an unsuccessful strategy in Senegal. Therefore, training 
programmes or alternative livelihoods for local practitioners of FGM/C are not 
(any more) provided in Senegal. 
Thus, there are major gaps between the de jure and de facto compliance in 
Senegal. Despite the efforts of the Senegalese government, which must be 
acknowledged, the extent of compliance with the human rights framework in 
relation to FGM/C in Senegal is limited and a lot of work remains to be done. 
Enacting laws and adopting policies is the beginning, but not the end. There is a 
clear need to intensify, expand and improve efforts in relation to FGM/C in 
order to achieve greater compliance with the human rights framework. 
Although there is probably not a single country in the world that has a perfect 
human rights record, nor is in full compliance with the human rights 
framework in relation to FGM/C, the level of compliance in Senegal proved to 
be (disappointingly) limited. 
 
Part IV of this research consisted of the conclusions (Chapter VI). In this 
Chapter, an answer to the central research question was formulated. The 
concluding chapter showed that, although Senegal has often been referred to as 
a “promising practice” in relation to the elimination of FGM/C, because it was 
the first country in which a series of public declarations of FGM/C 
abandonment were made, careful analysis of the DHS and MICS regarding 
Senegal shows that the national prevalence of FGM/C is not declining as 
rapidly as the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme, the Senegalese government 
and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) might have hoped for. The national 
prevalence of FGM/C among girls and women of reproductive age (15 to 49 
years) remained fairly constant in the past decade. Between 2005 and 2014 the 
national prevalence of FGM/C declined in Senegal with 3.5% (from 28.2% in 
2005 to 24.7% in 2014).  
 Chapter VI showed that there is no clear-cut answer to the ‘compliance 
question’ in relation to the practice of FGM/C in Senegal. A complicated mix of 
factors interact, work together and clarify why Senegal is partly in compliance 
and partly not in compliance with the human rights framework in relation to 
the practice of FGM/C. These factors include: (i) lack of national capacity and 
resources, (ii) lack of deterrence and the fear for punishment and sanctions, (iii) 
reputation; (iv) power and coercion; (v) political personalities; (vi) legitimacy 
 
 
 
Summary 
385 
and fairness; (vii) temporal dimension; (viii) pressure of influential parties 
and/or the pressure of domestic interest groups.  
 First of all, there is a lack of human, financial and material resources at the 
Department of the Family (Direction de la Famille) of the Ministry of Women, 
Family and Children (Ministre de la Femme, de la Famille et de l’Enfance), which is 
the coordinating body of the Senegalese government to take action in the field 
of FGM/C.  The weak capacity of the Department of the Family and the lack of 
ownership, coordination and cooperation at the national level (with other 
Ministries, but also with other actors in the field) contributes to non-compliance 
with the human rights framework. Not only at the Ministerial level this lack of 
capacity proved to be a problem, but also in relation to the National Human 
Rights Institutions (NHRIs) at the national level. The Senegalese authorities 
have established an impressive institutional framework consisting of many 
NHRIs that are involved in the promotion and protection of human rights, but 
there is no clear division of tasks or coordination between these institutions. In 
the second place, there is a lack of lack of deterrence, since the UN and AU 
monitoring mechanisms are, to a large extent, powerless to punish Senegal 
when the State is not in compliance with the human rights framework. In the 
third place, reputational concerns are important in relation to the ‘compliance 
question’. Senegal fears to damage its reputation, since it is a country that is 
proud to be an exception in the region with regard to the level of democracy 
and the absence of a military coup. In the fourth place, pressure from the 
international community (or ‘powerful States’) enhances compliance with the 
human rights framework in Senegal. The fifth factor that influences compliance 
is the role of political personalities. President Léopold Sédar Senghor, President 
Abdou Diouf and Ndèye Soukèye Gueye were mentioned as influential persons 
that either influenced the process of compliance positively and/or negatively.  
In the sixth place, considerations relating to legitimacy and fairness indeed play 
a major role in Senegal. Local customs clashed with human rights norms, which 
was for example clearly observable in relation to the adoption of Law No. 99-05 
criminalizing FGM/C in 1999. In the seventh place, the temporal dimension of 
the social, economic, and political changes contemplated by regulatory treaties 
as a factor that lies at the root of non-compliance with the human rights 
framework in Senegal. A “period of transition” might have resulted in better 
compliance. In the eighth place, influential parties and/or domestic interest 
groups influence compliance positively and negatively in Senegal. First of all, 
the pressure and influence by Marabouts6 is an important factor. Very often, the 
position of the Marabout is of greater significance than the Senegalese 
government or national law. Marabouts have also a big influence in relation to 
the practice of FGM/C, since they all are in favour of the practice and defend 
FGM/C as part of their religion and tradition. When Law No. 99-05 
criminalizing FGM/C was debated in Parliament, the supreme Marabout of 
northern Senegal, Thierno Mountaga Tall, pronounced a fatwa7 in which he 
                                                        
6 A Marabout is a Muslim religious leader and teacher in West Africa, often a scholar of the Qur’an 
and a religious teacher. 
7 A fatwa is a religious edict. 
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cited a Prophet’s Hadith8 from which he inferred that FGM/C “is a corollary to 
circumcision […] and both operations are intrinsic elements of human nature.”9 
Furthermore, Marabouts urged Muslim deputies to vote against the bill. Not 
only in relation to the adoption of the law, but also during court cases, 
Marabouts have influenced the outcome of cases. Second of all, the pressure and 
influence of civil society is an important factor in relation to the ‘compliance 
question’ in Senegal. Civil society in Senegal is very strong and CSOs have a 
powerful voice. CSOs in Senegal have put pressure on the government to ratify 
human rights treaties. More specifically, activists and CSOs brought not only 
FGM/C to the attention of the ‘general public’ in Senegal in the 1990s, but they 
also pushed for the adoption of the national law criminalizing FGM/C. CSOs 
have an important role to play in relation to the compliance question, since they 
actually do “most of the work” in the field of FGM/C in Senegal. A civil society 
representative explained: “In communities, NGOs are doing the 
implementation, instead of the State.” Finally, although mentioned very often 
by several scholars as a factor that hampers compliance, ambiguity of treaty 
language does not influence compliance negatively in Senegal, since the 
Senegalese government knows exactly what is expected from them in relation 
to the elimination of FGM/C. Although the treaty language in the provisions of 
the CEDAW and CRC are general, arguably a bit vague and imposes broad 
obligations upon States, it was for the Senegalese State clear what the object and 
of the legally binding treaty obligations (and non-binding recommendations 
following from soft-law instruments) contain. 
 
The propensity of Senegal to join international and regional human rights 
framework does not automatically mean that it will bring its human rights 
practice into compliance with the human rights framework. Becoming a party 
to a treaty is one step, but recognition of rights on paper is not sufficient to 
guarantee that these rights will be enjoyed in practice. This research showed 
that a discrepancy exist between the commitments of Senegal to comply with 
the human rights framework on the one hand and the actual behaviour of 
Senegal in relation to the practice of FGM/C on the other. Today, more than 
one million girls and women in Senegal are living with the consequences of 
FGM/C and hundreds of thousands of girls and women in Senegal run the risk 
of undergoing, and will undergo the practice in the (near) future. But does that 
mean that the commitments of Senegal in relation to the elimination of FGM/C 
should be regarded as “empty promises”? This research showed that Senegal’s 
promises are not empty. It is a complicated process to generate the real change 
that is necessary to modify the status quo. It is a rather ambitious task for the 
Senegalese government, civil society and international organizations to 
eliminate the persistent practice of FGM/C in Senegal. The elimination of 
                                                        
8 Hadith are the collections of the reports claiming to quote what the Prophet Muhammad and other 
founders of Islam said on any matter.  
9 M. Ndoye, Le Processus de Pénalisation de l’Excision au Sénégal: Enjeux et Perspectives pour les Droits 
Sexuels des Femmes. Institut de Hautes Etudes et du Développement, Thèse de Doctorat No. 901, 
Genève, 2011, p. 134.  
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FGM/C has not, and will not be realized overnight,10 and most probably not in 
one generation. The reason is that cultural norms, practices and traditions need 
to change, as well as patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes 
regarding the roles, responsibilities and identities of girls and women in the 
family and society.11 However, if the factors that have been identified in this 
research will be addressed in the (near) future, Senegal will most probably be 
able to turn their promises into a lasting reality, and generate positive change to 
girls and women at risk of undergoing the practice of FGM/C.  
 
                                                        
10 E. Sepper, Confronting the “Sacret and Unchangeable”: The Obligation to Modify Cultural 
Patterns under the Women’s Discrimination Treaty, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Law, Volume 30, No. 2, 2008, p. 627. 
11 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations, Senegal, CEDAW/C/SEN/CO/3-7, 28 July 2015, para. 18.  
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La présente recherche traite de la pratique des Mutilations Génitales 
Féminines/de l’Excision (MGF/E) que l’on appelle aussi circoncision féminine. 
On définit cette pratique comme «toutes les interventions consistant à enlever 
totalement ou partiellement les organes génitaux externes de la femme ou à leur 
causer d'autres lésions pour des raisons non thérapeutiques.»1 Au cours des 
dernières décennies, le débat sur l'élimination des MGF/E s’est inscrit dans le 
cadre des instruments internationaux et régionaux relatifs aux droits de la 
personne.  Cette pratique est en effet considérée comme une forme de violence 
faite aux femmes et une violation de leurs droits fondamentaux. Un cadre 
général des droits de l’homme, en vigueur sur le plan international et régional, 
aborde la question des violences faites aux femmes et des pratiques culturelles 
néfastes en général et des MGF/E en particulier.  Mais en dépit de ce cadre et 
des différentes normes quasi-juridiques portant sur l’excision, les taux de 
prévalence de cette pratique demeurent élevés dans de nombreux pays. Dès 
lors, se pose la question de savoir dans quelle mesure (et pour quelles raisons) 
les États se conforment, ou dans le cas des MGF/E, ne se conforment 
apparemment pas à ce cadre des droits de l’homme, dont l’objet est d’éliminer 
cette pratique. Le Sénégal est sélectionné comme une étude de cas. La 
problématique centrale de la présente recherche repose donc sur la question 
suivante: Quels sont les facteurs qui expliquent pourquoi le Sénégal se conforme et/ou 
ne se conforme pas au cadre des droits de l’homme pour éliminer la pratique des 
mutilations génitales féminines / de l’excision dans ce pays? 
 
Cette étude comprend quatre parties, à savoir I) le cadre théorique; II) le cadre 
des droits de l’homme; (III) l’analyse empirique; et (IV) la conclusion. 
 
Première partie, cadre théorique (Chapitre II): Depuis les années 1950, les 
spécialistes du droit et des sciences politiques ont eu de longs débats sur 
l'importance du droit international et ont élaboré des théories sur la question de 
savoir pourquoi les États se conforment aux normes du droit international (ou 
les violent), l’objectif étant de mieux comprendre le rôle du droit international 
dans le façonnement du comportement des États. L'observation célèbre de 
Louis Henkin selon laquelle  «presque toutes les nations observent presque tous 
les principes du droit international et presque toutes leurs obligations presque 
                                                        
1 Organisation mondiale de la santé, éliminer les mutilations génitales féminines : déclaration inter-
institutionnelle, Bibliothèque de l’OMS, 2008, p.4.  
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tout le temps2 » a ouvert la voie à de nouvelles conceptions de la question de la 
conformité au droit à la fin des années 1970. Depuis, les spécialistes du droit 
international et les experts en relations internationales ont élaboré de multiples 
théories pour tenter d’expliquer la façon dont les États respectent la légalité 
internationale. Le chapitre II fait le point de ces théories à travers une analyse 
documentaire qui vise  à cerner les facteurs qui expliquent pourquoi les pays 
appliquent ou non le droit international, en général, et le cadre relatif aux droits 
de l'homme, en particulier. 
Le chapitre examine tout d’abord quatre théories de spécialistes du droit 
international et quatre théories d’experts en relations internationales, 
considérées en général comme les « courants principaux» (ou grandes écoles) de 
pensée dans la documentation concernant l’application ou le respect des 
normes en matière des droits de l’homme (voir tableau 7.1). Les théories 
élaborées de part et d’autre reposent souvent sur des prémisses contradictoires. 
En général, les théoriciens traditionnels du droit international qui croient en la 
primauté de ce droit, ont construit leurs théories sur l'hypothèse d'une 
propension générale des Etats à se conformer au droit international. Ces 
hypothèses sont probablement enracinées dans le positivisme dominant de la 
discipline traditionnelle du droit international. Les spécialistes en relations 
internationales sont, pour leur part, beaucoup plus sceptiques et pensent 
largement le contraire à ce sujet. Ces derniers se montrent très pessimistes 
quant à la possibilité que le droit international puisse jouer un rôle dans le 
changement du comportement des États. Le fossé entre ces points de vue s’est 
toutefois réduit lorsque les théoriciens des deux bords ont commencé à 
converger sur la «question de la conformité au droit» à la fin des années 1990, 
en faveur de leurs programmes de recherche. 
 
Tableau 7.1 Principaux courants théoriques de la conformité au droit 
international 
 
Droit International Relations internationales 
 
Théorie du respect des droits (Compliance theory) 
de Henkin 
 
Réalisme 
Théorie de la gestion juridique (Managerial 
theory) de Chayes & Chayes Institutionnalisme 
Théorie de la légitimité (Legitimacy theory) de 
Franck Libéralisme 
Théorie du processus juridique transnational 
(Transnational legal process theory) de Koh Constructivisme 
 
Ce chapitre s’intéresse ensuite aux autres théories, qui ont été élaborées dans le 
contexte des nouvelles recherches interdisciplinaires et qui ont apporté un 
éclairage différent sur « la question de la conformité au droit ».  Une nouvelle 
                                                        
2 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave (Comment les Nations se comportent): Law and Foreign Policy, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 2ème édition, 1979, p. 47. 
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génération de spécialistes du droit international et des relations internationales 
a développé des théories qui se rejoignent sur les concepts traditionnels mais 
qui expriment des visions divergentes sur la question du respect par les États 
du droit international en général et du cadre relatif aux droits de l’homme en 
particulier. Le chapitre II expose donc également sept théories contenues dans 
les manuels traitant du droit international et des relations internationales, et qui 
sont acceptées comme alternatives aux «principaux courants» théoriques 
susmentionnés. Ces sept théories sont: i) la théorie de la réputation de Guzman; 
ii) la théorie de l'application (enforcement theory) de Downs, Rocke & Barsoom; 
iii) la théorie des limites (du droit international) de Goldsmith & Posner; iv) la 
théorie du modèle en spirale de Risse, Ropp & Sikkink; (v) la théorie de la 
socialisation des États de Goodman & Jinks; (vi) la théorie interactionnelle de 
Brunnée & Toope; et vii) la théorie du signal de Moore. 
Après une analyse minutieuse de toutes ces approches en matière de 
conformité, la présente recherche établit, dans sa première partie, une 
distinction entre les deux groupes de théories: i) celles fondées sur les intérêts; 
et ii) celles fondées sur les normes. Elle constate que ces nouvelles approches 
vont largement dans le même sens que les nombreux travaux réalisés par les 
spécialistes du droit international et des relations internationales. Elles 
découlent souvent des théories traditionnelles en matière de droit international 
et de relations internationales. De nombreux facteurs expliquant le respect ou le 
non-respect par les États des normes du droit international relatives aux droits 
de l’homme sont exposés dans le tableau 7.2 ci-après: 
 
Tableau 7.2 Facteurs expliquant le respect et le non-respect du droit 
international relatif aux droits de l’homme 
 
Respect Non-respect 
 
Intérêt personnel 
 
Intérêt personnel 
Légitimité et équité Légitimité et équité 
Transparence dans la formulation des 
instruments juridiques 
Ambiguïté dans la formulation des 
instruments juridiques 
Réputation Manque de capacités au niveau national 
Pouvoir et coercition Absence d’effet dissuasif 
Punitions et sanctions Pression des parties influentes 
Personnalités politiques Conseils juridiques inappropriés 
Pacta sunt servanda (Les conventions doivent 
être respectées) 
Dispositions obsolètes des normes des 
instruments juridiques 
Coûts de transaction réduits Echec du processus de négociation des 
instruments  
Validation symbolique, rites, ascendance Décalage entre engagement et respect  
Cohérence Contradiction avec les coutumes locales 
Communautarisme Loi non autorisée 
Internalisation des règles  
Pression des groupes d’intérêt locaux  
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Communication  
Acculturation  
Réciprocité  
 
La deuxième partie de la présente recherche porte sur le cadre relatif aux droits 
de l’homme (chapitres III et IV). Le chapitre III fournit davantage 
d’informations de base sur la pratique des MGF/E, compte tenu de la nécessité 
d’expliquer de manière approfondie ce qu’est cette pratique et ce qu’elle 
implique concrètement sur le plan des violations des différents droits de 
l’homme et du cadre juridique applicable en la matière. 
Le chapitre III définit quatre différentes formes de MGF/E. La forme la plus 
sévère est l’infibulation qui consiste en une excision et en l'ablation des grandes 
lèvres et en le scellement des deux bords, au moyen de points de suture ou en 
permettant une soudure naturelle des tissus de la cicatrice. Selon l'UNICEF, 125 
millions de femmes et de filles ont déjà fait l’objet de la pratique de la MGF/E, 
et 30 millions de filles risquent de la subir au cours de la prochaine décennie si 
les tendances actuelles persistent. Cette pratique pourrait même être beaucoup 
plus répandue que ne l’indiquent les chiffres de l'UNICEF si l’on se réfère aux 
données recueillies par le biais d’études effectuées à petite échelle, qui tendent à 
montrer que la MGF/E se pratique aussi bien dans les pays d'Asie3, que dans 
ceux du Moyen-Orient 4  et de l’Amérique latine 5 . Cette pratique suscite 
également des préoccupations au sein des communautés immigrées en Europe, 
aux États-Unis, au Canada, en Australie et en Nouvelle-Zélande. La MGF/E a 
lieu à tout âge mais plus généralement sur des filles entre leur naissance et l'âge 
de 15 ans. Selon l'UNICEF, dans la moitié des pays où les données sur les 
MGF/E sont disponibles, les fillettes subissent en majorité l’excision avant leur 
cinquième anniversaire. Parfois, ce sont des femmes adultes qui sont soumises à 
cette pratique (juste avant ou après leur mariage, ou suivant leur première 
grossesse). L'âge auquel les filles et les femmes font l’objet de la MGF/E varie 
considérablement d'un pays à l'autre, et même au sein d’un même pays, en 
fonction des traditions et des particularités locales. Les MGF/E sont 
généralement pratiquées par des « sage-femmes traditionnelles ». Cette 
pratique est souvent considérée comme une «affaire de femmes» car elle est 
organisée essentiellement par les grand-mères et pratiquée sur les fillettes par 
des femmes âgées. La «médicalisation» des MGF/E où se sont les médecins ou 
autres membres du corps de la santé qui interviennent pour pratiquer l’ablation 
est de plus en plus fréquente dans certains pays en dépit du fait que l'OMS a 
toujours condamné la pratique. Traditionnellement, les excisions sont faites en 
zone rurale dans les maisons des filles, sans recours à une anesthésie correcte et 
en utilisant des instruments tranchants non-stériles (sur plusieurs filles à la fois), 
notamment des ciseaux, des lames de rasoir, des couteaux, des pierres aiguisées 
ou du verre brisé. La pratique de la MGF/E n'entraîne aucun bienfait sur la 
                                                        
3 Notamment  Brunei, Inde, Indonésie, Malaisie, Maldives, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Tadjikistan et Thaïlande. 
4 Notamment Bahreïn, Iran, Israël, Jordanie, Kuwait, Oman, Territoires palestiniens, Arabie saoudite, 
Syrie, Émirats arabes unis et Qatar 
5 Notamment en Colombie 
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santé et peut au contraire avoir des conséquences graves, immédiates et à long 
terme, sur la santé physique, sexuelle et émotionnelle des filles et des femmes 
qui la subissent, car elle implique l'ablation de tissus génitaux normaux et sains. 
Il n'y a pas de réponse directe et simple à la question de savoir pourquoi les 
gens pratiquent les MGF/E, car les raisons et les justifications de cette pratique 
sont nombreuses, interdépendantes et imbriquées les unes aux autres. Les 
« coutumes » et les « traditions » sont les raisons les plus fréquemment citées 
pour expliquer la poursuite de cette pratique, qui est souvent profondément 
ancrée dans la culture locale et transmise d'une génération à l'autre. Les 
communautés veulent préserver leur identité culturelle et donc respecter les 
traditions comme l’excision. L’autre justification communément invoquée de la 
MGF/E est liée à la sexualité féminine. On croit que les femmes non excisées ne 
seraient pas en mesure de maîtriser leur sexualité. La MGF/E protègerait donc 
la moralité et la « pureté » sexuelle de la femme en ôtant ou en réduisant le 
désir sexuel de celle-ci. Elle empêcherait la femme de s’engager dans des 
relations sexuelles ou de se livrer à des comportements sexuels déviants et 
condamnables. Dans de nombreuses communautés, l’honneur de la famille 
dépend de la virginité et de la retenue sexuelle de la fille, une fille non excisée 
jetterait donc le déshonneur sur elle et sa famille et aurait ensuite des difficultés 
à se marier. Bien que la MGF/E se pratique dans toutes les religions, on lui 
attribue une dimension religieuse particulière. D’importantes communautés (en 
particulier en Asie et au Moyen-Orient) croient que l’excision est une obligation 
musulmane, même si aucune référence à cette pratique ne se trouve dans le 
Coran. La pratique est motivée également par des raisons d'hygiène et 
d'esthétique. Certaines communautés pratiquant la MGF/E considèrent les 
organes génitaux féminins comme sales et laids et les femmes non excisées 
comme impures. Elles estiment pour cette raison que les organes génitaux 
féminins doivent faire l’objet d’une ablation pour améliorer l'apparence et la 
propreté des femmes. Les termes utilisés sur le plan local en référence à cette 
pratique sont d’ailleurs souvent synonyme de purification ou de propreté. Enfin, 
de nombreux mythes ou de fausses croyances sont associés à la pratique des 
MGF/E. L'autre explication communément donnée pour la poursuite de 
l'excision est la pression de la communauté. Selon la théorie de la convention 
sociale, l’excision fait souvent référence à une norme sociale si profondément 
enracinée et puissante qu’on ne peut la changer. La pression sociale au sein de 
la communauté est telle qu’il est difficile aux individus d’éliminer la pratique 
de la MGF/E de leur propre chef, sans l'appui de l’ensemble des structures de 
cette communauté. Selon la théorie de la convention sociale, les parents aiment 
leurs enfants et pratiquent l’excision pour permettre à leurs filles de se marier.  
L’élimination de la MGF/E doit donc passer par un processus de 
transformation sociale car il s’agit d’une pratique très complexe et à multiples 
facettes. 
Le chapitre IV indique qu’initialement l’Organisation des Nations Unies 
était réticente à prendre des mesures concernant la question des MGF/E, qu’elle 
plaçait hors du champ d'application du droit international des droits de 
l’homme. Cette situation a toutefois changé au cours des années 1990 avec le 
mouvement mondial visant à mettre fin à la violence faite aux femmes. Le 
chapitre IV propose une analyse juridique des droits faisant l’objet de violation 
et donne un aperçu des obligations et des recommandations que les États 
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doivent respecter en vue de l’élimination des MGF/E. Le chapitre montre que 
les mutilations génitales féminines ou excisions constituent une violation d’un 
certain nombre de droits humains reconnus et protégés en vertu des 
instruments internationaux et régionaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme, 
notamment le droit d'être à l’abri de toute discrimination fondée sur le sexe, le 
droit de jouir du meilleur état de santé susceptible d'être atteint, le droit à la vie 
(lorsque l'intervention entraîne la mort), le droit de ne pas être soumis à la 
torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants et les 
droits de l'enfant. Ces droits sont inscrits dans divers traités des droits de 
l’homme qui sont juridiquement contraignants pour les États qui les ont ratifiés. 
Parmi les instruments importants, on peut citer, entre autres, la Convention sur 
l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination à l'égard des femmes 
(CEDAW), la Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant (CDE), la Charte 
africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples (CADHP), qu’on appelle 
également « Charte de Banjul », le Protocole à la CADHP relatif aux droits des 
femmes en Afrique (Protocole de Maputo) et la Charte africaine des droits et du 
bien-être de l'enfant (CADBE). Ces instruments relatifs aux droits de l'homme 
contiennent des dispositions en vertu desquelles les MGF/E constituent une 
violation des droits de l’homme, et font obligation aux États parties de prendre 
des mesures visant à prévenir et à éliminer ces pratiques. Outre ces instruments 
juridiques contraignants, de nombreux instruments à caractère non obligatoire 
abordent expressément la pratique des MGF/E. Il s’agit notamment de 
déclarations, de programmes et de plans d'action, de recommandations 
générales et d’observations générales, d’organismes de surveillance de 
l’application des traités, et de résolutions non contraignantes. Le chapitre IV 
montre également que des désaccords en matière de droits peuvent surgir 
lorsque les partisans des MGF/E invoquent le droit à la culture, les droits des 
minorités et le droit à la liberté religieuse. Ces trois droits de la personne ne 
sont toutefois pas absolus car ils peuvent être restreints par le cadre universel 
relatif aux droits de l’homme. Les États ont une obligation d’agir avec diligence 
de sorte à prévenir, empêcher, instruire, poursuivre et réprimer les violations 
des droits de la personne, même lorsque les responsables de telles violations 
sont des particuliers. Lorsqu’ils pratiquent des MGF/E, ces derniers (plutôt que 
des représentants de l'État), sont d’autant responsables car les États peuvent 
être également responsables d'actes privés s'ils n'agissent pas avec la diligence 
voulue pour prévenir, instruire, et selon les lois nationales, réprimer les actes de 
violence à l’égard des femmes en général et les MGF/E en particulier. Les États 
sont tenus à prendre des mesures afin d'éliminer les MGF/E. 
 
La troisième partie (chapitre V) de cette recherche consiste en une analyse 
empirique. Le cadre des droits de l'homme a été mis au point au niveau 
international mais les efforts visant à éliminer les MGF/E doivent se réaliser au 
niveau national. L’étude d’un cas a été menée au Sénégal pour évaluer la 
mesure dans laquelle ce pays se conforme au cadre universel des droits de 
l’homme en relation avec la pratique des MGF/E. Le Sénégal a signé et ratifié 
l’ensemble des traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme qui revêtent de 
l’importance par rapport à la pratique des MGF/E et n'a formulé aucune 
réserve vis-à-vis de ces instruments. A priori, la mesure dans laquelle le Sénégal 
se conforme au cadre des droits de l’homme semble satisfaisante: le pays 
 
 
 
                                                      Résumé 
395 
dispose d’une constitution qui prévoit la jouissance des droits sans 
discrimination, d’un dispositif institutionnel impressionnant, qui comprend 
plusieurs institutions nationales des droits de l'homme (INDH) œuvrant en 
faveur de la promotion et de la protection des droits de l'homme, une loi 
nationale criminalisant les MGF/E adoptée en 1999, des plans d'action 
nationaux (PAN) et de nombreuses autres politiques qui ont été adoptées pour 
prévenir et éliminer les MGF/E, ainsi que des Organisations de la société civile 
(OSC) participant activement à la sensibilisation des populations au niveau 
communautaire. Une analyse plus approfondie montre toutefois que le Sénégal 
ne se conforme que partiellement au  cadre des droits de la personne qui vise à 
éliminer la pratique des MGF/E. 
Tout d'abord, le Sénégal est tenu à présenter aux différents organes chargés 
de surveiller l’application des traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme des rapports 
périodiques sur la façon dont il met en œuvre ces droits. Hors, le Sénégal n’a 
pas pleinement respecté cette obligation. Le retard pris dans la présentation 
d’un nombre considérable de rapports attendus pose en effet problème. Les 
quelques rapports que le Sénégal a soumis aux organes de surveillance 
montrent toutefois que ce pays s’est conformé à la recommandation d’inclure 
dans ces rapports des informations sur la loi et les mesures prises pour éliminer 
les MGF/E, les statistiques sur l'incidence de la pratique dans le pays et les 
progrès réalisés à cet égard. 
Le Sénégal consacre le principe de l'égalité des hommes et des femmes dans 
sa constitution nationale en instaurant la jouissance des droits sans 
discrimination. Les lois nationales chargées d’appliquer cette disposition 
présentent toutefois de nombreux vides juridiques et de nombreuses lacunes. 
Certaines lois nationales au Sénégal restent profondément discriminatoires à 
l'égard des femmes, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les questions relatives 
à la famille. 
S’agissant de l'obligation d'interdire les MGF/E l'Assemblée nationale 
sénégalaise a adopté en 1999 la loi n° 99-05 modifiant l’article 299bis du Code 
pénal, qui réprime toutes les formes de MGF/E, y compris la médicalisation de 
la pratique. La peine prévue est de six mois à cinq ans d'emprisonnement. La 
peine maximale doit être appliquée lorsque la MGF/E est "effectuée ou 
encouragée par un membre du corps médical ou paramédical." Le Sénégal ne 
s’est pas conformé à la recommandation de veiller à l'application et à la mise en 
œuvre effective de cette loi, étant donné que les MGF/E sont toujours 
pratiquées au Sénégal en toute impunité. Le nombre d’affaires traitées en justice 
n’est pas représentatif de l'incidence des mutilations génitales féminines ou 
excisions au Sénégal car les personnes refusent de signaler les cas relevants de 
cette pratique à la police. Seulement quelques individus ont été poursuivis pour 
ce type d’affaires depuis l'adoption de la loi. Le Sénégal n’a pas mis en place un 
mécanisme national de mise en œuvre et de suivi de la loi visant à éliminer les 
MGF/E et ne dispose pas de «ressources suffisantes» pour appliquer les cadres 
législatifs en la matière. 
Le Sénégal s’est conformé à la recommandation concernant la mise en place 
de mesures appropriées, en particulier de plans d'action nationaux, de 
stratégies, de politiques, de règles et de règlements visant à prévenir et à 
éliminer les MGF/E. Le gouvernement sénégalais a élaboré, en 2013, deux plans 
d’action nationaux pour les secteurs de la santé et des affaires religieuses. Ces 
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plans d’action et d’autres politiques offrent beaucoup de possibilités en matière 
de coordination des actions dans le domaine des MGF/E au Sénégal mais ils ne 
sont malheureusement pas appliqués correctement. Le Sénégal n’a pas respecté 
son obligation de mettre en œuvre les cadres législatifs sur les MGF/E et ne 
dispose donc pas de mécanismes de responsabilisation efficace, aux niveaux 
national et local, pour suivre le respect et la mise en œuvre de ces textes 
juridiques stratégiques. Le gouvernement sénégalais n’a prévu aucun 
financement pour soutenir la mise en œuvre des politiques et des programmes. 
C’est dans le cadre du programme conjoint UNICEF-UNFPA qu’est d’ailleurs 
financée la mise en œuvre des plans d’action nationaux. 
Le Sénégal s’est conformé partiellement à la recommandation sur la collecte 
et la diffusion des données de base relatives à la prévalence de la pratique des 
MGF/E, ainsi qu’aux tendances et aux comportements concernant cette 
question. Lors d’enquêtes démographiques de santé (EDS ou DHS) et 
d’enquêtes en grappes à indicateurs multiples (EGIM ou MICS), menées au 
Sénégal, des données ont été recueillies sur la prévalence et les types des 
MGF/E, l'âge des jeunes filles ou fillettes ayant subi cette pratique, les 
individus l’ayant pratiquée, ainsi que sur les croyances et les opinions relatives 
à l’excision. Des données ont été également recueillies sur l’application de la 
législation nationale sur cette question, notamment grâce à une étude réalisée 
par le Professeur Ndiaye, qui donne une image plus précise de l'état 
d’application de la loi n ° 99-05 du 29 janvier 1999, qui interdit et réprime la 
pratique des mutilations génitales féminines. Ces données sont toutefois 
insuffisantes, ce qui a conduit les spécialistes à insister sur la nécessité de 
renforcer la recherche et la collecte de données sur la pratique de l’excision au 
Sénégal, qui reste mal documentée. 
Le Sénégal ne s’est pas conformé à son obligation d’apporter le soutien 
nécessaire aux victimes des MGF/E, ni à son obligation de protéger les femmes 
qui risquent de subir cette pratique. Il n'existe aucun service de soutien social 
et/ou psychologique approprié pour les fillettes ou les femmes qui ont été 
victimes ou qui risquent d’être victimes des MGF/E. 
Le Sénégal ne s’est pas non plus conformé à son obligation de sensibiliser 
tous les secteurs de la société et à mobiliser l’opinion publique contre les 
MGF/E par le biais de l'information, de l'éducation formelle et informelle et de 
programmes de sensibilisation. Les campagnes de sensibilisation sur les 
MGF/E au niveau communautaire sont entreprises par les organisations de la 
société civile (OSC) et les organisations internationales (OI), et beaucoup moins 
par le gouvernement sénégalais. Les personnes interrogées dans le cadre de 
cette recherche se sont exprimées de façon négative sur le rôle joué à cet égard 
par le gouvernement sénégalais. Les représentants de la société civile ont 
souvent exprimé leur grande déception du fait que les réunions ou ateliers sur 
les MGF/E étaient organisés par le gouvernement "dans de magnifiques hôtels 
à Dakar ou à Saly», ne voyant pas comment cela pourrait aider directement les 
communautés sur place. En outre, selon les personnes interrogées, le 
gouvernement ne tient pas compte des efforts que déploient les OSC dans la 
lutte contre les MGF/E, et ne leur apporte ni soutien financier, ni 
encouragement. De nombreuses personnes (dont des représentants du 
gouvernement, d’organisations internationales et de la société civile) ont 
expliqué que la sensibilisation à la pratique des MGF/E n’était pas intégrée aux 
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programmes d’études supérieures (médicales, juridiques, sociales). Il n'existe, 
par ailleurs, aucun programme de formation en faveur des professionnels de 
santé (médecins, infirmières, sages-femmes, psychologues) pour leur permettre 
de dépister les MGF/E de les gérer et de prodiguer des conseils aux victimes de 
cette pratique. Les actions éducatives et de formation, formelles ou informelles, 
sur les GMF/E, ne sont pas régulières. Le gouvernement n’encourage pas un 
enseignement qui tient compte de la dimension genre pour apprendre aux filles 
à maîtriser leur destinée. Les quelques initiatives entreprises dans ce domaine, 
sont fait par des agences des Nations Unies ou d’OSC. 
Le Sénégal s’est conformé en partie à la recommandation de faire participer 
le plus grand nombre d’acteurs dans la lutte contre les MGF/E. Mais là encore, 
la participation de ces acteurs ne vient pas du gouvernement mais c’est le 
résultat d’efforts déployés dans le cadre du Programme conjoint UNFPA-
UNICEF et des OSC elles-mêmes. Les OSC tentent d’associer les dirigeants 
communautaires, les chefs religieux, les hommes ainsi que les garçons dans 
leurs campagnes de plaidoyer et de sensibilisation. 
Le Sénégal a essayé de se conformer à la recommandation de rechercher des 
alternatives à la pratique de l’excision en offrant un soutien et des possibilités 
d’éducation et de formation aux exciseuses afin de les convertir à une autre 
profession. Une OSC sénégalaise a ainsi lancé un projet pilote en coopération 
avec le ministère des affaires de la Femme, de la Famille et de l'Enfance. Cette 
approche d’une « source alternative de revenus » aux exciseuses s’est toutefois 
avérée infructueuse au Sénégal. Les programmes de formation et de création de 
moyens de subsistance alternatifs en faveur des personnes se livrant à la 
pratique des MGF/E ne sont donc plus fournis dans ce pays. 
Ainsi, il existe des écarts importants entre le respect en droit et le respect en 
fait des normes juridiques du droit international au Sénégal. Le gouvernement 
sénégalais a, reconnaissons-le, déployé des efforts pour se conformer au cadre 
des droits de la personne, relatif à la pratique des mutilations génitales 
féminines ou de l’excision au Sénégal mais son degré de conformité demeure 
faible et beaucoup reste à faire dans ce domaine. Promulguer des lois et adopter 
des politiques n’est pas une fin mais un début. Il est clair que le Sénégal doit 
accélérer et multiplier ses efforts en vue de mettre en œuvre les instruments 
juridiques internationaux pour mettre fin aux MGF/E. Aucun pays au monde 
ne peut se targuer d'un bilan parfait en matière de droits de l'homme, ou de se 
conformer pleinement au cadre des droits de l'homme relatif à l’excision, mais il 
faut reconnaitre que le degré de conformité du Sénégal s’avère (très) limité. 
 
La quatrième partie (chapitre VI) porte sur les conclusions de la recherche. Elle 
formule une réponse à la question centrale de la conformité aux normes du 
droit international, qui indique qu’en dépit de ce que l’on a appelé les 
« pratiques exemplaires » du Sénégal, ayant été le premier pays à faire une série 
de déclarations publiques en faveur de l’abandon de la pratique de l’excision 
une analyse détaillée des EDS et des EGIM montre que la prévalence des 
MGF/E dans ce pays n’a pas diminué aussi rapidement qu’auraient pu espérer 
le programme conjoint UNFPA-UNICEF, le gouvernement sénégalais et les 
organisations de la société civile. La prévalence nationale des MGF/E chez les 
fillettes et les femmes en âge de procréer (de 15 à 49 ans) est restée assez 
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constante au cours de la dernière décennie. Elle n’a diminué que de 3,5% entre 
2005 et 2014 (de 28,2% en 2005 à 24,7% en 2014). 
Le chapitre VI indique qu'il n'y a pas de réponse claire à la «question de la 
conformité au droit» par rapport à la pratique de l'excision au Sénégal. Un 
certain nombre de facteurs agissent les uns sur les autres et se conjuguent dans 
un ensemble complexe pour expliquer pourquoi le Sénégal ne se conforme que 
partiellement ou pas du tout au cadre des droits de l’homme, relatif à la 
pratique des MGF/E. Ces facteurs comprennent notamment: i) le manque de 
capacités et de ressources nationales, ii) l'absence d’effet de dissuasion et le 
mépris des peines et des sanctions encourues, iii) la réputation; iv) 
l’intimidation et la coercition; v) les personnalités politiques; vi) la légitimité et 
l'équité; vii) la dimension temporelle; viii) les pressions exercées par des parties 
influentes et / ou des groupes d'intérêts nationaux. 
Le premier facteur réside dans le manque de ressources humaines, 
financières et matérielles dont souffre la Direction chargée de la Famille du 
Ministère de la Femme, de la Famille et de l'Enfance. Cette Direction est 
l'organe de coordination du gouvernement sénégalais dans les mesures prises 
en ce qui concerne la pratique des MGF/E. La faiblesse des moyens de la 
Direction chargée de la Famille, son manque d’appropriation des programmes 
et l’absence de coordination et de coopération (avec d'autres ministères, mais 
aussi avec d'autres acteurs concernés) contribuent au non-respect des normes 
juridiques du cadre des droits de l’homme, relatives à l’excision. Ce manque de 
capacités ne se pose pas qu’au niveau ministériel. Il touche également les 
institutions nationales des droits de l'homme (INDH). Les autorités sénégalaises 
ont mis en place un imposant cadre institutionnel formé de nombreuses INDH 
qui œuvrent à la promotion et à la protection des droits de l'homme, mais sans 
répartition clairement établie des tâches et sans coordination parmi elles. Le 
deuxième facteur repose sur l’absence d’effet dissuasif compte tenu du fait que 
les mécanismes de surveillance de l'ONU et de l'UA sont, dans une large 
mesure, impuissants à sanctionner le Sénégal lorsque cet État ne se conforme 
pas aux dispositions du cadre des droits de l'homme. Le troisième facteur 
important qui influe sur la «question de la conformité» concerne les 
préoccupations à l’égard de la réputation du Sénégal. Ce pays craint de porter 
atteinte à son image de marque car il s’agit d’un pays fier d'être une exception 
dans la région en ce qui concerne le niveau de démocratie et l'absence de coup 
d'Etat militaire. Le quatrième facteur réside dans les pressions qu’exercent la 
communauté internationale (ou les «États puissants») sur le Sénégal pour 
l’amener à mieux respecter le cadre des droits de l'homme. Le rôle des 
personnalités politiques constitue le cinquième facteur qui influe sur la question 
de la conformité. Les Présidents Léopold Sédar Senghor, Abdou Diouf et Ndèye 
Soukèye Gueye comptent parmi les personnalités dont on dit qu’ils ont 
influencé le processus de conformité de façon positive ou négative. Les 
questions de légitimité et d'équité qui jouent un rôle véritablement majeur au 
Sénégal constituent le sixième facteur. Les coutumes locales se sont souvent 
heurtées aux normes juridiques des droits de l'homme, ce qui a été clairement 
mis en évidence lors de l'adoption de la loi n ° 99-05 criminalisant les MGF/E 
en 1999. Le septième facteur à l’origine de la non-conformité au cadre des droits 
de l’homme, relatif à l’excision au Sénégal réside dans la dimension temporelle 
des changements socioéconomiques et politiques prévus par les traités 
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normatifs. Une "période de transition" aurait donné lieu à une meilleure 
application du cadre. Le huitième facteur  réside dans les pressions qu’exercent 
certaines parties et/ou groupes d'intérêt nationaux influents sur  le 
gouvernement sénégalais pour l’amener à se conformer ou non au cadre des 
droits de l’homme relatif à l’excision.  Les pressions et l'influence exercées à cet 
égard par les marabouts6 est un aspect important. Très souvent, la parole du 
Marabout a plus d’importance que la position du gouvernement ou que la 
législation nationale. Les Marabouts ont aussi une grande influence sur la 
pratique des MGF/E, qu’ils soutiennent et défendent pour des motifs religieux 
ou traditionnels. Lorsque la loi n ° 99-05 criminalisant l’excision a été débattue 
au Parlement, le Grand Marabout du Nord Sénégal, Thierno Mountaga Tall, 
avait prononcé une fatwa7 dans laquelle il avait cité un Hadith8 du prophète qui 
lui avait permis de présumer que l’excision était " un corollaire de la 
circoncision [...] et que les deux pratiques  étaient des éléments intrinsèques de 
la nature humaine." 9 En outre, les marabouts avaient exhorté les députés 
musulmans à voter contre le projet de loi. Les Marabouts ont joué un rôle 
influent non seulement lors de l'adoption de la loi, mais également dans 
l’examen des affaires pénales dont ils ont influencé l’issue. Les pressions et 
l’influence exercées par la société civile constituent, par ailleurs, un aspect 
important dans la «question de la conformité au droit» au Sénégal. La société 
civile sénégalaise est très puissante et ses organisations font entendre leur voix. 
Les OSC au Sénégal ont fait pression auprès du gouvernement pour qu’il ratifie 
les traités relatifs aux droits de l'homme. Plus concrètement, les militant(e)s et 
les OSC au Sénégal ont non seulement porté la question des MGF/E à 
l’attention du grand public dans les années 1990, mais sont également parvenus 
à faire adopter la loi nationale criminalisant la pratique de l’excision. Les OSC 
ont un rôle important à jouer dans la question de la conformité au droit, car ce 
sont elles qui font réellement "la plus grande partie du travail" en ce qui 
concerne les MGF/E au Sénégal. Selon un représentant de la société civile : «ce 
sont les ONG qui mettent en œuvre les programmes à la place de l'Etat au sein 
des communautés." Enfin, même si de nombreux chercheurs l’ont mentionné 
comme étant un facteur qui entrave la non- application des traités et 
conventions, l’ambiguïté ou le manque de clarté des dispositions de ces traités 
et conventions ne devrait pas avoir d'impact négatif au Sénégal car le 
gouvernement sénégalais sait exactement ce qui est attendu de lui en vue de 
l'élimination des MGF/E. Si les dispositions de la Convention sur l'élimination 
de toutes les formes de discrimination à l'égard des femmes (CEDAW) et de la 
Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant (CDE) sont de nature générale et sans 
doute un peu vague et imposent des obligations générales aux États, leur objet, 
                                                        
6 Un Marabout est un dignitaire musulman vénéré, qui enseigne le Coran en Afrique de l’Ouest. 
7 Une fatwa est un avis juridique donné par un spécialiste de loi islamique sur une question 
particulière 
8 Un Hadith est un recueil qui comprend l'ensemble des traditions relatives aux actes et aux paroles 
de Mahomet et de ses compagnons, considérées comme des principes de gouvernance personnelle 
et collective pour les musulmans. 
9 M. Ndoye, Le Processus de Pénalisation de l’Excision au Sénégal: Enjeux et Perspectives pour les Droits 
Sexuels des Femmes. Institut de Hautes Etudes et du Développement, Thèse de Doctorat No. 901, 
Genève, 2011, p. 134. 
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ainsi que les obligations découlant des traités juridiquement contraignants (et 
des recommandations issues des instruments juridiques non contraignants) ne 
peuvent  échapper au Sénégal. 
 
La propension du Sénégal à adhérer aux instruments internationaux et 
régionaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme ne signifie pas automatiquement que 
ce pays mettra sa législation et sa pratique des droits de l’homme en conformité 
avec ces instruments.   Devenir partie à un traité constitue une étape mais la 
reconnaissance des droits sur papier ne suffit pas à garantir que ces droits 
seront respectés en pratique. La présente étude montre qu’il existe un écart 
entre les engagements du Sénégal à se conformer au cadre des droits de 
l’homme et le comportement réel de ce pays par rapport à la pratique de la 
MGF/E. Aujourd'hui, plus d'un million de filles et de femmes au Sénégal vivent 
avec les conséquences de l’excision et des centaines de milliers d’autres courent 
le risque de subir cette pratique dans un proche avenir. Mais devons-nous dire 
pour autant que les engagements pris par le Sénégal en vue de l'élimination des 
MGF/E représentent de « vaines promesses »? La présente recherche montre 
que ce ne sont pas de vaines promesses mais qu’il s’agit d’un processus 
compliqué visant à susciter un changement réel pour sortir du statu quo. Mettre 
fin à la pratique persistante de l’excision au Sénégal est une tâche assez 
ambitieuse pour le gouvernement sénégalais, la société civile et les 
organisations internationales. L’élimination de cette pratique ne peut pas se 
faire du jour au lendemain10, et probablement pas en une génération. Il faut 
d’abord un changement dans les normes et les pratiques culturelles, les 
traditions, ainsi que dans les attitudes patriarcales et les stéréotypes 
profondément ancrés au niveau des rôles, des responsabilités et de l'identité des 
filles et des femmes au sein de la famille et de la société11. Toutefois, si les 
facteurs évoqués dans cette recherche sont pris en considération à l’avenir, le 
Sénégal sera probablement en mesure de faire en sorte que ses promesses 
deviennent une réalité durable, susceptible d’insuffler un changement positif 
pour les filles et les femmes qui risquent de subir la pratique des MGF/E. 
 
 
                                                        
10 E. Sepper, Confronting the “Sacret and Unchangeable”: The Obligation to Modify Cultural 
Patterns under the Women’s Discrimination Treaty, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Law, Volume 30, No. 2, 2008, p. 627. 
11 Comité des Nations Unies pour l’élimination de la discrimination à l’égard des femmes, 
observations finales sur la situation des femmes au Sénégal, CEDAW/C/SEN/CO/3-7, 28 juillet 2015, 
para. 18. 
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ANNEX I  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAP OF SENEGAL1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Source: S. Ndiaye and M. Ayad, Enquête Démographique et de Santé au Sénégal 2005, Centre de 
Recherche pour le Développement Humain [Sénégal] et ORC Macro, 2006.  
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LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED 
 
Government 
 
1. Coumba Ngom Thiam Ministry of the Family 
2. Soukeye Ndeye  Ministry of the Family 
3. Astou Diouf  Ministry of the Family 
4. Mamadou Ndoye Ministry of the Family 
5. Abdoulaye Ba Ministry of Justice 
6. Seyni Konte Diop Ministry of Health 
7. Yacine Fall Ndeye Ministry of Education 
8. Aminata Diallo Parlementarian (Réseau Parlementaire  
 pour la protection de l'enfant) 
9. Omar Ndoye  Association of European  
 Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA) 
10. Famara Sane Former Parliamentarian 
11. Abdoulaye Mar Senegalese Human Rights Committee  
12. Marieme Diop Consultative Council of Human Rights  
 
International Organizations 
 
13. Mamadou Wane UNICEF 
14. Daniela Luciani UNICEF 
15. Jean Lieby UNICEF 
16. Marie Sabara UNICEF 
17. Nafissatou J. Diop UNFPA 
18. Gallo Kebe UNFPA 
19. Michele Noussoessi Aguey OHCHR 
20. Andrea Ori OHCHR 
21. Aminata Kebe  OHCHR 
22. Marie Piere Chaupin Mangou UN Women 
23. Fatim Tall Thiam WHO  
24. Abdrahmane Diallo USAID 
 
Civil Society Organizations 
 
25. Molly Melching TOSTAN 
26. Kalidou Sy  TOSTAN 
27. Oumou Diop  TOSTAN 
28. Aminata Diop Gesellschaft für Internationale  
 
 
 
Annex II 
 
406 
 Zusammenarbeit  
29. Anta Fall  Save the Children  
30. Marietou Dia Action Aid International 
31. Astou Sylla African Women's Development and  
 Communication Network (FEMNET) 
32. Abdoulaye Ka Le Groupe pour l'Étude et l'Enseignement  
 de la Population (GEEP) 
33. Mariame Coulibaly Women in Law and Development in Africa 
 (WiLDAF) 
34. Magatte Sy Gaye Comité Sénégalais sur les Pratiques  
 Traditionnelles (COSEPRAT) 
35. Gabiel Sagna Comité Sénégalais sur les Pratiques  
 Traditionnelles (COSEPRAT) 
36. Moussa Mane Association Sénégalaise pour le Bien-Etre  
 Familial (ASBEF) 
37. Alioune Badara Diouf Association Sénégalaise pour le Bien-Etre  
 Familial (ASBEF) 
38. Yacine Diagne Association des Femmes de la Médina  
39. Fatou Ndiaye Turpin Réseau Siggil Jigéen 
40. Daouda Fall   La Palabre 
41. Birame Djiguene Ndoye La Palabre 
42. Fatou Deme Diouf Comité de Lutte Contre les Violences  
 faites aux Femmes et aux Enfants  
43. Fatou Biutou Thioune Comité de Lutte Contre les Violences  
 faites aux Femmes et aux Enfants  
44. Mahamed Diadhiou Formation et de Recherche en Santé de  
 la Reproduction (CEFOREP) 
45. Birahim Ndiaye Professor Université Cheikh Anta Diop  
46. Fatou Kiné Camara Professor Université Cheikh Anta Diop  
47. Khady Sarr Ndiaye Association des Juristes Sénégalais (AJS) 
48. Soukeyna Ndao Diallo Association des Juristes Sénégalais (AJS) 
49. Ousmane Samb Réseau Islam et Population (RIP) 
50. Abdoul Aziz Kebe Professor Université Cheikh Anta Diop  
51. Abdoul Aziz Kasse Association Prévenir 
52. Jeane Diaw Enda Graf Sahel 
53. Misha Hussain Journalist Thomson Reuters Foundation  
54. Sanou Ndeng Toure Social worker 
 
 
407 
ANNEX III  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Introduction. Professional/Personal Details 
 
1. What is your position? 
2. What are your main tasks and duties? 
 
 
Theme I. Ratification of Human Rights Treaties 
 
3. Has the Senegalese government ratified all human rights treaties, such as 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)? 
a. If so, why? 
b. If not, why not? 
 
Theme II. Cooperation with Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
 
4. Does the Senegalese government respect its legal obligation to submit 
periodic reports to the respective treaty monitoring bodies on how the 
human rights are being implemented? 
a. If so, why? 
b. If not, why not? 
 
Theme III. Criminalizing Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) 
 
5. Why has the law against FGM/C been adopted in 1999? 
6. Had the international (UN) and regional (AU) human rights framework 
any influence on the adoption of the law? 
a. If so, in what way? 
b. If not, why not? 
7. Does the general population in Senegal have knowledge about the 
existence of the law criminalizing FGM/C? 
a. If so, why? 
b. If not, why not? 
8. Has the national law against FGM/C a deterrent effect?  
a. If so, in what way? 
b. If not, why not?  
9. Is it important to have a national law against FGM/C? 
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a. If so, why? 
b. If not, why not? 
10. Is the law against FGM/C sufficiently implemented and enforced? 
a. If so, in what way? 
b. If not, should the law be better implemented and enforced? 
a. If so, how? 
b. If not, why not? 
11. Are mechanisms in place to monitor adherence and implementation of the 
law? 
a. If so, in what way? 
b. If not, why not?  
12. Is the number of court cases representative for the incidence of FGM/C in 
Senegal? 
a. If yes, why?  
b. If not, why not? 
13. Do you think that it is necessary to increase the number of court cases? 
a. If not, why not? 
b. If so, what is needed to increase the number of court cases? 
 
Theme IV. Policies and National Action Plans 
 
14. Which national policies have been adopted in the field of FGM/C? 
15. Why have these policies been adopted?  
16. Had the international (UN) and regional (AU) human rights framework 
any influence on the adoption of these policies? 
a. If so, in what way? 
b. If not, why not? 
17. What are the reasons for more emphasis on the human rights-based 
approach in the second National Action Plan? 
18. Are the policies well implemented? 
a. If so, in what way? 
b. If not, why not? 
19. Are there sufficient resources allocated towards the implementation of the 
policies? 
a. If so, in what way? 
b. If not, why not? 
20. Have all policies been successful? 
a. If so, how, on what topics? 
b. If not, why not? What could be improved? 
 
Theme V. Role of the Government 
 
21. What is the role of the government in the abandonment of FGM/C in 
Senegal? 
22. Is FGM/C a priority for the Senegalese government? 
a. If so, in what way? 
b. If not, why not? 
23. Are sufficient resources (including budgets) allocated towards the 
implementation of the legislative and policy frameworks? 
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a. If so, in what way? 
b. If not, why not? 
24. Are there any outreach activities to communities by government agencies? 
a. If so, what kind of activities? 
b. If not, why not? 
 
Theme VI. Role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
 
25. What is the role of CSOs in the abandonment of FGM/C in Senegal?  
26. How does the role of CSO’s working in the field of FGM/C relate to the 
work of the government?  
27. Does the government recognize the role the CSOs play in the 
abandonment of FGM/C and give the CSOs all necessary support and 
encouragement?  
a. If so, how (f.e. financially)? 
b. If not, why not?  
 
Theme VII. Role of UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme 
 
28. What is the role of the UNICEF-UNFPA Joint Programme in the 
abandonment of FGM/C in Senegal?  
 
Theme VIII. Data collection and Research 
 
29. Is basic data collected and disseminated about the prevalence, trends, 
attitudes and behaviour regarding FGM/C in Senegal, as well as reported 
cases and enforcement of legislation? 
a. If so, in what way? 
b. If not, why not? 
30. Is there a need for more research on FGM/C?  
a. If so, on which topics? 
b. If not, why not? 
 
Theme IX. Support Services 
 
31. Are medical, social and psychological support services available to assist 
and protect girls who have been subjected to FGM/C or those at risk of 
undergoing FGM/C? 
a. If so, which support services? 
b. If not, why not? 
 
Theme X. Training for Students and Professionals 
 
32. Is awareness of FGM/C integrated in the curricula of students? 
a. If so, why? 
b. If not, why not? 
33. Are health professionals (doctors, nurses, midwives, psychologists) trained 
to detect, manage and counsel FGM/C?  
a. If so, why? 
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b. If not, why not? 
34. Are trainings on FGM/C provided for the following other sectors: family 
services and child protection services, teachers and other school staff, legal 
professionals (judges, magistrates, lawyers), immigration officers and law 
enforcement professionals? 
a. If so, why? 
b. If not, why not? 
 
Theme XI. Training Programmes for Cutters 
 
35. Are training programmes for the cutters provided, in order for them to 
adopt an alternative profession?  
a. If so, why?  
b. If not, why not? 
 
Conclusion. Impact Human Rights Framework 
 
36. Do human rights have an impact on the abandonment of FGM/C in 
Senegal? Is it important that the international (UN) and regional (AU) 
human rights framework exist? 
a. If so, why?  
b. If not, why not? 
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LETTER OF CONSENT 
 
Université de Tilburg 
Institut international de Victimologie  
de Tilburg (INTERVICT) 
PO Box 90153 
5000 LE Tilburg 
Pays-Bas 
 
 
 
Formulaire d’information et d’autorisation des entretiens  
avec les parties concernés 
 
 
 
1. Contexte et justification 
 
Vous avez été invité(e) à participer à une étude sur «L’application effective ou non du système 
international des droits de l'homme en ce qui concerne l'éradication de la Mutilations Génitales 
Féminines/de l’Excision (MGF/E)  au Sénégal». Le but de cette étude est d'identifier les facteurs qui 
influent positivement et / ou négativement sur la conformité du système international des droits de 
l'homme par rapport aux MGF/E. Cette étude vise à contribuer à une meilleure compréhension de 
l'approche fondée sur les droits humains en ce qui concerne les MGF/E et la conformité de cette 
approche avec le système international des droits de l'homme. Notre recherche sera effectuée dans 
un pays: le Sénégal. Celle-ci se fera sous la direction du Professeur R.M. Letschert de l’Université de 
Tilburg, aux Pays-Bas en collaboration avec Madame M.J. (Annemarie) Middelburg LLM 
(PhD/doctorat et chercheur à INTERVICT). Cette dernière aura la charge de mener les entrevues au 
Sénégal. 
 
2. Procédures 
 
Avant que vous ne décidiez si vous souhaitez participer à cette étude ou non, nous voudrions vous 
fournir des informations supplémentaires concernant cette étude, les risques potentiels liés à votre 
participation et sur ce qu'on attend de vous lors d’une éventuelle participation. Si vous jugez être 
suffisamment informé(e) sur le but, le contenu de l’étude ; si vous décidez d’y participer, nous vous 
demanderons préalablement de signer le formulaire de consentement ou d’y apposer une petite 
croix (X) en présence d’un témoin (uniquement si vous êtes analphabète). 
 
Si vous acceptez de participer à cette étude, nous vous inviterons à l’entretien dans un endroit 
discret. L’entretien prendra à peu près une heure. Il sera enregistré et transcrit par la suite. A part 
vous-même, seul le chercheur et éventuellement un traducteur/interprète seront présents lors de 
l'entretien. 
 
Vous avez été invité(e) à l’entrevue en vertu de votre expérience. Vous pouvez refuser de répondre 
à certaines questions et vous pouvez vous retirer à chaque moment sans donner une justification 
préalable. La décision d’abandonner l’étude n’aura aucune influence sur la suite de vos relations 
avec le chercheur ou avec l’instance locale qui vous a contacté(e). 
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3. Confidentialité 
 
Vos données et vos réponses resteront confidentielles. Tous les enregistrements et toutes les 
transcriptions seront gardés en lieu sécurisé et fermé à l’intérieur d’un bâtiment de l’Université de 
Tilburg. Les seules personnes ayant accès à cette information sont les chercheurs impliqués dans 
cette étude. Les informations récoltées pendant l’étude seront rendues anonymes afin d’éviter toute 
possibilité d’identification. Vous avez le droit d’accéder à vos données aussi longtemps qu’elles 
n’aient pas été rendues anonymes. Pour cet effet vous pouvez contacter Annemarie Middelburg, la 
chercheuse principale de cette étude, qui s’occupera du traitement des données. 
 
4. Risques 
 
Nous ne prévoyons aucun risque lié à votre participation. Toutefois, il peut arriver  que vous 
divulguiez des informations strictement personnelles où que vous vous sentiez mal à l’aise à cause 
de la nature de certaines questions posées. Nous voulons éviter ce genre de situations. Vous avez le 
droit de ne pas répondre ou de passer sous silence certaines questions sensibles durant l’entretien. 
Vous pouvez également interrompre l’entretien à tout instant. Si vous estimez avoir besoin de 
soutien concernant certains thèmes traités lors de l’entretien, nous pourrions vous conseiller ou 
peut être même vous assister.  
 
5. Bénéfices 
 
Certes, cette étude n'a aucun bénéfice direct pour vous, mais votre participation nous aidera à en 
apprendre davantage sur l'impact du cadre international des droits de l’homme. Les données 
recueillies pourrons permettre de mieux comprendre en quoi les droits peuvent changer une 
pratique culturelle, ce qui peut conduire à des politiques et interventions plus efficaces. 
 
6. Compensation 
 
Votre participation à cette étude n’engendre aucun frais supplémentaire.  
 
7. Le droit de refuser ou de vous retirer de l’étude 
 
Votre participation à cette étude est complètement volontaire. Vous pouvez refuser d’y participer, 
de vous retirer à tout moment sans avoir besoin de justifier votre décision. La décision 
d’abandonner l’étude n’aura aucune influence sur la suite de vos relations avec le chercheur ou avec 
l’instance locale qui vous a contacté(e). 
 
8. Contact 
 
N’hésitez pas à contacter Annemarie Middelburg à l’Université de Tilburg pour des informations 
supplémentaires à propos de cette étude ou pour connaître vos droits et vos devoirs. Vous pouvez 
la joindre au numéro +221 7 77 13 63 70 (téléphone mobile) ou par courrier électronique 
m.j.middelburg@tilburguniversity.edu.  
 
 
FORMULAIRE D’AUTORISATION 
 
J’ai été invité(e) à participer à la recherche sur «L’application effective ou non du système 
international des droits de l'homme en ce qui concerne l'éradication de la Mutilations Génitales 
Féminines/de l’Excision (MGF/E) au Sénégal». J'ai lu l'information ci-dessus ou quelqu'un me l'a 
lue. J’ai eu l’occasion de poser des questions sur l’étude, j´ai été suffisamment élucidé. J’ai reçu des 
réponses adéquates. Je participe de mon plein gré à cette étude. Je comprends que j’ai le droit de me 
retirer de l’entretien à tout moment sans que cela n’influe sur mes rapports ultérieurs avec le 
chercheur et ou l’instance locale qui m’a contacté(e). J’atteste avoir reçu une copie de ce formulaire 
d’autorisation après signature. 
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Nom du participant     Date                             Signature du participant 
 
 
 
                                                       ___/___/___ (jour/mois/année)  
 
 
 
Si analphabète 
 
Nom du témoin indépendant        Date                                     Signature du témoin 
 
 
 
                                                       ___/___/___ (jour/mois/année)  
 
   
 
(si possible cette personne doit être choisie par le 
participant sans qu’il n’y ait de lien avec le groupe de 
recherche) 
 
Nom du chercheur     Date                                 Signature du chercheur 
 
 
 
                                                      ___/___/___ (jour/mois/année)  
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ANNEX V  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONFERENCE INVITATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INVITATION 
 
Présentation et discussion 
 
L’application effective ou non du système international des 
droits de l'homme en ce qui concerne l'éradication de 
l’excision au Sénégal 
 
 
 
Lundi 27 Janvier 
 
Programme 
 
15.30h :   Arrivée des invités 
 
16.00h – 17.00h :  Présentation des résultats préliminaires de la recherche 
 
17.00h – 18.00h :  Questions et discussion 
 
18.00h :   Réception 
 
 
Adresse : Residence des Pays-Bas à Dakar, Avenue des Ambassadeurs, Fann Residence 
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